463 Phil. 67
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
WHEREFORE, all premises considered, the Court grants the petition and thus directs the Register of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City to reconstitute the Original Certificate of Title for Lot No. 4429 of the Cadastral Survey of Opon strictly in accordance with the technical description of said lot.[2]However, upon presentation of the aforesaid order to the Office of the Register of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City, Cleofe was informed that the owner's copy had already been issued to Ruben Augusto, pursuant to an Order issued by the court dated August 23, 1996, and that based on the record, the same was in the possession of Atty. Noel Archival.
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that after due consideration, respondents be ordered to surrender the owner's copy of Original Certificate of Title No. 3560 of the Register of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City to the petitioner herein. [3]In their Comment on the petition, therein respondents Ruben Augusto and Atty. Noel Archival alleged, inter alia, that the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Felisa, Magdalena, Alfonso and Jose, all surnamed Augusto, was falsified and fictitious, and, thus, null and void. In the interim, Cleofe had her adverse claim annotated at the dorsal portion of the title in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Noel Archival is hereby directed to produce the owner's copy of OCT No. 3560, before the Office of the Clerk of Court within ten (10) days from receipt of this order to allow the annotation of petitioner's interest, after which title may be returned to the respondent.The trial court declared that, based on the pleadings of the parties, the issue of ownership over the property had been raised, a matter which the court, sitting as a cadastral court, could not pass upon. The trial court further ruled that pending resolution of the issue of ownership over the property in an appropriate proceedings therefor, there was a need for the annotation of the petitioners' interest over the property. The respondents therein filed a "Motion for a Partial Reconsideration" of the Order alleging that Cleofe's interest over the property had been sufficiently protected by the annotation of her adverse claim. The respondents suggested that:
Furnish copies of this order to petitioner and respondents as well as their respective counsels.[4]
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court to partially reconsider its Order dated 22 October 1997 and issue a new order enjoin (sic) the respondent to produce the owner's copy of OCT No. 3560 before the Office of the Register of Deeds, Lapu-Lapu City on 25 November 1997 at 2:30 p.m. Other reliefs just and equitable are likewise prayed for under the premises.However, on November 14, 1997, the court issued an Order denying the motion of the respondents therein.
Cebu City, 06 November 1997, Philippines.[5]
Going over the pleadings of the parties, the court gathers that ownership over the land in question is disputed by the parties, which this court, sitting as a cadastral court, cannot pass upon. However, since the petitioner has also shown enough basis for claiming possession of the owner's copy of OCT No. 3560, by virtue of the Deed of Absolute Sale (Annex "A"), and in view of the willingness of Atty. Archival to have petitioner's interest annotated at the back of the title, the court feels that for the protection of both parties, the owner's copy of OCT No. 3560 in the possession of Atty. Noel Archival must be produced, in order that petitioner's interest may be annotated therein pending resolution of the issue on ownership in the proper proceedings.In fine, the assailed order of the respondent judge partook of the nature of an ad cautelam order. This is not to say that the respondent court sitting as a cadastral court had no jurisdiction to delve into and resolve the issue of ownership over the property. Apropos is our ruling in Vda. de Arceo v. Court of Appeals, et al.,[10] viz:
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Noel Archival is hereby directed to produce the owner's copy of OCT No. 3560, before the Office of the Clerk of Court within ten (10) days from receipt of this order to allow the annotation of petitioner's interest, after which the title may be returned to the respondent.[9]
The first question must, however, be resolved against the petitioners. We have held that under Section 2 of the Property Registration Decree, the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, sitting as a land registration court, is no longer as circumscribed as it was under Act No. 496, the former land registration law. We said that the Decree "has eliminated the distinction between the general jurisdiction vested in the regional trial court and the limited jurisdiction conferred upon it by the former law when acting merely as a cadastral court." The amendment was "[a]imed at avoiding multiplicity of suits, the change has simplified registration proceedings by conferring upon the required trial courts the authority to act not only on applications for `original registration' but also `over all petitions filed after original registration of title, with power to hear and determine all questions arising from such applications or petitions." At any rate, we have also stated that the limited jurisdiction-rule governing land registration courts is subject to recognized exceptions, to wit, (1) where the parties mutually agreed or have acquiesced in submitting controversial issues for determination; (2) where they have been given full opportunity to present their evidence; and (3) where the court has considered the evidence already of record and is convinced that the same is sufficient for rendering a decision upon such controversial issues. By the same token, it has been held that the rule is not, in reality, one of jurisdiction, but rather, of mere procedure, which may be waived. It is not amiss to state likewise that where the issue, say, of ownership, is ineluctably tied up with the question of right of registration, the cadastral court commits no error in assuming jurisdiction over it, as, for instance, in this case, where both parties rely on their respective exhibits to defeat one another's claims over the parcels sought to be registered, in which case, registration would not be possible or would be unduly prolonged unless the court first decided it.[11]Earlier, we ruled in Averia, Jr. v. Caguioa,[12] thus:
The above provision has eliminated the distinction between the general jurisdiction vested in the regional trial court and the limited jurisdiction conferred upon it by the former law when acting merely as a cadastral court. Aimed at avoiding multiplicity of suits, the change has simplified registration proceedings by conferring upon the regional trial courts the authority to act not only on applications for "original registration" but also "over all petitions filed after original registration of title, with power to hear and determine all questions arising upon such applications or petitions."IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DISMISSED. The December 5, 1997 Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Lapu-Lapu City, is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioners.
Consequently, and specifically with reference to Section 112 of the Land Registration Act (now Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529), the court is no longer fettered by its former limited jurisdiction which enabled it to grant relief only in cases where there was "unanimity among the parties" or none of them raised any "adverse claim o serious objection." Under the amended law, the court is now authorized to hear and decide not only such non-controversial cases but even the contentious and substantial issues, such as the question at bar, which were beyond its competence before.[13]
No appeal may be taken from:[7] Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. JANCOM Environmental Corporation, 375 SCRA 320 (2002).
(a) An order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration;
(b) An order denying a petition for relief or any similar motion seeking relief from judgment;
(c) An interlocutory order;