842 Phil. 654
TIJAM, J.:
WHEREFORE, considering all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered identifying the properties purusant (sic) to the aforesaid Report and declaring the following as the identifying descriptions of the individual properties of all the parties.On May 14, 1992, the RTC issued a Writ of Execution[17] and subsequently ordered the Amended Decision final and executory.[18]Lot 1
Psu-167189
ECI Trading
TCT No. T-15797
A parcel of LAND (Lot 1 of the plan Psu-167189, L.R.C. Record No. ), situated in Tagaytay City. Bounded on the N., along line 1-2 by Provincial Road (20.00 m. wide); on the E., along lines 2-3-4, by property of Josefa Jara Martinez; on the S., along line 4-5, by property of Leopoldo de Grano; and on the W., along line 5-1, by Right of way. Beginning at a point marked "1" on plan, being N. 82 deg. 53'W., 819.80 m. from B.L.L.M. 5, Mp. of Tagaytay.Thence N. 83 deg. 13'E., 82.00 m. to point 2;containing an area of THREE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED (3,200) Square Meters. All points referred to are indicated on the plan and are marked on the ground by P.S. Cyl. Conc. Mons.; bearings true; date of survey, January 31, 1958 and that of the approval, May 19, 1958.
thence S. 2 deg. 03'R, 79.18 m. to point 3;
thence S. 9 deg. 08'E., 7.00 m. to point 4;
thence S. 75 deg. 20'W., 41.96 m. to point 5;
thence N. 3 deg. 00'E., 93.01 m. to point of beginning;Lot 2
Psu-167189
(ECI Trading)
TCT No. T-16603
A PARCEL OF LAND (Lot 2 of the plan Psu-167189, L.R.C. Record No. ), situated in Tagaytay City. Bounded on the W., along line 1-2 by Lot 3 of plan Psu-167189; on the N., along lines 2-3-4, by Provincial Road (20.00 m. wide); on the E., along line 4-5, by Right of Way; and on the S., along line 5-1, by property of Leopoldo de Grano. Beginning at a point marked "1" on plan, being S. 89 deg. 22'W., 859.91 m. from B.L.L.M. 5 Mp. of Tagaytay,thence N. 4 deg. 00'E., 107.00 m. to point 2;containing an area of THREE THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED (3,400) Square Meters. All points referred to are indicated on the plan and are marked on the ground by P.S. Cyl. Conc. Mons.; bearings true; date of survey, January 31, 1958 and that of the approval, May 19, 1958.
thence N. 85 deg. 41'E., 7.17 m. to point 3;
thence N. 83 deg. 13'E., 24.83 m. to point 4;
thence S. 3 deg. 00'W., 102.79 m. to point 5;
thence S. 77 deg. 25'W., 34.72 m. to the point of beginning;Lot 3
Psu-167189
(Century Investment, TCT No. 2903)
A PARCEL OF LAND (Lot 3 of the plan Psu-167189, L.R.C. Record No. ), situated in Tagaytay City. Bounded on the W., along line 1-2, by property of Genoveva Perlas and Jose Crisostomo (Lot 3, Psu-146224 Amd.); on the N., along line 2-3, by Provincial Road (20.00 m. wide); on the E., along line 3-4, by Lot 2 of plan Psu-167189; on the S., along line 4-5, by property of Leopoldo de Grano; and on the W., along line 5-1, by property of Leopoldo de Grano. Beginning at a point marked "1" on plan, being N. 89 deg. 56'W., 890.87m. From B.L.L.M. 5 Mp. of Tagaytay.thence N. 4 deg. 00'E., 94.23 m. to point 2;containing an area of THREE THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED SIXTY SIX (3,466) Square Meters. All points referred to are indicated on the plan and are marked on the ground as follows; points 1 and 2 by old P.L.S. Conc. Mons.; and the rest by P.S. Cyl. Conc. Mons; bearings true; date of survey, January 31, 1958 and that of the approval, May 19, 1958.
thence N. 85 deg. 41'E., 32.00 m. to point 3;
thence S. 4 deg. 00'W., 107.00 m. to point 4;
thence S. 77 deg. 11'W., 33.06 m. to point 5;
thence N. 4 deg. 00'E., 17.70 m. to point of beginning;Lot 1
Psu-146224 Amd.
(Multi Realty Dev. Corp.)
(MRDC) TCTNo. T-14786
A PARCEL OF LAND (Lot 1 of the amendment plan Psu-146224 Amd., L.R.C. Record No. ), situated in Tagaytay City. Bounded on the E., along line 1-2 by Lot 2 of the amendment plan; on the S., along line 2-3 by property of Leopoldo de Grano; on the W., along line 3-4, by property of Francisco Tolentino (LOT 2 Psu-110811); and on the N., along line 4-1, by National Road (20.00 m. wide). Beginning at a point marked "1" on plan, being N. 84 deg. 10'W., 953.36 m. from BL.L.M. 5, Tagaytay City,thence S. 2 deg. 51'W., 80.51 m. to point 2;containing an area of THREE THOUSAND (3,000) Square Meters. All points referred to are indicated on the plan and are marked on the ground as follows; point 2 by P.L.S. Cyl. Conc. Mons.; and the rest by old P.L.S. Cyl. Conc. Mons.; bearings true; date of the amendment survey, March 4 and Oct. 11, 1955 and that of approval, Oct. 28, 1955.
thence N. 80 deg. 13'W., 38.24 m. to point 3;
thence N. 2 deg. 51'E., 77.56 m. to point 4;
thence S. 84 deg. 38'E., 38.00 m. to the point of beginning;Lot 2
Psu-146224 Amd.
(Marilyn Go, Ramos Yeo, Laurence L. Go and Montgomery L. Go)
TCT Nos. 17271 and 17272
A PARCEL OF LAND (Lot 2 of the amendment plan Psu-146224 Amd., L.R.C. Record No. ), situated in Tagaytay City. Bounded on the N., along lines 1-2-3, by National Road (20.00 m. wide); on the E., along line 3-4, by lot 3 of the amendment plan; on the S., along line 4-5, by property of Leopoldo de Grano; on the W., along line 5-1, by lot 1 of the amendment plan. Beginning at a point marked "1" on plan, being N. 84 deg. 10W., 953.36 m. from B.L.L.M. 5, Tagaytay City.thence S. 88 deg. 13'E., 8.39 m. to point 2;containing an area of THREE THOUSAND (3,000) Square Meters. All points referred to are indicated on the plan and are marked on the ground as follows; points 4 and 5 by P.L.S. Cyl. Conc. Mons.; and the rest by old P.L.S. Cyl. Conc. Mons.; bearings true; date of the amendment survey, March 4 and Oct. 11, 1955 and that of the approval, Oct. 28, 1955.
thence S. 88 deg. 15'E., 17.79 m. to point 3;
thence S. 3 deg. 54'W., 89.09 m. to point 4;
thence N. 74 deg. 18'W., 35.41 m. to point 5;
thence N. 2 deg. 51'E., 80.51 m. to the point of beginning;Lot 3
Psu-146224 Amd.
(Richard Chua TCT No. T-2163)
A PARCEL OF LAND (Lot 3 of the amendment plan Psu-146224 Amd., L.R.C. Record No. ), situated in Tagaytay City. Bounded on the N., along line 1-2, by National Road (20.00 m. wide); on the E., and on the S., along lines 2-3-4, by property of Leopoldo de Grano; and on the W., along line 4-1, by Lot 2 of the amendment plan. Beginning at a point marked "1" on plan, being N. 84 deg. 00'W., 917.72 m. from B.L.L.M. 5, Tagaytay City.thence S. 88 deg. 10'E., 28.41 m. to point 2;containing an area of TWO THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED NINETY-SIX (2,596) Square Meters. All points referred to are indicated on the plan and are marked on the ground as follows: point 4 by P.L.S. Cyl. Cone. Mon.; and the rest by old P.L.S. Cyl. Conc. Mons.; bearings true; date of the amendment survey, March 4 and Oct. 11, 1955 and that of the approval, Oct. 28, 1955.
thence S. 4 deg. 00'W., 94.23 m. to point 3;
thence N. 77 deg. 48'W., 28.53 m. to point 4;
thence N. 3 deg. 54'E., 89.09 m. to the point of beginning;
Plaintiffs Richard O. Chua and Polly S. Chua and defendant Century Investment Co., Inc. are hereby ordered to pay not later than fifteen (15) days from receipt of this judgment, their outstanding balance the amounts of P11,000.00 and P5,000.00, respectively, in favor of Engineers Paz and Daliri, pursuant to a Statement of Expenses which they submitted to the Court, in an equal sharing basis, pursuant to a prior agreement of the parties.
SO ORDERED.[16]
WHEREFORE, the Amended Petition for Annulment of Judgment is hereby DENIED. The assailed Amended Decision dated 27 January 1992 of the Regional Trial Court, Fourth Judicial Region, Tagaytay City, Cavite, Branch 18, in Civil Case No. TG-893, is AFFIRMED.The motions for reconsideration filed by Gos[27] and Multi-Realty[28] were also denied by the CA in its October 24, 2017 Resolution[29].
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.[26]
THE COURT A QUO COMMITTED AN EGREGIOUS AND HARMFUL ERROR IN ISSUING THE ASSAILED DECISION AND ASSAILED RESOLUTION, WHICH DENIED THE AMENDED PETITION, AND FAILED TO ANNUL AND SET ASIDE THE AMENDED DECISION ISSUED BY THE RTC PURSUANT TO SECTION 2, RULE 47 OF THE RULES OF COURT, CONSIDERING THAT:For its part, Multi-Realty raised the following assignment of errors in its petition:
A. THE RTC NEVER ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSONS OF THE PETITIONERS DUE TO IMPROPER SUBSTITUTED SERVICE OF SUMMONS;
B. THE RTC HAD NO JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE RTC CASE, SINCE THE ALTERNATIVE CAUSES OF ACTION PLEADED IN THE AMENDED COMPLAINT ARE EXCLUSIVELY WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF LAND REGISTRATION COURTS TO RESOLVE; AND
C. CONTRARY TO THE FINDING OF THE COURT A QUO, THE PETITIONERS ARE NOT BARRED BY LACHES FROM FILING THE AMENDED PETITION, PRECISELY BECAUSE THE AMENDED DECISION IS VOID FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION OF THE RTC.[30]
Ultimately, the issues for Our resolution are: 1) Whether there was a valid substituted service of summons on Gos for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction; 2) Whether the amendments of certificates of title can only be ordered in proper in rem proceedings by a court sitting as a land registration court; 3) Whether the order of amendment of the certificates of title is beyond the one (1) year prescriptive period under PD No. 1529; 4) Whether the amendment of certificates of title is allowed under PD. No. 1529; and, 5) Whether the Gos and Multi-Realty are barred by laches to question the Amended Decision of the trial court.I
THE COURT A QUO COMMITTED GRAVE AND REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT FAILED TO FIND THAT THE AMENDED PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT IS AN APPROPRIATE REMEDY TO RECTIFY THE AMENDED DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT, WHICH WAS PROMULGATED WITHOUT JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE.
A. THE TRIAL COURT PROMULGATED THE AMENDED DECISION WITHOUT JURISDICTION CONSIDERING THAT AMENDMENTS OF CERTIFICATES OF TITLE CAN ONLY BE ORDERED IN PROPER IN REM PROCEEDINGS BY A COURT SITTING AS A LAND REGISTRATION COURT, AND NOT IN AN ORDINARY CIVIL ACTION SUCH AS THE AMENDED AND/OR SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT AD CAUTELA IN CIVIL CASE NO. TG-893.
B. THE TRIAL COURT ALSO PROMULGATED THE AMENDED DECISION WITHOUT JURISDICTION SINCE THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO COMPLY WITH SECTION 23 OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1592, (SIC) OR THE PROPERTY REGISTRATION DECREE (PD 1529) ON PUBLICATION AND NOTICE TO INTERESTED PARTIES.
C. EVEN ASSUMING THAT CIVIL CASE NO. TG-893 WAS AN ACTION IN REM, THE TRIAL COURT STILL HAD NO JURISDICTION TO ORDER THE AMENDMENT OF THE CERTIFICATES OF TITLE SINCE THE AMENDMENT OF TORRENS CERTIFICATES OF TITLES PRAYED FOR THEREIN IS TANTAMOUNT TO THE RE-OPENING OR REVIEW OF THE DECREE OF REGISTRATION BEYOND THE REGLEMENTARY ONE (1) YEAR PROVIDED UNDER SECTION 32 OF PD 1529.
D. THE TRIAL COURT STILL HAD NO JURISDICTION TO ORDER THE AMENDMENT OF THE CERTIFICATES OF TITLE SINCE SUCH AMENDMENT DID NOT FALL WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF ALLOWABLE AMENDMENTS UNDER SECTION 108 OF PD 1592 (SIC).II
THE COURT A QUO COMMITTED GRAVE AND REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT PETITIONER MULTI-REALTY WAS BARRED BY LACHES, SINCE THE AMENDED DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT IS VOID FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION; CONSEQUENTLY, PETITIONER MULTI-REALTY CANNOT BE BARRED BY LACHES.III
THE COURT A QUO COMMITTED GRAVE AND REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT COMPLETELY FAILED TO CONSIDER THE ARGUMENTS AND EVIDENCE OF PETITIONER MULTI-REALTY, AS WELL AS THE RESULTING PREJUDICE THAT THE AMENDMENT OF ITS CERTIFICATE OF TITLE WILL PRODUCE, AS IS CLEARLY EVIDENT FROM THE ASSAILED DECISION AND THE ASSAILED RESOLUTION.[31]
The court's jurisdiction over a defendant is founded on a valid service of summons. Without a valid service, the court cannot acquire jurisdiction over the defendant, unless the defendant voluntarily submits to it. The defendant must be properly apprised of a pending action against him and assured of the opportunity to present his defenses to the suit. Proper service of summons is used to protect one's right to due process.[33]It is settled in Our jurisprudence, that personal service is the preferred mode of service of summons, but if, for justifiable reasons, it cannot be served within reasonable time, then substituted service can be resorted to.
In actions in personam, such as the present case, the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the defendant through personal or substituted service of summons. However, because substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of service and personal service of summons is preferred over substituted service, parties do not have unbridled right to resort to substituted service of summons. Before substituted service of summons is resorted to, the parties must: (a) indicate the impossibility of personal service of summons within a reasonable time; (b) specify the efforts exerted to locate the defendant; and (c) state that the summons was served upon a person of sufficient age and discretion who is residing in the address, or who is in charge of the office or regular place of business of the defendant.Let us examine the full text of the Sheriffs Return dated December 15, 1989 executed by Deputy Sheriff Bienvenido J. Liboro (Deputy Sheriff Liboro), which reads:
THIS CERTIFIES THAT on December 15, 1989, summons and copies of the complaint together with annexes in the above-entitled case were served upon subject defendants at No. 154, 10th Street, New Manila, Quezon City, thru Mr. Patricio Alampay, a person of suitable age and discretion residing at the above given address, who acknowledged receipt thereof as evidenced by his signature affixed on the original copy of the summons herewith returned to the Honorable Court of origin SERVED by way of substituted service.[35]Here, the service of summons was, without question, made via substituted service. A careful reading of the Sheriff's Return, however, would reveal the absence of specific details on the serious efforts to serve the summons on the persons of Gos, nor were there valid reasons cited why personal service proved to be ineffectual.
X x x. For substituted service of summons to be accepted, there must be several attempts by the sheriff to personally serve the summons within a reasonable period [of one month] which eventually resulted in failure to prove impossibility of prompt service. Several attempts means at least three (3) tries, preferably on at least two different dates. In addition, the sheriff must cite why such efforts were unsuccessful. It is only then that impossibility of service can be confirmed or accepted.[36]Moreso, there are two (2) requirements for substituted service of summons to be available under the Rules[37]: (1) recipient must be a person of suitable age and discretion; and (2) recipient must reside in the house or residence of defendant. The case of Manotoc,[38] explains a person of suitable age and discretion:
If the substituted service will be effected at defendants house or residence, it should be left with a person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein. A person of suitable age and discretion is one who has attained the age of full legal capacity (18 years old) and is considered to have enough discernment to understand the importance of a summons. Discretion is defined as the ability to make decisions which represent a responsible choice and for which an understanding of what is lawful, right or wise may be presupposed. Thus, to be of sufficient discretion, such person must know how to read and understand English to comprehend the import of the summons, and fully realize the need to deliver the summons and complaint to the defendant at the earliest possible time for the person to take appropriate action. Thus, the person must have the relation of confidence to the defendant, ensuring that the latter would receive or at least be notified of the receipt of the summons. The sheriff must therefore determine if the person found in the alleged dwelling or residence of defendant is of legal age, what the recipients relationship with the defendant is, and whether said person comprehends the significance of the receipt of the summons and his duty to immediately deliver it to the defendant or at least notify the defendant of said receipt of summons. These matters must be clearly and specifically described in the Return of Summons.Here, both requirements were not met. Deputy Sheriff Liboro did not alleged any justifiable reason for effecting the substituted service upon the person of Mr. Patricio Alampay (Alampay). The Sheriff's Return failed to substantiate that Alampay is a person of suitable age with full legal capacity (18 years old), and is considered to have enough discernment to comprehend the import of the summons, and fully realize the need to deliver the same to the Gos at the earliest possible time for the person to take appropriate action.
x x x xHence, it can be inferred that the Amended Complaint is not only an Accion Reinvindicatoria but an indirect and collateral attack to the validity and accuracy of Gos and Multi-Realty's titles, which is not allowed within the purview of Sections 108 and 32 of P.D. 1529, quoted as follows:
1. For the resurvey of Multi-Realty's Lot, Go's Lot, Chua's Lot, Century's Lot and ECI's Lot for purposes of shifting northwesternly and locating correctly the said lots on the ground;
2. Amending the tie-lines for the Multi-Realty's Lot, Go's Lot, Chua's Lot, Century's Lot and ECI's Lot to reflect the correct tie-line as determined by this Honorable Court;
3. Correcting the tie-lines as appearing in the respective certificates of title for the Multi-Realty's Lot, Go's Lot, Chua's Lot, Century's Lot and ECI's Lot to reflect the correct tie-line as determined by this Honorable Court;
4. Directing the Registry of Deeds for Tagaytay City to issue an amended transfer certificates of title for the Multi-Realty's Lot, Go's Lot, Chua's Lot, Century's Lot and ECI's Lot incorporating therein the correct tie-line as determined by this Honorable Court. (Emphasis Ours).[41]
Section 108. Amendment and alteration of certificates. No erasure, alteration, or amendment shall be made upon the registration book after the entry of a certificate of title or of a memorandum thereon and the attestation of the same by the Register of Deeds, except by order of the proper Court of First Instance. A registered owner or other person having an interest in registered property, or, in proper cases, the Register of Deeds with the approval of the Commissioner of Land Registration, may apply by petition to the court upon the ground that the registered interests of any description, whether vested, contingent, expectant or inchoate appearing on the certificate, have terminated and ceased; or that new interest not appearing upon the certificate have arisen or been created; or that an omission or error was made in entering a certificate or any memorandum thereon, or, on any duplicate certificate: or that the same or any person on the certificate has been changed; or that the registered owner has married, or, if registered as married, that the marriage has been terminated and no right or interests of heirs or creditors will thereby be affected; or that a corporation which owned registered land and has been dissolved has not convened the same within three years after its dissolution; or upon any other reasonable ground; and the court may hear and determine the petition after notice to all parties in interest, and may order the entry or cancellation of a new certificate, the entry or cancellation of a memorandum upon a certificate, or grant any other relief upon such terms and conditions, requiring security or bond if necessary, as it may consider proper; Provided, however, That this section shall not be construed to give the court authority to reopen the judgment or decree of registration, and that nothing shall be done or ordered by the court which shall impair the title or other interest of a purchaser holding a certificate for value and in good faith, or his heirs, and assigns, without his or their written consent. Where the owners duplicate certificate is not presented, a similar petition may be filed as provided in the preceding section.And Section 32, provides:
All petitions or motions filed under this Section as well as any other provision of this Decree after original registration shall be filed and entitled in the original case in which the decree or registration was entered. (Emphasis Ours)
Section 32. Review of decree of registration; Innocent purchaser for value. The decree of registration shall not be reopened or revised by reason of absence, minority, or other disability of any person adversely affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing judgments, subject, however, to the right of any person, including the government and the branches thereof, deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by such adjudication or confirmation of title obtained by actual fraud, to file in the proper Court of First Instance a petition for reopening and review of the decree of registration not later than one year from and after the date of the entry of such decree of registration, but in no case shall such petition be entertained by the court where an innocent purchaser for value has acquired the land or an interest therein, whose rights may be prejudiced. Whenever the phrase "innocent purchaser for value" or an equivalent phrase occurs in this Decree, it shall be deemed to include an innocent lessee, mortgagee, or other encumbrancer for value.In addition, Spouses Chua themselves admitted in their Opposition dated January 26 1990, that the said complaint was only for recovery of possession and not a land registration case, which they implicitly admitted that the trial court has no jurisdiction in correction of certificates of title. The pertinent portions thereof, provides:
Upon the expiration of said period of one year, the decree of registration and the certificate of title issued shall become incontrovertible. Any person aggrieved by such decree of registration in any case may pursue his remedy by action for damages against the applicant or any other persons responsible for the fraud. (Emphasis Ours)
The instant case was not instituted by [Spouses Chua] principally to seek the correction of the certificates of title, but to recover land unjustly detained from them. x x x.Gos and Multi-Realty certificates of title became incontrovertible after the lapse of the one-year period.
The alternative prayers set forth by the [Spouses Chua], including the necessity for a thorough resurvey of the properties concerned and the correction of the tie lines, if found necessary, have not and will not change the nature of the present suit, which is primarily for recovery of possession, not for correction of certificate of title. Thus, if the preliminary findings of the surveyors would subsequently be confirmed, a conversion of the present proceedings into a land registration cases, or perhaps, the filing of an entirely new action, will then have to be necessary, this time for the correction of the certificate of title. (Emphasis Ours)[42]
x x x Provided, however, That this section shall not be construed to give the court authority to reopen the judgment or decree of registration, and that nothing shall be done or ordered by the court which shall impair the title or other interest of a purchaser holding a certificate for value and in good faith, or his heirs and assigns without his or their written consent. Where the owner's duplicate certificate is not presented, a similar petition may be filed as provided in the preceding section.[43]Moreover, the appellate court was not correct in its conclusion that it merely identified the respective property of each adjoining party, by using the correct tie-line, the defects are very material that it cannot be argued that they are just clerical in nature.[44] The material alterations in the boundaries of the respective properties of Gos and Multi-Realty pertain to the essential core of their title and definitely affect their integrity.
It is axiomatic that the jurisdiction of a tribunal, including a quasi-judicial officer or government agency, over the nature and subject matter of a petition or complaint is determined by the material allegations therein and the character of the relief prayed for, irrespective of whether the petitioner or complainant is entitled to any or all such reliefs. Jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of an action is conferred by the Constitution and the law, and not by the consent or waiver of the parties where the court otherwise would have no jurisdiction over the nature or subject matter of the action. Nor can it be acquired through, or waived by, any act or omission of the parties. Moreover, estoppel does not apply to confer jurisdiction to a tribunal that has none over the cause of action. x x xPenultimately, this is not to say, however, that a certiorari before the Court is a remedy against its own final and executory judgment. As ruled in certain cases, the Court is invested with the power to suspend the application of the rules of procedure as a necessary complement to promote substantial justice. The case of Philippine Woman's Christian Temperance Union, Inc. v. Teodoro R. Yangco 2nd and 3rd Generation Heirs Foundation, Inc.,[50] citing Jimmy L. Barnes v. Hon. Ma. Luisa C. Quijano Padilla,[51] discussed the rationale for this, to wit:
x x x x
Indeed, the jurisdiction of the court or tribunal is not affected by the defenses or theories set up by the defendant or respondent in his answer or motion to dismiss. Jurisdiction should be determined by considering not only the status or the relationship of the parties but also the nature of the issues or questions that is the subject of the controversy, x x x The proceedings before a court or tribunal without jurisdiction, including its decision, are null and void, hence, susceptible to direct and collateral attacks.[49] (Emphasis Ours)
Let it be emphasized that the rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed. Even the Rules of Court reflect this principle. The power to suspend or even disregard rules can be so pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which this Court itself has already declared to be final, x x x.In this case, the grave error in jurisdiction permeating the proceedings taken in Civil Case No. TG-893, deprived Gos and Multi-Realty substantial portion of its properties without the very foundation of due process. Certainly, the Court cannot let this mistake pass without de rigueur rectification by suspending the rules of procedure, and permitting the present recourse to access auxiliary review.[53]
The emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford every party litigant the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities. Time and again, this Court has consistently held that rules must not be applied rigidly so as not to override substantial justice.[52] (Emphasis supplied)