447 Phil. 483
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision sought to be considered is hereby modified by setting aside Order Nos. 2 and 3 of the decision, and incorporating therein substitute Orders which shall read as follows:As none of the parties appealed the decision of the Board, it became final and executory.
- Requiring the complainant to tender the amount of P101,560.00 within fifteen (15) days from finality of this decision; however, in the event such amount remains unpaid as of the end of said period, the same shall earn interest at the rate of six (6%) percent per annum, reckoned from such finality until the same is fully paid;
- Requiring complainant, to immediately pay upon promulgation of this decision without prejudice to such appeal as may thereafter be filed and pending such appeal, if any, the amount of Three Thousand (P3,000.00) pesos a month as rental for her use and occupancy of the premises subject of this case, reckoned from the time of her occupancy of the unit until the amount set forth in the preceding order is fully paid; the said amount of rental shall form part of the purchase price of the premises as herein adjusted, and may be paid as a whole in one lump sum in advance, or through monthly amortizations, at the option of the complainant;
- Requiring the respondent to accept .the price tendered by complainants, together with the payment of rentals set forth in the preceding order, in full satisfaction .of his claims, rights and interests over the property, within ten (10) days from such tender/offer or actual payment, as the case maybe, and consequently within a period not later than ten (10) days thereafter, execute the necessary documents and deliver title to the premises in the name of complainant. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Section 28. Appeal to the Office of the President. - Any party may appeal the decision of the Board of Commissioners to the Office of the President within 30 days from receipt thereof x x x x[24]It thus prayed for the dismissal of the petition.
A closer examination of the entire judgment reveals that the rentals aside from the P101,560.00 shall form part of the purchase price. The amount initially paid by petitioner is not in full satisfaction of the purchase price. For if this was the intent of the Board, it should have so stated in paragraph no. 1 of the dispositive portion. There would have been no need for Nos. 2 and 3 of the dispositive portion.Her Motion for Reconsideration[27] having been denied by the Court of Appeals,[28] Azarcon comes to this .Court via the present petition for review on certiorari, assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals in this wise:
This becomes more apparent in view of the fact that the payment of rentals is reckoned from the petitioner occupied the unit until the amount of P101,560.00 is paid by petitioner. This implies that the rentals and the P101,560.00 form the totality of the purchase price.
Complementary to Nos. 1 and 2 of the dispositive portion, No. 3 requires private respondents to accept the price tendered by petitioner, “together with the payment of the rentals set forth in the preceding order” referring to No. 2. Such amounts, the judgment further states, will be in full satisfaction of private respondents’ claims, rights and interests over the property. Afterwhich, the private respondents shall execute the necessary documents and deliver title to the petitioner. This explains why the prayer of petitioner for a writ of execution to compel private respondents to execute the necessary documents cannot be . granted. Petitioner has to pay the rentals first before the execution of the necessary documents in her favor. The order of Arbiter Bunagan, therefore, seeks to implement what must necessarily follow after No. 1, which is the payment of rentals in accordance with No. 2.
Likewise, denial of the motion for reconsideration by the Arbiter’s order for the issuance of a writ of execution in favor of private respondents is correct. There was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Board in finding that:“x x x From the respective averments of the parties, it is also clear that both are fully aware that the obligation of the complainant is not limited to or has not been discharged by the amount already paid to respondent. Complainant only argues that her obligation to pay rentals has not yet accrued because she has not yet made a choice as to the manner of payment. We cannot agree with the complainant’s position as this will mean that complainant’s obligation to pay may not at all become due because the demandability thereof will be solely dependent upon her will.xxxWHEREFORE, IN VIEW . OF THE FOREGOING, complainant’s motion for reconsideration and motion to quash writ of execution are hereby DENIED. Let the appropriate writ of execution be issued for the payment of the rentals to be reckoned from March of 1988 to July 1993.” (pp. 4-5, Resolution)In effect, the Board’s resolution affirmed the Arbiter’s order for the implementation of no. 2 of the dispositive portion requiring petitioner to pay rentals.
x x x[26] (Underscoring supplied).
SAGANA, in its Comment[30] once more maintains that Azarcon’s petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals should have been dismissed due to her failure to exhaust all administrative remedies.[31]
- THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN INTERPRETING THE FINAL AND EXECUTORY 10 MAY 1993 DECISION AS ORDERING PETITIONER-APPELLANT LIABLE FOR THE BALANCE OF THE PURCHASE PRICE PLUS RENTALS IN COMPLETE DISREGARD OF THE EXPRESS DIRECTIVES OF ITS DISPOSITIVE PORTION WHICH FIND SUPPORT IN THE FACTS ESTABLISHED THEREIN.
- THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN UPHOLDING PUBLIC RESPONDENT BOARD’S FINDING THAT PETITIONER-APPELLANT WAS AWARE THAT SHE WAS LIABLE FOR THE BALANCE OF THE PURCHASE PRICE PLUS RENTALS.[29]
The term “purchase price as adjusted” as used in directive no. 2 of the dispositive portion of the decision clearly refers to the cumulative amounts of P101,560.00 and the rentals. If the plain and literal meaning of directive no. 2 of the dispositive portion of the decision were to be disregarded and petitioner’s interpretation that her obligation is discharged with the payment of the amount of P101,560.00 were to be followed, then there is no “purchase price as adjusted” to speak of because the purchase price would have remained the same and without any adjustment. The language of directive no. 2 is clear and unequivocal, viz:The dispute thus arises from the parties’ conflicting understanding or interpretation of the phrase “the said amount of rental shall form part of the purchase price as adjusted” found in the fallo, Azarcon contending that the payment of rentals is an alternative to the payment of the balance of the purchase price, and SAGANA contending that the rental payments shall be in addition to the balance of the purchase price.“Requiring complainant, to immediately pay upon Promulgation of this decision without prejudice to such appeal as may thereafter be filed and pending such appeal, if any the amount of Three Thousand (P3,000.00) Pesos a month as rental for her use and occupancy of the premises subject of this case, reckoned from the time occupancy of the unit until the amount set forth in preceding order is fully paid; said amount of rental shall form part of the purchase price as herein adjusted, and may be paid as a whole in one lump sum in advance, or through mont[h]ly amortizations, at the option of the complainant.” (Emphasis supplied)Thus, in granting private respondent’s motion for execution, public respondent Arbiter correctly ruled as follows:“it is clear that the payment by complainant of the sum of P101,560.00 did not discharge all its obligations to the respondent pursuant to the dispositive portion of the final judgment.”[33]
“[SAGANA] has failed to convincingly refute [AZARCON’s] argument that the non-release of the loan was due to its non-submission of certain requirements.If Azarcon had been spared by the Board of paying interest by way of damages because she was not responsible “for the delay in the release of the loan and consequently for the non-payment of [the balance] of the purchase price,” why should the Board have intended to make her liable to pay rentals over and above the balance of the purchase price, especially given her tender of payment of such balance after the loan application was not approved, which tender SAGANA refused to accept without interest being paid thereon? That the Board had no such intention, the following portion of its May 10, 1993 decision instructs:
Hence, for this reason, the . . . issue [of whether or not Azarcon is liable for the payment of interest] is resolved in the negative. We are convinced that [Azarcon] should not be held responsible for the delay in the release of the loan and consequently for the non-payment of the purchase price. Such being the case, we believe that a recall of our previous ruling ordering [Azarcon] to pay interest by way of damages is in order.[36] (Underscoring supplied).
In the absence of payment through housing loan, the buyer should effect payment through other means within a reasonable period. The seller should also extend all support and assistance to make it possible for the buyer to find such means, particularly if it contributed to the non-release of the loan. If parties cannot agree on the substitute method of payment on the period for effecting the same, then the Board may step to fix the same. Meantime we believe that until this matter can be resolved, complainant should pay rentals as equitable payment for use of the premises, which can be applied to the balance of the purchase price.[37] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied).From the immediately foregoing disquisition of the Board, it is clear that the payment of rentals was devised by it merely as an interim scheme, until a “substitute method of payment [of the balance of the purchase price]” was agreed upon by the parties.