513 Phil. 595
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff, Mr. Federico Calilung and against the defendant, Emiliano Joven ordering the latter and all persons claiming rights under him to vacate the subject premises and to return the premises to the plaintiff. Defendant is also ordered to pay plaintiff a monthly rent of P110,000.00 from February 1998 until he vacates with interest at 25% per annum, and to pay P50,000.00 as and for attorney's fees plus costs of suit.[5]Aggrieved over the adverse decision, Joven elevated the matter on appeal on 23 December 1998 before RTC Branch 58, then presided by Judge Philbert Iturralde. Despite the Notice of Appeal, Calilung filed a Motion for Execution before MTCC Br. II, but said court denied the said motion. Upon the transmittal of the records of the case,[6] Calilung filed before said court a Motion to Dismiss the appeal, which was subsequently denied.
WHEREFORE, the court hereby resolves:Two days later, or on 26 May 1999, Judge Pinto promulgated her decision affirming in toto the judgment of Judge Suriaga in the ejectment case.
1. To grant the first motion,
a) Ordering the Clerk of Court of this Court to release to plaintiff the monthly rental for March 1999 in the amount of P133,100.00 under O.R. No. 84583962 dated March 3, 1999; and
b) Ordering the Manila Insurance Co., Inc. to release and/or pay to plaintiff the supersedeas bond in the sum of P1,004,000.00.
2. To grant the second motion,
a) Ordering the disqualification of Atty. Carmelino Roque to appear in this case as counsel for the defendant; and
b) Expunging/striking out from the record of this case all pleadings that Atty. Carmelino Roque has filed in this case.
3) To deny the third motion for want of merit.[8]
Under the circumstances, the MTC Decision dated December 4, 1998 has been superseded by the Regional Trial Court decision dated May 26, 1999. In fact, it is now the subject of plaintiff's "Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with Prayer for Restraining Order/Preliminary Injunction before the Honorable Court of Appeals.Joven sought a reconsideration of said Order on the ground that: (1) The RTC Br. 58 Decision of 26 May 1999 could not be deemed to have superseded the MTCC Decision of 04 December 1998 because the enforceability of said RTC Decision has been enjoined by the Court of Appeals and the same RTC decision is the present subject of a Petition For Certiorari; (2) The action to annul the judgment of MTCC Br. II dated 04 December 1998, based on extrinsic fraud, may be filed within four (4) years from the discovery of the fraud, and the subsequent Decision of RTC Br. 58 affirming the said MTCC Decision; and (3) Honorable Judge Pinto should have, in good grace, inhibited from deciding the instant case for Annulment of Judgment. On 07 December 1999, Joven received an Order dated 29 November 1999 denying his Motion for Reconsideration.
As correctly pointed out by defendant movant [Calilung], this Court has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case as it is now within the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. The matter has become moot and academic. It results in a situation where a decision (dated December 4, 1998) rendered by Municipal Trial Court and affirmed by the Regional Trial Court would still be the subject of an annulment proceedings in the Regional Trial Court.
Wherefore, the cause of action in this case having become moot and academic. The motion is granted and this case is hereby ordered dismissed.
The Motion for Inhibition is now considered moot.[10]
As regards to respondent Suriaga, the Investigating Justice observed that the testimonies of the Calilung spouses were replete with important details that could not be ignored. He pointed out that mere denials and an unsatisfactory refutation on the part of Judge Suriaga to prove his innocence do not persuade to establish the falsity of complainant's testimony and that of his wife. It was no less than a bribe for Judge Suriaga to demand and receive money from a party in a case before him for which act he has no place in the judiciary. Neither is respondent judge's improper and illegal act, of asking from complainant the amount of P250,000.00 to be given to Judge Iturralde, to be condoned.On 19 March 2001, the Court of Appeals rendered the decision assailed in G.R. No. 148970 resolving the petition filed by Joven questioning, among other things, the denial of his motion to suspend the appeal proceedings. According to the appellate court:
The Court agrees with [sic] the foregoing findings and conclusion of Justice Ramirez. The culpability of respondent Judge Suriaga for serious misconduct has been established not just by substantial evidence which suffices in an administrative investigation but by an overwhelming preponderance thereof. . . .
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Given the factual circumstances prevailing in this case, the Court does not hesitate to conclude that "[r]espondent Judge tainted the image of the judiciary to which he owes fealty and the obligation to keep it all times unsullied and worthy of the people's trust." A judge should conduct himself at all times in a manner which would reasonably merit the respect and confidence of the people for he is the visible representation of the law. Rule 2.01 of Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct directs that a judge should behave at all times to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the Judiciary. In National Bureau of Investigation vs. Judge Ramon B. Reyes, whose factual milieu is similar to this case, the Court said:Bribery is a serious charge punishable by, inter alia, dismissal from service with forfeiture of benefits and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office including government-owned or controlled corporations. In the case at bench, we find sufficient bases in the charge of malfeasance in office against respondent. On past occasions where we had the disagreeable task of disciplining mulcting magistrates, we did not hesitate to impose the penalty of dismissal. Conformably, as he has demonstrated his unsuitability to remain a member of the bench, respondent is deservingly dismissed from the service with all its attendant consequences.Perforce, the penalty of dismissal from the service is the most appropriate penalty under the circumstances for respondent Judge Suriaga's malfeasance in office.
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WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:
1.] Respondent Wilfred S. Suriaga is DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and leave credits and with prejudice to re-employment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations;
2.] The administrative complaint against respondent Philbert I. Iturralde is REFERRED[11] back to the Office of the Court Administrator for further investigation. In the meantime, his preventive suspension is hereby LIFTED.[12]
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the assailed order of respondent judge dated May 24, 1999 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDEAfter the denial of his Motion for Reconsideration, Calilung filed on 31 August 2001 a Petition for Review on Certiorari before this Court. Said Petition was ordered consolidated with the Petition for Review filed by Joven on 20 January 2000 since both petitions have the ultimate common issue of whether or not the judgment dated 04 December 1998 of (then) Judge Wilfred Suriaga in the ejectment case should be nullified on the ground of extrinsic fraud.
1) The effectivity of the judgment in Civil Case No. 9314 dated May 26, 1999 is ordered SUSPENDED pending the final termination of Civil Case No. 9399.2) The Executive Judge of the RTC of Angeles City is further ordered to reraffle Civil Case No. 9399 to another judge.3) Let the writ of preliminary injunction issued on September 17, 1999 be converted to a FINAL INJUNCTION.[13]
. . . Annulment of judgment, we have had occasion to rule, rests on a single ground: extrinsic fraud. What "extrinsic fraud" means is explained in Macabingkil v. People's Homesite and Housing Corporation:Acts that shall warrant annulment of a judgment were further explained by the Court in the case of Ybañez v. Court of Appeals:[16]...
It is only extrinsic or collateral fraud, as distinguished from intrinsic fraud, however, that can serve as a basis for the annulment of judgment. Fraud has been regarded as extrinsic or collateral, within the meaning of the rule, "where it is one the effect of which prevents a party from having a trial, or a real contest, or from presenting all of his case to the court, or where it operates upon matters pertaining, not to the judgment itself, but of the manner in which it was procured so that there is not a fair submission of the controversy." In other words, extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the prevailing party in the litigation which is committed outside of the trial of the case, whereby the defeated party has been prevented from exhibiting fully his side of the case, by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent.[15]
The kind of fraud that justifies the annulment of a judgment is extrinsic fraud. This refers to some act or conduct of the prevailing party which has prevented the aggrieved party from having a trial or presenting his case to the court, or was used to procure judgment without a fair submission of the controversy. Extrinsic fraud refers to acts outside the trial.[17]In the case at bar, it is evident that extrinsic fraud has been committed against Joven. The receipt of the money demanded by Suriaga from Calilung is clearly an act used to procure judgment without a fair submission of the controversy. It was a fraudulent act of the prevailing party done outside the trial which could not be litigated and determined at the trial of the case.
No Costs.
1.) The Petition in G.R. No. 140984 is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 60, Angles City, dismissing the Complaint for Annulment of Judgment is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Br. II, Angeles City, is hereby DECLARED NULL and VOID. Let trial on the merits be held anew.2.) The Petition in G.R. No. 148970 is hereby DENIED for being moot in view of the declaration of nullity of the Decision of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities.