562 Phil. 939
This a Petition for Review on
Certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, filed by petitioner
Federico Ledesma, Jr., seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision,
[1] dated 28 May 2005, and the Resolution,
[2]
dated 7 September 2006, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
79724. The appellate court, in its assailed Decision and Resolution,
affirmed the Decision dated 15 April 2003, and Resolution dated 9 June
2003, of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), dismissing
petitioner’s complaint for illegal dismissal and ordering the private
respondent Philippine National Training Institute (PNTI) to reinstate
petitioner to his former position without loss of seniority rights.
The factual and procedural antecedents of the instant petition are as follows:
On 4 December 1998, petitioner was employed as a bus/service driver by
the private respondent on probationary basis, as evidenced by his
appointment.
[3]
As such, he was required to report at private respondent’s training
site in Dasmariñas, Cavite, under the direct supervision of its site
administrator, Pablo Manolo de Leon (de Leon).
[4]
On 11 November 2000, petitioner filed a complaint against de Leon for
allegedly abusing his authority as site administrator by using the
private respondent’s vehicles and other facilities for personal ends.
In the same complaint, petitioner also accused de Leon of immoral
conduct allegedly carried out within the private respondent’s
premises. A copy of the complaint was duly received by private
respondent’s Chief Accountant, Nita Azarcon (Azarcon).
[5]
On 27 November 2000, de Leon filed a written report against the
petitioner addressed to private respondent’s Vice-President for
Administration, Ricky Ty (Ty), citing his suspected drug use.
In view of de Leon’s report, private respondent’s Human Resource
Manager, Trina Cueva (HR Manager Cueva), on 29 November 2000, served a
copy of a Notice to petitioner requiring him to explain within 24 hours
why no disciplinary action should be imposed on him for allegedly
violating Section 14, Article IV of the private respondent’s Code of
Conduct.
[6]
On 3 December 2000, petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against private respondent before the Labor Arbiter.
In his Position Paper,
[7]
petitioner averred that in view of the complaint he filed against de
Leon for his abusive conduct as site administrator, the latter
retaliated by falsely accusing petitioner as a drug user. VP for
Administration Ty, however, instead of verifying the veracity of de
Leon’s report, readily believed his allegations and together with HR
Manager Cueva, verbally dismissed petitioner from service on 29
November 2000.
Petitioner alleged that he was asked to report at private respondent’s
main office in España, Manila, on 29 November 2000. There, petitioner
was served by HR Manager Cueva a copy of the Notice to Explain together
with the copy of de Leon’s report citing his suspected drug use. After
he was made to receive the copies of the said notice and report, HR
Manager Cueva went inside the office of VP for Administration Ty.
After a while, HR Manager Cueva came out of the office with VP for
Administration Ty. To petitioner’s surprise, HR Manager Cueva took
back the earlier Notice to Explain given to him and flatly declared
that there was no more need for the petitioner to explain since his
drug test result revealed that he was positive for drugs. When
petitioner, however, asked for a copy of the said drug test result, HR
Manager Cueva told him that it was with the company’s president, but
she would also later claim that the drug test result was already with
the proper authorities at Camp Crame.
[8]
Petitioner was then asked by HR Manager Cueva to sign a resignation
letter and also remarked that whether or not petitioner would resign
willingly, he was no longer considered an employee of private
respondent. All these events transpired in the presence of VP for
Administration Ty, who even convinced petitioner to just voluntarily
resign with the assurance that he would still be given separation pay.
Petitioner did not yet sign the resignation letter replying that he
needed time to think over the offers. When petitioner went back to
private respondent’s training site in Dasmariñas, Cavite, to get his
bicycle, he was no longer allowed by the guard to enter the premises.
[9]
On the following day, petitioner immediately went to St. Dominic
Medical Center for a drug test and he was found negative for any drug
substance. With his drug result on hand, petitioner went back to
private respondent’s main office in Manila to talk to VP for
Administration Ty and HR Manager Cueva and to show to them his drug
test result. Petitioner then told VP for Administration Ty and HR
Manager Cueva that since his drug test proved that he was not guilty of
the drug use charge against him, he decided to continue to work for the
private respondent.
[10]
On 2 December 2000, petitioner reported for work but he was no longer
allowed to enter the training site for he was allegedly banned
therefrom according to the guard on duty. This incident prompted the
petitioner to file the complaint for illegal dismissal against the
private respondent before the Labor Arbiter.
For its part, private respondent countered that petitioner was never
dismissed from employment but merely served a Notice to Explain why no
disciplinary action should be filed against him in view of his
superior’s report that he was suspected of using illegal drugs.
Instead of filing an answer to the said notice, however, petitioner
prematurely lodged a complaint for illegal dismissal against private
respondent before the Labor Arbiter.
[11]
Private respondent likewise denied petitioner’s allegations that it
banned the latter from entering private respondent’s premises. Rather,
it was petitioner who failed or refused to report to work after he was
made to explain his alleged drug use. Indeed, on 3 December 2000,
petitioner was able to claim at the training site his salary for the
period of 16-30 November 2000, as evidenced by a copy of the pay
voucher bearing petitioner’s signature. Petitioner’s accusation that
he was no longer allowed to enter the training site was further belied
by the fact that he was able to claim his 13th month pay thereat on 9
December 2000, supported by a copy of the pay voucher signed by
petitioner.
[12]
On 26 July 2002, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision,
[13]
in favor of the petitioner declaring illegal his separation from
employment. The Labor Arbiter, however, did not order petitioner’s
reinstatement for the same was no longer practical, and only directed
private respondent to pay petitioner backwages. The dispositive
portion of the Labor Arbiter’s Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the dismissal of the
[petitioner] is herein declared to be illegal. [Private respondent] is
directed to pay the complainant backwages and separation pay in the
total amount of One Hundred Eighty Four Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty
One Pesos and Fifty Three Centavos (P184, 861.53).[14]
Both parties questioned the Labor Arbiter’s Decision before the NLRC.
Petitioner assailed the portion of the Labor Arbiter’s Decision denying
his prayer for reinstatement, and arguing that the doctrine of strained
relations is applied only to confidential employees and his position as
a driver was not covered by such prohibition.
[15]
On the other hand, private respondent controverted the Labor Arbiter’s
finding that petitioner was illegally dismissed from employment, and
insisted that petitioner was never dismissed from his job but failed to
report to work after he was asked to explain regarding his suspected
drug use.
[16]
On 15 April 2003, the NLRC granted the appeal raised by both parties and reversed the Labor Arbiter’s Decision.
[17]
The NLRC declared that petitioner failed to establish the fact of
dismissal for his claim that he was banned from entering the training
site was rendered impossible by the fact that he was able to
subsequently claim his salary and 13th month pay. Petitioner’s claim
for reinstatement was, however, granted by the NLRC. The decretal
part of the NLRC Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision under review
is, hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and another entered, DISMISSING the
complaint for lack of merit.
[Petitioner] is however, ordered REINSTATED to his former position without loss of seniority rights, but WITHOUT BACKWAGES.[18]
The Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner was likewise denied by the NLRC in its Resolution dated 29 August 2003.
[19]
The Court of Appeals dismissed petitioner’s Petition for
Certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, and affirmed the NLRC
Decision giving more credence to private respondent’s stance that
petitioner was not dismissed from employment, as it is more in accord
with the evidence on record and the attendant circumstances of the
instant case.
[20] Similarly
ill-fated was petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied
by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution issued on 7 September 2006.
[21]
Hence, this instant Petition for Review on
Certiorari[22]
under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, filed by petitioner
assailing the foregoing Court of Appeals Decision and Resolution on the
following grounds:
I.
WHETHER, THE
HON. COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS, AND THE
ASSAILED DECISION IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD.
PETITIONER’S DISMISSAL WAS ESTABLISHED BY THE UNCONTRADICTED EVIDENCES
ON RECORD, WHICH WERE MISAPPRECIATED BY PUBLIC RESPONDENT NLRC, AND HAD
THESE BEEN CONSIDERED THE INEVITABLE CONCLUSION WOULD BE THE
AFFIRMATION OF THE LABOR ARBITER’S DECISION FINDING ILLEGAL DISMISSAL
II.
WHETHER, THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS SUBVERTED DUE PROCESS OF LAW WHEN IT
DID NOT CONSIDER THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD SHOWING THAT THERE WAS NO JUST
CAUSE FOR DISMISSAL AS PETITIONER IS NOT A DRUG USER AND THERE IS NO
EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THIS GROUND FOR DISMISSAL.
III.
WHETHER, THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW IN
NOT FINDING THAT RESPONDENTS SUBVERTED PETITIONER’S RIGHT TO DUE
PROCESS OF THE LAW.[23]
Before we delve into the merits of this case, it is best to stress that
the issues raised by petitioner in this instant petition are factual in
nature which is not within the office of a Petition for Review.
[24] The
raison d’etre
for this rule is that, this Court is not a trier of facts and does not
routinely undertake the re-examination of the evidence presented by the
contending parties for the factual findings of the labor officials who
have acquired expertise in their own fields are accorded not only
respect but even finality, and are binding upon this Court.
[25]
However, when the findings of the Labor Arbiter contradict those of the
NLRC, departure from the general rule is warranted, and this Court must
of necessity make an infinitesimal scrunity and examine the records all
over again including the evidence presented by the opposing parties to
determine which findings should be preferred as more conformable with
evidentiary facts.
[26]
The primordial issue in the petition at bar is whether the petitioner was illegally dismissed from employment.
The Labor Arbiter found that the petitioner was illegally dismissed
from employment warranting the payment of his backwages. The NLRC and
the Court of Appeals found otherwise.
In reversing the Labor Arbiter’s Decision, the NLRC underscored the
settled evidentiary rule that before the burden of proof shifts to the
employer to prove the validity of the employee’s dismissal, the
employee must first sufficiently establish that he was indeed dismissed
from employment. The petitioner, in the present case, failed to
establish the fact of his dismissal. The NLRC did not give credence to
petitioner’s allegation that he was banned by the private respondent
from entering the workplace, opining that had it been true that
petitioner was no longer allowed to enter the training site when he
reported for work thereat on 2 December 2000, it is quite a wonder he
was able to do so the very next day, on 3 December 2000, to claim his
salary.
[27]
The Court of Appeals validated the above conclusion reached by the NLRC
and further rationated that petitioner’s positive allegations that he
was dismissed from service was negated by substantial evidence to the
contrary. Petitioner’s averments of what transpired inside private
respondent’s main office on 29 November 2000, when he was allegedly
already dismissed from service, and his claim that he was effectively
banned from private respondent’s premises are belied by the fact that
he was able to claim his salary for the period of 16-30 November 2000
at private respondent’s training site.
Petitioner, therefore, is now before this Court assailing the Decisions
handed down by the NLRC and the Court of Appeals, and insisting that he
was illegally dismissed from his employment. Petitioner argues that
his receipt of his earned salary for the period of 16-30 November 2000,
and his 13
th month pay, is neither inconsistent with nor a negation of
his allegation of illegal dismissal. Petitioner maintains that he
received his salary and benefit only from the guardhouse, for he was
already banned from the work premises.
We are not persuaded.
Well-entrenched is the principle that in order to establish a case
before judicial and quasi-administrative bodies, it is necessary that
allegations must be supported by substantial evidence.
[28]
Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.
[29]
In the present case, there is hardly any evidence on record so as to meet the quantum of evidence required,
i.e.,
substantial evidence. Petitioner’s claim of illegal dismissal is
supported by no other than his own bare, uncorroborated and, thus,
self-serving allegations, which are also incoherent, inconsistent and
contradictory.
Petitioner himself narrated that when his presence was requested on 29
November 2000 at the private respondent’s main office where he was
served with the Notice to Explain his superior’s report on his
suspected drug use, VP for Administration Ty offered him separation pay
if he will just voluntarily resign from employment. While we do not
condone such an offer, neither can we construe that petitioner was
dismissed at that instance. Petitioner was only being given the option
to either resign and receive his separation pay or not to resign but
face the possible disciplinary charges against him. The final
decision, therefore, whether to voluntarily resign or to continue
working still, ultimately rests with the petitioner. In fact, by
petitoner’s own admission, he requested from VP for Administration Ty
more time to think over the offer.
Moreover, the petitioner alleged that he was not allowed to enter the
training site by the guard on duty who told him that he was already
banned from the premises. Subsequently, however, petitioner admitted
in his Supplemental Affidavit that he was able to return to the said
site on 3 December 2000, to claim his 16-30 November 2000 salary, and
again on 9 December 2000, to receive his 13
th
month pay. The fact alone that he was able to return to the training
site to claim his salary and benefits raises doubt as to his purported
ban from the premises.
Finally, petitioner’s stance that he was dismissed by private
respondent was further weakened with the presentation of private
respondent’s payroll bearing petitioner’s name proving that petitioner
remained as private respondent’s employee up to December 2000. Again,
petitioner’s assertion that the payroll was merely fabricated for the
purpose of supporting private respondent’s case before the NLRC cannot
be given credence. Entries in the payroll, being entries in the course
of business, enjoy the presumption of regularity under Rule 130,
Section 43 of the Rules of Court. It is therefore incumbent upon the
petitioner to adduce clear and convincing evidence in support of his
claim of fabrication and to overcome such presumption of regularity.
[30] Unfortunately, petitioner again failed in such endeavor.
On these scores, there is a dearth of evidence to establish the fact of
petitioner’s dismissal. We have scrupulously examined the records and
we found no evidence presented by petitioner, other than his own
contentions that he was indeed dismissed by private respondent.
While this Court is not unmindful of the rule that in cases of illegal
dismissal, the employer bears the burden of proof to prove that the
termination was for a valid or authorized cause in the case at bar,
however, the facts and the evidence did not establish a
prima facie case that the petitioner was dismissed from employment.
[31]
Before the private respondent must bear the burden of proving that the
dismissal was legal, petitioner must first establish by substantial
evidence the fact of his dismissal from service. Logically, if there
is no dismissal, then there can be no question as to the legality or
illegality thereof.
In
Machica v. Roosevelt Services Center, Inc.,
[32] we had underscored that the burden of proving the allegations rest upon the party alleging, to wit:
The rule is that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it; thus, petitioners were burdened to prove their allegation that respondents dismissed them from their employment. It must be stressed that the evidence to prove this fact must be clear, positive and convincing.
The rule that the employer bears the burden of proof in illegal
dismissal cases finds no application here because the respondents deny
having dismissed the petitioners.[33]
In
Rufina Patis Factory v. Alusitain,
[34] this Court took the occasion to emphasize:
It is a basic rule in evidence, however, that the burden of proof is on the part of the party who makes the allegations – ei incumbit probatio, qui dicit, non qui negat. If
he claims a right granted by law, he must prove his claim by competent
evidence, relying on the strength of his own evidence and not upon the
weakness of that of his opponent.[35]
It is true that the Constitution affords full protection to labor, and
that in light of this Constitutional mandate, we must be vigilant in
striking down any attempt of the management to exploit or oppress the
working class. However, it does not mean that we are bound to uphold
the working class in every labor dispute brought before this Court for
our resolution.
The law in protecting the rights of the employees, authorizes neither
oppression nor self-destruction of the employer. It should be made
clear that when the law tilts the scales of justice in favor of labor,
it is in recognition of the inherent economic inequality between labor
and management. The intent is to balance the scales of justice; to put
the two parties on relatively equal positions. There may be cases where
the circumstances warrant favoring labor over the interests of
management but never should the scale be so tilted if the result is an
injustice to the employer.
Justitia nemini neganda est -- justice is to be denied to none.
[36]
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
the instant Petition is
DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated 28
May 2005 and its Resolution dated 7 September 2006 in CA-G.R. SP No.
79724 are hereby
AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago, (Chairperson), Austria-Martinez, Corona, and
Nachura, JJ., concur.
[1] Penned by Associate
Justice Ruben T. Reyes (now a member of this Court) with Associate
Justices Josefina Guevarra-Salonga and Fernanda Lampas-Peralta ,
concurring.
Rollo, pp. 38-50.
[2] Rollo, pp. 52-53.
[3] Id. at 82.
[4] Id.
[5] Id. at 85-86.
[6] Id. at 107.
[7] Id. at 71-81.
[8] Id.
[9] Id.
[10] Id.
[11] Id. at 91-105.
[12] Id.
[13] Id. at 65-70.
[14] Id.
[15] Id. at 144-160.
[16] Id. at 160-172.
[17] Id. at 54-64.
[18] Id. at 63.
[19] Id. at 42.
[20] Id. at 38-50.
[21] Id. at 52-53.
[22] Id. at 12-36.
[23] Id. at 236-237.
[24] Limketkai Sons Milling, Inc. v. Llamera, G.R. No. 152514, 12 July 2005, 463 SCRA 254, 260.
[25] Dusit Hotel Nikko v. National Union of Workers in Hotel, Restaurant and Allied Industries (NUWHRAIN), Dusit Hotel Nikko Chapter, G.R. No. 160391, 9 August 2005, 466 SCRA 374, 387-388;
The Philippine American Life and General Insurance Co. v. Gramaje, G.R. No. 156963, 11 November 2004, 442 SCRA 274, 283.
[26] Sta. Catalina College v. National Labor Relations Commission, 461 Phil. 720, 730 (2003).
[27] Rollo, pp. 118-119.
[28] Philippine Air Line v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 159556, 26 May 2005, 459 SCRA 236, 251.
[29] Government Service Insurance System v. Court of Appeals, 357 Phil. 511, 531 (1998).
[30] Id. at 529.
[31] Schering Employees Labor Union (SELU) v. Schering Plough Corporation, G.R. No. 142506, 17 February 2005, 451 SCRA 689, 695.
[32] G.R. No. 168664, 4 May 2006, 389 SCRA 534.
[33] Id. at 544-545.
[34] G.R. No. 146202, 14 July 2004, 434 SCRA 418.
[35] Id. at 428.
[36] JPL Marketing Promotions v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 151966, 8 July 2005, 463 SCRA 136, 149-150.