(NAR) VOL. 9 NO. 4 / OCTOBER - DECEMBER 1998
"After a thorough study of this case, the undersigned prosecutor finds sufficient evidence to hold respondent prosecutor liable of the imputed administrative offenses.The act of respondent prosecutor of disregarding the basic rules on inquest which resulted to the precipitate release of the detained persons who were charged with illegal possession of assorted firearms indeed constitutes a clear case of gross and serious mis and most of all amounts to gross ignorance of the law. The prosecution service would undoubtedly be better off minus one prosecutor who has the temerity to abuse his authority at the expense of destroying the integrity and impartiality of the public office he holds.
The admission by respondent prosecutor that he conducted an inquest without the charge sheet and supporting documents formally filed against the detained person smacks of a lamentable state of real ignorance of the basic procedure embodied in the rules on inquest which has long been in effect. It is indeed difficult to comprehend why respondent prosecutor a public prosecutor for thirteen (13) years should proceed to conduct an inquest proceedings when the police officers concerned have not yet formally referred to him the complaint/referral documents against Manguerras. Irrespective of his opinion as to the regularity or irregularity of the arrest and detention of the suspects, the rules on inquest requires that the complaint/referral documents must first be submitted to the inquest officer by the law enforcement authorities before commencing the inquest proceedings. This is very clear in Section 3 of the New Rules on Inquest. (Department of Justice Circular No. 61 dated September 21, 1993) which provides, viz:
"Sec. 3. Commencement and Termination of Inquest — The inquest proceedings shall be considered commenced upon receipt by the Inquest Officer from the law enforcement authorities of the complaint/referral documents which should include:
a. the affidavit of arrest;
b. the investigation report;
c. the statement of the complainant and witnesses; and
d. other supporting evidence gathered by the police in the course of the latter's investigation of the criminal incident involving the arrested or detained person.
The inquest Officer shall, as far as practicable, cause the affidavit of arrest and statements/affidavits of the complainant and the witnesses to be subscribed and sworn to before him by the arresting officer and the affiants.
The inquest proceedings must be terminated within the period prescribed under the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended."
Clearly, the inquest proceedings is commenced only upon receipt by the Inquest Officer from the law enforcement officers of the complaint/referral documents above-stated and upon instruction by the City or Provincial Prosecutor to render an inquest duty. Thus, the act of respondent prosecutor of disregarding the above-mentioned basic rule of procedure which resulted to the precipitate release of the Manguerras amounts to serious misconduct, grave abuse of authority and most of all gross ignorance of the well-established rule which is subject to disciplinary action. A public prosecutor, being endowed with quasi-judicial authority, owes it to the public and to the administration of justice to know the law and he is expected to exhibit more than a cursory acquaintance with the statutes and procedural rules.
The reason advanced by respondent prosecutor why he conducted an inquest in the subject case even without a formal complaint or referral documents is not sufficient justification for him to motu propio take cognizance of the case as it is not allowed in the rules. When he sensed that the concerned police officers could not complete or file the necessary complaint or referral documents against the Manguerras in that nigh' common sense dictates that he should have explained to the lawyers of the Manguerras that he could not act on their case without the charge sheet and supporting documents submitted to him. If the lawyers insisted for the release of their clients, he should have advised them to address their request for release to the concerned police officers who have custody over their clients. But surprisingly, respondent prosecutor apparently had shown extra-ordinary interest to the case. Despite the absence of a complaint or referral documents, he proceeded to conduct an inquest proceedings, required the detained persons to execute counter-affidavit and solely on the basis thereon, prepared a Joint-Inquest Report recommending the release of the detained persons, such action of respondent prosecutor is clearly highly irregular. For it is very fundamental that in inquest proceedings, what is being examined by the Inquest Officer to determine whether the arrest of the detained person was made in accordance with the provisions of paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure are the complaint/referral documents submitted by the arresting officers but not the counter-affidavit or evidence submitted by the detained person. Besides, in inquest cases, the submission of counter-affidavit is not allowed, unless the detained person would demand the exercise of his right to a preliminary investigation in which case he has to execute a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, with the assistance of a lawyer and, in case of non-availability, a responsible person of his choice (Sec. 10, supra). With the execution of such waiver, the inquest proceedings would be converted to a regular preliminary investigation. It is only then that the Inquest Officer would require the detained person to submit his counter-affidavit or controverting evidence. Hence, it was a patent error for respondent prosecutor to take cognizance of the case and base his inquest report recommending dismissal on the latter's counter-affidavit. Such error, under the circumstances, cannot be characterized as mere deficiency in prudence, discretion and judgment, but a patent disregard of well-known rules tantamount to gross ignorance of the law.
To top it all, when the guard on duty, PO1 Dario Son Arias, refused to receive the copy of the said Joint-Inquest Report intended for the arresting officers, respondent prosecutor, flaunting his authority, said to the former that: 'Mo-firma ka ug sa dili, wala ka'y mahimo niini kay ako ni silang i-release" (Whether you sign this or not, there is nothing you can do because I will release them). Aside from that, PO1 Dario Son Arias was firm and straightforward in testifying during the clarificatory hearing that respondent prosecutor together with the Manguerras left the Headquarters, and he even saw respondent prosecutor gave a ride to the Manguerras (TSN, August 26, 1996, pp. 13, 16). It may not be amiss therefore to state that the Manguerras were released by respondent prosecutor even prior to the approval of his joint-inquest report by the City Prosecutor. Such actuations of respondent prosecutor constitute a clear case of gross and serious misconduct which cannot just simply be obliterated by the fact that the case against the Manguerras was finally dismissed. Rather, such conduct, being an example of the kind of gross and flaunting misconduct that undermines the integrity and impartiality of the prosecution service, deserves no other than the ultimate penalty of dismissal under section 22 (c), Rule IV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987).
It bear stressing that as a public prosecutor, respondent prosecutor owes it to the people to help in the preservation and maintenance of the integrity of the administration of justice. He is therefore, expected to exhibit the highest sense of honesty, integrity, efficiency and competence in the performance of his official duty. Sad to say, under the circumstances, respondent prosecutor failed to live up to these highest ethical standards. By committing the questioned acts, respondent prosecutor undermined the integrity of the service and jeopardized the public's faith in the impartiality of the prosecution office. By his conduct, he even bolstered the public perception that when it comes to the prosecution of the rich and influential persons, there is a double standard of justice, i.e. one for the rich and the other for the poor. His actuations in the premises destroy the very image of the prosecution service and henceforth, shall not be countenanced by this Department."
I concur with the findings of the Secretary of Justice.