557 Phil. 737
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
The groups filed their respective answers. Majority of the respondents prayed that the just compensation should be fixed at P8,000.00 per square meter.
- The first group is represented by Atty. Reynaldo Dimayacyac;
- The second group is represented by Attys. Cesar Cruz and Gregorio Ortega; and
- The third group is represented by Atty. Emmanuel Agustin.
For resolution is the Second Report on Appraisal of the Fair Market Valuation dated August 2, 2000 submitted by Commissioners Arturo V. Magtibay, (Chairman), Jessie E. Cantos and Lauro C. Andaya. Said report reiterated its recommendation in that Partial Report dated May 30, 2000, that the expropriation price shall be P4,800.00 per square meter.Subsequently, the trial court issued several Orders directing petitioner to pay respondents, represented by their respective counsel, just h compensation computed at P5,500.00 per square meter pursuant to its Order dated August 15, 2000, thus:
The Court, acting on the Partial Report, issued an Order dated July 10, 2000, modifying said recommendation and pegged the price at P5,500.00 per square meter, as to the properties of the defendants named therein.
Mentioned in the second report is the findings and recommendation of Amicus Curiae, Cuervo Appraisers, Inc., thru Manager/Appraiser Salvador D. Oscianas. He rendered an opinion that the fair market value per square meter ranges from P5,500.00 to a maximum of P6,000.00 (Report as Exhibit "97", supplemented by his testimony in Court on July 18, 2000). He mentioned three (3) prior landsales/transactions within the zone, to wit:Mr. Oscianas stated that the lands in the area in question are for commercial/light industrial purposes. These are developed areas as per his ocular inspection. It is accessible by National highways (Calicanto) from Batangas City Hall and the Bauan/Diversion Road as well as Municipal Road (the bypass road), and by the sea (Port of Batangas). It has water, lighting, communications and garbage facilities. Batangas City and province enjoy continuous boom of industrial and commercial developments. It has not experienced recession, unlike other regions, although it has experienced also the depreciation of the peso and the rise of the prices of prime commodities and real properties, much higher than P15,000.00 per square meter than the recorded past sales prices. He recommended for a maximum price of P6,000.00 per square meter as fair market value of the properties in question.
- Deed of Absolute Sale between Demetrio Marasigan in favor of Phil. Ports Authority (PPA for brevity) dated December 11, 1996, price per square meter was P5,000.00.
- Judgment by compromise agreement dated September 23, 1997 (Exhibit "100-2") between Andrea Palacios and the City Government of Batangas, wherein the expropriation price per square meter for the road right of way (By-pass road) was agreed upon at P5,200.00.
- Purchase by First Gas at Sta. Rita (fronting Batangas Bay) for P10,000.00 per square meter (industrial zone) a little further than Sta. Clara into the seashore in 1997.
Atty. Emmanuel Agustin in behalf of his clients submitted a Decision by Compromise Agreement dated January 20, 1999 in the Court of Appeals in that case of Dimaano vs. PPA pegging the price per square meter at P10,000.00 involving a similarly situated lot (Exh. "47").
Jurisprudence on expropriation pricing has shown that the fair market valuation is greatly guided by prior sales near the date of expropriation (Toledo City vs. Fernandos, et al., G.R. L-45144, April 15, 1998 and prior Supreme Court decisions).
Based on the foregoing considerations, the Court hereby sets the fair market value at P5,500.00 per square meter of the lots of the above-named defendants and those similarly situated, including those who did not file answer.
SO ORDERED.
Pursuant to the order of 15 August 2000, plaintiff is required to pay by way of just compensation to the following defendants, represented by Atty. Emmanuel D. Agustin, to wit:
Names of Defendants | | TCT/Tax Dec. No. | | Area of Property Owned by them. Likewise, as mentioned in the complaint and in the Answer | | Amount Just compensation due them based on P5,500.00/sq.m. per August 15, 2000 partial Judgment Order | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
1. Felipa D. Acosta married to Honesto Hernella; Heirs of Eleuterio D. Acosta married to Martha Galang; Pacita D. Acosta married to Emilio Berberabe; Lamberto D. Acosta married to Angelina Ituralde | TD No. 90-00010 | 13,131 sq. m. | P72,220,500.00 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
xxx | xxx | xxx | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
24 Heirs of Francisco Sumanga | TD No. 033-02504 | | 856 sq. m. | 4,708,000.00 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
TD No. 033-02475 | 1,305 sq. m. | 7,177,500.00 |
SO ORDERED.
Pursuant to the Order dated 15 August 2000, plaintiff is required to pay by way of just compensation to the following defendants, represented by Atty. Gregorio Ortega and Atty. Simon T. Agbing, to wit:
Names of Defendants | | | TCT/Tax Dec. No. | Area of Property owned by them. Likewise, as mentioned in the complaint and in the Answer | | Amount Just compensation due them based on P5,500.00/sq.m. per August 15, 2000 partial Judgment Order | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
1. Pedro Alcantara md to Dorotea Macatangay. | TD 090-00003 | 1,581 | P 8,695,500.00 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| | xxx | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
72 Heirs of Basilio Macaraeg | TD 033-02525 | 1/7 of 5,088=726.85 | 3,997,675.00 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
and Pacencia del Mundo | TD 033-02528 | 1/7 of 4,926=703.7 | 3,870,350.00 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
TOTAL... | P3,384,212,425.00 |
Pursuant to the Order dated 15 August 2000, plaintiff is required to pay by way of just compensation to the following defendants, to wit:
Names of Defendants | | TCT/Tax Dec. No. | Area of Property owned by them. Likewise, as men-tioned in the com-plaint and in the Answer | | Amount Just compensation due them based on P5,500.00/sq.m. per August 15, 2000 partial Judgment Order | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
1. Pastor Realty Corp. | TCT RT-627 (37429) TCT RT-626 (137428) | 41,389 398 | P227,639,500.00 2,189,000,000.00 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
xxx | xxx | xxx | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| TD-033-02476 | 1,250 | 6,875,000.00 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
| P556,879,500.00 = = = = = = = = |
Names of Defendants | TCT/Tax Dec. No. | Area of Property owned by them. Likewise, as mentioned in the complaint and in the Answer | Amount Just compensation due them based on P5,500.00/sq.m. per August 15, 2000 partial Judgment Order | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Counsel: Atty. Cesar C. Cruz | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
1. Remedios Rosales | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Bondoc & Jose K. Rosales | TCT No. T-43534 | 106,720 | P586,960,000.00 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
2. Heirs of Lumin Antolin | TD-035-01704 | 54,681 | 30,745,500.00 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
P887,705,500.00 = = = = = = = = | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
xxx | | xxx | xxx | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Defendants Baliwag (no counsel) | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
1. Gregorio Baliwag, Eliseo | TD 035-02501 | 740 | P 4,103,000.00 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Baliwag, Crisanta Baliwag | TD 033-02691 | 483 | 2,656,500.00 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
TD 033-02533 | 1,220.5 | 6,712,750.00 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
P 13,472,250.00 = = = = = = = = |
The motion further prays that they (respondents represented by Atty. Emmanuel Agustin) be allowed to adopt the Orders of the Court dated July 10, 2000 and August 15, 2000 setting the fair market value at P5,500.00 per square meter. There being no opposition, the same is GRANTED.Records show that petitioner interposed an appeal from this Order to the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 70023.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Motion to Dismiss Appeal is GRANTED. The Petition and Supplemental Petitions are DISMISSED and the writs of preliminary injunction are hereby LIFTED. The 'Petition to Cite Respondent Paterno V. Tac-an In Contempt' is DENIED for lack of merit.Acting on the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a TRO, we issued a Resolution on August 7, 2006 requiring respondents to comment thereon within ten (10) days from notice and ordering the issuance of a TRO enjoining the trial court and its agents or representatives from implementing and enforcing the Orders dated May 29, 2001, November 18, 2004 and November 24, 2004 issued in Civil Case No. 5447, effective immediately until further orders from this Court.
SO ORDERED.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED NO ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER OF AUGUST 23, 2000 HAD BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY, HENCE, PETITIONER'S APPEAL WAS CORRECTLY DISMISSED.For our resolution are the following issues:
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED NO ERROR, DID NOT MISAPPREHEND THE FACTS, NOR COMMIT GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT HELD THAT THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER FIXING JUST COMPENSATION WAS IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE, ESPECIALLY IN THE ABSENCE OF COUNTERVAILING EVIDENCE FOR THE PETITIONER.
Section 1. Subject of appeal. - An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable.The above Rule clearly states that only a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein declared by the Rules to be appealable, may be subject of an appeal; and that no appeal may be taken from an interlocutory order.
No appeal may be taken from:
(a) An order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration;
(b) An order denying a petition for relief or any similar motion seeking relief from judgment;
(c) An interlocutory order;
xxx xxx xxx
A final judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case leaving nothing more to be done by the Court in respect thereto, e.g., an adjudication on the merits which, on the basis of the evidence presented at the trial, declares categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties are and which party is in the right; or a judgment or order that dismisses an action on the ground, for instance, of res judicata or prescription. Once rendered, the task of the Court is ended, as far as deciding the controversy or determining the rights and liabilities of the litigants is concerned. Nothing more remains to be done by the Court except to await the parties' next move (which, among others, may consist of the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration, or the taking of an appeal) and ultimately, of course, to cause the execution of the judgment once it becomes 'final' or, to use the established and more distinctive term, 'final and executory.'Here, the assailed Order dated August 15, 2000 merely fixed the fair market value of the lots at P5,500.00 per square meter. The Order is not an adjudication on the merits and does not declare the rights and obligations of the parties. Nor does it rule who between the parties is right. In other words, the trial court has yet to decide the case on its merits. Clearly, the challenged Order being interlocutory is not appealable.
xxx xxx xxx
Conversely, an order that does not finally dispose of the case, and does not end the court's task of adjudicating the parties' contentions and determining their rights and liabilities as regards each other, but obviously indicates that other things remain to be done by the Court, is 'interlocutory,' e.g., an order denying a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules, or granting a motion for extension of time to file a pleading, or authorizing amendment thereof, or granting or denying applications for postponement, or production or inspection of documents or things, etc. Unlike a 'final' judgment or order, which is appealable, as above pointed out, an 'interlocutory' order may not be questioned on appeal except only as part of an appeal that may eventually be taken from the final judgment rendered in this case.
The rule is founded on considerations of orderly procedure, to forestall useless appeals and avoid undue inconvenience to the appealing party by having to assail orders as they are promulgated by the court, when all such orders may be contested in a single appeal.
Even if we consider the Order dated 15 August 2000 to be a final order that is the proper subject of appeal to this Court, we cannot sustain the appeal. PPA's contention that its evidence were completely ignored by the trial court is without merit. As the defendants-appellees pointed out in their respective Briefs and Motion to Dismiss Appeal, PPA never presented any evidence. When the defendants-appellees were presenting their respective evidence, PPA was not even present during these proceedings although it was properly notified of the said hearings. Despite ample opportunity to do so, PPA did not ask the trial court that it be given the opportunity to present its evidence. Neither did the PPA present any rebuttal evidence to the evidence presented by the defendants-appellees. The "Comment on Commissioners' Partial Report" dated 3 July 2000 submitted by PPA merely states:Relative to the second issue, the Court of Appeals ruled that the Petition for Certiorari can not be sustained for having been filed late. Petitioner is assailing the first Order dated May 29, 2001 granting respondents' motion for execution of the August 23, 2000 Order and subsequent Orders of the trial court stated earlier. Petitioner received a copy of the Order dated May 29, 2001 as early as June 4, 2001. However, petitioner filed its Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals only on December 14, 2004. Obviously, it was late by more than three years and six months. Under Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rule of Civil Procedure, as amended, a petition for certiorari should be filed not later than 60 days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution.In the aforesaid "Comment on Commissioners' Partial Report," PPA did not even attach any document why "(t) he just compensation for the properties should be lower" and failed to present evidence that the lands involved "are agricultural in nature" or "are not being used for commercial or industrial purposes" in the face of the testimony by defendants-appellees' witness, Mr. Oscianas, that the highest and best use of the property is industrial (TSN dated 18 July 2000, pp. 15-17). The Court notes that even before the filing by the PPA of its complaint for expropriation on 14 October 1999, the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) has already promulgated in 1997 a zonal valuation for the properties located in Batangas which classified defendants-appellees' properties as industrial and agricultural. In other words, PPA's arguments are mere legal conclusions devoid of any factual justification.
- The commissioners submitted their Partial Report on the just compensation of the properties involved, recommending a valuation of P4,800.00 per square meter.
- The just compensation for the properties should be lower than the foregoing valuation.
- The lands are agricultural in nature. They are not being used for commercial or industrial purposes.
The Land Valuation Report of the PPA Land Acquisition Committee, tax declarations and zonal valuations that the PPA urges this Court to consider are mere attachments to their complaint which were not marked, much less formally offered before the trial court. Nobody from the PPA even identified these documents. Rule 132, Section 34 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides that: "The Court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. x x x."
Even assuming that PPA's evidence can be considered to form part of the record despite the lack of formal offer of evidence, the same can only serve as factors to be considered. Thus, in Section 5 (Standards for the Assessment of the Value of the Land Subject of Expropriation Proceedings or Negotiated Sale) of Republic Act No. 8974, the Court may consider the following relevant standards "among other well-established factors," to wit:In order to facilitate the determination of just compensation, the Court may consider, among other well established factors, the following relevant standards:We have examined the Order dated 15 August 2000 and find the same to be consistent with the aforesaid statutory standards.
(a) The classification and use for which the property is suited;
(b) The developmental costs for improving the land;
(c) The value declared by the owners;
(d) The current selling price of similar lands in the vicinity;
(e) The reasonable disturbance compensation for the removal and/or demolition of certain improvements on the land and for the value of improvements thereon;
(f) The size, shape or location, tax declaration and zonal valuation of the land;
(g) The price of the land as manifested in the ocular findings, oral as well as documentary evidence presented; and
(h) Such facts and events as to enable the affected property owners to have sufficient funds to acquire similarly-situated lands of the government, and thereby rehabilitate themselves as early as possible.
There is likewise no merit in PPA's contention that the lack of pre-trial voided the proceedings. First. PPA is estopped from raising lack of pre-trial because it failed to set the case for pre-trial which was its duty under Rule 18, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Second. In the case of Spouses Martinez v. Hon. De la Merced, et al., 174 SCRA 182, 189 (1989), the Supreme Court ruled that "(a) party's failure to object to the absence of a pre-trial is deemed a waiver of his right thereto" and that the "trial court's inadvertent failure to calendar the case for a pre-trial or a preliminary conference cannot render the proceedings illegal or void ab initio." In the present case, PPA failed to object to the absence of a pre-trial. Third. There is no showing that the trial court disregarded the provisions of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court specifically Sections 5, 6, 7 and 8 which to Our mind already serve the purposes of pre-trial in expediting the ascertainment of facts. Under the aforesaid provisions, the trial court appoints not more than three (3) competent and disinterested persons as commissioners to ascertain and report to the trial court the just compensation for the property sought to be taken. Evidence may be introduced by either party before the commissioners and the commissioners shall assess the consequential damages to the property as well as consequential benefits derived by the owner from the property. Thereupon, the commissioners make full and accurate report of all their proceedings, which report the court may, after all interested parties shall have been given the time to file their objections thereto and after hearing shall have been conducted, either accept and render judgment in accordance therewith or for cause shown, recommit said report to the commissioners for further report of facts; or set aside said report and appoint new commissioners; or accept said report in part and reject it in part, and ultimately make such order or render such judgment as shall secure to the plaintiff the property essential to the exercise of his right of expropriation and to the defendant just compensation for the property so taken.
1) Zonal valuation of real properties in Batangas City made by the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) in 1997;In its objection to respondents' Formal Offer of Evidence in support of their motion, petitioner claimed that their documentary evidence are irrelevant because Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8974[6] "speaks of the Bureau of Internal Revenue's, not the local governments' zonal valuation as basis for the payment of the provisional deposit to the land owner."
2) Executive Order Nos. 385 and 431 issued by then President Corazon C. Aquino on December 19, 1989 and October 19, 1990 declaring the subject lots as industrial/port zone; and
3) The Comprehensive Land Use and Zoning Plan prepared by the Batangas City Planning and Development Office on May 22, 1993 reclassifying the lots as industrial port zone.
We also note that in the Supplemental Order, herein respondent Judge merely used the zonal valuation for industrial lots at Barangay Sta. Clara at P4,250.00 per square meter instead of the higher zonal valuation for industrial lots for Provincial Road to Manila, Calicanto-Junction Hilltop at P6,080.00 or at M.H. del Pilar-Calicanto-Junction at P9,500.00, which conforms to the guidelines in the implementation of zonal valuation of real properties for RDO No. 58-Batangas City, notwithstanding the fact that defendants-appellees' properties are located in Barangay Calicanto itself. In other words, herein respondent Judge conservatively applied the lower zonal valuation in enforcing the statutory requirement of requiring the payment of the current relevant zonal valuation of the BIR upon filing of the complaint.It should be emphasized that the determination of zonal valuation involves questions of fact or evaluation of evidence which is not proper in a petition for certiorari. The only issue involved therein is whether the trial court, in issuing the questioned order, acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion which does not exist in this case.
With respect to the "Petition to Cite Respondent Paterno V. Tac-an in Contempt," the same must be denied for lack of merit. According to PPA, herein respondent Judge committed indirect contempt of Court when he conducted a hearing on 20 April 2005 and heard a motion on 21 June 2005 despite the issuance of a temporary restraining order by this Court contained in its Resolution of 19 April 2005. Herein respondent Judge explained that there was no hearing scheduled or conducted on 20 April 2005 with regard to Civil Case No. 5447 although an Order dated 20 April 2005 was issued in connection with the Manifestation and Motion dated 14 April 2005 filed by the Bureau of Treasury represented by the Office of the Solicitor General setting the same for hearing on 21 April 2005. The Order dated 20 April 2005 issued by herein respondent Judge merely states that" "(t) here being no proof of receipt by the opposing counsel, schedule the Manifestation and Motion filed by the Bureau of Treasury on 25 April 2005 at 10:00 in the morning. The scheduled hearing on 25 April 2005 did not push through because the Bureau of Treasury filed a Manifestation and Motion dated 21 April 2005 praying that it be excused from attending the hearing. We see no contumacious act in regard to this instance on the part of herein respondent Judge. Neither can We rule as contumacious the act of herein respondent Judge in hearing a motion filed by defendants not parties in the Main and Supplemental Petitions of the PPA on 21 June 2005.At any rate, the petition to cite Judge Tac-an in contempt of court has become moot and academic. He has resigned compulsorily from the Judiciary.