601 Phil. 124
PERALTA, J.:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the subject motion for reconsideration filed by the prosecution is granted. Accordingly, the order of this court dated August 25, 2004, granting the accused's motion to quash the information is hereby reconsidered and set aside and, therefore, the accused's motion to quash the information is denied.Petitioner then filed his Motion for Reconsideration,[19] which was denied in the Order[20] dated January 26, 2005.
SO ORDERED.[18]
The Supreme Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the fundamental charter and immemorial tradition. It cannot and should not be burdened with the task of dealing with causes in the first instance. Its original jurisdiction to issue the so-called extraordinary writs should be exercised only where absolutely necessary or where serious and important reasons exist therefor. Hence, that jurisdiction should generally be exercised relative to actions or proceedings before the Court of Appeals, or before constitutional or other tribunals, bodies or agencies whose acts for some reason or another are not controllable by the Court of Appeals. Where the issuance of an extraordinary writ is also within the competence of the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court, it is in either of these courts that the specific action for the writ's procurement must be presented. This is, and should continue, to be the policy in this regard, a policy that courts and lawyers must strictly observe.[22]Later, we reaffirmed such policy in People v. Cuaresma[23] after noting that there is "a growing tendency on the part of litigants and lawyers to have their applications for the so-called extraordinary writs, and sometimes even their appeals, passed upon and adjudicated directly and immediately by the highest tribunal of the land." We stressed that -
[t]his Court's original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari (as well as prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction) is not exclusive. x x x It is also shared by this Court, and by the Regional Trial Court, with the Court of Appeals x x x. This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which application therefor will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and should also serve as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level x x x courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is established policy. It is a policy that is necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Court's time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the Court's docket. x x x.Notwithstanding the dismissibility of the instant petition for failure to observe the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts, this Court will proceed to entertain the case grounded as it is on a pure question of law.
Under Section 6, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is the Supreme Court which is vested with exclusive administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel. Prescinding from this premise, the Ombudsman cannot determine for itself and by itself whether a criminal complaint against a judge, or court employee, involves an administrative matter. The Ombudsman is duty bound to have all cases against judges and court personnel filed before it, referred to the Supreme Court for determination as to whether an administrative aspect is involved therein.In Fuentes, the issue was whether the Ombudsman may conduct an investigation over the acts of a judge in the exercise of his official functions alleged to be in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, in the absence of an administrative charge for the same acts before the Supreme Court.[30] According to this Court:
x x x x
Maceda[28] is emphatic that by virtue of its constitutional power of administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk, it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges' and court personnel's compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.[29]
Thus, the Ombudsman may not initiate or investigate a criminal or administrative complaint before his office against petitioner judge, pursuant to his power to investigate public officers. The Ombudsman must indorse the case to the Supreme Court, for appropriate action.Indeed, supervision over all inferior courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals to the lowest ranked court employee, is vested by the Constitution in the Supreme Court. However, that prerogative only extends to administrative supervision. As such, the Ombudsman cannot encroach upon this Court's task to oversee judges and court personnel and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation of the laws of the land.
Article VIII, Section 6 of the Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals to the lowest municipal trial court clerk.
Hence, it is the Supreme Court that is tasked to oversee the judges and court personnel and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation of the laws of the land. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the independence of the judiciary and the doctrine of separation of powers.
Petitioner's questioned order directing the attachment of government property and issuing a writ of execution were done in relation to his office, well within his official functions. The order may be erroneous or void for lack or excess of jurisdiction. However, whether or not such order of execution was valid under the given circumstances, must be inquired into in the course of the judicial action only by the Supreme Court that is tasked to supervise the courts. "No other entity or official of the Government, not the prosecution or investigation service of any other branch, not any functionary thereof, has competence to review a judicial order or decision--whether final and executory or not--and pronounce it erroneous so as to lay the basis for a criminal or administrative complaint for rendering an unjust judgment or order. That prerogative belongs to the courts alone."[31]
The undersigned Graft Investigation Officer of the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas, accuses JUDGE RODOLFO B. GARCIA, of the crime of RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING TO HOMICIDE, defined and penalized under ARTICLE 365 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE, committed as follows:From the foregoing, the filing of the criminal charges against the petitioner before the MCTC was warranted by the above circumstances. Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide is prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods ranging from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. Section 32 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7691,[33] provides as follows:
That on or about the 12th day of November, 2002, at about 5:15 o'clock in the afternoon, at Sitio Tunga, Barangay Bantayanon, Municipality of Calatrava, Province of Negros Occidental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused JUDGE RODOLFO B. GARCIA, a public officer, being then the Municipal Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Calatrava-Toboso, Negros Occidental, with Salary Grade 26, then driving a Land Cruiser Toyota bearing Plate No. FDB-193, along the road at Sitio Tunga, Barangay Bantayanon, Calatrava, Negros Occidental, a public highway, did then and there drive or operate said vehicle in a reckless, negligent and imprudent manner without taking the necessary precaution considering the grade, visibility and other conditions of the highway, nor due regard to the traffic rules and ordinances in order to prevent accident to persons or damage to property, thereby causing by such recklessness, negligence and imprudence the said vehicle to hit and bump the motorcycle driven by Francisco C. Ortega, Jr., bearing Plate No. FH-2324, with Josemarie Paghubasan as his backrider, thereby causing upon Francisco C. Ortega, Jr. the following physical injuries, to with [sic]:
x x x x
which injuries resulted to the death of Francisco C. Ortega, Jr.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[32]
SEC. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Criminal Cases. - Except in cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts and of the Sandiganbayan, Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:As such, the jurisdiction of the MCTC over the case is beyond contestation.
(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all violations of city or municipal ordinances committed within their respective territorial jurisdiction; and
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount thereof: Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence, they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof.