HERNANDO, J.:[**]
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered directing the defendants and all persons deriving right from them, to vacate the real properties known as Lots 5, 7 and 9 of Block 73, Pound Street, Phase 8, North Fairview, Quezon City and for each of them to pay the plaintiffs the amount of PESOS: ONE THOUSAND (P1,000.00) as reasonable monthly rentals from January 2006 until they fully vacate the same plus the amount of P10,000.00 as attorney's fees.Aggrieved by the MeTC's Decision, Palajos filed an appeal which was given due course. The other defendants, namely, Veverlie Eguia, Dennis Villanueva, Shierra Toribio and Bong Fausto filed a motion to set aside the rendered judgment and/or suspension of proceedings which was denied.[12]
SO ORDERED.[11]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated September 21, 2007 of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 38, Quezon City is reversed and set aside and a new judgment is hereby entered dismissing the case for forcible entry against defendant-appellant Gorgonio P. Palajos.Unsatisfied, Manolo filed a petition with the CA.
SO ORDERED.[14]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated 28 August 2009 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 216, Quezon City, in Civil Case No. Q-09-64229 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated 21 September 2007 of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 38, Quezon City in Civil Case No. 06-35654, is hereby REINSTATED.Palajos moved for a reconsideration which the CA denied in its February 7, 2013 Resolution.[16]
SO ORDERED.[15]
Thus, the pivotal issue in this case is whether or not Manolo proved his prior physical possession of the subject property, which includes Lot No. 5, Block 73, to entitle him to recover in an ejectment suit of forcible entry.(1). THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT DID NOT CONSIDER THE OTHER FACTUAL CIRCUMSTANCES INDUBITABLY SHOWING THAT THE PETITIONER WAS AHEAD THAN THE RESPONDENT IN THE POSSESSION OF LOT 5, BLOCK 73, LOCATED AT POUND STREET, PHASE 8, NORTH FAIRVIEW, QUEZON CITY;(2). THE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT PETITIONER MADE A CLANDESTINE ENTRY IN THE PREMISES DESPITE TOTAL ABSENCE OF EVIDENCE TO SUBSTANTIATE THE SAME.[17]
SECTION 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. — Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession, together with damages and costs.There are two (2) kinds of ejectment suits, namely: (1) forcible entry; and (2) unlawful detainer, the differences of which may be summarized as follows:
Forcible Entry | Unlawful Detainer | |
Possession | The possession of the defendant or the intruder is illegal from the beginning because his/her possession of the property is against the will or without the consent of the plaintiff or the former possessor. Thus, plaintiff must allege in the complaint and prove that he/she was in prior physical possession of the property in litigation until he/she was deprived thereof by the defendant. | The possession is previously legal but eventually becomes unlawful upon the expiration of one's right to possess the property after, for instance, the termination or violation of a lease contract. Thus, the plaintiff need not have prior physical possession of the property. |
Demand to Vacate | No previous demand to vacate is required before the filing of the action. | Prior to the filing of the action, plaintiff must issue a demand to vacate to defendant, which the latter fails to comply. |
Prescriptive Period | In general, the one-year prescriptive period is reckoned from the date of actual entry on the property. However, if forcible entry is done through stealth, the period is counted from the time the plaintiff discovered the entry. | The one-year period in unlawful detainer is counted from the date of the last demand to vacate. |
Possession can be acquired by juridical acts. These are acts to which the law gives the force of acts of possession. Examples of these are donations, succession, execution and registration of public instruments, inscription of possessory information titles and the like. The reason for this exceptional rule is that possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of ground before it can be said that he is in possession. It is sufficient that petitioner was able to subject the property to the action of his will.[24] (Citations omitted)Furthermore, in Madayag v. Madayag,[25] We likewise pointed out that:
As correctly held by the RTC, thus, Patrick has sufficiently proven prior possession of the subject property by juridical act, specifically, through the issuance of a Certificate of Lot Award and subsequent sale of the subject property in his favor, and the registration thereof in the Torrens system in his name. As consistently held by the Court, if we are to disregard such juridical acts and unreasonably constrict the concept of prior possession to "physical occupation" in its rigid literal sense, then it will open floodgates of absurdity wherein land intruders will be favored under the law than Torrens title holders. Such intruders may then easily be favored in a summary procedure of ejectment by mere assertion of physical occupation. On the other hand, Torrens title holders would have to resort to the protracted litigation in an ordinary civil procedure by filing either an accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria, while the intruders, in the meantime, enjov the use of another man's land.[26] (Underscoring supplied)This Court finds that it is necessary to provisionally determine ownership of the subject property for purposes of determining prior possession. In the instant case, both the MeTC and the CA correctly found that Manolo and his siblings were able to establish that they are the registered owners of the subject property which they acquired from their parents in 1999.[27] Although they did not immediately put the same to active use, but viewed in the light of the foregoing juridical acts, Manolo had been occupying the land since 1999. On the other hand, Palajos claims that his right to enter Lot No. 5 of the subject property was by virtue of a May 4, 1988 Deed of Absolute Sale which B.C. Regalado & Co. executed in his favor.[28] However, We find that Palajos failed to substantially prove the same. We cite in agreement the following findings of the MeTC:
It is also worthwhile to note that, defendant Palajos' assertions are conflicting. In his Answer, he anchored his claim of prior physical possession on a Deed of Absolute Sale, which was executed in his favor in 1988 by B.C. Regalado & Co., Inc. In his Position Paper, however, he claimed that the subject premises is part of the Intestate Estate of the late Don Hermogenes and Antonio Rodriguez and that the administrator of the Estate assigned it to him on February 26, 1991 and on November 7, 2006, a Deed of Absolute Sale was executed in his favor by the administrator of the Estate. If his allegation that he acquired the subject property in 1988 through a Deed of Sale with B.C. Regalado were true, then there would [be] no need for him to acquire the same for P650,000.00 from the Estate of Don Hermogenes and Antonio Rodriguez.[29]With regard to the issue of prior physical possession, sometime in September or October 2001, Manolo and his siblings took actual possession of the subject property and constructed a concrete perimeter fence around it.[30] On the other hand, Palajos' evidence of alleged prior possession of Lot No. 5 of the subject property - such as payment of real property taxes on February 17, 2005 and January 21, 2006, or proofs of billing of his Bayantel telephone which he had installed in his residence in the year 2004, or that he was able to procure a COMELEC registration application of his son on October 24, 2003[31]- are incidents that occurred after Manolo took possession of the subject property. Thus, this Court finds that Manolo had prior physical possession of the subject property.