LOPEZ, M., J.:
ART. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be exercised except within thirty days from the notice in writing by the prospective vendor, or by the vendor, as the case may be. The deed of sale shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property, unless accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that he has given written notice thereof to all possible redemptioners.
x x x x (Emphasis supplied.)
Hence, the Court declares that Hermelina Rama is possessed of the right to redeem the one-fourth share of Ricardo Rama of Lot 6034-C-2-H-4, which was sold to Medardo and Purita Nogra on July 13, 2001, and that the redemption was legally effected when on October 26, 2007, within 30 days from written notice of the sale, she consigned with the Court the amount of [P]35,000.00, the consideration of the sale. Medardo and Purita Nogra are directed within ten (10) days to execute a Deed of Redemption over the said one-fourth share of Ricardo Rama in favour of Hermelina Rama, and may, upon proof of delivery of the said document to Hermelina Rama, withdraw the amount of [P]35,000.00 consigned with the Court.Aggrieved, Spouses Nogra appealed to the CA, insisting that: Ricardo mailed a written notice of the provisional sale in 1992 to Hermelina as evidenced by the postal registry return slip; Hermelina had sufficient knowledge of the conveyances made by her co-owners due to her participation in the ejectment case against Lucina; and Ricardo's admission during the July 25, 2007 barangay conciliation was sufficient to charge Hermelina actual knowledge of the sale. As such, Spouses Nogra argued that Hermelina's right to redeem Ricardo's share had already lapsed when she filed the Complaint for Annulment of Sale, Redemption, and Other Reliefs on October 16, 2007.[15]
So ordered.[14]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 7 of Cebu City dated 25 October 2011 in Civil Case No. CEB-33782 and its Order dated 20 January 2013 are hereby SET ASIDE. [Petitioners'] Complaint is DISMISSED.In a Resolution[21] dated June 10, 2015, the CA denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration. Meantime, Hermelina died and was succeeded by Baby, who filed this petition. She maintains that a written notice is mandatory and indispensable for the commencement of the 30-day period to exercise the right of redemption under Article 1623.[22]
SO ORDERED.[20] (Emphases in the original.)
ART. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be exercised except within thirty days from the notice in writing by the prospective vendor, or by the vendor, as the case may be. The deed of sale shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property, unless accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that he has given written notice thereof to all possible redemptioners.The Court has been consistent in ruling that the required written notice by the seller is mandatory and indispensable for the 30-day redemption period to commence. In the oft-cited case of De Conejero v. Court of Appeals,[23] the Court explained:
x x x x (Emphasis supplied.)
With regard to the written notice, we agree with petitioners that such notice is indispensable, and that, in view of the terms in which Article 1623 of the Philippine Civil Code is couched, mere knowledge of the sale, acquired in some other manner by the redemptioner, does not satisfy the statute. The written notice was obviously exacted by the Code to remove all uncertainty as to the sale, its terms and its validity, and to quiet any doubts that the alienation is not definitive. The statute not having provided for any alternative, the method of notification prescribed remains exclusive.[24] (Emphases supplied)In Verdad v. Court of Appeals,[25] the Court was more emphatic on the mandatory character of the written notice:
The written notice of sale is mandatory. This Court has long established the rule that notwithstanding actual knowledge of a co-owner, the latter is still entitled to a written notice from the selling co-owner in order to remove all uncertainties about the sale, its terms and conditions, as well as its efficacy and status.[26] (Emphasis supplied.)In Spouses Pascual v. Spouses Ballesteros,[27] the indispensability of the written notice to trigger the running of the 30-day period in legal redemption was also underscored:
Anent the second issue asserted by the petitioners, we find no reversible error on the part of the CA in ruling that the 30-day period given to the respondents within which to exercise their right of redemption has not commenced in view of the absence of a written notice. Verily, despite the respondents' actual knowledge of the sale to the respondents, a written notice is still mandatory and indispensable for purposes of the commencement of the 30-day period within which to exercise the right of redemption.[28] (Emphasis supplied.)Indeed, Article 1623 is clear. A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the law is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for construction or interpretation; there is only room for interpretation.[29] Our ruling in Barcellano v. Bañas,[30] citing Justice Edgardo Paras, is highly instructive:
Justice Edgardo Paras, referring to the origins of the requirement, would explain in his commentaries on the New Civil Code that despite actual knowledge, the person having the right to redeem is STILL entitled to the written notice. Both the letter and the spirit of the New Civil Code argue against any attempt to widen the scope of the "written notice" by including therein any other kind of notice such as an oral one, or by registration. If the intent of the law has been to include verbal notice or any other means of information as sufficient to give the effect of this notice, there would have been no necessity or reason to specify in the article that said notice be in writing, for under the old law, a verbal notice or mere information was already deemed sufficient.In the seminal case of Alonzo, however, the Court embarked upon an unorthodox course of action in proceeding to construe an otherwise clear provision in Article 1088[32] of the Civil Code, which provides for the similar requirement of a written notice of sale from the vendor. In that case, two (2) of the five (5) co-heirs separately sold their property shares to the same buyers in 1963 and 1964. The buyers then occupied and enclosed the area sold to them with a fence and thereafter, built a house on it. Such conspicuous acts of the buyers led the Court to conclude that the co-heirs had undeniably acquired actual knowledge of the terms, validity, and finality of the sale, thereby enabling them to properly exercise their redemption right. Despite such knowledge, however, it took them more than a decade before they redeemed the property. The Court, therefore, dispensed with the required written notice under the law; reckoned the redemption period from the co-heirs' actual notice of the sale; and ruled that the right to redeem was already extinguished for failure to exercise it within the 30-day redemption period. In favoring equity and deviating from the strict letter of the law, the Court justified:
Time and time again, it has been repeatedly declared by this Court that where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation. There is only room for application. Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express terms, and interpretation should be resorted to only where a literal interpretation would be either impossible or absurd or would lead to an injustice. The law is clear in this case, there must first be a written notice to the family of Bañas.
Absolute Sentencia Expositors Non Indiget, when the language of the law is clear, no explanation of it is required.
We find no need to rule on the other issues presented by the petitioner. The respondent Bañas has a perfect right of redemption and was never in danger of losing such right even if there was no redemption complaint filed with the barangay, no tender of payment or no consignation.[31] (Citations omitted and emphasis supplied.)
As "it is thus apparent that the Philippine legislature in Article 1623 deliberately selected a particular method of giving notice, and that notice must be deemed exclusive," x x x.The Court was, however, keen to clarify that its ruling was not meant to abandon the prevailing doctrine on the indispensability of the written notice of sale from the seller:
x x x x
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and likewise, we may add, by its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge should be to discover in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as this is never within the legislative intent. An indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives of the legislature, is to render justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with justice. Law and justice are inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws that, while generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case because of its peculiar circumstances. In such a situation, we are not bound, because only of our nature and functions, to apply them just the same, in slavish obedience to their language. What we do instead is find a balance between the word and the will, that justice may be done even as the law is obeyed.
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the law as it is worded, yielding like robots to the literal command without regard to its cause and consequence. "Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to the words of a law," so we are warned, by Justice Holmes again, "where these words import a policy that goes beyond them." While we admittedly may not legislate, we nevertheless have the power to interpret the law in such a way as to reflect the will of the legislature. While we may not read into the law a purpose that is not there, we nevertheless have the right to read out of it the reason for its enactment. In doing so, we defer not to "the letter that killeth" but to "the spirit that vivifieth," to give effect to the lawmaker's will.
"The spirit, rather than the letter of a statute determines its construction, hence, a statute must be read according to its spirit or intent. For what is within the spirit is within the statute although it is not within the letter thereof, and that which is within the letter but not within the spirit is not with in the statute. Stated differently, a thing which is within the intent of the lawmaker is as much within the statute as if within the letter; and a thing which is within the letter of the statute is not within the statute unless within the intent of the lawmakers."
x x x x
In the face of the established facts, we cannot accept the private respondents' pretense that they were unaware of the sales made by their brother and sister in 1963 and 1964. By requiring written proof of such notice, we would be closing our eyes to the obvious truth in favor of their palpably false claim of ignorance, thus exalting the letter of the law over its purpose. The purpose is clear enough: to make sure that the redemptioners are duly notified. We are satisfied that in this case the other brothers and sisters were actually informed, although not in writing, of the sales made in 1963 and 1964, and that such notice was sufficient.
While we do not here declare that this period started from the dates of such sales in 1963 and 1964, we do say that sometime between those years and 1976, when the first complaint for redemption was filed, the other co-heirs were actually informed of the sale and that thereafter the 30-day period started running and ultimately expired. This could have happened any time during the interval of thirteen years, when none of the co-heirs made a move to redeem the properties sold. By 1977, in other words, when Tecla Padua filed her complaint, the right of redemption had already been extinguished because the period for its exercise had already expired.
The following doctrine is also worth noting:"While the general rule is, that to charge a party with laches in the assertion of an alleged right it is essential that he should have knowledge of the facts upon which he bases his claim, yet if the circumstances were such as should have induced inquiry, and the means of ascertaining the truth were readily available upon inquiry, but the party neglects to make it, he will be chargeable with laches, the same as if he had known the facts."It was the perfectly natural thing for the co-heirs to wonder why the spouses Alonzo, who were not among them, should enclose a portion of the inherited lot and build thereon a house of strong materials. This definitely was not the act of a temporary possessor or a mere mortgagee. This certainly looked like an act of ownership. Yet, given this unseemly situation, none of the co-heirs saw fit to object or at least inquire, to ascertain the facts, which were readily available. It took all of thirteen years before one of them chose to claim the right of redemption, but then it was already too late.[33] (Emphases supplied.)
We realize that in arriving at our conclusion today, we are deviating from the strict letter of the law, which the respondent court understandably applied pursuant to existing jurisprudence. The said court acted properly as it had no competence to reverse the doctrines laid down by this Court in the above-cited cases. In fact, and this should be clearly stressed, we ourselves are not abandoning the De Conejero and Butte doctrines. What we are doing simply is adopting an exception to the general rule, in view of the peculiar circumstances of this case.[34] (Emphasis in the original.)Verily, this exceptional ruling must be taken in its proper context lest the purpose of the law be rendered in vain. As will be discussed, several features of equity impelled the Court to exercise its equitable jurisdiction. In other words, the Court merely opted to take exception from the "slavish obedience"[35] to "the letter that killeth,"[36] and yielded to "spirit that vivifieth,"[37] due to the manifest wrong or injustice that would result if the strict letter of the law was to be applied in the given circumstances. Indeed, our courts are not divided into that of equity and of law, but are vested with the power to administer both law and equity;[38] they are not powerless to determine a factual matter in accordance with both standards of law and equity.[39] We stress, however, that equity intervenes only when the strict application of the law will no longer serve its purpose, but will cause injustice due to the exceptional circumstances which were not contemplated by the legal provision.[40] As we have stated in Reyes v. Lim:[41]
Equity jurisdiction aims to do complete justice in cases where a court of law is unable to adapt its judgments to the special circumstances of a case because of the legal inflexibility of its statutory or legal jurisdiction. Equity is the principle by which substantial justice may be attained in cases where the prescribed or customary forms of ordinary law are inadequate.[42]Since the law provides no remedy in cases attended by the following factors: (1) peculiar circumstances that gave the co-owners sufficient knowledge of the sale and its particulars; and (2) laches on the part of the redemptioners, the Court yielded towards equity.
Article 1623 does not prescribe any particular form of notice, nor any distinctive method for notifying the redemptioner. So long, therefore, as the latter is informed in writing of the sale and the particulars thereof, the 30 days for redemption start running, and the redemptioner has no real cause to complain. In the case at bar, the redemptioners (now petitioners) admit that on August 19, 1952 the co-owner-vendor, Enrique Torres, showed and gave Enrique Conejero (who was acting for and on behalf of his wife, Paz Torres) a copy of the 1951 deed of sale in favor of respondents Raffinans. The furnishing of this copy was equivalent to the giving of written notice required by law; it came from the vendor and made available in writing the details and finality of the sale. In fact, as argued for the respondents at bar, it served all the purposes of the written notice, in a more authentic manner than any other writing could have done. As a necessary consequence, the 30-day period for the legal redemption by co-owner Paz Torres (retracto de comuneros) began to run its course from and after August 19, 1952, ending on September 18, of the same year.[44] (Emphases supplied.)Moreover, actual knowledge of the sale and its particulars would likewise not suffice to disregard the explicit requirement of written notice under the law. Such actual knowledge must, be coupled with laches on the part of the redemptioner. Laches has been defined as "the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier."[45] It is not concerned only with the mere lapse of time,[46] but with the inequity caused by the relief-seeker's inaction.[47]
Co-owners with actual notice of the sale are not entitled to written notice. A written notice is a formal requisite to make certain that the co-owners have actual notice of the sale to enable them to exercise their right of redemption within the limited period of thirty days. But where the co-owners had actual notice of the sale at the time thereof and/or afterwards, a written notice of a fact already known to them, would be superfluous. The statute does not demand what is unnecessary.[55] (Emphases supplied.)This statement, while categorical, is merely an obiter dictum – a "judicial comment made while delivering a judicial opinion, but one that is unnecessary to the decision in the case and therefore not precedential x x x"[56] – as the Court expressly ruled that Article 1623 is inapplicable because there was no co-ownership in that case in view of the physical partition of the property. Hence, Spouses Si cannot be relied upon as a jurisprudential precedent to support deviation from the explicit requirement of a written notice from the vendor under Article 1623. Nonetheless, it may not go amiss to state that in such obiter, the Court was still cognizant of the purpose of the required written notice, i.e., to well-equip the redemptioners to exercise their right. In short, consistent with the prevailing jurisprudence, mere actual knowledge of the sale is not sufficient to commence the running of the 30-day period absent all the necessary information pertinent for the proper exercise of the right.