766 Phil. 696
PERALTA, J.:
The undersigned sheriff respectfully submits the following report to wit:Petitioners filed through counsel a Special Appearance with Motion to Dismiss[8] on November 15, 2006. They asserted that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the corporation since the summons was improperly served upon Claudia Abante (Abante), who is a mere liaison officer and not one of the corporate officers specifically enumerated in Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules. Likewise, the individual petitioners argued that the sheriff and/or process server did not personally approach them at their respective address as stated in the Complaint. Neither did he resort to substituted service of summons, and that, even if he did, there was no strict compliance with Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules. The Court's pronouncements in Spouses Mason v. Court of Appeals,[9] E. B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd. v. Judge Benito,[10] Laus v. Court of Appeals,[11] and Samartino v. Raon[12] were invoked in praying for the dismissal of the complaint and the discharge of the writ of attachment.
On 26 October 2006, [a] copy of Writ of Attachment dated 26 October 2006, issued by the Court in the above-entitled case was received by the undersigned for service and implementation.
On even date, the undersigned served the Summons, copy of [the] Complaint, application for attachment, the plaintiffs affidavit and bond, and the Order and Writ of Attachment, on the defendants Nation Petroleum Gas et al., at BPI Building, Rizal Street, Candelaria, Quezon. Said summons and all pertinent papers, upon telephone instruction of defendant Melinda Ang, were received by Claudia Abante, [defendants'] [Liaison] Officer, as evidenced by her signature at the original copy of Summons and Writ. I also served copies to other defendants at their given addresses, but they refused to acknowledge receipt thereof.
On the same day, at the instance of the plaintiff's counsel and representative, the undersigned levied the real properties of the defendants at the Register of Deeds of Lucena City, Makati City, Pasig City, Quezon City and the Register of Deeds of Manila. I also levied a property (plant equipment) in NPGI plant in Sariaya, Quezon. Copies of the notices of levy on attachment are hereto attached.
WHEREFORE, the original copies of the Summonses, Order, Writ of Attachment and all pertinent papers are hereby returned to the Court of origin for record and information.[7]
The very essence of service of summons is for the defendants to be aware of an existing suit against them and for them to file an answer or responsive pleading thereto. When corporate and individual defendants were served with summons through the [liaison] officer who received the same for and in their behalf as per instruction of defendant Melinda Ang, and when defendants filed a responsive pleading in the form of a Motion to Dismiss, the essence of service of summons was met and defendants are deemed to have ultimately received the summons despite their protestations. There is no reason for the Court to doubt the regularity of the Sheriffs service of summons as in fact its regularity is presumed. It bears stressing that defendants did not per se deny having received summonses. Perforce, they are challenging the manner of service of the same. Having ultimately received the summonses upon them and considering the rules on service of the same was substantially complied with, the Court finds no reason to deny the instant Motion to Dismiss.[21]Petitioners elevated the jurisdictional issue to the CA via petition for certiorari and prohibition.[22] As afore-stated, the appellate court later dismissed the petition and denied the motion for reconsideration; hence, this petition raising the following issues for resolution:
We deny.I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF THE DEFENDANT CORPORATION BY SERVICE OF SUMMONS UPON ITS MERE EMPLOYEE.II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSONS OF THE INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS BY RESORTING TO SUBSTITUTED SERVICE OF SUMMONS DESPITE ABSENCE OF EARNEST EFFORTS ON THE PART OF THE SERVING OFFICER TO SERVE SUMMONS PERSONALLY.[23]
SECTION 11. Service upon domestic private juridical entity. - When the defendant is a corporation, partnership or association organized under the laws of the Philippines with a juridical personality, service may be made on the president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel.When the defendant is a domestic corporation like herein petitioner, service of summons may be made only upon the persons enumerated in Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules.[27] The enumeration of persons to whom summons may be served is restricted, limited and exclusive following the rule on statutory construction expressio unios est exclusio alterius.[28] Substantial compliance cannot be invoked.[29] Service of summons upon persons other than those officers specifically mentioned in Section 11, Rule 14 is void, defective and not binding to said corporation.[30]
Basic is the rule that a strict compliance with the mode of service is necessary to confer jurisdiction of the court over a corporation. The officer upon whom service is made must be one who is named in the statute; otherwise, the service is insufficient. The purpose is to render it reasonably certain that the corporation will receive prompt and proper notice in an action against it or to insure that the summons be served on a representative so integrated with the corporation that such person will know what to do with the legal papers served on him.[31]As correctly argued by petitioners, Sps. Mason already resolved that substantial compliance on service of summons upon a domestic corporation is no longer an excuse. Thus:
The question of whether the substantial compliance rule is still applicable under Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure has been settled in Villarosa which applies squarely to the instant case. In the said case, petitioner E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co. Ltd. (hereafter Villarosa) with principal office address at 102 Juan Luna St., Davao City and with branches at 2492 Bay View Drive, Tambo, Parañaque, Metro Manila and Kolambog, Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City, entered into a sale with development agreement with private respondent Imperial Development Corporation. As Villarosa failed to comply with its contractual obligation, private respondent initiated a suit for breach of contract and damages at the Regional Trial Court of Makati. Summons, together with the complaint, was served upon Villarosa through its branch manager at Kolambog, Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City. Villarosa filed a Special Appearance with Motion to Dismiss on the ground of improper service of summons and lack of jurisdiction. The trial court denied the motion and ruled that there was substantial compliance with the rule, thus, it acquired jurisdiction over Villarosa. The latter questioned the denial before us in its petition for certiorari. We decided in Villarosa's favor and declared the trial court without jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case. We held that there was no valid service of summons on Villarosa as service was made through a person not included in the enumeration in Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which revised the Section 13, Rule 14 of the 1964 Rules of Court. We discarded the trial court's basis for denying the motion to dismiss, namely, private respondent's substantial compliance with the rule on service of summons, and fully agreed with petitioner's assertions that the enumeration under the new rule is restricted, limited and exclusive, following the rule in statutory construction that expressio unios est exclusio alterius. Had the Rules of Court Revision Committee intended to liberalize the rule on service of summons, we said, it could have easily done so by clear and concise language. Absent a manifest intent to liberalize the rule, we stressed strict compliance with Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.The foregoing notwithstanding, We agree with the CA that there was a valid and effective service of summons upon petitioner corporation through its liaison officer who acted as the agent of the corporate secretary. It ruled:
Neither can herein petitioners invoke our ruling in Millennium to support their position for said case is not on all fours with the instant case. We must stress that Millennium was decided when the 1964 Rules of Court were still in force and effect, unlike the instant case which falls under the new rule. Hence, the cases cited by petitioners where we upheld the doctrine of substantial compliance must be deemed overturned by Villarosa, which is the later case.
At this juncture, it is worth emphasizing that notice to enable the other party to be heard and to present evidence is not a mere technicality or a trivial matter in any administrative or judicial proceedings. The service of summons is a vital and indispensable ingredient of due process. x x x[32]
Petitioner corporation asserts that based on the said rule [Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules], the service of summons made by the sheriff upon its liaison officer, Claudia Abante, was defective for the reason that a liaison officer is not one of the corporate officers enumerated therein upon whom service of summons is authorized to be made. It contends that there having been no valid service, the trial court consequently did not acquire jurisdiction to hear the complaint a quo.Petitioner corporation cannot conveniently rely on the sworn statements of the individual petitioners and Abante. Upon examination, Ang's denial of having spoken with any process server to give instruction to serve the summons and other pertinent papers to Abante[34] is not incompatible with the Sheriffs Report stating that "[s]aid summons and all pertinent papers, upon telephone instruction of defendant Melinda Ang, were received by Claudia Abante, [defendants'] [Liaison] Officer, as evidenced by her signature at the original copy of Summons and Writ." While it may be true that Ang had not talked to the sheriff or process server, it still does not rule out the possibility that she in fact spoke to Abante and instructed the latter to receive the documents in her behalf. As to the Affidavit of Abante, her disavowal of having spoken to Ang or receiving telephone instructions from her is truly self-serving. Evidence as simple as a telephone billing statement or an affidavit of a disinterested third person, among others, could have been presented to refute the sheriffs claim, but there was none. Likewise, no substantial proofs were credibly shown to support Abante's allegation that the sheriff insisted on having the court processes received and that she was "intimidated by the presence of a court personnel who was quite earnest in accomplishing his task."[35]
The contention deserves full credence only if it is to be assumed that Claudia Abante received the summons in her official capacity as petitioner corporation's liaison officer. However, this is not true in the instant case, since according to the sheriff, Abante proceeded to receive the summons and accompanying documents only after receiving instructions to do so from Melinda Ang, an individual petitioner herein and the petitioner corporation's corporate secretary. It is clear, therefore, that Abante, in so receiving the summons, did so in representation of Ang who, as corporate secretary, is one of the officers competent under the Rules of Court to receive summons on behalf of a private juridical person. Thus, while it may be true that there was no direct, physical handing of the summons to Ang, the latter could at least be charged with having constructively received the same, which in Our view, amounts to a valid service of summons.
Having herself instructed Abante to receive the summons, Ang, and for that matter, petitioner corporation, is thus now precluded from impugning the jurisdiction of the trial court on the ground of invalid service of summons. In point in this regard is the principle of estoppel which, under our remedial laws, is an effective bar against any claim of lack of jurisdiction. Under said doctrine, an admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon the person making it and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon.
Thus, despite the assertions of Ang and Abante that, as between them, no such instruction had been relayed and received, the sheriffs statement belying the allegations should be accorded weight.
The sheriffs report is further bolstered by the presumption of regularity in the performance of public duty as the same is provided for in Rule 131 of the Rules of Court. The presumption applies so long as it is shown that the officer, in performing his duties, is not inspired by any improper motive, a fact that is true with the sheriff in the case at bar. And, if the presumption may be made to apply to public officers in general, with more reason should its benefit be accorded to the sheriff, who is an officer of the court.
True, the presumption is disputable, but to overcome the same, more concrete evidence than the affidavit of Abante is required. As correctly pointed out by the respondent, in line with the ruling of the Supreme Court in R. Transport Corporation vs. Court of Appeals and Talsan Enterprises, Inc. vs. Baliwag, Abante's affidavit is self-serving in nature, and being so, is not sufficient to overturn the said presumption.
On this aspect, petitioners score the respondent, asserting that the two above-cited cases are not applicable to the case at hand inasmuch as these were decided before the advent of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, adding likewise that the cited cases and the instant case differ in their respective factual milieus. We are not persuaded. Under either the former or the present rules, it is clear that Abante's denial that she received instructions from Ang is evidence that would pale in comparison to the declaration of an officer of the court indisputably performing his duty objectively and free from any malicious and ill motives.[33]
Section 6. Service in person on defendant. - Whenever practicable, the summons shall be served by handling a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him.Sections 6 and 7 of the Rules cannot be construed to apply simultaneously and do not provide for alternative modes of service of summons which can either be resorted to on the mere basis of convenience to the parties for, under our procedural rules, service of summons in the persons of the defendants is generally preferred over substituted service.[37] Resort to the latter is permitted when the summons cannot be promptly served on the defendant in person and after stringent formal and substantive requirements have been complied with.[38] The failure to comply faithfully, strictly and fully with all the requirements of substituted service renders the service of summons ineffective.[39]
Section 7. Substituted service. - If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant's office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.
We can break down this section into the following requirements to effect a valid substituted service:In resorting to the substituted service, the sheriff in this case pithily declared in his Report that he "also served copies to other defendants at their given addresses, but they refused to acknowledge receipt thereof." Obviously, the Sheriffs Report dated November 13, 2006 does not particularize why substituted service was resorted to and the precise manner by which the summons was served upon the individual petitioners. The disputable presumption that an official duty has been regularly performed will not apply where it is patent from the sheriffs or server's return that it is defective.[42]
(1) Impossibility of Prompt Personal Service
The party relying on substituted service or the sheriff must show that defendant cannot be served promptly or there is impossibility of prompt service. Section 8, Rule 14 provides that the plaintiff or the sheriff is given a "reasonable time" to serve the summons to the defendant in person, but no specific time frame is mentioned. "Reasonable time" is defined as "so much time as is necessary under the circumstances for a reasonably prudent and diligent man to do, conveniently, what the contract or duty requires that should be done, having a regard for the rights and possibility of loss, if any[,] to the other party." Under the Rules, the service of summons has no set period. However, when the court, clerk of court, or the plaintiff asks the sheriff to make the return of the summons and the latter submits the return of summons, then the validity of the summons lapses. The plaintiff may then ask for an alias summons if the service of summons has failed. What then is a reasonable time for the sheriff to effect a personal service in order to demonstrate impossibility of prompt service? To the plaintiff, "reasonable time" means no more than seven (7) days since an expeditious processing of a complaint is what a plaintiff wants. To the sheriff, "reasonable time" means 15 to 30 days because at the end of the month, it is a practice for the branch clerk of court to require the sheriff to submit a return of the summons assigned to the sheriff for service. The Sheriffs Return provides data to the Clerk of Court, which the clerk uses in the Monthly Report of Cases to be submitted to the Office of the Court Administrator within the first ten (10) days of the succeeding month. Thus, one month from the issuance of summons can be considered "reasonable time" with regard to personal service on the defendant.
Sheriffs are asked to discharge their duties on the service of summons with due care, utmost diligence, and reasonable promptness and speed so as not to prejudice the expeditious dispensation of justice. Thus, they are enjoined to try their best efforts to accomplish personal service on defendant. On the other hand, since the defendant is expected to try to avoid and evade service of summons, the sheriff must be resourceful, persevering, canny, and diligent in serving the process on the defendant. For substituted service of summons to be available, there must be several attempts by the sheriff to personally serve the summons within a reasonable period [of one month] which eventually resulted in failure to prove impossibility of prompt service. "Several attempts" means at least three (3) tries, preferrably on at least two different dates. In addition, the sheriff must cite why such efforts were unsuccessful. It is only then that impossibility of service can be confirmed or accepted.
(2) Specific Details in the Return
The sheriff must describe in the Return of Summons the facts and circumstances surrounding the attempted personal service. The efforts made to find the defendant and the reasons behind the failure must be clearly narrated in detail in the Return. The date and time of the attempts on personal service, the inquiries made to locate the defendant, the name/s of the occupants of the alleged residence or house of defendant and all other acts done, though futile, to serve the summons on defendant must be specified in the Return to justify substituted service. The form on Sheriffs Return of Summons on Substituted Service prescribed in the Handbook for Sheriffs published by the Philippine Judicial Academy requires a narration of the efforts made to find the defendant personally and the fact of failure. Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 5 dated November 9, 1989 requires that "impossibility of prompt service should be shown by stating the efforts made to find the defendant personally and the failure of such efforts," which should be made in the proof of service.
(3) A Person of Suitable Age and Discretion
If the substituted service will be effected at defendant's house or residence, it should be left with a person of "suitable age and discretion then residing therein." A person of suitable age and discretion is one who has attained the age of full legal capacity (18 years old) and is considered to have enough discernment to understand the importance of a summons. "Discretion" is defined as "the ability to make decisions which represent a responsible choice and for which an understanding of what is lawful, right or wise may be presupposed". Thus, to be of sufficient discretion, such person must know how to read and understand English to comprehend the import of the summons, and fully realize the need to deliver the summons and complaint to the defendant at the earliest possible time for the person to take appropriate action. Thus, the person must have the "relation of confidence" to the defendant, ensuring that the latter would receive or at least be notified of the receipt of the summons. The sheriff must therefore determine if the person found in the alleged dwelling or residence of defendant is of legal age, what the recipient's relationship with the defendant is, and whether said person comprehends the significance of the receipt of the summons and his duty to immediately deliver it to the defendant or at least notify the defendant of said receipt of summons. These matters must be clearly and specifically described in the Return of Summons.
(4) A Competent Person in Charge
If the substituted service will be done at defendant's office or regular place of business, then it should be served on a competent person in charge of the place. Thus, the person on whom the substituted service will be made must be the one managing the office or business of defendant, such as the president or manager; and such individual must have sufficient knowledge to understand the obligation of the defendant in the summons, its importance, and the prejudicial effects arising from inaction on the summons. Again, these details must be contained in the Return.[41]
34. In the instant case, representatives of the undersigned counsel and plaintiff RCBC personally observed the service of summons on the defendants. Based on their account, the following facts and circumstances transpired:According to respondent's version, copies of the complaint, summons and writ of attachment, among others, were served to petitioner corporation at its offices in Candelaria, Quezon and RCBC Plaza. In the Quezon office, the sheriff was informed that the individual petitioners were all not around to receive the summons for the corporation considering that they do not hold office at said address. Likewise, a staff from the RCBC Plaza office stated that all them were not around and were probably at home. Thereafter, summons was served on the individual petitioners at their respective addresses in Makati City, Quezon City, and Candelaria, Quezon. Their house helpers told that they were not at home but were in the RCBC Plaza office. Considering that the sheriff already went there and its personnel said that they were not at said office, it became apparent on the sheriff that the individual petitioners were trying to evade service of summons. Thus, given this predicament, it was futile for him to go back to the RCBC Plaza office.a. On [October 26, 2006], the Sheriff served summons on defendant NPGI at the G/F BPI Building, Rizal Street, Candelaria, Quezon, the reported office address of defendant NPGI in the latter's General Information Sheet submitted with the Securities and Exchange Commission.36. Indeed, in the instant case, contrary to the allegations contained in the Motion to Dismiss, the summons were properly served to the individual defendants through substituted service considering that there were justifiable causes existing which prevented personal service upon all the individual defendants within a reasonable time.a.1. In the said address, the Sheriff met a person who introduced herself as Ms. Claudia Abante, the Liaison [Officer] of defendant NPGI.b. Copies of the Complaint, summons and Writ of Attachment, among others, were likewise served to defendant NPGI at its office located at 39th Floor, Yuchengco Tower, RCBC Plaza, 6819 Ayala Avenue, corner Sen. Gil Puyat Avenue, Makati City, Metro Manila ('RCBC Plaza Office').
a.2. Upon inquiry, the Sheriff was informed that defendants NPGI Officers were all not around to receive the summons for defendant NPGI considering that, according to Ms. Abante, the defendant NPGI Directors do not hold office at said address.
a.3. However, Ms. Abante volunteered to call defendant Melinda Ang on the phone to inform her that summons was beings served upon defendant NPGI.
a.4. Subsequently, Ms. Abante informed the Sheriff that defendant Melinda Ang authorized her to receive the summons for defendant NPGI.
a.5. Considering that she claimed to be authorized by defendant Melinda Ang, who is the Corporate Secretary of defendant NPGI, to receive the summons on behalf of defendant NPGI, the Sheriff entrusted the same to her, as well as the Complaint and the Writ of Attachment, among others, and Ms. Abante voluntarily signed the receiving copy thereof.
a.6 the Sheriff did not intimidate Ms. Abante into receiving the summons. In fact, she volunteered to receive the same.b.1. The personnel from said office also stated that all the defendant NPGI Directors were not around and were probably at home. As such, a copy of the Complaint, summons and Writ of Attachment, among others, were left with said office.c. Thereafter, summons on the individual defendants were served at the following addresses:c.1. Renato Ang, Nena Ang, Melinda Ang, Pauline Ang - 1348 Palm Avenue, Dasmarinas Village, Makati City;d. Upon service of the summons upon them, it became apparent that the individual defendants were evading service of summons considering that the sheriff was being given a run-around.
c.2. Guillermo Sy and Alison Sy - 1320 Glorioso Streets, Dasmarinas Village, Makati City;
c.3. Nelson Ang, Luisa Ang - 19 Swallow Drive, Greenmeadows, Quezon City;
c.4. Mario Ang - Diamond Furniture, Cabunyag Street, Candelaria, Quezon; and
c.5. Ricky Ang - Rizal Street, Candelaria, Quezon.d.1. In their respective residences, their house helpers stated that the individual defendants were not at home but in the RCBC Plaza Office.
d.2. However, considering that the Sheriff had already been to the RCBC Plaza Office and the personnel at said office previously stated that all the defendants were not at said office, it became apparent that all the defendants were trying to evade service of summons.
d.3. Given the obvious attempt of defendants to evade service of summons, it was futile for the Sheriff to go back to the RCBC Plaza Office.
d.4. Hence, summons were served to the individual defendants through substituted service by entrusting the same to their house helpers residing at the respective addresses, all of whom are of suitable age and discretion.
x x x x36.1. It should be noted that aside from defendant NPGI, there are ten (10) other individual defendants in the instant case who are residing in addresses which are far apart (i.e., Makati City, Pasig City, City of Manila and Quezon Province).
36.2. Summons were attempted to be served to all defendant NPGI Directors, Luisa Ang, Guillermo Sy and Pauline Ang on the following addresses:36.3. To require the sheriff to return several times at the residences of the ten (10) defendants as suggested by the defendants, despite the apparent intention of the defendants to evade service of summons, and the considerable distances between all their residences (i.e., Makati City, Pasig City, City of Manila and Quezon Province), would clearly be unreasonable.[49]
- Renato Ang, Nena Ang, Melinda Ang, Pauline Ang - 1348 Palm Avenue, Dasmarinas Village, Makati City;
- Guillermo Sy and Alison Sy - 1320 Glorioso Streets, Dasmarinas Village, Makati City;
- Nelson Ang, Luisa Ang - 19 Swallow Drive, Greenmeadows, Quezon City;
- Mario Ang - Diamond Furniture, Cabunyag Street, Candelaria, Quezon; and
- Ricky Ang - Rizal Street, Candelaria, Quezon.