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HERNANDO, J.:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Review and Recommendation dated August 6, 1998 of Graft Investigation Officer Emora C. Pagunuran, and approved by Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto, dismissing the petitioner's complaint in OMB-0-90-2808, and the Order dated September 25, 1998 denying the petitioner's motion for reconsideration, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.Thereafter, respondents Concepcion[18] and Lobregat[19] filed their Manifestations seeking to set aside this Court's August 23, 2001 Decision on the ground of denial of due process as they were not notified of the petition filed by Republic before this Court. In addition, respondent Cojuangco, Jr. filed a Motion for Reconsideration of this Court's August 23, 2001 Decision.[20]
The Ombudsman is hereby directed to proceed with the preliminary investigation of the case OMB-0-90-2808.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.[17]
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court dated August 23, 2001 is SET ASIDE. The petitioner is DIRECTED to serve copies of the petition on the respondents who are directed to file their respective Comments on the petition within ten (10) days from said service. The motion for reconsideration of respondent Eduardo Cojuangco is MOOTED by the resolution of this Court.Thereafter, the Ombudsman and petitioner Republic filed their respective Motion for Reconsideration,[23] and Motion for Partial Reconsideration.[24] Subsequently, this Court issued a Resolution dated March 19, 2008 denying with finality the respective motions for lack of merit.[25]
SO ORDERED.[22]
a) To finance the establishment, operation and maintenance of a hybrid coconut seednut farm under such terms and conditions that may be negotiated by the National Investment and Development Corporation with any private person, corporation, firm or entity as would insure that the country shall have, at the earliest possible time, a proper, adequate and continuous supply of high yielding hybrid seednuts;"The CIDF was envisioned to finance a nationwide coconut-replanting program using 'precocious high-yielding hybrid seednuts' to be distributed for free to coconut farmers. Its initial capital of PHP 100,000,000.00 was to be paid from the Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund (CCSF), with an additional amount of at least P0.20 per kilogram of copra resecada out of the CCSF collected by the Philippine Coconut Authority."[34]
b) To purchase all of the seednuts produced by the hybrid coconut seednut farm which shall be distributed, for free, by the Authority to coconut farmers in accordance with, and in the manner prescribed in, the nationwide coconut replanting program that it shall devise and implement; Provided, That farmers who have been paying the levy herein authorized shall be given priority;
c) To finance the establishment, operation and maintenance of extension services, model plantations and other activities as would insure that the coconut farmers shall be informed of the proper methods of replanting their farms with the hybrid seednuts.
It appears, therefore, that the execution of the questioned contracts and substitution of the NIDC by the UCPB were given legislative imprimatur. The ratification of the question[ed] MOA, its amendments and supplements by P.D. Nos. 961 and 1468 was, at the very least, a declaration on the part of the government that the questioned contracts are, in fact, valid, legal and beneficial to the government and the Republic and that the act of the officers of the NIDC of entering into the questioned contracts were, in fact valid and legal. The said laws have not been repealed nor declared constitutional and, therefore, remain valid and effective to date. Respondents, are therefore, protected by the mantle of legality which all valid laws cast upon those who abide by them.Petitioner Republic filed its Motion for Reconsideration[63] on the following grounds: (a) the offense charged in the Complaint falls within the category of an ill-gotten wealth case, which under the Constitution is imprescriptible; and (b) void contracts are not subject to ratification and/or confirmation. However, the said motion was denied by GIO I Pagunuran in the Order dated September 25, 1998, which was approved by Ombudsman Desierto on October 9, 1998.[64]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that the complaint be, as it is hereby, dismissed.[62] (Emphasis supplied)
The PetitionI. WHETHER THE OMBUDSMAN ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DECLARING THAT THE OFFENSE CHARGED IN THE COMPLAINT FOR VIOLATION OF R.A. NO. 3019 HAD ALREADY PRESCRIBED WHEN THE COMPLAINT WAS FILED.II. WHETHER THE OMBUDSMAN ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DECLARING THAT THERE IS NO BASIS TO INDICT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS FOR VIOLATION OF THE ANTI-GRAFT LAW BASED ON THE CONTRACT IN QUESTION.[65]
ART. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. — Criminal liability is totally extinguished:In People v. Bayotas,[103] We explained the effects of the death of the accused pending appeal, to wit:
- By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment[.]
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his/[her] conviction extinguishes his/[her] criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his/[her] criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore."With the demise of respondents Eleazar, Jr., Orosa, Lobregat, and Cojuangco, Jr., their criminal liabilities and civil liability ex delicto are now extinguished. For the civil liability, which may be based on sources other than delict, the Republic may file a separate civil action against the estate of respondents Eleazar, Jr., Orosa, Lobregat, and Cojuangco, Jr. as may be warranted by law and procedural rules; or if already filed, the said separate civil action shall survive notwithstanding the dismissal of the criminal case in view of their deaths.
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission:a) Law3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) [x x x]
e) Quasi-delicts
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his/[her] right to file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription.[104]
Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. — x x xHowever, the above provision was already declared unconstitutional in Fabian v. Desierto[105] for expanding the Supreme Court's jurisdiction without its consent in violation of Art. VI, Sec. 30 of the Constitution, to wit:
x x x x
In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives, or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. (Emphasis supplied)
Taking all the foregoing circumstances in their true legal roles and effects, therefore, Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to this Court from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently violates the proscription in Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution against a law which increases the appellate jurisdiction of this Court. No countervailing argument has been cogently presented to justify such disregard of the constitutional prohibition which, as correctly explained in First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. vs. The Court of Appeals, et al., was intended to give this Court a measure of control over cases placed under its appellate jurisdiction. Otherwise, the indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate jurisdiction would unnecessarily burden the Court.[106] (Citations omitted)Also, Sec. 27 of RA 6770 only relates to administrative disciplinary cases.[107] It does not apply to appeals from Ombudsman's rulings in criminal cases,[108] nor to resolutions on preliminary investigations[109] such as the case at bar. In Nava v. Commission on Audit,[110] We declared that the remedy of an aggrieved party in such criminal case is an action for certiorari under Rule 65, to wit:
The remedy availed of by petitioner is erroneous. Instead of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, petitioner filed with this Court the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court pursuant to the provisions of Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770.In Tirol, Jr. v. Del Rosario,[112] We explained that although the law is silent as to the remedy of the aggrieved in criminal cases, the party is not without recourse as he or she can assail the Ombudsman's finding of probable cause in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 if the same is tainted with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, viz.:
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court provides that only judgments or final orders or resolutions of the Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court and other courts, whenever authorized by law, may be the subject of an appeal by certiorari to this Court. It does not include resolutions of the Ombudsman on preliminary investigations in criminal cases. Petitioner's reliance on Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770 is misplaced. Section 27 is involved only whenever an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 is taken from a decision in an administrative disciplinary action. It cannot be taken into account where an original action for certiorari under Rule 65 is resorted to as a remedy for judicial review, such as from an incident in a criminal action. In other words, the right to appeal is not granted to parties aggrieved by orders and decisions of the Ombudsman in criminal cases, like the case at bar. Such right is granted only from orders or decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative cases.
An aggrieved party is not left without any recourse. Where the findings of the Ombudsman as to the existence of probable cause is tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.[111] (Citations omitted, emphases and underscoring supplied)
Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770 provides that orders, directives and decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative cases are appealable to the Supreme Court via Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. However, in Fabian v. Desierto, we declared that Section 27 is unconstitutional since it expanded the Supreme Court's jurisdiction, without its advice and consent, in violation of Article VI, Section 30 of the Constitution. Hence, all appeals from decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases may be taken to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.Verily, petitioner Republic correctly availed of the remedy of petition for certiorari under Rule 65 when it assailed Ombudsman's August 6, 1998 Review and Recommendation and the September 25, 1998 Order which dismissed the complaint against respondents for violation of RA 3019. Petitioner Republic received a copy of the August 6, 1998 Review and Recommendation on August 28, 1998 and the September 25, 1998 Order on October 28, 1998.
True, the law is silent on the remedy of an aggrieved party in case the Ombudsman found sufficient cause to indict him in criminal or non-administrative cases. We cannot supply such deficiency if none has been provided in the law. We have held that the right to appeal is a mere statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by, and in accordance with, the provisions of law. Hence, there must be a law expressly granting such privilege. The Ombudsman Act specifically deals with the remedy of an aggrieved party from orders, directives and decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. As we ruled in Fabian, the aggrieved party is given the right to appeal to the Court of Appeals. Such right of appeal is not granted to parties aggrieved by orders and decisions of the Ombudsman in criminal cases, like finding probable cause to indict accused persons.
However, an aggrieved party is not without recourse where the finding of the Ombudsman as to the existence of probable cause is tainted with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. An aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.[113] (Citations omitted, emphases and underscoring supplied)
SEC. 4. Where and when petition to be filed. — The petition may be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution sought to be assailed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, and unless otherwise provided by law or these Rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.Applying the foregoing, petitioner Republic had until December 13, 1998 within which to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. However, it only filed the instant petition on December 28, 1998 or 15 days beyond the 60-day reglementary period. Patently, petitioner Republic's petition is filed out of time as per the above-quoted provision.
If the petitioner had filed a motion for new trial or reconsideration in due time after notice of said judgment, order or resolution, the period herein fixed shall be interrupted. If the motion is denied, the aggrieved party may file the petition within the remaining period, but which shall not be less than five (5) days in any event, reckoned from notice of such denial. No extension of time to file the petition shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and in no case to exceed fifteen (15) days. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
SECTION 4. When and where petition filed. — The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of said motion.Settled is the rule that statutes regulating the procedure of the courts are construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage [115] Since A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC relates to the mode of procedure, i.e., the reglementary period within which to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, it is applicable to pending cases at the time of its adoption.
The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by law or these rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.
No extension of time to file the petition shall be granted except for compelling reason and in no case exceeding fifteen (15) days. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Prefatorily, the petition should have been dismissed for late filing. Petitioner received a copy of the assailed resolution on 08 April 1999. A motion for reconsideration was filed by the PCGG on 12 April 1999. On 06 August 1999, it received a copy of the order denying its motion for reconsideration. Pursuant to Section 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition should have been filed on 02 October 1999; instead, the petition was only posted on 05 October 1999. During the pendency of this case, however, the Court promulgated A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC (Further Amending Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure), made effective on 01 September 2000, that provided:In Ark Travel Express Inc. v. Abrogar,[118] the Court upheld the retroactive application of A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC to pending cases before it, to wit:SECTION 4. When and where petition filed. — The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of said motion.In view of the retroactive application of procedural laws, the instant petition should now be considered timely filed.[117] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The issue raised in the present petition concerns the jurisdiction of the RTC in ordering the dismissal of the criminal cases pending before the MTC and therefore, the proper remedy is certiorari. As such, the present petition for certiorari ought to have been dismissed for late filing. The assailed Order dated October 2, 1998 was received by Ark Travel on October 16, 1998. Ark Travel filed the Motion for Reconsideration fourteen days later or on October 30, 1998. On November 27, 1998, Ark Travel received the Order of the denial of the Motion for Reconsideration. Pursuant to Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, then prevailing, the petition should have been filed on the forty-sixth day (60 days minus 14 days) from November 27, 1998 or on January 12, 1999, the last day of the 60-day reglementary period; instead, the petition was filed on January 26, 1999.Therefore, the retroactive application of A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC, specifically the 60-day period within which to file a petition for certiorari, which must be reckoned from the notice of the denial of a motion for reconsideration or new trial, shall also be applied to the present case. Thus, petitioner Republic had 60 days from receipt of the September 25, 1998 Order or until December 27, 1998 within which to file a petition. However, since December 27, 1998 is a Sunday, petitioner Republic's filing of its petition on December 28, 1998 is considered timely filed within the 60-day reglementary period.
However, during the [sic] pendency of herein petition, the Court promulgated A.M. No. 00-2-03, amending Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, effective September 1, 2000, to wit:SEC. 4. When and where petition filed. — The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of said motion.In which case, the filing of the petition on January 26, 1999 was filed on the 60th day from November 27, 1998, Ark Travel's date of receipt of notice of the order denying Ark Travel's motion for reconsideration.
We have consistently held that statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage — procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and to that extent. In view of such retroactive application of procedural laws the instant petition should be considered as timely filed.[119] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
SECTION 6. Order to Comment. — If the petition is sufficient in form and substance to justify such process, the court shall issue an order requiring the respondent or respondents to comment on the petition within ten (10) days from receipt of a copy thereof. Such order shall be served on the respondents in such manner as the court may direct, together with a copy of the petition and any annexes thereto.Section 2, Rule 56
In petitions for certiorari before the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, the provisions of Section 2, Rule 56, shall be observed. Before giving due course thereto, the court may require the respondents to file their comment to, and not a motion to dismiss, the petition. Thereafter, the court may require the filing of a reply and such other responsive or other pleadings as it may deem necessary and proper. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
SECTION 2. Rules Applicable. — The procedure in original cases for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto and habeas corpus shall be in accordance with the applicable provisions of the Constitution, laws, and Rules 46, 48, 49, 51, 52 and this Rule, subject to the following provisions:Sections 2, 3 and 4, Rule 46
SECTION 2. To What Actions Applicable. — This Rule shall apply to original actions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and quo warranto.Based on the above-quoted provisions, the petition must be accompanied by a proof of service to respondents. Failure to comply with said requirement shall be a sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition. The Court shall acquire jurisdiction over the person of the respondent upon service on him or her of its order or resolution indicating its initial action on the petition or by voluntary submission.
Except as otherwise provided, the actions for annulment of judgment shall be governed by Rule 47, for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus by Rule 65, and for quo warranto by Rule 66.
SECTION 3. Contents and Filing of Petition; Effect of Non-Compliance with Requirements. — The petition shall contain the full names and actual addresses of all the petitioners and respondents, a concise statement of the matters involved, the factual background of the case, and the grounds relied upon for the relief prayed for.
x x x x
It shall be filed in seven (7) clearly legible copies together with proof of service thereof on the respondent with the original copy intended for the court indicated as such by the petitioner, and shall be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or certified true copy of the judgment, order, resolution, or ruling subject thereof, such material portions of the record as are referred to therein, and other documents relevant or pertinent thereto. The certification shall be accomplished by the proper clerk of court or by his duly authorized representative, or by the proper officer of the court, tribunal, agency or office involved or by his duly authorized representative. The other requisite number of copies of the petition shall be accompanied by clearly legible plain copies of all documents attached to the original.
The petitioner shall also submit together with the petition a sworn certification that he has not theretofore commenced any other action involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency; if there is such other action or proceeding, he must state the status of the same; and if he should thereafter learn that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency, he undertakes to promptly inform the aforesaid courts and other tribunal or agency thereof within five (5) days therefrom.
The petitioner shall pay the corresponding docket and other lawful fees to the clerk of court and deposit the amount of P500.00 for costs at the time of the filing of the petition.
The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition.
SECTION 4. Jurisdiction Over Person of Respondent, How Acquired. —
The court shall acquire jurisdiction over the person of the respondent by the service on him/[her] of its order or resolution indicating its initial action on the petition or by his/[her] voluntary submission to such jurisdiction. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Aside from matters of life, liberty, honor or property which would warrant the suspension of the Rules of the most mandatory character and an examination and review by the appellate court of the lower court's findings of fact, the other elements that should be considered are the following: (a) the existence of special or compelling circumstances, (b) the merits of the case, (c) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules, (d) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (e) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.[122]In Ginete v. Court of Appeals,[123] We explained the rationale in the relaxation of the rules of procedure in case of justifiable instances, to wit:
Let it be emphasized that the rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed. Even the Rules of Court reflect this principle. The power to suspend or even disregard rules can be so pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which this Court itself has already declared to be final, as we are now constrained to do in instant case.Clearly, the present case pertains to the Ombudsman's investigation of respondents' purported violation of RA 3019 allegedly involving government funds and/or property. The Republic should not be faulted by the OSG's failure to timely serve copies of the petition to respondents Concepcion and Lobregat within the reglementary period. Besides, petitioner Republic provided justifiable reason for its failure to comply with the procedural requirements in filing the instant petition. Also, to deny Republic's privilege to question the assailed OMB's August 6, 1998 Review and Recommendation and the September 25, 1998 Order would frustrate, rather than promote, substantial justice, especially when the case involves purportedly public funds and/or property. Hence, considering the existence of special or compelling circumstance, the technical rules of procedure may be relaxed in this case in order to serve the demands of substantial justice.
Thus, this court is not averse to suspending its own rules in the pursuit of the ends of justice. "[x x x] For when the operation of the Rules will lead to an injustice we have, in justifiable instances, resorted to this extraordinary remedy to prevent it. The rules have been drafted with the primary objective of enhancing fair trials and expediting justice. As a corollary, if their application and operation tend to subvert and defeat, instead of promote and enhance it, their suspension is justified. In the words of Justice Antonio P. Barredo in his concurring opinion in Estrada v. Sto. Domingo, "(T)his Court, through the revered and eminent Mr. Justice Abad Santos, found occasion in the case of C. Viuda de Ordoveza v. Raymundo, to lay down for recognition in this jurisdiction, the sound rule in the administration of justice holding that 'it is always in the power of the court (Supreme Court) to suspend its own rules or to except a particular case from its operation, whenever the purposes of justice require it [x x x]"
The Rules of Court were conceived and promulgated to set forth guidelines in the dispensation of justice but not to bind and chain the hand that dispenses it, for otherwise, courts will be mere slaves to or robots of technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion. That is precisely why courts, in rendering justice have always been, as they in fact ought to be, conscientiously guided by the norm that on the balance, technicalities take a backseat to substantive rights, and not the other way around. As applied to instant case, in the language of Justice Makalintal, technicalities "should give way to the realities of the situation."[124]
SECTION 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceeding for investigation and punishment.As elucidated in Del Rosario v. People,[136] as a general rule, "the fact that any aggrieved person entitled to an action has no knowledge of his/[her] right to sue or of the facts out of which his/[her] right arises does not prevent the running of the prescriptive period."[137] On the other hand, the blameless ignorance rule provides that "the statute of limitations runs only upon discovery of the fact of the invasion of a right which will support a cause of action."[138]
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed tor reasons not constituting jeopardy. (Emphasis supplied)
The first mode being self-explanatory, We proceed with Our construction of the second mode.Applying the foregoing principles and based on Our judicious review of the records, We are convinced that the exception on the date of discovery or the blameless ignorance doctrine applies to the case at bar.
In interpreting the meaning of the phrase "if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceeding for its investigation," this Court has, as early as 1992 in People v. Duque, held that in cases where the illegality of the activity is not known to the complainant at the time of its commission, Act No. 3326, Section 2 requires that prescription, in such a case, would begin to run only from the discovery thereof, i.e., discovery of the unlawful nature of the constitutive act or acts.
It is also in Duque where this Court espoused the raison d'être for the second mode. We said, "[i]n the nature of things, acts made criminal by special laws are frequently not immoral or obviously criminal in themselves; for this reason, the applicable statute requires that if the violation of the special law is not known at the time, the prescription begins to run only from the discovery thereof, i.e., discovery of the unlawful nature of the constitutive act or acts."
Further clarifying the meaning of the second mode, the Court, in Duque, held that Section 2 should be read as "[p]rescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and until the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment." Explaining the reason therefor, this Court held that a contrary interpretation would create the absurd situation where "the prescription period would both begin and be interrupted by the same occurrence; the net effect would be that the prescription period would not have effectively begun, having been rendered academic by the simultaneous interruption of that same period." Additionally, this interpretation is consistent with the second paragraph of the same provision which states that "prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, [and shall] begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy."
Applying the same principle, We have consistently held in a number of cases, some of which likewise involve behest loans contracted during the Marcos regime, that the prescriptive period for the crimes therein involved generally commences from the discovery thereof, and not on the date of its actual commission.
In the 1999 and 2011 cases of Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto, the Court, in said separate instances, reversed the ruling of the Ombudsman that the prescriptive period therein began to run at the time the behest loans were transacted and instead, it should be counted from the date of the discovery thereof.
In the 1999 case, We recognized the impossibility for the State, the aggrieved party, to have known the violation of RA 3019 at the time the questioned transactions were made in view of the fact that the public officials concerned connived or conspired with the "beneficiaries of the loans." There, We agreed with the contention of the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee that the prescriptive period should be computed from the discovery of the commission thereof and not from the day of such commission. It was also in the same case where We clarified that the phrase "if the same be not known" in Section 2 of Act No. 3326 does not mean "lack of knowledge" but that the crime "is not reasonably knowable" is unacceptable. Furthermore, in this 1999 case, We intimated that the determination of the date of the discovery of the offense is a question of fact which necessitates the reception of evidence for its determination.
Similarly, in the 2011 Desierto case, We ruled that the "blameless ignorance" doctrine applies considering that the plaintiff therein had no reasonable means of knowing the existence of a cause of action. In this particular instance, We pinned the running of the prescriptive period to the completion by the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee of an exhaustive investigation on the loans. We elucidated that the first mode under Section 2 of Act No. 3326 would not apply since during the Marcos regime, no person would have dared to question the legality of these transactions.
Prior to the 2011 Desierto case came Our 2006 Resolution in Romualdez v. Marcelo, which involved a violation of Section 7 of RA 3019. In resolving the issue of whether or not the offenses charged in the said cases have already prescribed, We applied the same principle enunciated in Duque and ruled that the prescriptive period for the offenses therein committed began to run from the discovery thereof on the day former Solicitor General Francisco I. Chavez filed the complaint with the PCGG.
This was reiterated in Disini v. Sandiganbayan where We counted the running of the prescriptive period in said case from the date of discovery of the violation after the PCGG's exhaustive investigation despite the highly publicized and well-known nature of the Philippine Nuclear Power Plant Project therein involved, recognizing the fact that the discovery of the crime necessitated the prior exhaustive investigation and completion thereof by the PCGG.
In Republic v. Cojuangco, Jr., however, We held that not all violations of RA 3019 require the application of the second mode for computing the prescription of the offense. There, this Court held that the second element for the second mode to apply, i.e., that the action could not have been instituted during the prescriptive period because of martial law, is absent. This is so since information about the questioned investment therein was not suppressed from the discerning eye of the public nor has the Office of the Solicitor General made any allegation to that effect. This Court likewise faulted therein petitioner for having remained dormant during the remainder of the period of prescription despite knowing of the investment for a sufficiently long period of time.
An evaluation of the foregoing jurisprudence on the matter reveals the following guidelines in the determination of the reckoning point for the period of prescription of violations of RA 3019, viz.:1. As a general rule, prescription begins to run from the date of the commission of the offense.
2. If the date of the commission of the violation is not known, it shall be counted form the date of discovery thereof.
3. In determining whether it is the general rule or the exception that should apply in a particular case, the availability or suppression of the information relative to the crime should first be determined.
If the necessary information, data, or records based on which the crime could be discovered is readily available to the public, the general rule applies. Prescription shall, therefore, run from the date of the commission of the crime.
Otherwise, should martial law prevent the filing thereof or should information about the violation be suppressed, possibly through connivance, then the exception applies and the period of prescription shall be reckoned from the date of discovery thereof.[140] (Emphasis supplied)
(i) | The Republic could not have questioned the MOA because it was given legislative imprimatur. |
| (ii) | There were material subsequent events that transpired after the execution of the MOA, but prior to the filing of the Complaint. |
| (iii) | The Complaint is replete with allegations of conspiracy and connivance. |
There are striking parallelisms between the said Behest Loans Case and the present one which lead us to apply the ruling of the former to the latter. First, both cases arouse out of seemingly innocent business transactions; second, both were "discovered" only after the government created bodies to investigate these anomalous transactions; third, both involve prosecutions for violations of R.A. No. 3019; and, fourth, in both cases, it was sufficiently raised in the pleadings that the respondents conspired and connived with one another in order to keep the alleged violations hidden from public scrutiny.Taken in its entirety and in view of the unique circumstance of this case, We declare that the reckoning point of the prescriptive period should be from the promulgation of the 1986 Freedom Constitution, which mandated the President to: (a) recover ill-gotten properties amassed by the leaders and supporters of the previous regime and protect the interest of the people through orders of sequestration or freezing of assets of accounts; and (b) eradicate graft and corruption in government and punish those guilty thereof, among others. Only then will the Republic have had the opportune time to discover any alleged acts or violations which would prompt the filing of a necessary action against the culprits.
x x x x
R.A. No. 3019, as applied to the instant case, covers not only the alleged one-sidedness of the MOA, but also as to whether the contracts or transactions entered pursuant thereto by private respondents were manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government, whether they caused undue injury to the government, and whether the private respondents were interested for personal gain or had material interests in the transactions.
The task to determine and find whether probable cause to charge private respondents exists properly belongs to the Ombudsman. We only rule that the Office of the Ombudsman should not have dismissed the complaint on the basis of prescription which is erroneous as hereinabove discussed. The Ombudsman should have given the Solicitor General the opportunity to present his evidence and then resolve the case for purposes of preliminary investigation. Failing to do so, the Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion.[152] (Emphasis supplied)
SEC. 2. Prescription shall begin to ran from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.In Perez v. Sandiganbayan[153] (Perez) citing People v. Pangilinan[154] (Pangilinan), We declared that "prescription is interrupted when the preliminary investigation against the accused is commenced," to wit:
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Prescription is interrupted when the preliminary investigation against the accused is commenced. In People v. Pangilinan, the Court held as follows:In Panaguiton, Jr. v. Department of Justice[156] (Panaguiton), the Court explained the rationale for the rule that prescription is interrupted by the commencement of the preliminary investigation, to wit:x x x There is no more distinction between cases under the RPC and those covered by special laws with respect to the interruption of the period of prescription. The ruling in Zaldivia v. Reyes. Jr. is not controlling in special laws. In Llenes v. Dicdican, Ingco, et al. v. Sandiganbayan, Brillante v. CA, and Sanrio Company Limited v. Lim, cases involving special laws, this Court held that the institution of proceedings for preliminary investigation against the accused interrupts the period of prescription. In Securities and Exchange Commission v. Interport Resources Corporation, et al., the Court even ruled that investigations conducted by the Securities and Exchange Commission for violations of the Revised Securities Act and the Securities Regulation Code effectively interrupts the prescription period because it is equivalent to the preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ in criminal cases.
In fact, in the case of Panaguiton, Jr. v. Department of Justice, which is [on] all fours with the instant case, this Court categorically ruled that commencement of the proceedings for the prosecution of the accused before the Office of the City Prosecutor effectively interrupted the prescriptive period for the offenses they had been charged under BP Big. 22. Aggrieved parties, especially those who do not sleep on their rights and actively pursue their causes, should not be allowed to suffer unnecessarily further simply because of circumstances beyond their control, like the accused's delaying tactics or the delay and inefficiency of the investigating agencies.[155] (Emphasis in the original)
It must be pointed out that when Act No. 3326 was passed on 4 December 1926, preliminary investigation of criminal offenses was conducted by justices of the peace, thus, the phraseology in the law, "institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment", and the prevailing rule at the time was that once a complaint is filed with the justice of the peace for preliminary investigation, the prescription of the offense is halted.Panaguiton further held that to rule that the running of the prescriptive period is interrupted only through the institution of judicial proceedings would deprive the injured party of his "right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not under his control."[158] An aggrieved party who actively pursues his or her cause should not be allowed to suffer unnecessarily simply because of accused's delaying tactics or delay, and inefficiency of the investigating agencies.[159]
The historical perspective on the application of Act No. 3326 is illuminating. Act No. 3226 was approved on 4 December 1926 at a time when the function of conducting the preliminary investigation of criminal offenses was vested in the justices of the peace. Thus, the prevailing rule at the time as shown in the cases of U.S. v. Lazada and People v. Joson is that the prescription of the offense is tolled once a complaint is filed with the justice of the peace for preliminary investigation inasmuch as the filing of the complaint signifies the institution of the criminal proceedings against the accused. These cases were followed by our declaration in People v. Parao and Parao that the first step taken in the investigation or examination of offenses partakes the nature of a judicial proceeding which suspends the prescription of the offense. Subsequently, in People v. Olarte, we held that the filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court, even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary examination or investigation, should, and does, interrupt the period of prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed cannot try the case on the merits. In addition, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed may only proceed to investigate the case, its actuations already represent the initial step of the proceedings against the offender, and hence, the prescriptive period should be interrupted.
In Ingco v. Sandiganbayan and Sanrio Company Limited v. Lim, which involved violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019) and the Intellectual Property Code (R.A. No. 8293), which are both special laws, the Court ruled that the prescriptive period is interrupted by the institution of proceedings for preliminary investigation against the accused. In the more recent case of Securities and Exchange Commission v. Inter port Resources Corporation, et al., the Court ruled that the nature and purpose of the investigation conducted by the Securities and Exchange Commission on violations of the Revised Securities Act, another special law, is equivalent to the preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ in criminal cases, and thus effectively interrupts the prescriptive period.[157]
The doctrine in the Panaguiton case was subsequently affirmed in People v. Pangilinan. In this case, the affidavit-complaint for estafa and violation of B.P. Blg. 22 against the respondent was filed before the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Quezon City on September 16, 1997. The complaint stems from respondent's issuance of nine (9) checks in favor of private complainant which were dishonored upon presentment and refusal of the former to heed the latter's notice of dishonor which was made sometime in the latter part of 1995. On February 3, 2000, a complaint for violation of BP Blg. 22 against the respondent was filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City, after the Secretary of Justice reversed the recommendation of the OCP of Quezon City approving the "Petition to Suspend Proceedings on the Ground of Prejudicial Question" filed by the respondent on the basis of the pendency of a civil case for accounting, recovery of commercial documents and specific performance which she earlier filed before the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela City. The issue of prescription reached this Court after the Court of Appeals (CA), citing Section 2 of Act 3326, sustained respondent's position that the complaint against her for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 had prescribed.It is worth noting that the offense in Panaguiton, i.e., violation of BP 22, was committed in 1993 when BP 22 was not yet covered by the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure. In 2003, the Supreme Court, through A.M. No. 00-11-01-SC,[167] amended the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure to include within its scope violations of BP 22. Thus, revisiting the rule on the interruption of prescriptive period with respect to special laws and those offenses covered by summary procedure is therefore in order.
In reversing the CA's decision, We emphatically ruled that "(t)here is no more distinction between cases under the RPC (Revised Penal Code) and those covered by special laws with respect to the interruption of the period of prescription" and reiterated that the period of prescription is interrupted by the filing of the complaint before the fiscal's office for purposes of preliminary investigation against the accused.
In the case at bar, it was clear that the filing of the complaint against the respondent with the Office of the Ombudsman on April 1, 2014 effectively tolled the running of the period of prescription. Thus, the filing of the Information before the Sandiganbayan on March 21, 2017, for unlawful acts allegedly committed on February 14, 2013 to March 20, 2014, is well within the three (3)-year prescriptive period of R.A. No. 7877. The court a quo's reliance on the case of Jadewell v. Judge Nelson Lidua, Sr., is misplaced. Jadewell presents a different factual milieu as the issue involved therein was the prescriptive period for violation of a city ordinance, unlike here as well as in the Pangilinan and other above-mentioned related cases, where the issue refers to prescription of actions pertaining to violation of a special law. For sure, Jadewell did not abandon the doctrine in Pangilinan as the former even acknowledged existing jurisprudence which holds that the filing of complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor tolls the running of the prescriptive period.[166]
SECTION 11. How Commenced. — The filing of criminal cases falling within the scope of this Rule shall be either by complaint or by information: Provided, however, that in Metropolitan Manila and in Chartered Cities, such cases shall be commenced only by information, except when the offense cannot be prosecuted de oficio.Patently, the phrase "without need of a prior preliminary examination or preliminary investigation" found in Sec. 9 of the 1983 Rules on Summary Procedure is now deleted in the above-quoted provision. Jadewell declared that "[a]s provided in the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, only the filing of an Information tolls the prescriptive period where the crime charged is involved in an ordinance."[168] Notably, the offense involved in Jadewell is a violation of city ordinance which, as provided in the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, is commenced only by information except when the offense cannot be prosecuted de oficio.
The complaint or information shall be accompanied by the affidavits of the complainant and of his witnesses in such number of copies as there are accused plus two (2) copies for the court's files. If this requirement is not complied with within five (5) days from date of filing, the case may be dismissed. (Emphasis supplied)
SECTION 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. — The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions and duties:In Presidential Ad Hoc Committee on Behest Loans v. Tabasondra,[169] the Court explained the rationale behind the Court's non-interference with the Ombudsman's investigatory and prosecutorial powers, to wit:(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of such cases;The Ombudsman shall give priority to complaints filed against high ranking government officials and/or those occupying supervisory positions, complaints involving grave offenses as well as complaints involving large sums of money and/or properties. (Emphasis supplied)
(2) Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any officer or employee of the Government, or of any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, as well as any government-owned or controlled corporations with original charter, to perform and expedite any act or duty required by law, or to stop, prevent, and correct any abuse or impropriety in the performance of duties;
(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public officer or employee at fault or who neglect to perform an act or discharge a duty required by law, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith; or enforce its disciplinary authority as provided in Section 21 of this Act: Provided, That the refusal by any officer without just cause to comply with an order of the Ombudsman to remove, suspend, demote, fine, censure, or prosecute an officer or employee who is at fault or who neglects to perform an act or discharge a duty required by law shall be a ground for disciplinary action against said officer;
(4) Direct the officer concerned, in any appropriate case, and subject to such limitations as it may provide in its rules of procedure, to furnish it with copies of documents relating to contracts or transactions entered into by his/[her] office involving the disbursement or use of public funds or properties, and report any irregularity to the Commission on Audit for appropriate action;
(5) Request any government agency for assistance and information necessary in the discharge of its responsibilities, and to examine, if necessary, pertinent records and documents;
(6) Publicize matters covered by its investigation of the matters mentioned in paragraphs (1), (2), (3) and (4) hereof, when circumstances so warrant and with due prudence: Provided, That the Ombudsman under its rules and regulations may determine what cases may not be made public: Provided, further, That any publicity issued by the Ombudsman shall be balanced, fair and true;
(7) Determine the causes of inefficiency, red tape, mismanagement, fraud, and corruption in the Government, and make recommendations for their elimination and the observance of high standards of ethics and efficiency;
(8) Administer oaths, issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum, and take testimony in any investigation or inquiry, including the power to examine and have access to bank accounts and records;
(9) Punish for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court and under the same procedure and with the same penalties provided therein;
(10) Delegate to the Deputies, or its investigators or representatives such authority or duty as shall ensure the effective exercise or performance of the powers, functions, and duties herein or hereinafter provided;
(11) Investigate and initiate the proper action for the recovery of ill-gotten and/or unexplained wealth amassed after February 25, 1986 and the prosecution of the parties involved therein.
The Ombudsman has the power to investigate and prosecute any act or omission of a public officer or employee when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. In fact, the Ombudsman has the power to dismiss a complaint without going through a preliminary investigation, since he/[she] is the proper adjudicator of the question as to the existence of a case warranting the filing of information in court. The Ombudsman has discretion to determine whether a criminal case, given its facts and circumstances, should be filed or not. This is basically his/[her] prerogative.It is worth noting that the instant petition is elevated before this Court via Rule 65 to determine whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction when it dismissed Republic's Complaint against respondents based on prescription of offense. To reiterate, the Court generally does not interfere with the Office of Ombudsman in its duty of finding the existence of probable cause nor its decision to dismiss the complaint without undergoing preliminary investigation as in the case at bar which was dismissed by reason of prescription of offense. An exception would be a finding of grave abuse of discretion.
In recognition of this power, the Court has been consistent not to interfere with the Ombudsman's exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory powers.
Various cases held that it is beyond the ambit of this Court to review the exercise of discretion of the Office of the Ombudsman in prosecuting or dismissing a complaint filed before it. Such initiative and independence are inherent in the Ombudsman who, beholden to no one, acts as the champion of the people and preserver of the integrity of the public service.
The rationale underlying the Court's ruling has been explained in numerous cases. The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, the functions of the courts will be grievously hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it, in much the same way that the courts would be extremely swamped if they would he compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the part of the fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to file an information in court or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant. In order to insulate the Office of the Ombudsman from outside pressure and improper influence, the Constitution as well as Republic Act No. 6770 saw fit to endow that office with a wide latitude of investigatory and prosecutory powers, virtually free from legislative, executive or judicial intervention. If the Ombudsman, using professional judgment, finds the case dismissible, the Court shall respect such findings unless they are tainted with grave abuse of discretion.[170] (Emphasis supplied)
Section 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.Furthermore, Sec. 12, Art. XI of the Constitution requires the Ombudsman to act promptly on all complaints filed before it:
Section 12. The Ombudsman and his[/her] Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or employees of the Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations, and shall, in appropriate cases, notify the complainants of the action taken and the result thereof.Also, Sec. 13 of RA 6770 mandates the Ombudsman to:
Section 13. Mandate. — The Ombudsman and his[/her] Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against officers or employees of the government, or of any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations, and enforce their administrative, civil and criminal liability in every case where the evidence warrants in order to promote efficient service by the Government to the people.In Cagang v. Sandiganbayan[177] (Cagang), there was inordinate delay by the Sandiganbayan in the resolution and termination of preliminary investigation. The Court laid down the guidelines to resolve issues involving the right to speedy disposition of cases, to wit:
First, the right to speedy disposition of cases is different from the right to speedy trial. While the rationale for both rights is the same, the right to speedy trial may only be invoked in criminal prosecutions against courts of law. The right to speedy disposition of cases, however, may be invoked before any tribunal, whether judicial or quasi-judicial. What is important is that the accused may already be prejudiced by the proceeding for the right to speedy disposition of cases to be invoked.We apply Cagang to the case at bar. The Court finds that respondents Concepcion, Dela Cuesta, Enrile, Ursua, and Pineda's constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases was violated by the Ombudsman through the inordinate delay in concluding the preliminary investigation.
Second, a case is deemed initiated upon the filing of a formal complaint prior to a conduct of a preliminary investigation. This Court acknowledges, however, that the Ombudsman should set reasonable periods for preliminary investigation, with due regard to the complexities and nuances of each case. Delays beyond this period will be taken against the prosecution. The period taken for fact-finding investigations prior to the filing of the formal complaint shall not be included in the determination of whether there has been inordinate delay.
Third, courts must first determine which party carries the burden of proof. If the right is invoked within the given time periods contained in current Supreme Court resolutions and circulars, and the time periods that will be promulgated by the Office of the Ombudsman, the defense has the burden of proving that the right was justifiably invoked. If the delay occurs beyond the given time period and the right is invoked, the prosecution has the burden of justifying the delay.
If the defense has the burden of proof, it must prove first, whether the case is motivated by malice or clearly only politically motivated and is attended by utter lack of evidence, and second, that the defense did not contribute to the delay.
Once the burden of proof shifts to the prosecution, the prosecution must prove first, that it followed the prescribed procedure in the conduct of preliminary investigation and in the prosecution of the case; second, that the complexity of the issues and the volume of evidence made the delay inevitable; and third, that no prejudice was suffered by the accused as a result of the delay.
Fourth, determination of the length of delay is never mechanical. Courts must consider the entire context of the case, from the amount of evidence to be weighed to the simplicity or complexity of the issues raised.
An exception to this rule is if there is an allegation that the prosecution of the case was solely motivated by malice, such as when the case is politically motivated or when there is continued prosecution despite utter lack of evidence. Malicious intent may be gauged from the behavior of the prosecution throughout the proceedings. If malicious prosecution is properly alleged and substantially proven, the case would automatically be dismissed without need of further analysis of the delay.
Another exception would be the waiver of the accused to the right to speedy disposition of cases or the right to speedy trial. If it can be proven that the accused acquiesced to the delay, the constitutional right can no longer be invoked.
In all cases of dismissals due to inordinate delay, the causes of the delays must be properly laid out and discussed by the relevant court.
Fifth, the right to speedy disposition of cases or the right to speedy trial must be timely raised. The respondent or the accused must file the appropriate motion upon the lapse of the statutory or procedural periods. Otherwise, they are deemed to have waived their right to speedy disposition of cases.[178] (Emphasis supplied)
| February 12, 1990 | Complaint filed by the Republic, through the OSG, before the PCGG against respondents Cojuangco, Jr., Enrile, Lobregat, Dela Cuesta, Eleazar, Jr., Concepcion, Ursua, Pineda, and Orosa for violation of RA 3019 |
| December 29, 1997 | GIO Manuel J. Tablada recommended the dismissal of the case, which was subsequently transferred to GIO I Pagunuran[179] |
| August 6, 1998 | GIO I Pagunuran issued a Review and Recommendation recommending the dismissal of the Complaint on the ground of prescription of offense |
| August 14, 1998 | Ombudsman Desierto approved GIO I Pagunuran's Review and Recommendation dated August 6, 1998 |
| September 11, 1998 | Republic, through OSG, filed its Motion for Reconsideration from the Review and Recommendation dated August 6, 1998[180] |
| September 25, 1998 | GIO I Pagunuran denied the Republic's Motion for Reconsideration |
| October 9, 1998 | Ombudsman Desierto approved the Order dated September 25, 1998, which denied Republic's motion for reconsideration |
In the absence of specific time periods in the Rules of the Ombudsman, Javier and Catamco thus applied Section 3, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides that the investigating prosecutor has 10 days after the investigation to determine whether there is sufficient ground to hold the respondent for trial. This 10-day period may appear short or unreasonable from an administrative standpoint. However, as held in Alarilla v. Sandiganbayan (Alarilla), given the Court's duty to balance the right of the State to prosecute violations of its law vis-à-vis the rights of citizens to speedy disposition of cases, the citizens ought not to be prejudiced by the Ombudsman's failure to provide for particular time periods in its own Rules of Procedure.We reproduce the relevant portions of Administrative Order No. (A.O.) 1, series of 2020[191] on the applicable time periods:
Soon after the promulgation of Javier and Catamco, the Ombudsman issued Administrative Order No. (A.O.) 1 series of 2020 which specified the time periods in conducting its investigations.
For fact-finding Investigations, A.O. 1 provides that "[u]nless otherwise provided for in a separate issuance, such as an Office Order creating a special panel of investigators and prescribing therein the period for the completion of an investigation, the period for completion of the investigation shall not exceed six (6) months for simple cases and twelve (12) months for complex cases" subject to considerations on the complexity of the case and the possibility of requesting for extension on justifiable reasons, which shall not exceed one year. Notably, the factfinding investigation in this case arguably spanned 10 years, or from October 2003 until November 2013 when the Complaint was filed before the Ombudsman, which is clearly beyond the period provided in A.O. 1. Nevertheless, the Court is constrained to disregard this apparent delay following the prevailing doctrine in Cagang that the period taken for fact-finding investigations prior to the filing of the formal complaint shall not be included in the determination of whether there has been inordinate delay.[190]
Section 7. Commencement of Preliminary Investigation. -Without prejudice to the Procedure in Criminal Cases prescribed under Rule II of Administrative Order No. 07, as amended, a preliminary investigation is deemed to commence whenever a verified complaint, grievance or request for assistance is assigned a case docket number under any of the following instances:Applying the foregoing to the instant case, preliminary investigation commenced on February 12, 1990 when the Complaint was filed, and terminated on October 9, 1998 when the Ombudsman approved the Order dated September 25, 1998 and denied the Republic's motion for reconsideration. Thus, whether the Court applies the 10-day period in Javier and Catamco, or the more generous periods of 12 to 24 months under A.O. 1, We arrive at the same conclusion that the Ombudsman exceeded the specified period provided for preliminary investigations.[192]
In all instances, the complaint, grievance or request for assistance with an assigned case docket number shall be considered as pending for purposes of issuing an Ombudsman clearance.
Section 8. Period for the conduct of Preliminary Investigation. - Unless otherwise provided for in a separate issuance, such as an Office Order creating a special panel of investigators/prosecutors and prescribing the period for completion of the preliminary investigation, the proceedings therein shall not exceed twelve (12) months for simple cases or twenty-four months (24) months for complex cases, subject to the following considerations:
Section 9. Termination of Preliminary Investigation. – A preliminary investigation shall be deemed terminated when the resolution of the complaint, including any motion for reconsideration filed in relation to the result thereof, as recommended by the Ombudsman investigator/prosecutor and their immediate supervisors, is approved by the Ombudsman or the Overall Deputy Ombudsman/Special Prosecutor/Deputy Ombudsman concerned. (Emphasis supplied)
Prejudice should be assessed in the light of the interest of the defendant that the speedy trial was designed to protect, namely: to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; to minimize anxiety and concerns of the accused to trial; and to limit the possibility that his [or her] defense will be impaired. Of these, the most serious is the last, because the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system. There is also prejudice if the defense witnesses are unable to recall accurately the events of the distant past. Even if the accused is not imprisoned prior to trial, he is still disadvantaged by restraints on his liberty and by living under a cloud of anxiety, suspicion and often, hostility. His financial resources may be drained, his association is curtailed, and he is subjected to public obloquy.[201] (Emphasis supplied)With this case pending for over 30 years and possibly more without assurance of its resolution, the Court recognizes that the tactical disadvantages carried by the passage of time should be weighed against petitioner Republic and in favor of the respondents.[202] Certainly, if this case were remanded for further proceedings, the already long delay would drag on longer. Memories fade, documents and other exhibits can be lost and vulnerability of those who are tasked to decide increase with the passing of years.[203] In effect, there would be a general inability to mount an effective defense.