414 Phil. 211
KAPUNAN, J.:
Does this rule apply only to final orders issued by the Hearing Officer or to interlocutory orders as well? Petitioner contends that the rule pertains exclusively to final acts but the Court of Appeals ruled otherwise. Hence, this petition.Rule XV
Appeal
Section 1. Appeal from the Resolution, Ruling or Order of the Hearing Officer. - Any decision, ruling or order of the Hearing Officer may be appealed by the aggrieved party to the Commission sitting En Banc within fifteen (15) days from receipt by the appellant of notice of such resolution, ruling or order.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition for certiorari is GRANTED and the questioned Orders of respondent Hearing Officer dated 21 July 1999 and 14 October 1999 are hereby set aside and declared null and void. Let a writ of preliminary injunction issue hereby restraining and enjoining private respondents from exercising the rights and privileges arising from the 40% disputed shares, and from managing the affairs and disbursing the funds of Yamaoka Nippon Corporation (now Pescarich Manufacturing Corporation) until final judgment in SEC Case No. 11-95-5199, upon petitioner's posting of an injunction bond in the amount of P1,000,000.00 to answer for any and all damages that may inure to private respondents by virtue of this decision.Addressing the question of the timeliness of the petition, the SEC held that the petition for certiorari was the proper remedy to question the decision of the Hearing Officer and that the same was filed on time.
The Hearing Officer is hereby ordered to create and appoint a Management Committee to undertake the management of Yamaoka Nippon Corporation (now Pescarich Manufacturing Corporation).
SO ORDERED.[1]
The SEC Rules which became effective on 29 August 1999 (15 days after its publication) no longer contains any separate provision on certiorari proceedings from interlocutory orders of the SEC Hearing Officers, as contrasted with the old SEC Rules. However, the SEC Rules does not prohibit the filing of certiorari proceedings with this Commission except in election cases (Section 8(g), rule XIV). We should therefore suppletorily apply the Rules of Court.Aggrieved, respondents sought relief in the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA reversed the decision of the SEC, holding that Section 1, Rule XV of the New SEC Rules does not distinguish between interlocutory and final orders. Hence, petitioner should have appealed within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the order denying the motion for reconsideration.
Under the Rules of Court, petitions for Certiorari shall be filed within 60 days from receipt of the assailed orders (Section 4, Rule 65). In the instant case, the petition was filed within the prescribed 60-day period. We note that petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration from the July 21, 1999 Order was filed on August 9, 1999 or during the effectivity of the old SEC Rules which allowed the filing of a motion for reconsideration.[2]
Based on the aforequoted section of the SEC New Rules, respondent should have availed himself of the remedy of appeal within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the SEC Hearing Officer's Order dated October 14, 1999 denying his motion for reconsideration.The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:
Respondent's contention that the said order is "interlocutory" and, hence, unappealable, is obviously untenable because Section 1, RULE XV does not distinguish between a final or interlocutory order of the SEC Hearing Officer. Suffice it to state, the phrase "any decision, ruling or order" is so self-explanatory and wide enough as to encompass decisions, rulings and orders whether final or interlocutory in nature.
Respondent's insistence that the Rules of Court applies in a suppletory manner is tenable only if the SEC New Rules is absolutely wanting of a specific provision on the matter. For reasons only known to him, respondent ignored the clear import of Section 1, RULE XV of the SEC New Rules and waited for fifty (50) days before filing his petition for certiorari on December 17, 1999, counted from October 28, 1999.
However, under the circumstances obtaining in this case, especially considering that there is no showing of any plausible justification why it took him fifty (50) days to file such petition, respondent must suffer the consequences of a procedural lapse which is antithetical to the well-settled rule that a petition for certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal.[3]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review is hereby GIVEN DUE COURSE and accordingly GRANTED. The Decision rendered by the Securities and Exchange Commission En Banc on June 6, 2000 in SEC-EB No. 690 entitled "Kanemitsu Yamaoka v. Hon. Hearing Officer Simeon P. Badillo, Jr., Yamaoka Nippon Corporation (now Pescarich Manufacturing Corporation), Tetsuo Adachi, and Eiji Kawai," is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.From this decision, petitioner appeals.
Consequently, let a writ of injunction issue permanently enjoining respondent, the Commission En Banc and/or the appropriate branch of the Regional Trial Court, their representatives, agents, employees, or other persons acting for and in their behalf, from executing and/or implementing the Decision of the Commission En Banc dated June 6, 2000 rendered in the said SEC-EB No. 690.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.[4]
SEC. 4. Prohibited Pleadings. - The following pleadings, motions, or petitions shall not be allowed in the cases covered by these Rules:Second, the SEC noted that a petition for certiorari is not allowed in election cases. Section 8, Rule XIV states:
- Motion to dismiss the complaint;
- Motion for a bill of particulars;
- Motion for new trial, or for reconsideration of judgment or order, or for reopening of trial;
- Petition for relief from judgment;
- Motion for extension of time to file pleadings, affidavits or any other paper;
- Memoranda;
- Motion to declare the defendant in default;
- Motion for Postponement;
- Supplemental pleadings; and
- Motion for leave to amend pleadings.
SEC. 8. Prohibited Pleadings and Motions. - The following pleadings, motions or petitions shall not be allowed:Section 10, Rule X likewise prohibits the filing of a petition for certiorari from 72-hour temporary restraining orders (TROs), thus:
- Motion to Dismiss;
- Motion for a Bill of Particulars;
- Motion for New Trial or for Reconsideration;
- Petition for Relief from Judgment;
- Motion for Extension of Time to File Pleadings, Affidavits or any Other Paper;
- Memorandum;
- Petition for Certiorari, mandamus or Prohibition against any Interlocutory Order of the Hearing Officer;
- Motion to Declare Respondent in Default;
- Motion for Postponement;
- Reply or Rejoinder;
- Third Party Complaint; and
- Intervention.
SEC. 10. Prohibitions. - Any motion that would delay the resolution of the application for TRO is prohibited. A petition for Certiorari with respect to the issuance of the seventy-two (72) - hour TRO is likewise prohibited.Significantly, there is no similar prohibition regarding writs of injunction, which is governed by the same Rule X. These provisions in the new Rules imply that in proper cases, petitions for certiorari against interlocutory orders are generally allowed. To this rule, only election cases and 72-hour TROs are excepted.
xxx. It is axiomatic that an interlocutory order cannot be challenged by an appeal. Thus, it has been held that "the proper remedy in such cases is an ordinary appeal from an adverse judgment on the merits, incorporating in said appeal the grounds for assailing the interlocutory orders. Allowing appeals from interlocutory orders would result in the `sorry spectacle' of a case being subject of a counterproductive ping-pong to and from the appellate court as often as a trial court is perceived to have made an error in any of its interlocutory rulings. However, where the assailed order is patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief, the Court may allow certiorari as a mode of redress.Clearly, therefore, allowing appeals from interlocutory orders would not "assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action or claim brought before the Commission."[10]