335 Phil. 76
PUNO, J.:
“Ordinarily, an employee who has been dismissed from the service on a legal ground does not deserve an award of separation pay. In this case, considering the length of service of the complainant of almost 18 years without any prior derogatory record, we feel that the extreme penalty of dismissal is disproportionately imposed. Respondent did not suffer any material damage by the infraction committed by complainant, the lump [sic] posts subject of the offense having been returned by him to respondent (USDI). The value of the subject items, although not having been alleged, can be gleaned to be minimal x x x”
“x x x x x x x x x”
“We find no reversible error in the appealed Decision.USDI’s motion for reconsideration was denied.[5] Hence, this petition.
“The complainant is a long-service employee and his small misdeed herein should not be used to sever his right to tenurial security and lifeline not only for himself but likewise for his family. Moreover, as the Labor Arbiter has found, this is a case of a first offense and the lamp post, apparently of small value, was returned. In other words, there was no damage done.
“Discipline to be meaningful must be corrective and progressive, not punitive.
“However, the complainant did not question the award of the Labor Arbiter.
“WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. Consequently, the appealed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED.
“SO ORDERED.”
“The Court feels that distinctions are in order. We note that heretofore the separation pay, when it was considered warranted, was required regardless of the nature or degree of the ground proved, be it mere inefficiency or something graver like immorality or dishonesty. The benediction of compassion was made to cover a multitude of sins, as it were, and to justify the helping hand to the validly dismissed employee whatever the reason for his dismissal. This policy should be re-examined. It is time we rationalize the exception, to make it fair to both labor and management, especially to labor.WHEREFORE, the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC Case No. V-0247-94, is MODIFIED by deleting the award for separation pay in favor of private respondent Beato Singuran.
“xxx xxx xxx
“We hold that henceforth separation pay shall be allowed as a measure of social justice only in those instances where the employee is validly dismissed for causes other than serious misconduct or those reflecting on his moral character. Where the reason for the valid dismissal is, for example, habitual intoxication or an offense involving moral turpitude, like theft or illicit sexual relations with a fellow worker, the employer may not be required to give the dismissed employee separation pay, or financial assistance, or whatever other name it is called, on the ground of social justice.
“A contrary rule would, as the petitioner argues, have the effect of rewarding rather than punishing the erring employee for his offense. And we do not agree that the punishment is his dismissal only and that the separation pay has nothing to do with the wrong he has committed. Of course it has. Indeed, if the employee who steals from the company is granted separation pay even as he is validly dismissed, it is not unlikely that he will commit a similar offense in his next employment because he thinks he can expect a like leniency if he is again found out. This kind of misplaced compassion is not going to do labor in general any good as it will encourage the infiltration of its ranks by those who do not deserve the protection and concern of the Constitution.
“The policy of social justice is not intended to countenance wrongdoing simply because it is committed by the underprivileged. At best it may mitigate the penalty but it certainly will not condone the offense. Compassion for the poor is not an imperative of every humane society but only when the recipient is not a rascal claiming an undeserved privilege. Social justice cannot be permitted to be refuge of scoundrels any more than can equity be an impediment to the punishment of the guilty. Those who invoke social justice may do so only if their hands are clean and their motives blameless and not simply because they happen to be poor. This great policy of our Constitution is not meant for the protection of those who have proved they are not worthy of it, like the workers who have tainted the cause of labor with the blemishes of their own character.”
The above doctrine has been consistently applied by this Court in a long line of cases. [9]
Respondent cannot use social justice to shield wrongdoing.[10] He occupied a position of trust and confidence. Petitioner relied on him to protect the properties of the company. Respondent betrayed this trust when he ordered the subject lamp posts to be delivered to the Adelfa Homeowners’ Association. The offense he committed involves moral turpitude.[11] Indeed, a City Prosecutor found probable cause to file an information for qualified theft against him.
It is incorrect to state that Singuran committed a minor misdeed because of the recovery of the stolen posts. It is unrebutted that the posts were not returned voluntarily, but only after the discovery of their loss and upon demand by petitioner. The fact that USDI did not suffer pecuniary damage will not obliterate respondent’s betrayal of the trust and confidence reposed by petitioner.[12] Neither would his length of service justify his dishonesty or mitigate his liability.[13] His length of service with petitioner even aggravates his offense. He should have been more loyal to petitioner company from which he has derived his family bread and butter for seventeen (17) years.