490 Phil. 249
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
This has reference with your verbal instruction that I will submit my written explanation regarding my absences on April 30,1998 and May 2, 1998.In the evening Gonzales left for Abra.
At the outset, my profound apologies for the above-stated absences. As you are fully aware of, on April 27, 1998, I formally requested your office that my official leave [which] will expire on April 29, 1998 shall be extended up to May 15, 1998. Inasmuch that I was in the province (ABRA) at that time, I was not aware that my request was disapproved until such time that I received your telegram two days later. Likewise, when I received your telegram, I was sick at that time and this was duly communicated to your office thru telegram. This was the reason I failed to report for work also on May 2, 1998.
As exhaustively discussed to you today, there is a great necessity for me to go home tonight in the province. Once again, I am asking your kind understanding that I shall be allowed to go on leave effective tomorrow and rest assured that I will report for work after the election. At any rate, the training of our new guards will start on May 18, 1998.
Thank you for this and for the past favors.
As discussed during our meeting, you are advised to submit an explanation within 24 hours why you did not report to work 1st May 1998? And why you came in late today 4th of May 1998, as we had a 10:30 AM scheduled communication meeting with the incoming Security Agency.Gonzales claims that he got hold of a copy of the above-quoted memo only on May 8, 1998.
We will be having another meeting tomorrow regarding the turnover of the outgoing Security Agency. I will be expecting your presence during the said meeting.
For your compliance.
THIS IS TO REITERATE OUR ADVICE FOR YOU TO REPORT BACK TO WORK IMMEDIATELY UPON RECEIPT OF THIS NOTICE DUE TO VERY URGENT MATTERS INVOLVING SECURITY DEPARTMENT’S CONCERNS WHICH IMPERATIVELY REQUIRE YOUR PERSONAL ATTENTION. PLEASE CONSIDER THIS AS OUR FINAL ADVICE.Gonzales, who claims to have received the May 5, 1998 telegram only in the afternoon of May 7, 1998, immediately repaired back to Manila on May 8, 1998 only to be “humiliatingly and ignominiously barred by the guard (a subordinate of [Gonzales]) from entering the premises.”
As you continuously disregard our several advices for you to report back to work to attend to very urgent matters involving Security Department’s concerns which, as categorically made clear to you, imperatively required your personal presence and attention considering that you are its Department Head, thus adversely affecting the operations of said department, we are left with no recourse but to terminate your services from the Hotel effective immediately for violations of rule no. 27, Type C, of the House Code of Discipline – “Acts of gross disobedience or insubordination” and provisions of the Labor Code, specifically Art. 282. Termination by Employer, par. (a) x x x willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection with his work.Gonzales thus filed on May 27, 1998 a complaint[11] against Acesite, Angerbauer and Kennedy for illegal dismissal with prayer for reinstatement and payment of full backwages, service incentive leave, 13th month pay, moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. Gonzales, however, failed to appear in 2 consecutive hearings despite notice, meriting the dismissal by the Labor Arbiter of his complaint by Order[12] of September 17, 1998.
Please be guided accordingly. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
By Decision[16] of December 29, 2000, the NLRC reversed that of the Labor Arbiter, the dispositive portion of which is quoted verbatim:I
The Labor Arbiter committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint for lack of merit.II
The Labor Arbiter seriously erred in the finding of facts, which caused grave or irreparable damage or injury to the complainant/appellant.III
The Labor Arbiter seriously erred in the finding that there was absence of due process in the dismissal of the complaint.[15]
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of Labor Arbiter Geobel A. Bartolabac dated February 7, 2000 is hereby, REVERSED. Respondents are hereby ordered:Acesite thereupon filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals anchored on the following grounds:1) to immediately reinstate complainant to his former position without loss of seniority rights;
2) to pay complainant backwages beginning for the period May 16, 1998, until he is actually reinstated, inclusive of all his other fringe benefits or their monetary equivalent;
3) to pay complainant the sum of P800,000.00 pesos as moral damages and the equal amount of P800,000.00 as and for exemplary damages;
4) to pay ten (10) per cent attorney’s fees. (Underscoring supplied)
By Decision[18] of October 12, 2001, the Court of Appeals, finding that Gonzales was illegally dismissed, affirmed with modification the NLRC decision:
- THE NLRC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT REVERSED THE FINDING OF THE LABOR ARBITER THAT THE RESPONDENT WAS LEGALLY DISMISSED FOR JUST CAUSE[.]
- THE NLRC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT REVERSED THE FINDING OF THE LABOR ARBITER THAT THE RESPONDENT WAS AFFORDED PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS[.]
- THE NLRC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT REVERSED THE FINDING OF THE LABOR ARBITER THAT THE RESPONDENT IS NOT ENTITLED TO HIS MONEY CLAIMS[.]
- THE NLRC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT INCLUDED PETITIONERS PHIL KENNEDY AND JOHANN ANGERBAUER LIABLE TO THE RESPONDENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THEY ARE MERE EMPLOYEES OF THE HOTEL[.][17]
After a careful study of the evidence on record and of the allegations of both parties, this Court is convinced that private respondent Gonzales was illegally dismissed.Hence, the two separate petitions of Acesite and Gonzales.
The parties hereto contest the receipt by private respondent Gonzales of the first telegram sent by petitioner Angerbauer. Since the evidence of petitioners is merely a piece of paper supposedly containing the contents of the telegram sent to the former, We cannot accept the same as proof that indeed a telegram was sent and was thereafter received by private respondent Gonzales. The burden of proof is upon petitioners to show that indeed the latter received the same.
Insofar as private respondent Gonzales’ failure to report for work on May 1, 1998, we give credence to the medical certificate he submitted to prove that he was indeed indisposed during the period in controversy especially in the light of the fact that the same was issued by his rival in the political arena, Dr. Laureano C. Gonzales, Jr., We do not think Dr. Gonzales who likewise ran for the same elective position as herein private respondent Gonzales would help him cover up his absences if he really did not treat the latter and had him under his care. Thus, his failure to report for work on May 1, 1998 was justified.
As to the third telegram, the final notice by petitioners to private respondent Gonzales, which directed him to report for work immediately upon receipt thereof, was complied with by the latter when he reported to the hotel on May 8, 1998 but was refused entry. Petitioners insist that he did not report to work. Private respondent Gonzales however submitted an official receipt of his diesoline purchase to evidence the fact that he went to Manila on said date.
And even granting arguendo that private respondent Gonzales did not heed the same, his immediate termination was still unwarranted despite the provision on petitioner’s House Code of Discipline.
Article 277 of the Labor Code, as amended, provides:ART. 277. Miscellaneous provisions. – (a) x x x.
(b) Subject to the constitutional right of workers to security of tenure and their right to be protected against dismissal except for just and authorized cause and without prejudice to the requirement of notice under Article 283 of this Code, the employer shall furnish the worker whose employment is sought to be terminated a written notice containing a statement of the causes for termination and shall afford the latter ample opportunity to be heard and defend himself with the assistance of his representative if he so desires in accordance with company rules and regulations promulgated pursuant to guidelines set by the Department of Labor and Employment. Any decision taken by the employer shall be without prejudice to the right of the worker to contest the validity or legality of his dismissal by filing a complaint with the regional branch of the National Labor Relations Commission. The burden of proving that the termination was for a valid or authorized cause shall rest on the employer. The Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment may certify the dispute in the event of a prima facie finding by the appropriate official of the Department of Labor and Employment before whom such dispute pending that the termination may cause a serious labor dispute or is in implementation of a mass lay-off.x x x
In the present case, the records do not show compliance by petitioners with the two (2)-notice rule prescribed in the above provision of law. Although several telegrams were sent to private respondent Gonzales, there is not one (1) telegram which contains a statement of the cause for his termination. The telegram and the meeting held on May 4, 1998 requiring him to submit a written explanation as to his absences did not apprise him that he was being considered for termination. Moreover, he was not informed that an investigation was being conducted vis-à-vis his continued absences and his non-disclosure of the fact that he was running for public office.
In other words, no notice was sent by petitioners to apprise private respondent Gonzales of the charges against him nor was he given ample opportunity to contest said charges with the assistance of counsel, if he so desired. What petitioners did was to send him a notice of termination on the premise that his immediate dismissal is authorized under their House Code of Discipline. While it is recognized that company policies and regulations, unless they are oppressive or contrary to law, are generally valid and binding on the parties and must be complied with, the same cannot be exercised for the purpose of defeating the rights of the employees under the law.
Unfortunately for petitioners, their employees are still entitled to the procedural requirements of notice and hearing despite provisions in their code of discipline purportedly giving them the right to immediately terminate their services. Employees cannot bargain away this right notwithstanding their acquiescence to the employer’s rules.
As to petitioners’ claim that private respondent willfully disobeyed their orders, the Supreme Court in the case of Lagatic vs. NLRC held:In order that an employer may dismiss an employee on the ground of willful disobedience, there must be concurrence of at least two (2) requisites: the employee’s assailed conduct must have been willful or intentional, the willingness being characterized by a wrongful and perverse attitude; and that the order violated must have been reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee and must pertain to the duties which he had been engaged to discharge.The present case does not show the presence of the first requisite. As private respondent Gonzales’ failure to comply with petitioners’ orders were not characterized by a perverse attitude. At most he can only be suspended from service for assuming that his leaves of absence would be approved by management. The penalty of dismissal is too harsh considering that private respondent Gonzales has been with the company for almost five (5) years and has rendered unblemished service until the period in controversy. For his unauthorized absences, We hereby rule that a suspension of one (1) week is commensurate to his violation of Type C, House Code of Discipline rule on unauthorized absences.
Anent the alleged willful non-disclosure by private respondent Gonzales of his candidacy for public office, We find the same to be unsupported by evidence. The tenor of private respondent Gonzales’ internal email to petitioner Angerbauer reveals that the latter was aware that the reason for the former’s prolonged absences was his ongoing campaign as Board Member of the Province of Abra. Considering the same, We are inclined to believe private respondent Gonzales’ version of the story.
Going now to the propriety of the monetary awards to private respondent Gonzales, We find the amount P800,000.00 each as moral and exemplary damages unwarranted. The collective amount of P100,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages is just under the circumstances. Public respondent NLRC’s award of ten (10) per cent attorney’s fees is affirmed.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated December 29, 2000 of public respondent National Labor Relations Commission is hereby MODIFIED as follows:
Petitioners are hereby ordered:
1. to reinstate private respondent Leo A. Gonzales to his former position without loss of seniority rights or privileges. If reinstatement is no longer feasible, then payment of separation pay equivalent to ½ month pay for every year of service is hereby ordered;
2. to pay private respondent Leo A. Gonzales his full back wages commencing on 14 May 1998 in view of his one (1) week suspension until he is actually reinstated;
3. to pay P100,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages; and
4. to pay 10% of the total monetary award as and for attorney’s fees.
With costs against the petitioners.[19] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT DID NOT AFFIRM THE FINDING OF THE LABOR ARBITER THAT THE RESPONDENT WAS LEGALLY DISMISSED FOR JUST CAUSE.II
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT REVERSED THE FINDING OF THE LABOR ARBITER THAT RESPONDENT WAS AFFORDED PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS.III
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT REVERSED THE FINDING OF THE LABOR ARBITER THAT THE RESPONDENT IS NOT ENTITLED TO HIS MONEY CLAIMS.[20]
Acesite argues that there was just cause for Gonzales’ termination under Article 282 of the Labor Code, the pertinent provision of which reads:I
[THE COURT OF APPEALS] GRAVELY ERRED IN DELETING THE AWARDS OF FRINGE BENEFITS OR THEIR MONETARY EQUIVALENTS WHICH THE NLRC ORDERED TO BE GIVEN TO THE PETITIONER FROM THE TIME HE WAS ILLEGALLY DISMISSED UP TO HIS ACTUAL REINSTATEMENT.II
[THE COURT OF APPEALS] SERIOUSLY ERRED IN BESTOWING TO THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS THE OPTION WHETHER TO REINSTATE THE PETITIONER OR NOT.III
[THE COURT OF APPEALS] ERRED IN SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCING THE AMOUNT OF AWARDS OF MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES WHICH THE NLRC DESERVINGLY ADJUDGED TO BE ACCORDED TO THE PETITIONER.[21]
ART. 282 TERMINATION BY EMPLOYER. – An employer may terminate an employment for any of the following causes:For, so Acesite claims, Gonzales “showed no respect for x x x [the] lawful orders for him to report back to work and repeatedly ignored all telegrams sent to him,”[22] and it merely exercised its legal right to dismiss him under the House Code of Discipline which imposes dismissal as penalty for a violation of Rule 27 thereof.
(a) Serious Misconduct of willful Disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection with his work;
(b) Gross and habitual Neglect by the employee of his duties;x x x
Unless they have exceeded their authority, corporate officers are, as a general rule, not personally liable for their official acts, because a corporation, by legal fiction, has a personality separate and distinct from its officers, stockholders and members. However, this fictional veil may be pierced whenever the corporate personality is used as a means of perpetuating fraud or an illegal act, evading an existing obligation, or confusing a legitimate issue. In cases of illegal dismissal, corporate directors and officers are solidarily liable with the corporation, where terminations of employment are done with malice or in bad faith. (Underscoring supplied, citations omitted)In holding Angerbauer and Kennedy solidarily liable, the NLRC intended “to deter other foreign employer[s] from repeating the inhuman treatment of their Filipino employees who should be treated with equal respect especially in their own land and prevent further violation of their human rights as employees.”
ART. 279 SECURITY OF TENURE. – In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except for just cause or when authorized by this Title. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)As for the award of attorney’s fees, the same is in order, Gonzales having been forced to litigate and incur expenses to protect his rights and interest.[33] This Court, however, reduces the award to P10,000.00.
WHEREFORE, as modified, the decision reads as follows:No pronouncement as to costs.1) Acesite Corporation is hereby ordered to pay Leo A. Gonzales:a) his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and his other benefits or their monetary equivalent, to be computed from the time he was illegally dismissed until the finality of this Decision less 3 days in view of his suspension;
b) separation pay equivalent to his 1 month salary for every year of service computed from the time Gonzales was first employed by Acesite until the finality of this Decision;
c) P10,000.00 as attorney’s fees; and2) The complaint against Johann Angerbauer and Phil Kennedy is hereby DISMISSED.