GAERLAN, J.:
That on or about the 21st day of June 1997, at about 3:30 o'clock dawn in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, armed with a handgun, with deliberate intent, with treachery and evident premeditation, with intent to kill, did then and there suddenly and unexpectedly attack, assault and use personal violence upon the person of one Atilano Andong by shooting him with said handgun hitting him at the right portion of his shoulder, thereby causing physical injuries which injuries would ordinarily caused the death of said Atilano Andong, thus performing all the acts of execution which would have produced the crime of murder as a consequence, but which nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the herein accused, that is, by the timely medical assistance given to said Atilano Andong which prevented his death.On September 6, 1999, Quijano pleaded not guilty to the charge.[6]
CONTRARY TO LAW.[5]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court finds the accused BEETHOVEN QUIJANO, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of FRUSTRATED MURDER, for which he is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of FOUR (4) YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY as MINIMUM to TWELVE (12) YEARS, FIVE (5) MONTHS, and ELEVEN (11) DAYS as MAXIMUM.Aggrieved, Quijano filed a notice of appeal.[15]
SO ORDERED.[14]
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, Cebu City in Criminal Case No. CBU-45614, finding appellant Beethoven Quijano guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of frustrated murder is AFFIRMED in toto.Undeterred, Quijano filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari.[20]
Costs against the appellant.
SO ORDERED.[18]
Dissatisfied with the ruling, Quijano filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the CA in its May 10, 2012 Resolution.[19]
Parameters of judicial review under Rule 45 and the exceptions thereto |
(i) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (ii) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (iii) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (iv) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (v) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (vi) when in making its findings[,] the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (vii) when the findings are contrary to that of the trial court; (viii) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (ix) when the facts set forth in the petition[,] as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs[,] are not disputed by the respondent; (x) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; [or] (xi) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.[33]The fourth exception obtains in the instant case. The trial court and the CA misapprehended certain facts, which upon re-evaluation, warrant a different conclusion.
Quijano's attack against Andong reeks of treachery |
Article 248. Murder. - Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246 shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:Significantly, there is treachery or alevosia when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms which tend directly and specially to ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.[34] For treachery to be appreciated, the following requisites must be proven: (i) the employment of means, method, or manner of execution which would ensure the safety of the malefactor from the defensive or retaliatory acts of the victim, no opportunity being given to the latter to defend himself or to retaliate, and (ii) the means, method, or manner of execution was deliberately or consciously adopted by the offender.[35]
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity.
x x x x
5. With evident premeditation.
x x x x
The prosecution failed to prove evident premeditation |
Accordingly, in order to establish the existence of evident premeditation, the following requisites must be proven during the trial: (i) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime, (ii) an act manifestly indicating that he clung to his determination, and (iii) a sufficient lapse of time between the determination and execution, to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act, and to allow his conscience to overcome the resolution of his will. Evident premeditation cannot be presumed in the absence of evidence showing when and how the accused planned, and prepared for the crime, and that a sufficient amount of time had lapsed between his determination and execution. It bears stressing that absent any clear and positive evidence, mere presumptions and inferences of evident premeditation, no matter how logical and probable, shall be deemed insufficient.[49] (Citations omitted)In the instant case, the prosecution failed to identify the time when Quijano decided to shoot Andong. Without this crucial data, it is impossible to conclude that indeed, there was a sufficient period of time that passed between the former's determination to kill and his actual execution, which allowed him to meditate and reflect on his plans.
Art. 6. Consummated, frustrated, and attempted felonies. - Consummated felonies as well as those which are frustrated and attempted, are punishable.The distinction between a frustrated and attempted felony was elucidated in People v. Labiaga:[51]
A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution and accomplishment are present; and it is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.
There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.
(i) In a frustrated felony, the offender has performed all the acts of execution which should produce the felony as a consequence; whereas in an attempted felony, the offender merely commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts and does not perform all the acts of execution.In addition to the main distinctions, it is important to note that in frustrated murder, there must be evidence showing that the wound inflicted would have been fatal were it not for timely medical intervention.[53]
(ii) In a frustrated felony, the reason for the non-accomplishment of the crime is some cause independent of the will of the perpetrator; on the other hand, in an attempted felony, the reason for the non-fulfillment of the crime is a cause or accident other than the offender's own spontaneous desistance.[52]
The danger to life of any wound is dependent upon a number of factors: the extent of the injury, the form of the wound, the region of the body affected, the blood vessels, nerves, or organs involved, the entrance of disease-producing bacteria or other organisms into the wound, the age and constitution of the person injured, and the opportunities for administering proper surgical treatment.Similar to the afore-cited case, the evidence fails to prove with moral certainty that Andong would have died from the gunshot wound without timely medical intervention. Unfortunately, the prosecution failed to present Dr. Manubag, the physician who treated Andong and administered the alleged life-saving procedure. The Medical Certificate alone, without the testimony of Dr. Manubag is inadequate proof of the nature and extent of Andong's injury. This lacuna may not be filled with the testimony of the expert witness Dr. Paradela, who merely testified as follows:
When nothing in the evidence shows that the wound would be fatal without medical intervention, the character of the wound enters the realm of doubt; under this situation, the doubt created by the lack of evidence should be resolved in favor of the petitioner. Thus, the crime committed should be attempted, not frustrated, homicide.
Under these standards, we agree with the CA 's conclusion. From all accounts, although the stab wound could have been fatal since the victim testified that he saw his intestines showed, no exact evidence exists to prove the gravity of the wound; hence, we cannot consider the stab wound as sufficient to cause death. As correctly observed by the CA, the victim's attending physician did not testify on the gravity of the wound inflicted on the victim. We consider, too, the CA's observation that the medical certifications issued by the East Avenue Medical Center merely stated the location of the wound. There was also no proof that without timely medical intervention, the victim would have died. This paucity of proof must necessarily favor the petitioner.[55] (Citations omitted and emphasis supplied)
The foregoing testimony clearly shows that the lone reason given by Dr. Paradela in concluding that Andong's wound would have been fatal without timely medical intervention was simply - "because this kind of wound would kill the patient if no medical intervention like close tube or CPT is applied."[57] Such a general and vague statement is insufficient to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Andong's wound would have been fatal without timely medical intervention. Likewise, the conclusion that the wound would have been mortal, was merely based on the fact that Dr. Manubag applied CPT. Worse, Dr. Paradela did not elaborate what a close tube or CPT is, how this type of procedure saved Andong's life, or Andong's condition prior to and during the operation.
Q - A while ago, you have said that you are a surgeon. Would you kindly explain to this Honorable court what this medical term mean [sic]? A - This GSW is gunshot wound and the point of entry is above the clavicle and then it coursed through. It exited just at the back near the scapular area of the back. I do not know when [sic] is the layman's term of scapula but near the shoulder blade and the result of that gun-shot wound, there was air and blood inside your chest. Q - In your expert opinion doctor, would you classify this kind of wound?
Would this be fatal or not? A - This wound is fatal. Q - Why would this be fatal doctor? A - Because this kind of wound would kill the patient if no medical intervention like close tube or a CPT is applied."[56]
Dr. Paradela's statement was so curt and wanting in essential details that he failed to furnish sufficient facts and data relevant to the charge. Moreover, the fact that the RTC and the CA gave probative value to Dr. Paradela's expert opinion does not in any way bind this Court to blindly adopt the same finding, especially in light of facts warranting a different conclusion.Rule 133 Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence
Section 5. Weight to be given opinion of expert witness, how determined. - In any case where the opinion of an expert witness is received in evidence, the court has a wide latitude of discretion in determining the weight to be given such opinion, and for that purpose may consider the following:
(a) Whether the opinion is based upon sufficient facts or data; (b) Whether it is the product of reliable principles and methods; (c) Whether the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case; and (d) Such other factors as the court may deem helpful to make such determination.[60]
With respect to the crime committed against Jay, accused-appellant is charged with Frustrated Murder. For failure of the prosecution to present the testimony of the doctor who treated him to testify regarding the nature of the injury sustained by the latter, the Court cannot determine whether the injury would have produced death if not for the timely medical attention. However, accused-appellant is responsible for committing Attempted Murder.[69]Similarly, in Etino,[70] the Court warned that the medical certificate alone is insufficient proof of the nature and extent of the injury. Accordingly, any doubt must be resolved in favor of the accused:
It is settled that "where there is nothing in the evidence to show that the wound would be fatal if not medically attended to, the character of the wound is doubtful," and such doubt should be resolved in favor of the accused.Interestingly, in Etino[72] the Court intimated that the testimony of any physician might suffice, unfortunately in this case, Dr. Paradela's inadequate testimony was insufficient to prove the fatal nature of the injury.
In this case, we find that the prosecution failed to present evidence to prove that the victim would have died from his wound without timely medical assistance, as his Medical Certificate alone, absent the testimony of the physician who diagnosed and treated him, or any physician for that matter, is insufficient proof of the nature and extent of his injury. This is especially true, given that said Medical Certificate merely stated the victim's period of confinement at the hospital, the location of the gunshot wounds, the treatments he received, and his period of healing.
Without such proof, the character of the gunshot wounds that the victim sustained enters the realm of doubt, which the Court must necessarily resolve in favor of petitioner.[71] (Citations omitted)
While the Medico-Legal Certificate - which shows the extent of Jerry's injuries - was correctly admitted into evidence as it was authenticated by Dr. Angelo Leano (Dr. Leano), the same was not sufficient to establish that Jerry would have died from the injuries he sustained if not for the timely medical assistance.Similar to Gemenez,[76] the prosecution, through Dr. Paradela's testimony, failed to prove that Andong indeed sustained fatal or mortal wounds and did not die because of timely medical assistance. It was further underscored therein that the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt each element of the crime as its case will rise or fall on the strength of its own evidence.[77] Any doubt shall be resolved in favor of the accused.[78] Accordingly, Quijano may not be convicted of frustrated murder in the absence of credible proof that Andong suffered a fatal wound but was saved due to timely medical assistance.
According to the prosecution, two doctors attended to Jerry, namely Dr. Leano and Dr. Vienna Encila (Dr. Encila). Dr. Encila was the surgeon who attended to the gunshot wounds in the chest and arm that Jerry sustained, while Dr. Leano worked on the injury to Jerry's thumb only. So while Dr. Leano was qualified to authenticate the Medico-Legal Certificate as he actually attended to Jerry, his personal knowledge, and consequently his testimony was, however, limited only the extent of the injuries to Jerry's thumb.
x x x x
Because Dr. Encila did not testify, there is nothing in the records therefore that explains the full extent of Jerry's injuries. The Medico-Legal Certificate only states that:
In the opinion of the doctor who attended to the patient, under normal conditions without subsequent complications and/or deeper involvement that may be present but not clinically apparent at the time of examination, the said physical injury/injuries will require medical attendance for a period of A and B - more than thirty (30) days.
x x x x
At this juncture, the Court deems it fit to emphasize that the prosecution has the burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt each element of the crime as its case will rise or fall on the strength of its own evidence. Any doubt shall be resolved in favor of the accused.
As there is doubt as to the existence of the second element of Frustrated Homicide - that the victim sustained fatal or mortal wounds but did not die because of timely medical assistance - Gemenez's conviction must thus be modified to Attempted Homicide.[75] (Emphasis supplied)
Quijano was positively identified as the malefactor. His defenses of denial and alibi are weak and self-serving |
Penalty and pecuniary liability for attempted murder |
[1] Rollo, pp. 3-25.
[2] Id. at 30-37; penned by Associate Justice Edwin D. Sorongon, with Associate Justices Portia A. Hormachuelos and Socorro B. Inting, concurring.
[3] Id. at 39-40; penned by Associate Justice Gabriel T. Ingles, with Associate Justices Ramon Paul L. Hernando (now a Member of this Court) and Pamela Ann Abella Maxino, concurring.
[4] Records, pp. 32-37; rendered by Judge Generosa G. Labra.
[5] Id. at 1-2.
[6] Id. at 32.
[7] Rollo, pp. 48-50; 66.
[8] Records, p. 33.
[9] Id.
[10] Id.
[11] Rollo, p. 44.
[12] CA rollo, pp. 32-37.
[13] Id. at 36-37.
[14] Id. at 37.
[15] Id. at 139-140.
[16] Rollo, pp. 30-37.
[17] Id. at 36.
[18] Id. at 37.
[19] Id. at 39-40.
[20] Id. at 3-25.
[21] Id. at 10.
[22] Id. at 17.
[23] Id. at 18.
[24] Id. at 19.
[25] Id. at 20-21.
[26] Id. at 21.
[27] Id. at 15.
[28] Id.
[29] Id. at 25.
[30] Id. at 146-151.
[31] Miro v. Vda. De Erederos, et al., 721 Phil. 772 (2013).
[32] Id.
[33] De Leon v. Maunlad Trans Inc., et al., 805 Phil. 531 (2017).
[34] People v. Bugarin, 807 Phil. 588, 598-599 (2017).
[35] Id. at 600.
[36] People v. Las Piñas, et al., 739 Phil. 502, 525 (2014).
[37] People v. Pulgo, 813 Phil. 205, 217 (2017), citing People v. Pidoy, 453 Phil. 221, 230 (2003); People v. Mataro, 406 Phil. 462 (2001), People v. Gutierrez, 429 Phil. 124, 137 (2002), citing People v. Arizala, 375 Phil. 666, 680 (1999), People v. Ortiz, Jr., 638 Phil. 521, 526 (2010).
[38] Id.
[39] Id. at 526.
[40] 395 Phil. 619 (2000).
[41] Id. at 640.
[42] 515 Phil. 584 (2006).
[43] Id. at 599.
[44] People v. Aquino, 348 Phil. 395 (1998).
[45] Id. at 398.
[46] People v. Ortiz, Jr., supra note 37 at 526.
[47] People v. Sebastian, 428 Phil. 622, 626-627 (2002).
[48] G.R. No. 227504, June 13, 2018.
[49] Id.
[50] See TSN dated July 22, 2022, pp. 4-5.
[51] 714 Phil. 77 (2013).
[52] Id. at 87, citing Serrano v. People, 637 Phil. 319, 335 (2010).
[53] Id., citing People v. Costales, 424 Phil. 321 (2002), citing People v. Dela Cruz, 353 Phil. 362 (1998) and People v. Zaragosa, 58 O.G. 4519.
[54] Supra.
[55] Id. at 336-337.
[56] See TSN dated November 18, 2002, p. 6.
[57] Id.
[58] Id. at 4-7; 9-10.
[59] Id. at 4.
[60] NEW RULES ON EVIDENCE, Rule 133, Section 5.
[61] Supra note 52.
[62] Id. at 336.
[63] Id.
[64] 552 Phil. 620 (2007).
[65] 620 Phil. 807 (2009).
[66] 826 Phil. 32 (2018).
[67] G.R. No. 241518, March 4, 2020.
[68] Supra.
[69] Id. at 826.
[70] Supra.
[71] Id. at 43.
[72] Id.
[73] Supra note 67.
[74] Id.
[75] Id.
[76] Id.
[77] Id., citing Moster v. People, 569 Phil. 616, 628 (2008).
[78] Id., id.
[79] People v. Macaspac, 806 Phil. 285, 290 (2017).
[80] REVISED PENAL CODE, Article 51.
[81] People v. Bugarin, supra note 34 at 601-602.
[82] Fantastico, et al. v. Malicse, Sr. et al., 750 Phil. 120, 139-140 (2015).
[83] People v. Jugueta, 783 Phil. 806 (2016).