502 Phil. 783
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing complainants' charge for illegal dismissal and for ULP for lack of merit. However, in view of their implied admission of complainants' entitlement thereto, respondent is hereby ordered to pay the corresponding 13th month pay and service incentive leave pay due the complainants herein.The Labor Arbiter declared that the complainants wrote their resignation letters in their own hand, and found no showing of force or intimidation in so doing. He declared that if there was, indeed, force or intimidation, the complainants ought to have made their real sentiments or opposition thereto on record by writing "under protest," "with reservations," or other words to that effect either below, beside, or somewhere near their signatures. Moreover, the fact that the contents of their resignation letters were dictated would not justify the conclusion that they had tendered their resignation against their will. On the contrary, the Labor Arbiter observed that this was more convenient on the part of the parties.
SO ORDERED.[9]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal from the Decision dated September 28, 2001 is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and the Decision AFFIRMED.The NLRC declared that the complainants' act of submitting resignation letters and accomplishing their respective clearances from KPI negated involuntariness. The NLRC also noted some inconsistencies in the amended complaint and the position paper of the complainants, viz.:
SO ORDERED.[11]
Complainants alleged that they still worked for several months with respondent as regular employees thereof even after the execution of their resignation letter. This allegation of complainants deserves scant consideration. Records show that complainant[s] filed the instant case on August 25, 2000. It is worth stressing that complainant[s] failed to indicate in their complaint the date they were allegedly dismissed. (Records, p. 1) [T]hen, in their amended complaint (Records, p. 12) and position paper (Records, p. 18), they claimed that they were dismissed on September 4, 2000. If it is really true that they were dismissed on September 4, 2000, how come they charged respondents of illegal dismissal on August 25, 2000[?] These apparent inconsistencies of complainants only goes (sic) to show the weakness of their allegations.[12]A motion for reconsideration was filed, which was denied for lack of merit.[13]
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:The appellate court ruled that the private respondents were regular employees, since they were performing activities normally necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of KPI for more than a year until their severance from work on September 4, 2000. The CA declared that as regular employees, their services could only be terminated for just and authorized causes under the Labor Code, as amended. The employees' transfer to an employment agency put KPI's motive in question and gave credence to the allegation that the employees had been illegally terminated or dismissed.
(1) REVERSING the assailed resolutions of public respondent with respect to its findings that petitioners were not illegally dismissed; and,
(2) AFFIRMING the assailed resolutions of public respondent NLRC with respect to the petitioners' charge for unfair labor practices.
Without costs in this instance.
SO ORDERED.[14]
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW IN HOLDING PRIVATE RESPONDENTS' RESIGNATIONS NOT VOLUNTARY DESPITE THEIR CONFIRMATION IN THEIR OWN HANDWRITING.The petitioners reiterated their claim that the private respondents were not coerced, threatened, or intimidated into filing their resignation letters. They claim that the CA erred in finding that the petitioners forced or intimidated the private respondents into signing blank sheets of paper which were used as their resignation letters. The petitioners contend that such finding is not supported by any evidence. They rely on the Labor Arbiter's conclusion that if the private respondents had really been forced to render their resignation, they should have written "under protest," "with reservations" or other words to that effect near their signatures to show their real sentiments or opposition. Moreover, the fact that the private respondents waited for one (1) month and twelve (12) days, before filing their complaint with the DOLE, casts doubt on the integrity of their position.II
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW IN DECLARING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS' DISMISSAL WAS ILLEGAL.[16]
To be stressed in the fundamental premise that petitioners are regular employees of private respondents, having been performing activities which are normally necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer for more than a year already, until their severance from work on September 4, 2000. Undeniably, petitioners were regular employees at the time they allegedly voluntarily resigned on July 14, 2000. As such regular employees, the Labor Code grants petitioners security of tenure, which essentially means that their employer can not terminate their services except for just and authorized causes, as provided for under the Labor Code. Viewed in this light, private respondents' act or action in transferring petitioners to a manpower agency (Gerrico Resources then later on to RCVJ) with the promise that they would receive the same benefits as regular employees, puts in question private respondents' real motive. If anything, it gives currency to the belief that petitioners had been illegally terminated or dismissed from employment.The CA was correct in declaring that the private respondents had attained the status of regular employees of petitioner KPI. It must be stressed that at the time of their dismissal, they had been working for the petitioners for more than one (1) year. However, the CA failed to rule on whether the private respondents should be reinstated and paid backwages and other monetary benefits.
Turning now to the question of the "voluntariness" of the resignation letters: We are inclined to agree with the petitioners that they were coerced, threatened or intimidated into signing blank sheets of paper which materialized into resignation letters, the contents of which were dictated by the Director and Personnel Manager of the respondent company. For to us, it is inconceivable that a worker who has already attained a regular status in his employment would opt to be transferred to another employment agency, there to start work anew - work that would relegate him to a mere casual laborer or employee. Obviously, petitioners were not given any other choice by management, but to agree to their transfer to Gerrico Resources, lest they lose their only means of livelihood. Considering that petitioners are ordinary sewers of respondent company, the fear of losing their jobs cannot but be a serious, legitimate concern. In Rance, et al. v. NLRC, it was held that when a person has no property, his job may possibly be his only possession or means of livelihood. Therefore, he should be protected against any arbitrary deprivation of his job. In the same spirit, Art. 280 of the Labor Code construes security of tenure as meaning that "the employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by" the Code.[21]...
The fact that petitioners in this case failed to indicate in their resignation letters the phrase "under protest" or "with reservations" is of no moment. To be stressed anew is the fact that petitioners were ordinary factory workers who could not and should not be expected to know the legal import or significance of some such phrase as "under protest" or "with reservations."
Additionally, private respondents' claim that petitioners voluntarily resigned is belied by the fact that the latter immediately filed a complaint for regularization with the NLRC upon their supposed transfer to the Gerrico Resources. We note that while petitioners were allegedly employed with Gerrico Resources, they continued working with respondent company and within the premises of respondent company for that matter. Hence, it came as no surprise that when they were disallowed entry into the premises of respondent company on September 4, 2000, they amended their complaint to one of illegal dismissal. Therefore, there is something askew in public respondent's ratiocination that —"Complainants alleged that they still worked for several months with respondent as regular employees thereof even after the execution of their resignation letter[s]. This allegation of complainants deserves scant consideration. Records show that complainant filed the instant case on August 25, 2000. It is worth stressing that complainant failed to indicate in their complaint the date they were allegedly dismissed. (Records, p. 1) Then, in their amended complaint (Records, p. 12) and position paper (Records, p. 18), they claimed that they were dismissed on September 4, 2000. If it is really true that they were dismissed on September 4, 2000, how come they charged respondents of illegal dismissal on August 25, 2000[?] These apparent inconsistencies of complainants only goes (sic) to show the weakness of their allegations. xxx" (underscoring supplied)For, stock can be taken of the fact that the complaint filed on August 25, 2000 was for "regularization," while that of September 4, 2000 was for "illegal dismissal" and "reinstatement." Notably, no date was indicated in the space provided for "Date Dismissed" in the complaint for August 25, 2000, precisely because petitioners were not yet dismissed then; rather, they were merely "transferred" to Gerrico Resources as contractual workers.
In Molave Tours v. NLRC, resignation has been defined as "the voluntary act of an employee who finds himself in a situation where he believes that personal reasons cannot be sacrificed in favor of the exigency of the service, then he has no other choice but to disassociate himself from his employment." In the context of Section II, Rule XIV, Book V of the Revised Rules Implementing the Labor Code, resignation is a formal pronouncement or relinquishment of an office. It must be made with the deliberate animus or intention of relinquishing the office accompanied by an act of relinquishment. In the same case, it was also held that the voluntariness of a resignation is negated by the filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal. Declared the Court:"The fact that private respondent immediately filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioner and repudiated his alleged resignation completely negated petitioner's claim that respondent Bolocon voluntarily resigned. By vigorously pursuing the litigation of his action against petitioner, private respondent clearly manifested that he has no intention of relinquishing his employment, which act is wholly incompatible to petitioner's assertion that he voluntarily resigned. Neither was petitioner able to discharge the burden of proving that respondent Bolocon's employment was validly terminated. Other than the mute words of Bolocon's alleged letter of resignation, the rest of petitioner's evidence failed to establish that Bolocon, indeed, voluntarily resigned. Worse, petitioner failed to refute private respondent's allegation of force and intimidation in the execution of the letter of resignation by opting not to present the testimony of its personnel manager who could have contradicted Bolocon's version of what actually transpired."[22]
Art. 280. Regular and Casual Employment. - The provisions of written agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, except where the employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season.As regular employees, the private respondents are entitled to security of tenure provided under the labor laws and may only be validly terminated from service upon compliance with the legal requisites for dismissal and considering that they were illegally dismissed, the private respondents should be reinstated, in accordance with the provision of the Labor Code, as amended, particularly Article 279, to wit:
An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding paragraph: Provided, That, any employee who has rendered at least one year of service, whether such service is continuous or broken, shall be considered a regular employee with respect to the activity in which he is employed and his employment shall continue while such activity exists.
Article 279. Security of Tenure. - In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by this Title. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement.[24]Thus, the said provision provides that illegally dismissed employees are entitled to backwages plus other benefits computed from the time compensation was withheld up to the time of actual reinstatement. An illegally dismissed employee who, in contemplation of the law, never left his office, should be granted the compensation which rightfully belongs to him from the moment he was unduly deprived of it up to the time it was restored to him;[25] the backwages to be awarded should not be diminished or reduced by earnings derived by the illegally dismissed employee elsewhere during the term of his illegal dismissal.[26]