793 Phil. 479
CARPIO, J.:
WHEREFORE, the Eight Hundred Twenty Two (822) square meters of the land owned by the defendants is hereby expropriated in favor of the National Power Corporation effective December 2009 upon payment of the fair market value of the property at Eleven Thousand (PI 1,000.00) Pesos per square meter or a total of Nine Million Forty-Two Thousand (P9,042,000.00) Pesos. Defendants' claim that said property was occupied by plaintiff since 1940 is unrebutted, hence, reasonable rentals of Twelve Thousand Pesos (PI2,000.00) yearly is hereby awarded to defendants from the year 1940 to the present at a twelve percent (12%) annual interest rate, until fully paid.On 8 March 2013, NAPOCOR filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order. However, the trial court denied the motion in an Order dated 30 April 2013[13] which was received by NAPOCOR on 23 May 2013 and by respondents on 15 May 2013.
SO ORDERED.[12]
In determining the propriety of execution of its Order dated January 29, 2013, pending appeal, showing good reasons as stated in the motion and while the Court has its jurisdiction over the case and still in possession of original record thereof or the record on appeal, the Court grants the "Motion for Execution Pending Appeal."[18]On 12 July 2013, the trial court's Officer-in-Charge issued a Writ of Execution.[19] Sheriff Raymundo P. Claveria issued a Notice[20] addressed to the President of NAPOCOR demanding payment of P9,042,000 and P12,000 yearly rentals plus 12% interest from 1940 up to the present until fully paid within ten days from receipt thereof.
SEC. 2. Discretionary execution. -In this case, the motion for execution pending appeal was filed by respondents seven days after their receipt of the trial court's order denying the motions for reconsideration filed by both parties. Clearly, respondents filed the motion for execution pending appeal before the lapse of the period to file an appeal, which is fifteen days from notice of the order denying the motion for reconsideration.[27] Therefore, the trial court still had jurisdiction when respondents filed their motion for execution pending appeal.
(a) Execution of a judgment or a final order pending appeal. - On motion of the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party filed in the trial court while it has jurisdiction over the case and is in possession of either the original record or the record on appeal, as the case may be, at the time of the filing of such motion, said court may, in its discretion, order execution of a judgment or final order even before the expiration of the period to appeal.
After the trial court has lost jurisdiction, the motion for execution pending appeal may be filed in the appellate court.
Discretionary execution may only issue upon good reasons to be stated in a special order after due hearing.
SEC. 9. Perfection of appeal; effect thereof. A party's appeal by notice of appeal is deemed perfected as to him upon the filing of the notice of appeal in due time.In this case, the trial court issued its Order granting the motion for execution pending appeal on 11 July 2013. That Order expressly stated that the trial court was still in possession of the original record of the case at the time. In fact, the records were transmitted to the Court of Appeals on 19 July 2013.[28] In other words, the trial court issued the Order granting the motion for execution pending appeal before the transmittal of the records to the Court of Appeals. Hence, contrary to NAPOCOR's contention, the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the trial court still had jurisdiction when the motion for execution pending appeal was filed and when the trial court resolved such motion.
A party's appeal by record on appeal is deemed perfected as to him with respect to the subject matter thereof upon the approval of the record on appeal filed in due time.
In appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of the appeals filed in due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties.
In appeals by record on appeal, the court loses jurisdiction only over the subject matter thereof upon the approval of the records on appeal filed in due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties.
In either case, prior to the transmittal of the original record or the record on appeal, the court may issue orders for the protection and preservation of the rights of the parties which do not involve any matter litigated by the appeal, approve compromises, permit appeals of indigent litigants, order execution pending appeal in accordance with Section 2 of Rule 39, and allow withdrawal of the appeal. (Emphasis supplied)
The Court rules that discretionary execution of judgments pending appeal under Sec. 2(a) of Rule 39 does not apply to eminent domain proceedings.The Court of Appeals' reliance on the case of Borja v. Court of Appeals[31] is misplaced. Borja involved a complaint for sum of money totalling P78,325 representing unpaid commissions and damages. On the other hand, this case involves expropriation proceedings, where the trial court fixed the just compensation for the subject property at P9,042,000 and yearly rentals at PI 2,000 since 1940 plus 12% interest per annum for a total award of P14,873,999.28. The difference in the nature of the actions and the amounts involved in Borja and in this case justifies the non-application of the rule on discretionary execution.
As early as 1919 in Visayan Refining Co. v. Camus and Paredes, the Court held:When the Government is plaintiff the judgment will naturally take the form of an order merely requiring the payment of the award as a condition precedent to the transfer of the title, as a personal judgment against the Government could not be realized upon execution.In Commissioner of Public Highways v. San Diego, no less than the eminent Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee explained the rationale behind the doctrine that government funds and properties cannot be seized under a writ of execution, thus:The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by general or special law, it may limit claimants action only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution and that the power of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since government funds and properties may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the corresponding appropriation as required by law. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law.PPA's monies, facilities and assets are government properties. Ergo, they are exempt from execution whether by virtue of a final judgment or pending appeal.
PPA is a government instrumentality charged with carrying out governmental functions through the management, supervision, control and regulation of major ports of the country. It is an attached agency of the Department of Transportation and Communication pursuant to PD 505.
x x x x
Therefore, an undeniable conclusion is that the funds of PPA partake of government funds, and such may not be garnished absent an allocation by its Board or by statutory grant. If the PPA funds cannot be garnished and its properties, being government properties, cannot be levied via a writ of execution pursuant to a final judgment, then the trial court likewise cannot grant discretionary execution pending appeal, as it would run afoul of the established jurisprudence that government properties are exempt from execution. What cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly.
From the above discussion, we find that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in its July 24, 2000 Order directing the execution of the First Compensation Order (July 10, 2000 Order) pending appeal.[30] (Emphasis supplied)
Execution pending appeal requires the observance of the following requisites: (a) there must be a motion therefor by the prevailing party; (b) there must be a good reason for issuing the writ of execution; and (c) the good reason must be stated in a special order.In this case, the trial court granted the motion for execution pending appeal based on "good reasons as stated in the motion," without identifying and discussing any of these alleged good reasons. A mere statement of "good reasons as stated in the motion" does not suffice to justify execution pending appeal. It is basic that the trial court should make a finding on whether the allegations in the motion for execution pending appeal constitute good reasons as required in Section 2 of Rule 39. The trial court should have expressed clearly and distinctly the facts and law on which the order granting the motion for execution pending appeal was based, but it did not. Without such finding, the allegations in the motion for execution pending appeal remain as allegations. Consequently, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in granting discretionary execution without stating and explaining clearly the basis therefor.
The prevailing doctrine as provided for in Section 2, paragraph 3 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Civil Procedure is that discretionary execution is permissible only when good reasons exist for immediately executing the judgment before finality or pending appeal or even before the expiration of the period to appeal. Good reasons consist of compelling circumstances justifying immediate execution lest judgment becomes illusory, or the prevailing party after the lapse of time be unable to enjoy it, considering the tactics of the adverse party who may have apparently no cause but to delay. Such reasons must constitute superior circumstances demanding urgency which will outweigh the injury or damages should the losing party secure a reversal of the judgment. Were it otherwise, execution pending appeal may well become a tool of oppression and inequity instead of an instrument of solicitude and justice.
The execution of judgment pending appeal is an exception to the general rule and must, therefore, be strictly construed. So, too, it is not to be availed of and applied routinely, but only in extraordinary circumstances.
This rule is strictly construed against the movant, for courts look with disfavor upon any attempt to execute a judgment which has not acquired a final character. In the same vein, the Court has held that such execution is "usually not favored because it affects the rights of the parties which are yet to be ascertained on appeal."
The exercise of the power to grant or deny immediate or advance execution is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. However, the existence of good reasons is indispensable to the grant of execution pending appeal. Absent any "such good reason, the special order of execution must be struck down for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion. (Emphasis supplied)
SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. - The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellants shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or final order, x x x.[28] CA rollo (G.R. No. 214070), p. 4. t/
The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed.