380 Phil. 318; 97 OG No. 44, 6418 (October 29, 2001)
PURISIMA, J.:
"On June 4, 1996, herein complainant Lucia F. Layola filed a complaint with the Office of the Deputy of the Ombudsman for the Military, charging SPO2 Leopoldo M. German and PO2 Tomasito H. Gagui, members of the Santa Maria Police Station, Santa Maria, Bulacan, with homicide for the death of complainant's son."To repeat; respondent Judge Basilio R. Gabo, Jr. stands charged with a violation of Section 3 (e), R.A. 3019, for issuing an unjust interlocutory order, and with gross ignorance of the law. According to the complainant the respondent judge directed that accused SPO2 German be held in the custody of his immediate superior, the Chief of Police of Sta. Maria, Bulacan, an order sans any legal and factual basis, instead of ordering the arrest of the said accused being indicted for murder, a heinous and non-bailable crime. Thereafter, respondent judge denied the motion for reconsideration interposed by the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military.
"On January 24, 1997, a resolution was handed down by the Ombudsman Investigator recommending the indictment for murder of SPO2 German and PO2 Gagui. The corresponding information for murder was drafted and thereafter, the case was indorsed to the Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan for filing with the appropriate court. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 209-M-97 and raffled to the sala of respondent Judge Basilio R. Gabo,[sic] RTC, Branch 11, Malolos, Bulacan."
"Sometime in March, 1997, a petition to take custody of accused SPO2 Leopoldo M. German was filed by the Chief of Police of the Sta. Maria Police Station based on the following grounds:
1. "that pursuant to the provisions of Presidential Decree 971, Presidential Decree 1184 and Executive Order No. 106, police personnel who are charged of any crime before any court of justice may be placed under the custody of his immediate superior officers upon request, [who shall] be responsible for the appearance of [such] police officer x x x during trials and when needed by the court; and
2. "that the x x x case is service connected and within the ambit of the above provisions of P.D. 971, 1184 and E. O. No. 106, because the offense imputed against [the accused] stemmed from the death of Pablo Loyola [sic], a violator of the law, who was then inside the cell of the Municipal Jail of Sta. Maria, Bulacan.""Respondent Judge, relying on the provisions of law cited in the petition for custody, resolved to grant the petition through an order dated April 7, 1997."
"A motion for reconsideration of the above- mentioned order was filed by the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military, bringing to respondent's attention the applicable and relevant laws. However, the said motion for reconsideration was denied in an order dated June 25, 1997."
"1. The questioned order dated April 7, 1997 was issued in the light of the Comment of the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, to whose office the prosecution of the case was indorsed by the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military. Said Comment by the prosecutor interposes no objection to the release of the accused to the custody of the petitioner Chief of Police, on the ground that from the records of the case, accused's "indictment was based on circumstantial evidence", hence, not so strong as to deprive the accused of his right to bail."The OCA found the charges of violating Section 3 (e), R.A. 3019 and of issuing an unjust interlocutory order, barren of merit but respondent judge was adjudged guilty of gross ignorance of the law.
"2. The motion for reconsideration of the above-mentioned order filed by the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military "did not raise strong arguments on why the order should be modified, "hence, the denial of said motion."
"3. The disputed order is now the subject of a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals initiated by the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military."
1. That Judge Basilio R. Gabo, Jr., RTC, Branch 11, Malolos, Bulacan be FINED P20,000 for granting bail in a capital offense without a hearing, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely;The aforestated recommendation of OCA is sustainable.
2. That the charges of violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) and issuance of an unjust interlocutory order be DISMISSED for lack of merit.
"No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, when evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution."Respondent judge was acting upon a case of murder punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Murder being a capital offense, respondent judge should have been mindful that bail cannot be allowed as a matter of right. In the case of Baylon vs. Sison,[7] it was succinctly held, "Quintessentially, and as a matter of law, the discretion of the court, in cases involving capital offenses may be exercised only after there has been a hearing called to ascertain the weight of the evidence against the accused. Peremptorily, the discretion lies, not in determining whether or not there will be a hearing, but in appreciating and evaluating the weight of the evidence of guilt against the accused. It follows that any order issued in the absence of the requisite evidence is not a product of sound judicial discretion but of whim and caprice and outright arbitrariness.[8]
"x x x. Inasmuch as the determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong is a matter of judicial discretion, it may rightly be exercised only after the evidence is submitted to the court at the heating. Since the discretion is directed to the weight of evidence and since evidence cannot properly be weighed if not duly exhibited or produced before the court, it is obvious that a proper exercise of judicial discretion requires that the evidence of guilt be submitted to the court, xxx"The prosecution must first be accorded an opportunity to present evidence because by the very nature of deciding applications for bail, it is on the basis of such evidence that judicial discretion is exercised in determining whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong. In other words, discretion must be exercised regularly, legally and within the confines of procedural due process, that is, after evaluation of the evidence submitted by the prosecution. Any order issued in the absence thereof is not a product of sound judicial discretion but of whim and caprice and outright arbitrariness.[10] Granting bail in non-bailable offenses without hearing is gross ignorance of the law.[11]
[3] Rollo, pp. 94-95.
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. x x x"