LEONEN, SAJ.:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing ratiocination, the contested decision of the 8th Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Branch 2, Aparri-Calayan, Cagayan dated March 30, 2016 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.The Regional Trial Court held that the Ontiveroses proved ownership and a better right of possession of the land through the Department of Education's judicial admission and various evidence, such as the relocation survey report, as well as tax receipts and declarations issued in their name.[23] It found that the Department of Education failed to prove its rightful possession, and the arguments of prescription and laches had no legal basis.[24]
The defendant-appellee is hereby ordered to vacate the subject property and surrender possession thereof to the plaintiffs-appellants.
SO DECIDED.[22]
Also known as accion plenaria de posesion, accion publiciana is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty independently of title. It refers to an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year from the accrual of the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the realty.Possession is a question of fact, which is generally barred from being raised in a Rule 45 petition.[48] Generally, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.[49] This Court, not being a trier of facts, upholds the factual findings of the appellate courts as conclusive on the parties and on this Court, save in exceptional cases.[50] A party seeking review must allege, substantiate, and prove the exception.[51] Furthermore, being a matter of judicial discretion, this Court's review will only be granted "when there are special and important reasons"[52] and when the petition raises "questions of such substance as to be of distinctly significant consequence and value."[53]
The objective of the plaintiffs in accion publiciana is to recover possession only, not ownership. However, where the parties raise the issue of ownership, the courts may pass upon the issue to determine who between the parties has the right to possess the property. This adjudication, however, is not a final and binding determination of the issue of ownership; it is only for the purpose of resolving the issue of possession, where the issue of ownership is inseparably linked to the issue of possession. The adjudication of the issue of ownership, being provisional, is not a bar to an action between the same parties involving title to the property. The adjudication, in short, is not conclusive on the issue of ownership.[47] (Citations omitted)
A perusal of the records of this case shows that contrary to the observation of the court a quo, the defendant-appellee during the initial pretrial conference admitted the existence of TCT No. T-56997 and that the certificate of title covers the land where the school is located. Further, in its Answer, defendant-appellee admitted paragraph 3 of the Complaint that plaintiffs are the owners of the lot denominated as Lot 849 covered by TCT No. T-56997 and that herein defendant by way of special and affirmative defenses, admitted having in possession and occupation of the same lot but interposes the defenses of prescription and laches, among others. Aside from these, Mito Jane Maguddatu, Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer of Aparri testified to the effect that the property of Eriberto Ontiveros denominated as Lot 849, Cad 250 is covered by TCT No. T-56997 and that the area where the Gaddang Elementary School is situated is still covered by said title.The Court of Appeals correctly appreciated that while respondents failed to present the original copy of TCT No. T-56997 and the electronic copy submitted was not admitted in evidence, petitioner nevertheless admitted the existence of TCT No. T-56997 over the land.[59] In addition, respondents presented tax receipts and declarations under their names.[60] In Kawayan Hills Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[61] this Court held that the declaration of a property for taxation purposes and the payment of real property taxes strengthen one's claim of possession in the concept of an owner.
It cannot be underscored however that the above were all admissions made during the proceedings that must have been considered also by the court a quo which under the rules, do not require proof. Aside from those judicial admissions, documentary evidences [sic] to support the plaintiffs' claim were admitted by the court a quo which to the mind of this court are adequate to prove their ownership of the land subject of this case. Tax declarations in the names of the plaintiffs including official tax receipts for payment of real property taxes are clear indicia of ownership although as a rule, are not in themselves incontrovertible evidence of ownership. In addition, the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement executed by and between Eriberto and Gerardo Ontiveros pointed out that Lot 849 was one of those properties they adjudicated between and among themselves which was admitted by the court a quo. This clearly adds to the claim of ownership of the herein plaintiffs for how can they adjudicate in themselves a property that they do not rightfully own? Be it noted that this act of adjudicating Lot 849 between themselves predicated from the fact that the mother of Gerardo predeceased Eriberto. Likewise, the written correspondence of Gerardo to various officials to include the then Secretary of Department of Education where he sought for reasonable rent for the use of a portion of Lot 849 by the Gaddang Elementary School indicates an iota of claim of ownership.
To even bolster their claim, herein plaintiffs-appellants presented in court Engr. Marlon Geronimo who categorically stated in his relocation survey report that Lot 849 is covered by TCT No. T-56997. Engr. Geronimo conducted the survey based on the same title and technical description on file at the Register of Deeds and was even made before and in the presence of the parties' respective counsels and representatives. The result of the survey where it was found out that Lot 849 is covered by TCT No. T-56997 was never disputed by the representatives of defendant-appellee which to the mind of the court is a manifestation that they had acquiesced to the findings of Engr. Geronimo and are now estopped from disputing the same.
With the plethora of testimonial as well as documentary evidences [sic] presented by herein appellants, this court is convinced that they had substantially proved their claim of ownership over the said parcel of land.
Although we concur with the adherence of the court to the rules which provides that evidence not offered in court cannot be admitted in evidence, as the original copy of TCT No. T-56997 was not offered by the plaintiffs-appellants, the reliance alone thereto of the court a quo, without considering the surrounding circumstances of the case and other material evidences presented in court, to the mind of the court, is misplaced as the same are just matters of technicalities of the law which can be relaxed in order to serve greater justice.
Time and again, this Court has held that rules of procedure are only tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, such that when rigid application of the rules tend to frustrate rather tha[n] promote substantial justice, this Court is empowered to suspend their operation. We will not hesitate to set aside technicalities in favour of what is fair and just[.]
As an offshoot of the ruling of the court a quo declaring that plaintiffs-appellants failed to substantiate their claim of ownership over the property, the court a quo, consequently, pronounced that they failed to prove that they have a better right of possession.
This court does not agree.
As correctly pointed out by the plaintiffs-appellants, the court a quo’s finding that they failed to prove that they made a prior demand to the defendant-appellee and Gaddang Elementary School to vacate the land due to the fact that the letter of Gerado to then Secretary Florencio Abad of the DepEd was denied admission merely because it was a mere photocopy, is again misplaced.
Be it noted that the case is one denominated as accion publiciana which is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty independent of title. It refers to an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year from the accrual of the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the realty.
The objective of the plaintiffs in accion publiciana is to recover possession only, not ownership. However, where the parties raise the issue of ownership, the courts may pass upon the issue to determine who between the parties has the right to possess the property. This adjudication is not a final determination of the issue of ownership; it is only for the purpose of resolving the issue of possession where the issue of ownership is inseparably linked to the issue of possession. The adjudication of the issue of ownership, being provisional, is not a bar to an action between the same parties involving title to the property. The adjudication in short, is not conclusive on the issue of ownership. Hence, prior demand, unlike in actions for forcible entry and unlawful detainer, is not wanting.
Contrary to the conclusion of the court a quo, the plaintiff-appellants were able to establish ownership over the said lot, thus, has a better right of possession while defendant-appellee failed to prove that it had acquired the same nor had better right to occupy and possess the same. To strengthen this contention, witness for the defendant Maria Gloria Flores even admitted there is no certificate of title nor tax declaration in the name of the defendant.[58] (Citations omitted)
As registered owners of the lots in question, the private respondents have a right to eject any person illegally occupying their property. This right is imprescriptible. Even if it be supposed that they were aware of the petitioners' occupation of the property, and regardless of the length of that possession, the lawful owners have a right to demand the return of their property at any time as long as the possession was unauthorized or merely tolerated, if at all. This right is never barred by laches.Grounded on public policy, laches is the "failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it."[66] Since laches is an equitable consideration, its determination based on the court's sound discretion "cannot work to defeat justice" or perpetrate a wrong.[67] "[L]aches cannot apply to registered land covered by a Torrens Title because under the Property Registration Decree, no title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession."[68]
In urging laches against the private respondents for not protesting their long and continuous occupancy of the lots in question, the petitioners are in effect contending that they have acquired the said lots by acquisitive prescription. It is an elementary principle that the owner of a land registered under the Torrens system cannot lose it by prescription.[65] (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)
The established rule, as reiterated in Heirs of Tomas Dolleton vs. Fil-Estate Management, Inc., is that "the elements of laches must be proven positively. Laches is evidentiary in nature, a fact that cannot be established by mere allegations in the pleadings . . . ." Evidence is of utmost importance in establishing the existence of laches because, as stated in Department of Education, Division of Albay vs. Oñate, 'there is "no absolute rule as to what constitutes laches or staleness of demand; each case is to be determined according to its particular circumstances." . . . Verily, the application of laches is addressed to the sound discretion of the court as its application is controlled by equitable considerations.In The City of Valenzuela v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila,[71] this Court held that laches does not set in when there is no delay in asserting one's rights, thus:
In this case, respondents (defendants-appellants below) did not present any evidence in support of their defense, as they failed to take advantage of all the opportunities they had to do so. The Court stressed in Heirs of Anacleto B. Nieto vs. Municipality of Meycauayan, Bulacan, that:. . . laches is not concerned only with the mere lapse of time. The following elements must be present in order to constitute laches:In this case, there is no evidence on record to prove the concurrence of all the aforementioned elements of laches. The first element may indeed be established by the admissions of both parties in the Complaint and Answer — i.e., that petitioner is the registered owner of the subject property, but respondents had been occupying it for sometime and refuse to vacate the same — but the crucial circumstances of delay in asserting petitioner's right, lack of knowledge on the part of defendant that complainant would assert his right, and the injury or prejudice that defendant would suffer if the suit is not held to be barred, have not been proven. Therefore, in the absence of positive proof, it is impossible to determine if petitioner is guilty of laches.[70] (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)
(1) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation of which complaint is made for which the complaint seeks a remedy;
(2) delay in asserting the complainant's rights, the complainant having had knowledge or notice, of the defendant's conduct and having been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit;
(3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would assert the right on which he bases his suit; and
(4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant, or the suit is not held to be barred.
The Court agrees with the CA and the RTC that in the case at bar, laches had not set in since not all the elements of laches arc present. As found by the RTC, it was only in 1997 that RCBMI, the successor in interest of respondent, discovered that respondent owns the subject property. After the said discovery, RCBMI immediately asserted its right by meeting with petitioner. After negotiations failed, RCBMI instantly filed a complaint against petitioner on behalf of respondent. Such actions negate the allegations of petitioner that respondent slept on its rights.[72]Here, this Court agrees with the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals that respondents did not sleep on their rights and intended to exercise their right to recover possession of the land through their actions. Upon receiving information that petitioner's officials introduced permanent structures on their land, Eriberto demanded payment of reasonable rent.[73] When he died, respondent Gerardo sent letters to the municipal officials of Aparri and then Education Secretary Florencio Abad to vacate the premises.[74] Because the demand went unheeded, the Ontiveroses filed an accion publiciana.[75]
Considering that CNES' possession was merely being tolerated, respondents cannot be said to have delayed in asserting their rights over the subject property. As explained in the recent case of Department of Education vs. Casibang, et al., a registered owner who is merely tolerating another's possession of his land is not required to perform any act in order to recover it. This is because the occupation of the latter is only through the continuing permission of the former. Consequently, once said permission ceases, the party whose possession is merely being tolerated is bound to vacate the subject property. Hence, until the registered owner communicates the cessation of said permission, there is no need to do anything to recover the subject property. Similarly, as aptly pointed out by the court a quo, Regino and his successor-in-interests repeatedly asserted their rights over the subject property by demanding from CNES the payment of rentals or for the latter to purchase the same. However, once it became clear that petitioner was not going to pay rent, purchase the lot, or vacate the premises, respondents instituted an action for recovery of possession. There was no prolonged inaction on the part of the respondents which could bar them from prosecuting their claims.Furthermore, in Pada-Kilario v. Court of Appeals,[78] this Court held that persons occupying a property by sheer tolerance of its owners are not possessors in good faith. Thus, they are not entitled to Article 448 and Article 546 of the New Civil Code:
Likewise, since CNES' occupation of Lot No. 3950 was merely being tolerated by Regino and his successors-in-interest, petitioner cannot now claim that they lacked any knowledge or notice that the former would assert their rights over said property. Even assuming arguendo that there was no agreement between CNES and Regino, the school is necessarily bound by an implied promise to vacate the subject property upon the registered owner's demand.
. . . .
Being the owners of the subject property, respondents have the right to recover possession from the petitioner because such right is imprescriptible. Even if the Department of Education has been occupying the subject property for a considerable length of time, respondents, as lawful owners, have the right to demand the return of their property at any time as long as the possession was only through mere tolerance. The same precept holds true even if the tolerance resulted from a promise that the possessor will pay for the reasonable value of the land.[77] (Citations omitted)
Considering that petitioners were in possession of the subject property by sheer tolerance of its owners, they knew that their occupation of the premises may be terminated any time. Persons who occupy the land of another at the latter's tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that they will vacate the same upon demand, failing in which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against them. Thus, they cannot be considered possessors nor builders in good faith. It is well-settled that both Article 448 and Article 546 of the New Civil Code which allow full reimbursement of useful improvements and retention of the premises until reimbursement is made, apply only to a possessor in good faith, i.e., one who builds on land with the belief that he is the owner thereof. Verily, persons whose occupation of a realty is by sheer tolerance of its owners are not possessors in good faith.[79] (Citations omitted)A builder in good faith asserts title to the land on which they build, such that they are a possessor in the concept of an owner, unaware that there exists in their title or mode of acquisition any flaw that invalidates it.[80] Here, petitioner knew that it had no title to the land, and that its occupation is by mere tolerance of respondents who later repeatedly asserted their right. Thus, petitioner cannot be considered in good faith; it is not entitled to Article 448, in relation to Article 546, of the Civil Code.