384 Phil. 567
KAPUNAN, J.:
Evaluating the allegations contained in the petition and respondents’ comment thereto, the Court regrets that it cannot agree with the petitioner(sic). As shown by the records the 16 criminal cases were dismissed without prejudice at the instance of the petitioners for failure of the private respondent to comply with the mandatory requirement of PD 1508. Since the dismissal of said cases was without prejudice, the Court honestly believes that the questioned order has not attained finality at all.Petitioners contend that an order dismissing a case or action without prejudice may attain finality if not appealed within the reglementary period. Hence, if no motion to revive the case is filed within the reglementary fifteen-day period within which to appeal or to file a motion for reconsideration of the court’s order, the order of dismissal becomes final and the case may only be revived by the filing of a new complaint or information.[26] Petitioners further argue that after the order of dismissal of a case attains finality, the court which issued the same loses jurisdiction thereon and, thus, does not have the authority to act on any motion of the parties with respect to said case.[27]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[22]
The Regional Trial Court, likewise, denied petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration[23] of the aforementioned Decision for lack of merit.[24]
Hence, this Petition.
Petitioners raise the following questions of law:
1. Whether or not an order dismissing a case or action without prejudice may attain finality if not appealed within the reglementary period, as in the present case;
2. Whether or not the action or case that had been dismissed without prejudice may be revived by motion after the order of dismissal had become final and executory; and
3. Whether or not the court that had originally acquired jurisdiction of the case that was dismissed without prejudice still has jurisdiction to act on the motion to revive after the order of dismissal has become final and executory.[25]
In Olympia International vs. Court of Appeals,[32] we stated thus:The law grants an aggrieved party a period of fifteen (15) days from his receipt of the court’s decision or order disposing of the action or proceeding to appeal or move to reconsider the same.[33]
The dismissal without prejudice of a complaint does not however mean that said dismissal order was any less final. Such order of dismissal is complete in all details, and though without prejudice, nonetheless finally disposed of the matter. It was not merely an interlocutory order but a final disposition of the complaint.
The dismissal of the case, and the lapse of the reglementary period to reconsider or set aside the dismissal, effectively operated to remove the case from the Court’s docket. Even assuming the dismissal to be without prejudice, the case could no longer be reinstated or "revived" by mere motion in the original docketed action, but only by the filing of another complaint accompanied, of course, by the payment of the corresponding filing fees prescribed by law.Contrary to private respondents’ claim, the foregoing rule applies not only to civil cases but to criminal cases as well. In Jaca vs. Blanco,[38] the Court defined a provisional dismissal of a criminal case as a dismissal without prejudice to the reinstatement thereof before the order of dismissal becomes final or to the subsequent filing of a new information for the offense."[39]x x x
[S]ince theoretically every final disposition of an action does not attain finality until after fifteen (15) days therefrom, and consequently within that time the action still remains within the control of the Court, the plaintiff may move and set aside his notice of dismissal and revive his action before that period lapses. But after dismissal has become final after the lapse of the fifteen-day reglementary period, the only way by which the action may be resuscitated or "revived" is by the institution of a subsequent action through the filing of another complaint and the payment of fees prescribed by law. This is so because upon attainment of finality of the dismissal through the lapse of said reglementary period, the Court loses jurisdiction and control over it and can no longer make a disposition in respect thereof inconsistent with such dismissal.[37] (Emphasis supplied.)
Referral to Lupon. – Cases requiring referral to the Lupon for conciliation under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1508[41] where there is no showing of compliance with such requirement, shall be dismissed without prejudice, and may be revived only after such requirement shall have been complied with. This provision shall not apply to criminal cases where the accused was arrested without a warrant.[42]There is nothing in the aforecited provision which supports private respondents’ view. Section 18 merely states that when a case covered by the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure is dismissed without prejudice for non-referral of the issues to the Lupon, the same may be revived only after the dispute subject of the dismissed case is submitted to barangay conciliation as required under the Local Government Code. There is no declaration to the effect that said case may be revived by mere motion even after the fifteen-day period within which to appeal or to file a motion for reconsideration has lapsed.
Sec. 22. Applicability of the regular rules. – The regular procedure prescribed in the Rules of Court shall apply to the special cases herein provided for in a suppletory capacity insofar as they are not inconsistent therewith.[43]A careful examination of Section 18 in relation to Section 22 of the 1991 Revised Rule of Summary Procedure and Rule 40, Section 2 in relation to Rule 13, Sections 9 and 10,[44] and Rule 36, Section 2[45] of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, leads to no other conclusion than that the rules regarding finality of judgments also apply to cases covered by the rules on summary procedure. Nothing in Section 18 of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure conflicts with the prevailing rule that a judgment or order which is not appealed or made subject of a motion for reconsideration within the prescribed fifteen-day period attains finality.[46] Hence, the principle expressed in the maxim interpretare et concordare legibus est optimus interpretandi, or that every statute must be so construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence [47] applies in interpreting both sets of Rules.
The doctrine of finality of judgments is grounded on fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice that at the risk of occasional error, the judgments of the courts must become final at some definite date set by law.[48]It is but logical to infer that the foregoing principle also applies to cases subject to summary procedure especially since the objective of the Rule governing the same is precisely to settle these cases expeditiously.[49] To construe Section 18 thereof as allowing the revival of dismissed cases by mere motion even after the lapse of the period for appealing the same would prevent the courts from settling justiciable controversies with finality,[50] thereby undermining the stability of our judicial system.
Section 412 Conciliation.-- (a) Pre-condition to Filing of Complaint in Court. -- No complaint, petition, action or proceeding involving any matter within the authority of the lupon shall be filed or instituted directly in court or any other government office for adjudication, unless there has been a confrontation between the parties before the lupon chairman or the pangkat, and that no conciliation or settlement has been reached as certified by the lupon secretary or pangkat secretary as attested to by the lupon or pangkat chairman or unless the settlement has been repudiated by the parties thereto.(b) Where Parties May Go Directly to Court.-- The parties may go directly to court in the following instances:[6] Section 18 of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure provides:(1) Where the accused is under detention;
(2) Where a person has otherwise been deprived of personal liberty calling for habeas corpus proceedings;
(3) Where actions are coupled with provisional remedies such as preliminary injunction, attachment, delivery of personal property, and support pendente lite; and
(4) Where the action may otherwise be barred by the statute of limitations.
(c) Conciliation among members of indigenous cultural communities. -- The customs and traditions of indigenous cultural communities shall be applied in settling disputes between members of the cultural communities.
Section 408. Subject Matter for Amicable Settlement; Exception Thereto. -- The lupon for each barangay shall have authority to bring together the parties actually residing in the same city or municipality for amicable settlement of all disputes except:
(a)......Where one party is the government, or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof;
(b)......Where one party is a public officer or employee, and the dispute relates to the performance of his official functions;
(c)......Offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding one (1) year or a fine exceeding Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00); Ncmmis
(d)......Offense where there is no private offended party;
(e)......Where the dispute involves real properties located in different cities or municipalities unless the parties thereto agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement by an appropriate lupon;
(f)......Disputes involving parties who actually reside in barangays of different cities or municipalities, except where such barangay units adjoin each other and the parties thereto agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement by an appropriate lupon;
(g)......Such other classes of disputes which the President may determine in the interest of justice or upon the recommendation of the secretary of Justice.
The court in which non-criminal cases not falling within the authority of the lupon under this Code are filed may, at any time before trial, motu proprio refer the case to the lupon concerned for amicable settlement.
Referral to Lupon. – Cases requiring referral to the Lupon for conciliation under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1508 where there is no showing of compliance with such requirement, shall be dismissed without prejudice, and may be revived only after such requirement shall have been complied with. This provision shall not apply to criminal cases where the accused was arrested without a warrant.
[7] Id., Rollo, pp. 22-23.
[8] Rollo, p. 25.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Rollo, pp. 26-27.
[11] Order dated November 13, 1995; Rollo, p. 32.
[12] Id., at 33.
[13] Rollo, p. 35.
[14] Id., at 36.
[15] Id., at 37.
[16] Id., at 38-40.
[17] Order, dated May 22, 1996, Rollo, p. 41.
[18] Petition, Id., at 43-45.
[19] Rollo, pp. 51-53.
[20] Id., at 51-52.
[21] See private respondents’ Manifestation for the Record, Rollo, pp. 54-55 and petitioners’ Supplement to the Petition; Id., at p. 56.
[22] Decision, dated August 26, 1997, Id., at 19-20.
[23] Id., at 57-61.
[24] Order, dated January 15, 1998, Id., at 21.
[25] Petition for Review, Id., at. 14.
[26] Id., at 9-10, 14.
[27] Id., at 14.
[28] Comment; Rollo, pp. 79-80.
[29] People vs. Bans, 239 SCRA 48, 54 (1994), per Bidin, J., citing Marcelo vs. De Guzman, 114 SCRA 657 (1982); Hydro Resources contractors Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 204 SCRA 309, 318-319 (1991), per Padilla, J., citing De la Cruz vs. Paras, 69 SCRA 75, (1976)
[30] People vs. Bans, supra Note 29.
[31] Olympia International vs. Court of Appeals, 180 SCRA 353, 361 (1989), per Fernan, C.J.
[32] Ibid.
[33] Rule 40, Section 2 in relation to Rule 13, Sections 9 and 10, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.
[34] Alabanzas vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 204 SCRA 304, 307-308 (1991), per Paras, J., citing Turquieza vs. Hernando, 97 SCRA 483 (1980); Heirs of Patriaca vs, Court of Appeals, 124 SCRA 410 (1983); Javier vs. Madamba, Jr., 174 SCRA 495 (1989), Galindez vs. Rural Bank of Llanera, Inc., 175 SCRA 132 (1989), Olympia International vs. Court of Appeals, 180 SCRA 353, 361 (1989), at 308; Borillo vs. Court of Appeals, 209 SCRA 130, 140 (1992), per Davide, J.
[35] Alabanzas vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, supra Note 34.
[36] 234 SCRA 455, 486-487 (1994), per Narvasa, C.J.
[37] Ibid.
[38] 47 O.G. Sup. 108, 110 (1950), per Ozaeta, J.
[39] Ibid.
[40] Rule 40, Section 2 in relation to Rule 13, Sections 9 and 10, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.
[41] Later replaced by the Provisions of the Local government Code of 1991. See provisions under Chapter 7 of said law.
[42] Section 18, 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.
[43] Section 22, 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.
[44] Rule 40, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides: Jurissc
When to appeal. – An appeal may be taken within fifteen (15) days after notice to the appellant of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and record on appeal within thirty (30) days after notice of the judgment or final order.
Rule 13, Sections 9 and 10 thereof state:
Section 9. Service of judgments, final orders or resolutions. – Judgments, final orders or resolutions shall be served either personally or by registered mail. When a party summoned by publication has failed to appear in the action, judgments, final orders or resolutions against him shall be served upon him also by publication at the expense of the prevailing party.
Section 10, Completeness of service.– Personal service is complete upon actual delivery. Service by ordinary mail is complete upon the expiration of ten (10) days after mailing, unless the court otherwise provides. Service by registered mail is complete upon actual receipt by the addressee, or after five (5) days from the date he received the first notice of the postmaster, whichever date is earlier.
[45] Rule 36, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure reads, thus:
Entry of judgments and final orders. – If no appeal or motion for new trial or reconsideration is filed within the time provided in these Rules, the judgment or final order shall forthwith be entered by the clerk in the book of entries of judgments. The date of finality of the judgment or final order shall be deemed to be the date of its entry. The record shall contain the dispositive part of the judgment or final order and shall be signed by the clerk, with a certificate that such judgment or final order has become final and executory.
[46] Rule 40, Section 2, in relation to Rule 13, Sections 9 and 10, and Rule 36, Section 2, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.
[47] Valera vs. Tuason, Jr., 80 Phil. 823, 827 (1948), per Tuason, J.
[48] Alabanzas vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, supra Note 34, citing Turquieza vs. Hernando, 97 SCRA 483 (1980); Heirs of Patriaca vs. Court of Appeals, 124 SCRA 410 (1983); Edra vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 179 SCRA 344 (1989), at 308.
[49] First paragraph, Resolution of the Supreme Court En Banc dated October 15, 1991 Providing for the revised Rule on Summary Procedure for Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.
[50] Alabanzas vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, supra note 34, citing Farescal Vda. De Emnas vs. Emans, 95 SCRA 470 and Heirs of Patriaca vs. Court of Appeals, 124 SCRA 410 (1983)
[51] Section 412 in relation to Section 408.
[52] Ibid.
[53] Millare vs. Hernando, 151 SCRA 484, 489 (1987), per Feliciano, J.
[54] Royales vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 127 SCRA 470 (1984), per Escolin, J.; Ebol vs. Amin, 135 SCRA 438 (1985), per Aquino, J.; Gonzales, vs. Court of Appeals, 151 SCRA 289 (1987), per Sarmiento, J.
[55] Alabanzas vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, supra note 54.
[56] Ibid., citing Carbonel vs. Court of Appeals, 147 SCRA 656 (1987); Republic vs. Reyes, 155 SCRA 313 (1987)