Challenged in this petition for review
[1] on
certiorari are the November 8, 2012 Decision
[2] and April 11, 2013 Resolution
[3]
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 116979 which annulled
and set aside the February 9, 2010 and August 27, 2010 Orders
[4]
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 82, Quezon City in Civil Case
No. Q-89-3137, an action for partition, accounting, delivery of shares
and damages among the compulsory heirs of decedent Carlos Sandico, Jr.
(Carlos Jr.).
The Facts:
On May 20, 1975, Carlos, Jr. died intestate leaving behind a sizeable
estate to his compulsory heirs: the surviving spouse, Concepcion
LimSandico (Concepcion), and their children, Ma. Enrica Sandico-Pascual
(Enrica), Carlos L. Sandico III (Carlos III), petitioner Guillerma
SandicoSilva (Guillerma), Lily Sandico-Brown (Lily), Pamela S. Zapanta
(Pamela), respondent Conchita S. Lo (Conchita) and Teodoro L. Sandico
(Teodoro).
Sometime in 1976, the heirs of Carlos Jr. executed an Extrajudicial
Settlement of Estate which provided that all properties of the decedent
shall be owned in common,
pro indiviso, by his heirs.
[5] In September 1988, Carlos, Jr.'s heirs executed a Memorandum of Agreement for the physical division of the estate.
[6] However, both agreements were never implemented and the heirs remained
pro indiviso co-owners of the estate's properties.
On August 3, 1989, Enrica, one of the heirs, filed Civil Case No.
Q-89-3137 before the RTC impleading all the other heirs, her mother and
siblings, as defendants. Eventually, Teodoro withdrew as defendant and
joined suit as plaintiff-in-intervention.
[7]
Opposing the physical division of the properties, defendants therein
primarily asserted Concepcion's usufructuary rights over the estate's
real properties. They further alleged a diminished value and use of the
properties should these be physically divided. Given the unanimity of
their defense against the complaint, Conchita and two other heirs
residing abroad, Lily and Pamela, executed a Special Power of Attorney
(SPA) in favor of their mother Concepcion and their sister, Guillerma,
respectively.
[8]
At the pre-trial, the parties stipulated on the following:
1. That this case is between members of the same family involving the mother and her children, all of whom are already of age;
2. That Carlos Sandico, Jr., husband of defendant [Concepcion]
Lim-Sandico and father of the plaintiff [Enrica] and other defendants,
died intestate on May 20, 1975, leaving as forced heirs the plaintiff
and other defendants herein, that is, as legitimate spouse and seven (7)
legitimate children;
3. That at the time of his death, the said deceased left the conjugal
properties x x xx, one half (l/2) of which conjugal properties
constituted his intestate estate;
4. That after the death of said Carlos Sandico, Jr., the parties herein
executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate dated November 18, 1976
distributing the intestate estate of the deceased, comprising of one
half (1/2) of the aforesaid conjugal properties, pro indiviso among the
parties herein in the proportions and manner stated in the said
Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate;
5. That after the death of the deceased on May 20, 1975, the defendant
Concepcion Sandico took over actual administration of the said intestate
estate, jointly with defendant Carlos Sandico III as contended by the
plaintiff but denied by the defendant; and
6. That the fruits or proceeds from the said intestate estate were not
distributed by the [defendant Concepcion] among the [co-heirs, the
decedent's legitimate children], from that time up to the present, in
accordance with the proportionate distribution agreed upon in the
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate, because of an alleged grant of
usufruct supposedly executed by the plaintiff [Enrica] and the other
defendants in [their mother's] favor, the existence and validity of
which the plaintiff [Enrica] questions or contests.[9]
Thereafter, the RTC issued numerous orders reflecting the negotiations
during court hearings for the distribution and partition of the estate
among the heirs. The trial court encouraged the heirs to arrive at a
mutually acceptable partition and distribution of the estate's
properties. The contentious matters among the heirs were the inventory
and classification of the estate's properties and their respective
proposals for settlement and division thereof.
Significantly, on September 1, 1994, the Registry of Deeds of Pampanga issued Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 377745-R
[10]
covering the subject property, a 103,024-square meter tract of
agricultural land located at Talimundok, San Agustin, Magalang,
Pampanga. The title was issued in the names of Concepcion and Carlos III
subject to the encumbrances of the decedent's estate which listed the
names of the other compulsory heirs, including herein petitioner and
respondent, Guillerma and Conchita, respectively. The title's Memorandum
of Encumbrances likewise noted Enrica's
lis pendens in connection with Civil Case No. Q-89-3137.
[11]
In the course of the trial, the heirs agreed on the manner of division of each property-
via raffle conducted by the trial court. The heirs drew lots for an
aliquot
of each property of the estate, with Concepcion drawing first. For the
heirs who failed to attend the hearing and the scheduled raffle, their
respective counsels or their appointed attorney-in-fact, either
Concepcion or Guillerma, in the case of Conchita, Lily and Pamela, drew
the lot on their behalf.
For ease of reference, we reproduce some of the RTC's Orders:
On several dates, this Court issued the following Orders
containing the stipulations agreed upon by the parties toward the
settlement of this long delayed case:
(1) x x x As indicated in the previous Order of this Court, the only
obstacle remaining in the way of the parties reaching a compromise
agreement is the delivery of the Amorsolo paintings designated to the
plaintiff [Enrica] and the plaintiff-in-intervention [Teodoro]. The
defendants finally agreed to deliver the same; provided, this will be
the last act that will be done to completely effectuate the compromise
agreement. After discussion of the modes to be followed in connection
with finalizing the compromise agreement and implementing the same,
defendants' counsel agreed to prepare a final draft of a compromise
agreement according to what have been agreed upon by the parties,
without prejudice to the immediate physical division of the properties
to be subdivided among the parties." (Court Order dated November 14,
1996)
(2) x x x Pursuant to the Order of this Court dated December 12, 1996,
the disposition of the lots referred to as Items No. 1 to 16 were taken
up one after the other. The lot designated as Item 1 was accordingly
first identified by clarifying its location, boundaries and character
(conjugal). Counsel of record for all the parties agreed that defendant
Concepcion Lim-Sandico draw ahead to determine which portion thereof
(whether left or the right) should go to her as her conjugal share, as
well as her share as one of the heirs together with her children. The
Court accordingly conducted the drawing of lots. Defendant Concepcion
Lim-Sandico drew the left portion or the lots designated as L-1 to 8 and
R-8. The lots designated as R-1 to R-7 shall appertain to the seven
children or heirs of the deceased. Under the personal supervision of the
Presiding Judge, counsel for the plaintiff [Enrica] drew lot R-6;
counsel for the plaintiff-inintervention drew lot R-7; defendant
Guillerma Silva drew lot R-5 for herself and lot R-2 for defendant Lily
S. Brown and Lot R-4 for defendant Pamela S. Zapanta; while Concepcion
Lim-Sandico drew Lot R-1 for defendants Carlos Sandico III and Lot R-3
for Conchita S. Lo.[12]
For three years, under the supervision of the RTC, the heirs negotiated
the terms of the estate's partition to be embodied in a compromise
agreement. Not surprisingly, a flurry of drafts (of the compromise
agreement) containing proposals for the distribution of the estate's
properties were exchanged among the heirs.
After the plaintiffs, Enrica and Teodoro, signed the final draft of the
compromise agreement, the defendants, Concepcion and the rest of her
children, tarried signing thereof. Primarily, Concepcion continued to
object to the division of the properties as it would purportedly reduce
the value and utility thereof. This sparked another set of discussion
among the opposing heirs culminating in the plaintiffs' (Enrica's and
Teodoro's) motion for the RTC to "decide the case on the basis of the
stipulations entered into by the parties embodied in the various orders
of the Court."
[13]
On January 11, 2000, the RTC issued an Order of Partition:
[14]
After a careful and conscientious consideration of the
foregoing submission of the plaintiffs and the defendants, this Court
concluded that it is the better part of discretion to grant the former's
Motion and decide the present case in accordance with their aforestated
submissions and contentions.
x x x x
[T]his Court cannot set at naught what the parties and their lawyers
have agreed upon by allowing them, or any of them, to repudiate, disown
or disregard the Compromise Agreement that resulted from the
negotiations they carried out and concluded under the aegis and
supervision of this Court. In fact, the plaintiff and the
plaintiff-in-intervention, with the assistance of their respective
counsel, have already signed the final Compromise Agreement. Sad to say,
the defendants balked at affixing their signatures when the plaintiff
and the plaintiff-in-intervention refused to accede to the last minute
change proposed by defendant Concepcion Lim-Sandico.
As a result, both plaintiff and plaintiff-in-intervention in effect
moved and pray that this Court consider this case submitted for decision
on the basis of the agreements reached by the parties during the
arduous negotiations for the amicable settlement thereof, as embodied in
the various relevant Orders of this Court aforequoted and on the basis
of the terms and conditions of the Compromise Agreement already signed
by them notwithstanding the refusal of the defendants to do the same.
While it is inclined to deem defendants' eleventh hour stand not to be without logical basis, this Court nonetheless is of the considered opinion, and it so holds,
that the defendants are legally bound by their previous acts and
admissions and by the previous Orders of this Court as above-enumerated,
and that the final Compromise Agreement already signed by the plaintiff and the plaintiff-in-intervention is
sufficient evidence of the extent and composition of the estate of the
late Carlos Sandico, Jr. and constitutes a valid and proper project for
its partition.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring
and ordering the partition of the intestate estate of the late Carlos
Sandico, Jr. among his surviving spouse and children (parties herein) in
accordance with and pursuant to the terms and conditions contained in
the final Compromise Agreement already signed by the plaintiff and the
plaintiff-in-intervention, dated September 17, 1998, which is hereby
incorporated to and made part of this Order disposing of the present
case by way of reference. All other reliefs prayed for by the parties in their respective relevant pleadings are hereby DENIED/DISMISSED.[15] (Emphasis supplied)
On June 26, 2000, Conchita executed a Revocation of the SPA. Conchita
filed a copy of the Revocation with the RTC but failed to furnish her
agent, Concepcion, a copy thereof. The latest SPA dated June 8, 1999
issued by Conchita in favor of Concepcion provided, thus:
That I have named, constituted and appointed, and by these
presents do name, constitute and appoint my mother CONCEPCION
LIM-SANDICO, x x x, to be my true and lawful attorney-in-fact, for me
and in my name, place and stead, to do or perform any or all of the
following acts and things, to wit:
1. To represent me in all the hearings of the above-mentioned case;
2. To enter into any compromise, settlement or any agreement with
respect to the said case in any manner and under such terms and
conditions as she may consider appropriate and acceptable;
3. To enter into any stipulation of facts and to make any admission in
connection with the said case as she may consider acceptable and
appropriate;
4. To enter into any partition agreement involving the properties
subject of the said case of which I have an interest or participation;
5. To make, sign, execute, acknowledge and deliver any and all documents
or writing of whatever nature in connection with, or in relation to,
the powers or authority herein given. x x x[16]
Notably, Conchita continued to retain the same counsel, Atty. Danilo Tuason, as that of the other defendants in the case.
Despite the RTC's January 11, 2000 Order of Partition, various
properties of the estate remained undivided and were not distributed
among the heirs. Thus, on August 29, 2003, Enrica filed a Motion to
Appoint Commissioners to Make Partition.
[17]
On September 10, 2003, Atty. Tuason, counsel for the defendants, filed a
Manifestation opposing the appointment of commissioners on the ground
that the agricultural land tenants have already agreed to the
subdivision of the agricultural lands. Apparently, some of the estate's
agricultural lands, including the herein subject property, were covered
by Republic Act No. 6657, The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL),
for distribution to tenant-farmers. Thus, in compliance with the law,
the heirs, represented by Concepcion, executed a
Kasunduan dated May 19, 1999 (1999
Kasunduan)
[18] with the tenants. The 1999
Kasunduan, a voluntary land transfer arrangement allowed by the CARL, provided for a 50-50 sharing of the subject property,
i.e., Carlos, Jr.'s heirs retained half thereof, and the other half will be distributed to the qualified beneficiaries, the tenants.
Thereafter, on October 17, 2003, the RTC granted the Motion to Appoint
Commissioners. Yet again, the appointment of commissioners did not
happen as plaintiffs appeared to have acquiesced to the defendants'
proposed subdivision of the agricultural lands, including the herein
subject property.
Sometime in 2006, Concepcion, representing herself and the other
defendants-heirs, Carlos III, petitioner Guillerma, Lily, Pamela and
respondent Conchita, executed a second agreement with the tenants of the
subject property designated as "
Kasunduan sa Pagwawakas/Pagtatapos ng Relasyon bilang May-ari ng Lupa at mga Ortilano/Kasama ng Lupa" (2006
Kasunduan).
[19] The 2006
Kasunduan, similar to the 1999
Kasunduan,
likewise covered the partition of the subject property and the transfer
of ownership of half thereof to the eight tenants while the other half
remained with the heirs of Carlos, Jr.
Thereafter, the defendants filed a Motion for Approval of New Agreement
and New Subdivision Plan of certain agricultural properties, including
the subject property, which motion the plaintiffs no longer opposed. On
March 2, 2007, the RTC issued an Order noting the agreement among the
parties to undertake a raffle for the distribution of the subject
property.
[20] Through their
respective counsels, the parties filed a Minutes of the Raffle for the
Distribution of the Property covered by TCT No. 377745-R.
[21]
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court:
On April 13, 2007, the trial court granted defendants' motions: it
approved the New Agreement and Subdivision Plan and ordered the
plaintiffs Enrica and Teodoro to sign the document. The
fallo of the April 13, 2007 Order reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Approval of
New Agreement and Subdivision Plan dated May 24, 2006 is hereby GRANTED.
Accordingly, said new agreement and subdivision plan are hereby approved
subject to the distribution of the property as agreed upon in the
raffle done by the parties on March 30, 2007. Plaintiffs Maria Enrica S.
Pascual and Teodoro Sandico are therefore, hereby ordered to sign the
same. x x x[22]
Curiously, Conchita did not question the March 2 and April 13, 2007 Orders of the RTC.
On May 26, 2009, to execute the RTC's April 13, 2007 Order and
facilitate the issuance of new titles over the subject property,
Concepcion filed a Motion to Order Register of Deeds to Enter New
Titles.
At this point, Conchita actively participated in the proceedings. On
November 6, 2009, through a different counsel, Conchita opposed
Concepcion's May 26, 2009 Motion on the ground that the 2006
Kasunduan is void.
[23] As per Conchita, the 2006
Kasunduan
lacked her signature since she had already revoked the agency
relationship with her mother, Concepcion. In addition, the signatories
thereto, specifically the tenants, are not real parties in interest to
the partition of the subject property forming part of the decedent's
estate. In all, absent the signatures of all the heirs, the 2006
Kasundaan cannot be the basis for the issuance of new titles covering the subject property.
On February 9, 2010, the RTC granted Concepcion's motion and ordered the
Register of Deeds of Pampanga to enter new titles in the names of the
tenants and the heirs of Carlos, Jr.
[24] It ruled that its April 13, 2007 Order approving the subdivision of the subject property and its distribution
via
raffle, had already become final and executory after the affected
parties, including respondent Conchita, did not file the appropriate
remedy therefrom.
The RTC affirmed its February 9, 2010 Order by denying Conchita's motion
for reconsideration thereof. Thus, the twin Orders were assailed by
Conchita before the appellate court in CA-G.R SP No. 116979.
Meanwhile, the Register of Deeds of Pampanga cancelled TCT No. 377745-R
and issued TCT Nos. 1105, 1107, 1108, 1109, 1111 and 1112 in the names
of the tenants.
[25]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals:
In her petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, Conchita alleged grave abuse of discretion in the RTC's February
9, 2010 and August 27, 2010 Orders. In the main, Conchita contended
that: (1) the RTC effectively partitioned and distributed the decedent's
estate to parties who are neither heirs nor successors-in-interest of
the decedent; and (2) the April 13, 2007 Order did not attain finality
as it was a void judgment based, in turn, on a void agreement-the 2006
Kasunduan.
During the pendency of the petition for
certiorari, Concepcion and Carlos III died and were subsequently substituted by their heirs as respondents in the case.
[26]
As previously adverted to, the appellate court annulled and set aside
the Orders of the RTC. In its November 8, 2012 Decision, the CA
invalidated the 2006
Kasunduan because it lacked the signature of
all the heirs: Enrica's, Teodoro's and Conchita's who now repudiates
her mother's, Concepcion's, signature on her behalf. The appellate court
ruled that the 2006
Kasunduan did not conform with the procedure
laid down in Rule 69 of the Rules of Court on Partition. It concluded
that a void agreement could not have validly partitioned the subject
property nor could it have validly transferred subsequent title over
half of the land to the tenants.
Only Guillerma filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the appellate court in its April 11, 2013 Resolution.
Hence, this appeal by
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court impugning grave error in the CA's ruling.
Issues
I. The Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it
ruled that the tenants, parties to the Kasunduan, are not indispensable
parties to the Petition for Certiorari.
II. The Court of Appeals seriously erred when it did not find the Petition for Certiorari to be an improper remedy.
III. The Court of Appeals committed a grave error when it held that the
lower court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.[27]
The threshold issue is procedural and lies in the propriety of a petition for certiorari to ultimately assail the issuance of new titles to the subject property.
The assailed 2010 Orders of the RTC are traced to its April 13, 2007
Order which approved the partition agreement for the subject property
based on the 2006 Kasunduan.
Thus, the main and substantive issues
before us delve into: (1) the stage of the action for partition, Civil
Case No. Q-89-3137, (2) the nature of the heirs' ownership over the
estate's properties, and (3) the validity of the 2006 Kasunduan to partition and divide the subject property.
To obviate confusion and considering the sparseness of the issues
presented by the petitioner, we state the issues for adjudication of the
Court:
I. Procedural
1. Whether the petition for
certiorari filed by Conchita is the proper remedy to assail the February 9 and August 27, 2010 Orders of the RTC;
2. Whether the tenants of the subject property should have been impleaded as indispensable parties to Conchita's petition for
certiorari; and
3. Whether the RTC's April 13, 2007 Order already attained finality.
II. Substantive
1. Whether the Orders of the RTC issued on April 13, 2007, February 9
and August 27, 2010 are void, in violation of Rule 69 of the Rules of
Court;
1.1 Corollary thereto, whether the RTC effectively distributed the
estate to persons who are not heirs of the decedent by approving the
transfer of, and title to, half of the subject property to the tenants;
2. Whether the 2006 Kasunduan partitioning the subject property is void
because it was not signed by all the heirs of the decedent;
2.1 In the alternative, whether the 2006 Kasunduan is unenforceable as against Conchita.
At the outset, we note that the CA glossed over significant factual
antecedents in the proceedings before the RTC. The matter on appeal, the
questioned incident which reaches us, involves the partition of a
specific property (the subject property) forming part of the decedent's
estate-the main subject matter of the action for partition before the
trial court. We emphasize that Civil Case No. Q-89-3137 is already at
the second stagepartition of the estate's properties by agreement of
the parties.
[28] In fact, the RTC has long terminated the first stage in its January 11, 2000 Order for Partition.
[29]
Our Ruling
I. Procedural
In the main, petitioner asserts that the CA erred in annulling and
setting aside the RTC's February 9 and August 27, 2010 Orders as well as
the April 13, 2007 Order approving the 2006
Kasunduan-the agreement of partition of the subject property. Petitioner posits that respondent ostensibly assailed,
via a petition for
certiorari
before the appellate court, the February 9 and August 27, 2010 Orders
directing the Registry of Deeds of Pampanga to enter the new titles
covering the subject property. According to petitioner, respondent was
actually assailing the RTC's April 13, 2007 Order approving the 2006
Kasunduan's
partition of the subject property. Petitioner points out that
respondent belatedly questioned the April 13, 2007 Order which had
already attained finality, and thus resorted to the incorrect remedy of
an extraordinary writ of
certiorari before the CA. In addition,
petitioner argues that respondent should have impleaded the tenants as
indispensable parties to the petition for
certiorari.
The contentions of petitioner are correct: the CA erred in taking cognizance of the petition for
certiorari
which failed to implead indispensable parties and is an improper remedy
to question the assailed orders of the RTC. The (1) April 13, 2007, (2)
February 9, 2010, and (3) August 27, 2010 Orders of the RTC are final
orders decreeing partition.
Section 2, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court on Partition provides:
Section 2. Order for partition and partition by agreement thereunder.
- If after the trial the court finds that the plaintiff has the right
thereto, it shall order the partition of the real estate among all the
parties in interest. Thereupon the parties may, if they are able to
agree, make the partition among themselves by proper instruments of
conveyance, and the court shall confirm the partition so agreed upon by
all the parties, and such partition, together with the order of the
court confirming the same, shall be recorded in the registry of deeds of
the place in which the property is situated.
A final order decreeing partition and accounting may be appealed by any party aggrieved thereby.
In connection thereto, Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court could not be any clearer on what may the subject of an appeal:
SECTION 1. Subject of appeal. - An appeal may
be taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the
case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to
be appealable.
x x x x
In our jurisdiction, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court have laid down two phases of an action for partition:
first,
the trial court, after determining that a co-ownership in fact exists
and that partition is proper, issues an order for partition; and,
second,
the trial court promulgates a decision confirming the sketch and
subdivision of the properties submitted by the parties (if the parties
reach an agreement) or by the appointed commissioners (if the parties
fail to agree), as the case may be.
[30]
In this case, while the property to be partitioned is the entirety of
Carlos, Jr.'s estate, only one of the properties thereof, the subject
property, is the subject matter of the controversy before us.
The CA overlooked the fact that the first stage of the partition has
long been terminated by the RTC. In fact, the status of the parties as
the compulsory heirs of Carlos, Jr. was immediately stipulated among
them.
[31] As early as January
11, 2000, the trial court had already issued an Order of Partition of
the Estate among the heirs pursuant to a compromise agreement. Notably,
none of the parties appeared to have appealed this final order of
partition.
We have had occasion to delineate the two phases of a judicial partition in several cases, to wit:
The first phase of a partition and/or accounting suit is
taken up with the determination of whether or not a co-ownership in fact
exists, (i.e., not otherwise legally proscribed) and may be made
by voluntary agreement of all the parties interested in the property.
This phase may end with a declaration that plaintiff is not entitled to
have a partition either because a co-ownership does not exist, or
partition is legally prohibited. It may end, upon the other hand, with
an adjudgment that a co-ownership does in truth exist, partition is
proper in the premises and an accounting of rents and profits received
by the defendant from the real estate in question is in order. In the
latter case, the parties may, if they are able to agree, make partition
among themselves by proper instruments of conveyance, and the court
shall confirm the partition so agreed upon. In either case - i.e.,
either the action is dismissed or partition and/or accounting is
decreed - the order is a final one, and may be appealed by any party
aggrieved thereby.
The second phase commences when it appears that "the parties are unable
to agree upon the partition" directed by the court. In that event,
partition shall be done for the parties by the court with the assistance
of not more than three (3) commissioners. This second stage may well
also deal with the rendition of the accounting itself and its approval
by the court after the parties have been accorded opportunity to be
heard thereon, and an award for the recovery by the party or parties
thereto entitled of their just share in the rents and profits of the
real estate in question. Such an order is, to be sure, final and
appealable.[32] (Emphasis supplied)
Considering that the case is among family members, the RTC could not be
faulted for giving the heirs a wide latitude to reach a compromise
agreement for the partition of their patriarch's estate long after its
January 11, 2000 Order for Partition. We note that in separate
instances, the parties have agreed to settle the decedent's
properties-the 1976 Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate and the 1988 MOA.
As we have noted, none of these partition agreements materialized or
were executed by the parties. Thus, the litigious action for partition
and accounting filed by one of the heirs, plaintiff Enrica.
Since Carlos, Jr.'s estate is sizeable, consisting in numerous
properties, each property may be the subject of separate agreements for
its partition. The parties may also agree to a project of partition
which covers the entire estate of the decedent. These various partition
agreements must all be approved by court order which are considered
final orders decreeing partition appealable by an aggrieved party under
the second paragraph of Section 2, Rule 69.
In this case, the issue arose during the course of the second phase,
i.e. during the individual partition of the estate's properties, specifically the subject property, contained in the 2006
Kasunduan
which was approved by the RTC in its April 13, 2007 Order. The RTC's
April 13, 2007 Order is a final order which respondent failed to appeal
before the CA following Section 2, Rule 69 in relation to Section 1,
Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. Ineluctably, the April 13, 2007 Order had
attained finality prompting the RTC's subsequent orders granting the
entry of new titles to "the resulting subdivision of [the subject
property] x x x embraced under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 377745 x
x x in the names of the tenants and parties to whom they are allocated
as indicated in the Kasunduan approved by this Court in its Order dated
April 13, 2007."
We find that the RTC's February 9 and August 27, 2010 Orders pertain to
the requirement in Section 2, Rule 69 for the recording of the partition
agreed upon by all the parties and the order of the court confirming
the deed of partition in the registry of deeds of the place where the
property is situated.
[33]
It is therefore plainly apparent that respondent sought to obliquely
assail a final order of partition of the trial court when she questioned
the RTC's subsequent final orders of partition, i.e. the February 9 and
August 27, 2010 Orders, in a petition for
certiorari before the
CA. Contrary to the rule laid down in Section 2 of Rule 69, respondent
circumvented the procedure to question the partition of the subject
property
via a record on appeal
[34] by treating the February 9 and August 27, 2010 Orders as interlocutory orders which could not be the subject of an appeal.
We have defined an interlocutory order as referring to something between
the commencement and end of the suit which decides some point or matter
but it is not the final decision on the whole controversy.
[35]
It does not terminate or finally dismiss or finally dispose of the
case, but leaves something to be done by the court before the case is
finally decided on the merits.
[36] On the other hand, a final order is one which leaves to the court nothing more to do to resolve the case.
[37]
On more than one occasion, we laid down the test to ascertain whether an order is interlocutory or final
i.e.,
"Does it leave something to be done in the trial court with respect to
the merits of the case? If it does, it is interlocutory; if it does not,
it is final. The key test to what is interlocutory is when there is
something more to be done on the merits of the case.
[38]
The February 9 and August 27, 2010 Orders are not interlocutory as there
is nothing more to be done as regards the partition of the subject
property. What remains to be done is the partition of the rest of the
estate's properties and the accounting for the fruits, profits and
rentals thereof. Clearly, respondent filed an incorrect remedy to assail
several final orders of the RTC.
Since ownership of half of the subject property was already transferred
and registered to new owners, respondent should have filed a separate
action and directly annul the new titles of the tenants alleging the
purported void partition, the 2006
Kasunduan. But she did not.
Next. Corollary to the foregoing, respondent should have
impleaded the new title holders, the tenants, as indispensable or
necessary parties to the petition for
certiorari before the CA.
The tenants are not strangers or third parties to the subject property.
Prior to being transferees of half of the subject property, they were
the agricultural tenants thereof. We note, however, that the subject
property is private agricultural compulsorily covered for distribution
to qualified beneficiaries such as the tenants under the CARL. Hence,
the heirs entered a voluntary transfer arrangement, offering to sell
half of the subject property pursuant to the CARL. Notably, the parties
have known, consented and acquiesced to the voluntary sale of the
subject property as contained in the 1999
Kasunduan executed prior to the 2006
Kasunduan and the respondent's revocation of the agency relationship with her mother, Concepcion, in 2000.
Concededly, the tenants are not heirs and are thus strangers to the
estate of the decedent, the subject matter of the action for partition.
However, in relation to the subject property, as tenants who are
qualified beneficiaries thereof under the CARL and to whom new titles
had been issued, they are palpably real parties-in-interest.
[39]
While the validity of the partition of the subject property and
consequent distribution thereof can still be finally determined in
CA-G.R. SP No. 116979, a complete relief for those already parties or
the complete determination of the claim could not be had since the
tenants were not impleaded. In short, the tenants are not indispensable
parties
[40] but, at the least, are necessary parties
[41] in the determination of the partition of the subject property.
In
Reyes v. Mauricio[42]
we ruled that a tenancy relationship carmot be extinguished by the
sale, alienation or the transfer of legal possession of the landholding.
Section 9 of Republic Act No. 1199 or the Agricultural Tenancy Act
provides:
SECTION 9. Severance of Relationship. - The tenancy
relationship is extinguished by the voluntary surrender of the land by,
or the death or incapacity of, the tenant, but his heirs or the members
of his immediate farm household may continue to work the land until the
close of the agricultural year. The expiration of the period of the
contract as fixed by the parties, and the sale or alienation of the land
does not of themselves extinguish the relationship. In the latter case,
the purchaser or transferee shall assume the rights and obligations of
the former landholder in relation to the tenant. In case of death of the
landholder, his heir or heirs shall likewise assume his rights and
obligations. (Emphasis supplied)
In addition, Section 10 of Republic Act No. 3844 (Code of Agrarian Reforms of the Philippines) likewise provides:
SEC. 10. Agricultural Leasehold Relation Not Extinguished by Expiration of Period, etc.
- The agricultural leasehold relation under this Code shall not be
extinguished by mere expiration of the term or period in a leasehold
contract nor by the sale, alienation or transfer of the legal possession
of the landholding. In case the agricultural lessor sells, alienates or transfers
the legal possession of the landholding, the purchaser or transferee
thereof shall be subrogated to the rights and substituted to the
obligations of the agricultural lessor. (Emphasis supplied)
By operation of law, the tenancy relationship between the tenants on one
hand, and the co-owners of the subject property, the heirs of the
decedent, on the other hand, subsisted even after the death of one of
the landholders. Under the CARL, the tenants are deemed qualified
beneficiaries to ownership of a portion of their tilled land.
Ultimately, the tenants cannot be cursorily excluded from a court
determination of the validity of the partition, and consequent change in
ownership, of the subject property.
II. Substantive
In annulling the RTC's February 9 and August 27, 2010 Orders, the CA
ruled that these emanated from the trial court's April 13, 2007 Order
which, in tum, was based on a void partition agreement-the 2006
Kasunduan. The CA makes much of the fact that not all the heirs signed the 2006
Kasunduan in violation of Rule 69 of the Rules of Court, buttressed by our holding in
Dadizon v. Bernadas[43]
that the partition of property should be agreed upon by all parties who
signified their assent by signing the partition agreement.
We do not agree. Despite the lack of signatures of specifically three
(3) heirs of the decedent, Enrica, Teodoro and respondent Conchita, the
2006
Kasunduan is a valid partition of the subject property which
was correctly confirmed by the RTC in its April 13, 2007 Order. Even
without going into the finality of the April 13, 2007 Order, the
antecedents herein which we have painstakingly outlined will bear out
that all the heirs have assented to the partition of the subject
property.
Before we proceed further, we find it imperative to lay down the Civil Code framework of our discussion.
1. The subject property was conjugal partnership property of the Spouses Carlos, Jr. and Concepcion Sandico.
[44]
Thus, half thereof is part of Carlos, Jr.'s estate while the other half
pertained to that of Concepcion's, who could validly alienate her
share.
2. From the moment of death of the decedent, the heirs' rights to the succession all vested
[45] and resulted in their co-ownership of the decedent's estate.
[46]
3. The parties in this case are all compulsory heirs, with the surviving
spouse, Concepcion, inheriting equivalent to the share of a legitimate
child, all her children.
[47] For the subject property, Concepcion owned 9/16
th thereof, as conjugal owner of half plus 1/8
th portion as her inheritance from the decedent.
4. Each co-owner has full ownership of his part of the property, even if held
pro indiviso, which he can alienate, assign or mortgage.
[48] Corollary thereto, a co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in common;
[49] no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in one.
[50]
5. The binding force of a contract must be recognized as far as it is legally possible to do so.
[51] (mutuality of contracts)
6. Unenforceable contracts which are ratified by the person in whose name it was entered into are effective.
[52]
First. We sustain the RTC's confirmation of the 2006 Kasunduan.
As correctly ruled by the trial court, albeit plaintiffs Enrica and
Teodoro did not sign the
Kasunduan, they acquiesced to the
partition and distribution of the subject property, the qualified
tenants receiving half thereof. In fact, Enrica filed a Manifestation
dated December 18, 2006 that she and Teodoro will not object to the 2006
Kasunduan as long as they will be given their preferred portion
of the subject property. Truly indicative of Enrica's and Teodoro's
acquiescence to the 2006
Kasunduan is the fact that neither of them have questioned it nor have they intervened in CA-G.R. SP No. 116979 and in this appeal.
As regards the absence of Conchita's signature to the 2006
Kasunduan after she has purportedly repudiated the agency relationship with her mother in 2000, we rule that the 2006
Kasunduan is effective as against Conchita.
Even without going into the validity of Concepcion signing the 2006
Kasunduan
on Conchita's behalf, the appellate court could not void the sale and
transfer of half of the subject property to its qualified beneficiaries
under a voluntary transfer arrangement provided in the CARL. We
reproduce herein the pertinent provisions of the law:
CHAPTER II
Coverage
Section 4. Scope. - The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of
1989 shall cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity
produced, all public and private agricultural lands, as provided in
Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229, including other lands
of the public domain suitable for agriculture.
More specifically the following lands are covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program:
(a) |
All alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain devoted to or suitable for agriculture. No
reclassification of forest or mineral lands to agricultural lands shall
be undertaken after the approval of this Act until Congress, taking into
account ecological, developmental and equity considerations, shall have
determined by law, the specific limits of the public domain. |
|
|
(b) |
All lands of the public domain in excess of the specific limits as determined by Congress in the preceding paragraph; |
|
|
(c) |
All other lands owned by the Government devoted to or suitable for agriculture; and |
|
|
(d) |
All private lands devoted to or
suitable for agriculture regardless of the agricultural products raised
or that can be raised thereon. |
CHAPTER V
Land Acquisition
Section 16. Procedure for Acquisition of Private Lands. - For purposes of acquisition of private lands, the following procedures shall be followed:
(a) |
After having identified
the land, the landowners and the beneficiaries, the DAR shall send its
notice to acquire the land to the owners thereof, by personal delivery
or registered mail, and post the same in a conspicuous place in the
municipal building and barangay hall of the place where the property is
located. Said notice shall contain the offer of the DAR to pay a
corresponding value in accordance with the valuation set forth in
Sections 17, 18, and other pertinent provisions hereof. |
|
|
(b) |
Within thirty (30) days from the date of
receipt of written notice by personal delivery or registered mail, the
landowner, his administrator or representative shall inform the DAR of
his acceptance or rejection of the offer. |
|
|
(c) |
If the landowner accepts the offer of the
DAR, the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) shall pay the landowner the
purchase price of the land within thirty (30) days after he executes and
delivers a deed of transfer in favor of the government and surrenders
the Certificate of Title and other muniments of title. |
|
|
(d) |
In case of rejection or failure to reply, the
DAR shall conduct summary administrative proceedings to determine the
compensation for the land requiring the landowner, the LBP and other
interested parties to submit evidence as to the just compensation for
the land, within fifteen (15) days from the receipt of the notice. After
the expiration of the above period, the matter is deemed submitted for
decision. The DAR shall decide the case within thirty (30) days after it
is submitted for decision. |
|
|
(e) |
Upon receipt by the landowner of the
corresponding payment or, in case of rejection or no response from the
landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible bank designated by the
DAR of the compensation in cash or in LBP bonds in accordance with this
Act, the DAR shall take immediate possession of the land and shall
request the proper Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. The DAR
shall thereafter proceed with the redistribution of the land to the
qualified beneficiaries. |
|
|
(f) |
Any party who disagrees with the decision may
bring the matter to the court of proper jurisdiction for final
determination of just compensation. |
CHAPTER VI
Compensation
Section 20. Voluntary Land Transfer. - Landowners of
agricultural lands subject to acquisition under this Act may enter into a
voluntary arrangement for direct transfer of their lands to qualified
beneficiaries subject to the following guidelines:
(a) |
All notices for voluntary
land transfer must be submitted to the DAR within the first year of the
implementation of the CARP. Negotiations between the landowners and
qualified beneficiaries covering any voluntary land transfer which
remain unresolved after one (1) year shall not be recognized and such
land shall instead be acquired by the government and transferred
pursuant to this Act. |
|
|
(b) |
The terms and conditions of such transfer
shall not be less favorable to the transferee than those of the
government's standing offer to purchase from the landowner and to resell
to the beneficiaries, if such offers have been made and are fully known
to both parties. |
|
|
(c) |
The voluntary agreement shall include
sanctions for non-compliance by either party and shall be duly recorded
and its implementation monitored by the DAR. (Emphasis supplied). |
We find no equivocation in the requirements listed above. The transfer of half of the subject property was under the
aegis
of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) pursuant to the law which
the heirs cannot ignore or circumvent by their claim that the 2006
Kasunduan was not validly executed. Given the compulsory requirement of
the law, there is no validity to respondent's assertion which was
sustained by the CA, that property of the decedent was distributed to
non-heirs. Plainly, the partition of the subject property, and the
consequent transfer and titling of half thereof to qualified
beneficiaries, is valid, just and binding on all the heirs of the
decedent, including Conchita.
Second. The transfer and distribution of half of the subject
property can be considered as the share of Concepcion in the conjugal
partnership property regime during her marriage to the decedent. The
legitimate children's share in the subject property pertains to only 7/8
th of 1/2 thereof, the half covering Carlos, Jr.'s share in the property regime. From that, Conchita's share is 1/8
th of 1/2, amounting to 1/16
th of the entire property as opposed to her mother whose total share is 9/16
th.
Conchita's right to the subject property is by virtue of succession,
but even that pertains to only to a portion of one half thereof.
Conchita's full rights as co-owner does not pertain to Concepcion's half
of the subject property.
Third. The CA mistakenly annulled the entire partition, and sale
of half, of the subject property to the tenants contrary to Articles
493-495 and 498 of the Civil Code which, in sum, allow for alienation by
a co-owner of his or her share in the co-owned property, termination of
the co-ownership, and partition of the property. The provisions read:
Article 493. Each co-owner shall have the full
ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto,
and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even
substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights
are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with
respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be
allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the
co-ownership.
Article 494. No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the
coownership. Each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the
thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned.
x x xx
Article 495. Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding
article, the co-owners cannot demand a physical division of the thing
owned in common, when to do so would render it unserviceable for the use
for which it is intended. But the co-ownership may be terminated in
accordance with article 498.
Article 498. Whenever the thing is essentially indivisible and
the coowners cannot agree that it be allotted to one of them who shall
indemnify the others, it shall be sold and its proceeds distributed.
We are not unaware of the basic principle in the law of co-ownership,
both under the present Civil Code as in the Code of 1889, that no
individual co-owner can claim title to any definite portion of the land
or thing owned in common until the partition thereof. Prior to that
time, all that the co-owner has is an ideal, or abstract, quota or
proportionate share in the entire thing owned in common by all the
co-owners.
As a co-owner
pro indiviso, Conchita exercises her right to the entire coowned property. In
Quijano v. Amante,
[53] we ruled that each of the co-owners holds the property
pro indiviso
and exercises his or her rights with the entire property; thus, each
co-owner may use and enjoy the property with no other limitation than
that he shall not injure the interests of his co-owners. Until a
division is actually made, the respective share of each cannot be
determined, and every co-owner exercises, together with his
co-participants, joint ownership of the pro indiviso property, in
addition to his use and enjoyment of it. However, as we have previously
discussed, Conchita's share pertains to only 1/8
th of 1/2 of the subject property which belongs to the estate of the decedent, Carlos, Jr.
In
Tabasondra v. Spouses Constantino,
[54]
we upheld the right of coowners (Valentina and Valeriana) to alienate
their pro indiviso shares to (Sebastian and Tarcila) even without the
knowledge or consent of their coowner (Cornelio) because the alienation
covered the disposition of only their respective interests in the
common property. We ruled pursuant to Article 493 of the Civil Code that
each co-owner "shall have the full ownership of his part and of the
fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate,
assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its
enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved," but "the effect of
the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be
limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division
upon the termination of the co-ownership." Hence, the petitioners
therein, as the successors-ininterest of Cornelio, could not validly
assail the alienation by Valentina and Valeriana of their shares in
favor of the respondents.
Hewing closely to the foregoing is our ruling in the case of
Heirs of the Late Gerry Ecarma v. Court of Appeals[55] where we sustained the right of an heir to ask for a partition of co-owned properties inherited from the decedent therein:
Their objection to the actual partition notwithstanding,
herein petitioners and even Rodolfo Ecarma cannot compel the other
co-heirs to remain in perpetual co-ownership over the subject
properties. Article 494, in relation to Article 1083, of the Civil Code
provides:
Art. 494. No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership.
Each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in
common, insofar as his share is concerned.
Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the thing undivided for a certain
period of time, not exceeding ten years, shall be valid. This term may
be extended by a new agreement.
A donor or testator may prohibit partition for a period which shall not exceed twenty years.
Neither shall there be any partition when it is prohibited by law.
No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his
coowners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes
the coownership.
Art. 1083. Every co-heir has a right to demand the division of the
estate unless the testator should have expressly forbidden its
partition, in which case the period of indivision shall not exceed
twenty years as provided in Article 494. This power of the testator to
prohibit division applies to the legitime.
Even though forbidden by the testator, the co-ownership terminates when
any of the causes for which partnership is dissolved takes place, or
when the court finds for compelling reasons that division should be
ordered, upon petition of one of the co-heirs.
The impasse between the parties is due to herein petitioners' persistent
objection to proposals for the partition of the subject properties. The
deceased Gerry Ecarma, Rodolfo Ecarma and herein petitioners
consistently opposed the proposed partition of the administrator,
respondent Renato, since such is ostensibly "not feasible, impractical
and renders detrimental use of the Kitanlad property." However, it is
apparent that Gerry Ecarma and his heirs (herein petitioners) completely
object to any kind of partition of the subject properties, contravening
even the proposed sale thereof.
We note that petitioners have been careful not to proffer that the
subject properties are indivisible or that physical division of thereof
would render such unserviceable since Article 495 of the Civil Code
provides the remedy of termination of co-ownership in accordance with
Article 498 of the same Code, i.e., sale of the property and
distribution of the proceeds. Ineluctably, therefore, herein
petitioners' absolute opposition to the partition of the subject
properties which are co-owned has no basis in law. As mere co-owners,
herein petitioners, representing the share of the deceased Gerry Ecarma,
cannot preclude the other owners likewise compulsory heirs of the
deceased spouses Natalio and Arrninda, from exercising all incidences of
their full ownership.
Clearly in this case, the partition and alienation of half of the subject property, through the 2006
Kasunduan, is not completely void and cannot be annulled as to the share of Concepcion and the other heirs, including Enrica and Teodoro.
Fourth. The CA makes much of the fact that Conchita revoked the
SPA she had given to her mother, Concepcion, who therefore no longer had
authority to represent her and sign the 2006
Kasunduan on her behalf.
To begin with, Conchita failed to inform her agent, Concepcion, of the
fact of revocation. She continued to clothe her mother, Concepcion, with
apparent authority to act on her behalf in Civil Case No. Q-893137.
Moreover, Conchita's counsel, Atty. Tuason, who was likewise the counsel
of the other defendants in the case, validly represented her in the
proceedings before the RTC until his withdrawal as counsel for Conchita
in 2009.
Law and jurisprudence recognize actual authority and apparent authority.
[56] Apparent authority is based on the principle of estoppel. The Civil Code provides:
Article 1431. Through estoppel an admission or
representation is rendered conclusive upon the person making it, and
cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon.
x x x x
Article 1869. Agency may be express, or implied from the acts of the
principal, from his silence or lack of action, or his failure to
repudiate the agency, knowing that another person is acting on his
behalf without authority.
Agency may be oral, unless the law requires a specific form.
Conchita failed to give her mother notice of the revocation and belatedly repudiated her assent to the 2006
Kasunduan
which was signed by her mother on her behalf despite her full and
complete knowledge that Civil Case No. Q-89-3137 was ongoing and that
the partition of her father's estate's properties was underway. Conchita
could not feign ignorance of the action for partition and what it
sought, and the consequence of failing to inform her mother that she had
revoked the SPA which she had previously given her.
The various Orders of the RTC partitioning different properties of the
estate clearly show that Concepcion or Atty. Tuason repeatedly and
consistently drew the lot on Conchita's behalf in the numerous raffles
conducted by the trial court to determine which portion of the property
to be divided will go to which heir.
The second paragraph of Article 1317 of the Civil Code provides that "a
contract entered into in the name of another by one who has no authority
x x x shall be unenforceable, unless it is ratified, expressly or
impliedly, by the person on whose behalf it has been executed x x x."
In this case, Conchita has impliedly ratified her mother's assent to the
partition on her behalf by failing to assail the RTC's April 13, 2007
Order and the conduct of the raffle for distribution of the property
even after she had obtained a copy of the Order and the Minutes of
Raffle.
[57]
We thus sustain petitioner's assertion that:
31. The new TCTs in favor of the tenants were issued in
2009. Therefore, respondent Conchita could have prevented the
cancellation of TCT No. 377745 and the actual distribution of the land
had she taken action as early as 2008, when she obtained a copy of the
Minutes of the Raffle.[58]
On the whole, we abide by the principle that the binding force of a
contract must be recognized as far as it is legally possible to do so.
Quando res not valet ut ago, valeat quantum valere patest.
Last. The Rules of Court was designed to aid in the proper and
efficient dispensation of justice. Technical rules of procedure are not
ends in themselves but are primarily devised for a just and speedy
disposition of every action and proceedings.
[59]
As previously noted, throughout the proceedings, the RTC extended a wide
latitude to enable the parties to reach a partition agreement
acceptable to all parties. However, for one reason or another, the
physical division of the estate's properties has not progressed.
At the point when Enrica already moved for the appointment of
commissioners, defendants therein suddenly manifested that there was no
need therefor since they had a proposal for the partition of the
agricultural lands of the estate. Yet again, the actual partition was
stalled.
When the herein subject property was eventually partitioned in the 2006
Kasunduan and confirmed by the RTC in its April 13, 2007 Order,
respondent Conchita sought to annul the partition which had already
resulted in the cancellation of TCT No. 37745 and the issuance of new
titles.
Quite apparent from all the foregoing is that a partition of the estate
by agreement of the parties will never happen. Other heirs of the
decedent have already died and are represented in the partition of the
estate by their own heirs. Thus, we direct the RTC, Branch 82, Quezon
City in Civil Case No. Q-89-3137 to appoint commissioners to make the
partition pursuant to Section 3, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on
Certiorari is
GRANTED. The November 8, 2012 Decision and April 11, 2013 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 116979 are
REVERSED and
SET ASIDE.
The February 9, 2010 and August 27, 2010 Orders of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 82, Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-89-3137 are
REINSTATED. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 82, Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-89-3137 is
DIRECTED to: (1)
APPOINT COMMISSIONERS for the partition of Carlos Sandico, Jr.'s estate; and (2)
INFORM THE COURT of its compliance within fifteen (15) days of such appointment. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Inting, Delos Santos, and
J. Lopez, JJ., concur.
Leonen, J., on wellness leave.
[1] Rollo, pp. 29-44.
[2] Id. at 47-60; penned by
Associate Justice Priscilla J. Baltazar-Padilla and concurred in by
Associate Justices Rosalinda Asuncion-Vicente and Agnes Reyes-Carpio.
[3] Id. at 62-69.
[4] Id. at 189-191, 193; penned by Judge Severino B. De Castro, Jr.
[5] Id. at 48.
[6] Id.
[7] Id. at 75; see April 13, 2007 Order of the RTC, Annex "D".
[8] Id. at 80-104.
[9] Id. at 74-75.
[10] Id. at 70-72; Annex "C" of the Petition.
[11] Id.; Entry No. 3633.
[12] Id. at 80-81.
[13] Id. at 110.
[14] Id. at 73-113.
[15] Id. at 11-113.
[16] Id. at 49.
[17] Id. at 31.
[18] Id. at 32.
[19] Id. at 50.
[20] Id. at 32.
[21] Id. at 33.
[22] Id. at 50-51.
[23] Id. at 51.
[24] Id.
[25] Id. at 36.
[26] Id. at 52; Concepcion was
substituted by her children and Carlos III by his wife, Aida Stela
Cruz-Sandico and three children, Carlos Manuel Sandico IV, Christopher
Sandico and Constantine Mario Sandico.
[27] Id. at 34-35.
[28] See Section 2, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court.
[29] See Section 2, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court.
[30] See Sections 2 and 3, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court and
Heirs of Marasigan v. Marasigan 572 Phil. 190 (2008).
[31] Rollo p. 74.
[32] Heirs of Marasigan v. Marasigan, supra note 29 at 221 citing
Maglucot-aw v. Maglucot, 385 Phil. 720 (2000).
[33] Section 2. Order for partition and partition by agreement thereunder.
- x x x Thereupon the parties may, if they are able to agree, make the
partition among themselves by proper instruments of conveyance, and the
court shall confirm the partition so agreed upon by all the parties, and
such partition, together with the order of the court confirming the
same, shall be recorded in the registry of deeds of the place in which
the property is situated.
[34] See Section 2(a), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.
[35] Bitong v. Court of Appeals, 354 Phil. 516, 533 (1998).
[36] Philgreen Trading Construction Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 338 Phil. 433, 440 (1997).
[37] Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company v. Court of Appeals, 408 Phil. 686, 694 (2001).
[38] Raymundo v. Suarez, 593 Phil. 28, 48 (2008).
[39] See Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.
[40] See Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.
[41] See Section 8, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.
[42] 650 Phil. 438, 446 (2010).
[43] 606 Phil 687, 697 (2009).
[44] Articles 175-178 of the
New Civil Code applies to the dissolution of the Spouses Carlos, Jr. and
Concepcion Sandico's property regime as Carlos, Jr. died in 1975,
before the effectively of the Family Code in 1988.
[45] See Article 777 of the Civil Code.
[46] See Article 484 of the Civil Code.
[47] See Articles 887, 888 and 897 of the Civil Code.
[48] See Article 493 of the Civil Code.
[49] See Articles 494, 495, 498 of the Civil Code.
[50] See Article 494 of the Civil Code.
[51] See Article 1308 of the Civil Code.
[52] See Articles 1317, 1403, paragraph 1, and 1404 of the Civil Code.
[53] 745 Phil. 40, 49 (2014).
[54] 802 Phil. 532, 540 (2016).
[55] G.R. No. 193374, June 8, 2016.
[56] Calubad v. Ricarcen Development Corp., 817 Phil. 509, 527 (2017).
[57] Rollo p. 37.
[58] Id.
[59] See Section 6, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court;
Lastimoso v. Asayo, 564 Phil. 350 (2007).