613 Phil. 72
PERALTA, J.:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused GENEROSO DAMASO is hereby ACQUITTED in Criminal Case Nos. 92-8157 and 92-8158 on grounds of insufficiency of evidence.
As for Civil Case No. 93-2588, in the interest justice and equity, judgment is hereby rendered against the plaintiff Rodrigo Sumiran and in favor of the defendants Damaso. The plaintiff is further ordered to pay to the defendants the following:a. P50,000.00 as moral damagesSO ORDERED.[4]
b. P20,000.00 as exemplary damages, and
c. the cost of suit.
To recapitulate, a party-litigant may either file his notice of appeal within 15 days from receipt of the Regional Trial Court's decision or file it within 15 days from receipt of the order (the "final order") denying his motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. Obviously, the new 15-day period may be availed of only if either motion is filed; otherwise, the decision becomes final and executory after the lapse of the original appeal period provided in Rule 41, Section 3.[6]
Propitious to petitioner is Neypes v. Court of Appeals, promulgated on 14 September 2005 while the present Petition was already pending before us. x x x
x x x x
With the advent of the "fresh period rule," parties who availed themselves of the remedy of motion for reconsideration are now allowed to file a notice of appeal within fifteen days from the denial of that motion.
The "fresh period rule" is not inconsistent with Rule 41, Section 3 of the Revised Rules of Court which states that the appeal shall be taken "within fifteen (15) days from notice of judgment or final order appealed from." The use of the disjunctive word "or" signifies disassociation and independence of one thing from another. It should, as a rule, be construed in the sense which it ordinarily implies. Hence, the use of "or" in the above provision supposes that the notice of appeal may be filed within 15 days from the notice of judgment or within 15 days from notice of the "final order," x x x.
x x x x
The "fresh period rule" finally eradicates the confusion as to when the 15-day appeal period should be counted - from receipt of notice of judgment or from receipt of notice of "final order" appealed from.
Taking our bearings from Neypes, in Sumaway v. Urban Bank, Inc., we set aside the denial of a notice of appeal which was purportedly filed five days late. With the fresh period rule, the 15-day period within which to file the notice of appeal was counted from notice of the denial of the therein petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
We followed suit in Elbiña v. Ceniza, wherein we applied the principle granting a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration or any final order or resolution.
Thereafter, in First Aqua Sugar Traders, Inc. v. Bank of the Philippine Islands, we held that a party-litigant may now file his notice of appeal either within fifteen days from receipt of the original decision or within fifteen days from the receipt of the order denying the motion for reconsideration.
In De los Santos v. Vda. de Mangubat, we applied the same principle of "fresh period rule," expostulating that procedural law refers to the adjective law which prescribes rules and forms of procedure in order that courts may be able to administer justice. Procedural laws do not come within the legal conception of a retroactive law, or the general rule against the retroactive operation of statutes. The "fresh period rule" is irrefragably procedural, prescribing the manner in which the appropriate period for appeal is to be computed or determined and, therefore, can be made applicable to actions pending upon its effectivity, such as the present case, without danger of violating anyone else's rights. (Emphasis supplied)
The determinative issue is whether the "fresh period" rule announced in Neypes could retroactively apply in cases where the period for appeal had lapsed prior to 14 September 2005 when Neypes was promulgated. That question may be answered with the guidance of the general rule that procedural laws may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage, there being no vested rights in the rules of procedure. Amendments to procedural rules are procedural or remedial in character as they do not create new or remove vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of rights already existing.
Sps. De los Santos reaffirms these principles and categorically warrants that Neypes bears the quested retroactive effect, to wit:Procedural law refers to the adjective law which prescribes rules and forms of procedure in order that courts may be able to administer justice. Procedural laws do not come within the legal conception of a retroactive law, or the general rule against the retroactive operation of statues ― they may be given retroactive effect on actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage and this will not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected, insomuch as there are no vested rights in rules of procedure.
The "fresh period rule" is a procedural law as it prescribes a fresh period of 15 days within which an appeal may be made in the event that the motion for reconsideration is denied by the lower court. Following the rule on retroactivity of procedural laws, the "fresh period rule" should be applied to pending actions, such as the present case.
Also, to deny herein petitioners the benefit of the "fresh period rule" will amount to injustice, if not absurdity, since the subject notice of judgment and final order were issued two years later or in the year 2000, as compared to the notice of judgment and final order in Neypes which were issued in 1998. It will be incongruous and illogical that parties receiving notices of judgment and final orders issued in the year 1998 will enjoy the benefit of the "fresh period rule" while those later rulings of the lower courts such as in the instant case, will not.[9]