490 Phil. 710
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
ON THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION:In his answer to the complaint, Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. admitted having executed a deed of sale over the parcel of land covered by T.D. No. 19804 in favor of Danao City, but averred that the latter failed to pay the purchase price thereof; besides, the private respondent had no right to share in the proceeds of the said sale. He likewise denied having received any demand for the delivery of Dulce’s share of the subject properties from the latter’s mother Carlota, or from the private respondent.ON THE SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION:
- Declaring the plaintiff the absolute owner of ONE-HALF (1/2) portion of the TWO (2) parcels of land described in paragraph 2 of the complaint;
- Declaring the plaintiff the absolute owner of the ONE-THIRD (1/3) portion of the NINE (9) parcels of land described in paragraph 3 of the complaint;
- Ordering the defendant to deliver to the plaintiff the latter’s ONE-THIRD (1/3) share of the SEVEN THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED NINETY-TWO PESOS (P7,492.00) representing the purchase price of the parcel of land described in paragraph 3(a) of the complaint with interest thereon until the amount is fully paid;
COMMON TO THE FIRST AND SECOND CAUSES OF ACTION:
- Ordering the partition and segregation of the ONE-HALF (1/2) portion belonging to the plaintiff of the TWO (2) parcels of land described in paragraph 2 of the complaint;
- Ordering the partition and segregation of the ONE-THIRD (1/3) portion belonging to the plaintiff of the remaining EIGHT (8) parcels of land described in paragraph 3 of the complaint;
- Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as moral damages;
- Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff exemplary damages the amount of which is left to the discretion of this Honorable Court;
- Ordering the defendant to deliver to the plaintiff the latter’s share of the fruits of the ELEVEN (11) parcels of land subject-matter of this complaint, the value of which will be proven during the trial;
- Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff actual litigation expenses, the value of which will be proven during the trial;
- Ordering the defendant to pay attorney’s fee in the amount of TWELVE THOUSAND PESOS (P12,000.00);
- Granting to the plaintiff such other reliefs and remedies as he may be entitled to in accordance with law and equity.[6]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff and against the defendant by declaring that the plaintiff is legally and rightfully entitled to the one half (1/2) portion of the two (2) parcels of land described in paragraph 2 of the Complaint and to the one third (1/3) portion of the nine (9) parcels of land described in paragraph 3 of the complaint as co-owner thereof, and ordering the partition and segregation of the said one half (1/2) portion of the said two (2) parcels of land and of the said one third (1/3) portion of the nine (9) parcels of land, and in the partition thereof, the mechanics of partition outlined in Rule 69 of the Revised Rules of Court must be followed (Magallon vs. Montejo, 146 SCRA 282); ordering the defendant Socorro Lawas, as administratrix of the Estate of Pedro Sepulveda, Sr., to deliver to plaintiff the latter’s one third (1/3) share of the P7,492.00 representing the purchase price of the parcel of land sold to Danao City with interest of twelve [per] centum (12%) per annum (Reformina vs. Tomol, 139 SCRA 260) from the date of filing of the Complaint until the amount due to plaintiff is fully paid, to pay attorney’s fees to plaintiff’s attorney in the sum of P10,000.00, and to pay the costs. The counterclaim is hereby dismissed.The trial court ruled that the private respondent’s action for reconveyance based on constructive trust had not yet prescribed when the complaint was filed; that he was entitled to a share in the proceeds of the sale of the property to Danao City; and that the partition of the subject property among the adjudicatees thereof was in order.
SO ORDERED.[15]
The petition is granted for the sole reason that the respondent failed to implead as parties, all the indispensable parties in his complaint.
- THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN THE INCORRECT APPLICATION OF ART. 494 OF THE CIVIL CODE AND IN UPHOLDING THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT’S FINDING THAT A TRUST RELATIONSHIP WAS CREATED BETWEEN HEREIN RESPONDENT AND PEDRO SEPULVEDA [SR.].
- THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT APPLYING THE LAWS ON PRESCRIPTION AND LACHES TO THE FACTS AS PROVEN IN THE CASE AGAINST HEREIN RESPONDENT.
- THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE FINDING OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 25 IN DANAO CITY THAT PAYMENT WAS MADE BY DANAO CITY FOR ONE (1) OF THE ELEVEN (11) PARCELS INVOLVED IN THE CASE AND OF WHICH HEREIN RESPONDENT SHOULD BE PAID BY PETITIONER ONE THIRD (1/3) OF THE PURCHASE PRICE.
- THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AWARDING MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND A SHARE IN THE RENTS AND PROFITS OF THE ELEVEN (11) PARCELS TO HEREIN RESPONDENT.
- THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT’S FINDING THAT ATTORNEY’S FEES ARE TO BE AWARDED AND EVEN INCREASING THE AMOUNT THEREOF.[16]
Under articles 807 and 834 of the old Civil Code the surviving spouse is a forced heir and entitled to a share in usufruct in the estate of the deceased spouse equal to that which by way of legitime corresponds or belongs to each of the legitimate children or descendants who have not been bettered or have not received any share in the one-third share destined for betterment. The right of the surviving spouse to have a share in usufruct in the estate of the deceased spouse is provided by law of which such spouse cannot be deprived and which cannot be ignored. Of course, the spouse may waive it but the waiver must be express.Section 1, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court provides that in an action for partition, all persons interested in the property shall be joined as defendants.
Section 1. Complaint in action for partition of real estate. - A person having the right to compel the partition of real estate may do so as in this rule prescribed, setting forth in his complaint the nature and extent of his title and an adequate description of the real estate of which partition is demanded and joining as defendants all the other persons interested in the property.Thus, all the co-heirs and persons having an interest in the property are indispensable parties; as such, an action for partition will not lie without the joinder of the said parties.[20] The mere fact that Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. has repudiated the co-ownership between him and the respondent does not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to take cognizance of the action for partition, for, in a complaint for partition, the plaintiff seeks, first, a declaration that he is a co-owner of the subject property; and, second, the conveyance of his lawful shares.[21] As the Court ruled in De Mesa v. Court of Appeals:[22]
The first stage of an action for judicial partition and/or accounting is concerned with the determination of whether or not a co-ownership in fact exists and a partition is proper, that is, it is not otherwise legally proscribed and may be made by voluntary agreement of all the parties interested in the property. This phase may end in a declaration that plaintiff is not entitled to the desired partition either because a co-ownership does not exist or a partition is legally prohibited. It may also end, on the other hand, with an adjudgment that a co-ownership does in truth exist, that partition is proper in the premises, and that an accounting of rents and profits received by the defendant from the real estate in question is in order. In the latter case, “the parties may, if they are able to agree, make partition among themselves by proper instruments of conveyance, and the court shall confirm the partition so agreed upon by all the parties.” In either case, whether the action is dismissed or partition and/or accounting is decreed, the order is a final one and may be appealed by any party aggrieved thereby.In the present action, the private respondent, as the plaintiff in the trial court, failed to implead the following indispensable parties: his father, Rodolfo Pelaez; the heirs of Santiago Sepulveda, namely, Paz Sepulveda and their children; and the City of Danao which purchased the property covered by T.D. 19804 (T.D. No. 35090) from Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. and maintained that it had failed to pay for the purchase price of the property.
The second stage commences when the parties are unable to agree upon the partition ordered by the court. In that event, partition shall be effected for the parties by the court with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. This second phase may also deal with the rendition of the accounting itself and its approval by the Court after the parties have been accorded the opportunity to be heard thereon, and an award for the recovery by the party or parties thereto entitled of their just shares in the rents and profits of the real estate in question….[23]
SEC. 7. Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. – Parties in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants.Indeed, the presence of all indispensable parties is a condition sine qua non for the exercise of judicial power. It is precisely when an indispensable party is not before the court that the action should be dismissed. Thus, the plaintiff is mandated to implead all the indispensable parties, considering that the absence of one such party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.[24] One who is a party to a case is not bound by any decision of the court, otherwise, he will be deprived of his right to due process. Without the presence of all the other heirs as plaintiffs, the trial court could not validly render judgment and grant relief in favor of the private respondent. The failure of the private respondent to implead the other heirs as parties-plaintiffs constituted a legal obstacle to the trial court and the appellate court’s exercise of judicial power over the said case, and rendered any orders or judgments rendered therein a nullity.[25]