LOPEZ, J., J.:
That on or about the 9th day of April 2009, in the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the person of AAA[241500],[6] a minor, sixteen (16) years of age, thereby causing upon her physical injuries which required medical attendance for a period of less than nine (9) days and incapacitated her from performing her customary labor for the same period of time.During arraignment, Vianna pleaded not guilty to the crime as charged. After pre-trial, trial on the merits ensued.[8]
CONTRARY TO LAW.[7]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused VIANNA BANTANG y BRIONES GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of violating paragraph (a), Section 10 of Republic Act No. 7610, and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, this Court imposes on her the indeterminate sentence of six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional in the minimum period as minimum, to six (6) years of prision mayor in its maximum period, as maximum.In arriving at such disposition, the Regional Trial Court held that when physical injuries are inflicted against a minor, as in this case, the proper charge is Section 10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610, instead of slight physical injuries under the Revised Penal Code. The Regional Trial Court noted that Vianna never denied punching AAA241500 but merely claimed that it was done in defense of her mother. The Regional Trial Court, however, doubted Vianna's own version of the incident for being uncorroborated. There was also no showing that AAA241500 had a grudge against Vianna for her to concoct a story against them. Further, the Regional Trial Court disbelieved that AAA241500 would bad mouth Teresita at that time, when she was all alone and outnumbered by Teresita's grown-up daughters. Evenmore, if Vianna merely acted in defense of her mother, the Regional Trial Court opined that her act of punching AAA241500 was not justified.
The Court further orders VIANNA BANTANG y BRIONES to pay AAA[241500] the slim of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS ([PHP] 150.00)" as actual damages, TEN THOUSAND PESOS ([PHP] 10,000.00) as moral damages, and TEN THOUSAND PESOS ([PHP] 10,000.00) as exemplary damages. The awards of civil indemnity and damages are without subsidiary penalties in case of insolvency.
SO ORDERED.[16]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Appeal is hereby DENIED. Accordingly, the Decision of the court a quo dated 08 September 2016 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, in that all the monetary awards shall bear legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of the finality of this judgment.In affirming Vianna's conviction, the Court of Appeals held that the latter's act of punching AAA241500 fell squarely under the definition of child abuse under Republic Act No. 7610. Further, Vianna's intention to debase, degrade, and demean the intrinsic worth of the minor victim can be inferred from the manner in which she committed the act complained of. According to the Court of Appeals, it was Vianna's mother, Teresita who first confronted AAA241500. However, it was Vianna who punched AAA241500 in her face and neck in retaliation to the degrading statements made by AAA241500 about Teresita to their landlord. For the Court of Appeals, Vianna went overboard in defending her mother as she could have resorted to other less violent means than using excessive force. Vianna could have just reprimanded AAA241500, knowing her to be totally defenseless and outnumbered by adults.
The Decision is AFFIRMED in all other respects.
SO ORDERED.[18]
In the main, Vianna bewails that the Court of Appeals erred in convicting her for violation of Section 10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610 despite the failure of the prosecution to establish the elements of child abuse. More specifically, Vianna incessantly insists that there is no intent to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of AAA241500 because she was only acting in defense of her mother when she punched AAA241500. Vianna also submits that the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation should be appreciated in her favor because she was provoked by AAA241500's improper act of mistreating her mother.[21] Lastly, Vianna stands firm in her contention that the Medical Certificate of AAA241500 should not be given due weight or credence as it was not identified by the doctor who issued the same.[22]I.
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING VIANNA OF VIOLATION OF SECTION 10(A) OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7610 DESPITE THE PROSECUTION'S FAILURE TO PROVE THE ELEMENTS THEREOF.II.
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING VIANNA GUILTY OF VIOLATION OF SECTION 10(A) OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7610 DESPITE AAA241500'S INCREDIBLE TESTIMONY.[20]
a. Rule 45 petition is limited to questions of law.In any case, even if this Court were to be exceptionally liberal and allow a review of the factual issues, still, the instant petition fails to impress.
Before proceeding to the merits of the case, this Court deems it necessary to emphasize that a petition for review under Rule 45 is limited only to questions of law. Factual questions are not the proper subject of an appeal by certiorari. This Court will not review facts, as it is not our function to analyze or weigh all over again evidence already considered in the proceedings below. As held in Diokno v. Hon. Cacdac, a reexamination of factual findings is outside the province of a petition for review on certiorari, to wit:
It is aphoristic that a re-examination of factual findings cannot be done through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court because as earlier stated, this Court is not a trier of facts[.] xxx The Supreme Court is not duty-bound to analyze and weigh again the evidence considered in the proceedings below. This is already outside the province of the instant Petition for Certiorari.
There is a question of law when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain set of facts; a question of fact, on the other hand, exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of the alleged facts. Unless the case falls under any of the recognized exceptions, we are limited solely to the review of legal questions.
b. Rule 45 petition is limited to errors of the appellate court
Furthermore, the "errors" which we may review in a petition for review on certiorari are those of the [Court of Appeals], and not directly those of the trial court or the quasi-judicial agency, tribunal, or officer which rendered the decision in the first instance. It is imperative that we refrain from conducting further scrutiny of the findings of fact made by trial courts, lest we convert this Court into a trier of facts. As held in Reman Recio v. Heirs of the Spouses Agueda and Maria Altamirano, etc., et al., our review is limited only to the errors of law committed by the appellate court[.][26] (Citations omitted, emphasis supplied)
Corollarily, under Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 7610, "child abuse" refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child which includes any of the following:ARTICLE VI
Other Acts of Abuse
SECTION 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and other Conditions Prejudicial to the Child's Development. –(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or be responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child's development including those covered by Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, but not covered by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period. (Emphasis supplied)
(1) psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and emotional maltreatment;In conjunction with this, Section 2 of the Rules and Regulations on the Reporting and Investigation of Child Abuse Cases defines the term "child abuse" as the infliction of physical or psychological injury, cruelty to, or neglect, sexual abuse or exploitation of a child. In turn, the same Section defines "physical injury" as those that include but are not limited to lacerations, fractured bones, burns, internal injuries, severe injury, or serious bodily harm suffered by a child.
(2) any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being;
(3) unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival, such as food and shelter; or
(4) failure to immediately give medical treatment to an injured child resulting in serious impairment of his [or her] growth and development or in his [or her] permanent incapacity or death. (Emphasis supplied)
As gleaned from the foregoing, the provision punishes not only those enumerated under Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, but also four distinct acts, i.e., (a) child abuse, (b) child cruelty, (c) child exploitation and (d) being responsible for conditions prejudicial to the child's development. The Rules and Regulations of the questioned statute distinctly and separately defined child abuse, cruelty and exploitation just to show that these three acts are different from one another and from the act prejudicial to the child's development. Contrary to petitioner's assertion, an accused can be prosecuted and be convicted under Section 10(a), Article VI of Republic Act No. 7610 if he commits any of the four acts therein. The prosecution need not prove that the acts of child abuse, child cruelty and child exploitation have resulted in the prejudice of the child because an act prejudicial to the development of the child is different from the former acts.It is, therefore, clear from the foregoing that when a child is subjected to physical abuse or injury, the person responsible therefor can be held liable under Republic Act No. 7610 by establishing the following elements: (1) the minority of the victim; (2) the acts committed by the accused constituting physical abuse against the victim; and (3) the fact that the said acts are punishable under Republic Act No. 7610.[29] In this case, all these elements are present. More specifically, it was sufficiently established that at the time of the incident, AAA241500 was merely a 16-year-old minor; that Vianna attacked AAA241500 by punching her twice on her face and neck, resulting in hematoma contusion on her left cheek; and that the said acts constitute physical abuse specified in Section 3(b)(1) of Republic Act No. 7610.
Moreover, it is a rule in statutory construction that the word "or" is a disjunctive term signifying dissociation and independence of one thing from other things enumerated. It should, as a rule, be construed in the sense which it ordinarily implies. Hence, the use of "or" in Section 10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610 before the phrase "be responsible for conditions prejudicial to the child's development" supposes that there four punishable acts therein. First, the act of child abuse; second, child cruelty; third, child exploitation; and fourth, being responsible for conditions prejudicial to the child's development. The fourth penalized act cannot be interpreted, as petitioner suggests, as a qualifying condition for the three other acts, because an analysis of the entire context of the questioned provision does not warrant such construal.[28] (Emphasis supplied)
Pertinent parts of the deliberation in Senate Bill No. 1209 underscoring the legislative intent to increase the penalties as a deterrent against all forms of child abuse, including those covered by the [Revised Penal Code] and the Child and Youth Welfare Code, as well as to give special protection to all children, read:In this case, it was sufficiently alleged in the Information and established through AAA241500's certificate of live birth[32] that she was a minor at the time when the crime was committed. Bearing also in mind the policy of Republic Act No. 7610, the applicable law, in this case, is Section 10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610 which carries a heavier penalty compared to that of slight physical injuries under Section 266 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 10951.[33] In other words, the application of Republic Act No. 7610, in this case, is only in keeping with the letter and intent of the law of providing stronger deterrence and special protection to children against all forms of child abuse. On this score, the Court of Appeals did not err in upholding Vianna's conviction under Republic Act No. 7610 instead of the Revised Penal Code.Senator Lina. . . .The aforequoted parts of the deliberation in Senate Bill No. 1209 likewise negate the contention of Justice Perlas-Bernabe that "to suppose that [Republic Act] No. 7610 would generally cover acts already punished under the Revised Penal Code would defy the operational logic behind the introduction of this special law." They also address the contention of Justice Caguioa that the passage of the same law was the Senate's act of heeding the call of the Court to afford protection to a special class of children, and not to cover any and all crimes against children that are already covered by other penal laws, like the [Revised Penal Code] and [Presidential Decree] No. 603.
For the information and guidance of our Colleagues, the phrase "child abuse" here is more descriptive than a definition that specifies the particulars of the acts of child abuse. As can be gleaned from the bill, Mr. President, there is a reference in Section 10 to the "Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and Other Conditions Prejudicial to the Child's Development."
We refer, for example, to the Revised Penal Code. There are already acts described and punished under the Revised Penal Code and the Child and Youth Welfare Code. These are all enumerated already, Mr. President. There are Particular acts that are already being punished.
But we are providing stronger deterrence against child abuse and exploitation by increasing the penalties when the victim is a child. That is number one. We define a child as "one who is 15 years and below." [Later amended to those below 18, including those above 18 under special circumstances]
The President Pro Tempore. Would the Sponsor then say that this bill repeals, by implication or as a consequence, the law he just cited for the protection of the child as contained in that Code just mentioned, since this provides for stronger deterrence against child abuse and we have now a Code for the protection of the child?
Senator Lina, We specified in the bill, Mr. President, increase in penalties. That is one. But, of course, that is not everything included in the bill. There are other aspects like making it easier to prosecute these cases of pedophilia in our country. That is another aspect of this bill.
The other aspects of the bill include the increase in the penalties on acts committed against children; and by definition, children are those below 15 years of age.
So, it is an amendment to the Child and Youth Welfare Code, Mr. President. This is not an amendment by implication. We made direct reference to the Articles in the Revised Penal Code and in the Articles in the Child and Youth Welfare Code that are amended because of the increase in the penalties.
The President Pro Tempore. Would Senator Lina think then that, probably, it would be more advisable to specify the amendments and amend the particular provision of the existing law rather than put up a separate bill like this?.
Senator Lina. We did, Mr. President. In Section 10, we made reference to...
The President Pro Tempore. The Chair is not proposing any particular amendment. This is just an inquiry for the purpose of making some suggestions at this stage where we are now in the period of amendments.
Senator Lina. We deemed it proper to have a separate Act, Mr. President, that will include all measures to provide stronger deterrence against child abuse and exploitation. There are other aspects that are included here other than increasing the penalties that are already provided for in the Revised Penal Code and in the Child and Youth Welfare Code when the victims are children.
Aside from the penalties, there are other measures that are provided for in this Act. Therefore, to be more systematic about it, instead of filing several bills, we thought of having a separate Act that will address the problems of children below 15 years of age. This is to emphasize the fact that this is a special sector in our society that needs to be given special protection. So this bill is now being presented for consideration by the Chamber. (Emphases in the original)
As pointed out by Senator Lina, the other aspect of [Senate Bill] No. 1209, is to increase penalties on acts committed against children; thus, direct reference was made to the Articles in the [Revised Penal Code] and in the Articles in the Child and Youth Welfare Code that are amended because of the increase in the penalties. The said legislative intent is consistent with the policy to provide stronger deterrence and special protection of children against child abuse, and is now embodied under Section 10, Article VI of [Republic Act] No. 7610[.][31]
That on or about the 9th day of April 2009, in the City of Mandaluyong City, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the person of [AAA241500], a minor, sixteen (16) years of age, thereby causing upon her physical injuries which required medical attendance for a period of less than nine (9) days and incapacitated her from performing her customary labor for the same period of time.[36]A cursory reading of the foregoing readily shows that there is no allegation of the specific intent to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of the child. Accordingly the prosecution is not required to establish the existence of this element to prove the commission of the crime. What can be gathered from the recital of the Information is that Vianna is criminally charged with child abuse by way of physical abuse. Under this particular form of child abuse, there is no requirement that there be a specific intent to debase, degrade or demean the child's intrinsic worth and dignity. It is sufficient that the Information alleges the minority of the victim and the acts committed by Vianna constituting physical abuse, which is punishable under Section 10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610.
To be held liable under [Republic Act] No. 7610, the offender must commit an abusive act against the child. Child abuse includes physical abuse of the child, whether the same is habitual or not. [Vianna's] act of punching AAA[241500] falls squarely within the said definition.The pronouncement of the Court of Appeals is in consonance with the ruling of the Court in Torres v. People,[38] where we considered the accused's act of whipping a child several times on the neck with a wet t-shirt and in public as an act that debases, degrades, and demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of the child. In the said case, the accused likewise maintained that he was merely disciplining the child for harassing and vexing him. He also contended that his act did not prejudice the child's development and growth, viz.:
. . . .
While it is true that not every instance of laying of hands on the child constitutes child abuse, [Vianna's] intention, to debase, degrade, and demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child can be inferred from the manner in which she committed the act complained of. In the case herein, it was [Vianna's] mother Teresita who initially confronted AAA[241500]. To [Vianna] the child cursed, pointed finger and said vile things against Teresita prompting [Vianna] to punch her in defense.
Granting that AAA[241500] had indeed pointed a finger while snapping back [at] Teresita, [Vianna] went overboard in defending her as she could have resorted to other less violent means than the use of excessive force such as hitting her face and neck. To Us, We find it to be intentional and sort of a retaliation than just an instinctive response, as a consequence of the alleged previous degrading statements made earlier made by AAA[241500] to their landlord berating Teresita. [Vianna] could just have reprimanded her, knowing her to be totally defenseless and outnumbered by grown-up adults.[37] (Emphasis supplied)
Although it is true that not every instance of laying of hands on the child constitutes child abuse, petitioner's intention to debase, degrade, and demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child can be inferred from the manner in which he committed the act complained of.Irrefragably, Vianna's act of punching AAA241500 not once but twice on her face and neck, in public, and with the use of such force as to result in a hematoma contusion, clearly constitute physical abuse of AAA241500. In fact, it was established that AAA241500 was shocked and traumatized by the physical abuse inflicted upon her.[40] Indeed, if the only intention of Vianna was to discipline AAA241500 or to defend her mother, she could have just reprimanded her or resorted to other less violent means. As an adult, Vianna should have exercised restraint and self-control, instead of hitting AAA241500, who was then all alone and defenseless.
To note, petitioner used a wet t-shirt to whip the child not just once but three (3) times. Common sense and human experience would suggest that hitting a sensitive body part, such as the neck, with a wet t-shirt would cause an extreme amount of pain, especially so if it was done several times. There also reason to believe that petitioner used excessive force. Otherwise, AAA would not have fallen down the stairs at the third strike. AAA would likewise not have sustained a contusion.
Indeed, if the only intention of petitioner were to discipline AAA and stop him from interfering, he could have resorted to other less violent means. Instead of reprimanding AAA or walking away, petitioner chose to hit the latter.
. . . .
Petitioner's act of whipping AAA on the neck with a wet t-shirt is an act that debases, degrades, and demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child It is a form of cruelty. Being smacked several times in a public place is a humiliating and traumatizing experience for all persons regardless of age. Petitioner, as an adult, should have exercised restraint and self-control rather than retaliate against a 14-year-old child.[39] (Emphasis supplied)
In People v. Dahilig,[47] it was held that:Verily, since the Regional Trial Court had the direct opportunity to examine AAA241500's demeanor and conduct on the stand, the Regional Trial Court was clearly in a better position than the appellate court to evaluate testimonial evidence properly. Moreover, there is no showing that the Regional Trial Court overlooked, misapprehended, or misconstrued some fact or circumstance of weight or substance so as to materially affect the disposition of the case or doubt the credibility of AAA241500. In fact, even the Court of Appeals affirmed the Regional Trial Court's appreciation of AAA241500's testimony which makes the same invariably conclusive and binding on this Court. As a matter of sound practice and procedure, this Court defers and accords finality to the factual findings of trial courts, more so, when as here, such findings are undisturbed by the appellate court.[51]
Matters affecting credibility are best left to the trial court because of its unique opportunity observe the elusive and incommunicable evidence of that witness' department on the stand while testifying, an opportunity denied to the appellate courts which usually rely on the cold pages of the silent records of the case.[48] (Citation omitted)
While in People v. Blancaflor,[49]
The trial court's findings on the credibility of witnesses carry great weight and respect and will be sustained by the appellate courts unless the trial court overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance which will alter the assailed decision or affect the result of the case.[50] (Citation omitted)
Meanwhile, Sec. 1 of Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISL), provides that if the offense is ostensibly punished under a special law, the minimum and maximum prison term of the indeterminate sentence shall not be beyond what the special law prescribed. Be that as it may, the Court had clarified in the landmark ruling of People v. Simon (G.R. No. 93028, July 29, 1994, 239 SCRA 555)] that the situation is different where although the offense is defined in a special law, the penalty therefor is taken from the technical nomenclature in the [Revised Penal Code]. Under such circumstance, the legal effects under the system of penalties native to the Code would also necessarily apply to the special law.[53] (Citations omitted)Tersely put, "if the special penal law adopts the nomenclature of the penalties under the Revised Penal Code, the determination of the indeterminate sentence will be based on the rules applied for those crimes punishable under the Revised Penal Code."[54] Correlatively, to determine the minimum and maximum terms of the sentence, this Court apply the first part of Section of Act No. 4103, which provides that "in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances could be properly imposed under the rules of said Code, and the minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the code for the offense."
Petitioner VIANNA BANTANG y BRIONES is GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for violating Section 10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610, and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, this Court imposes upon her the indeterminate sentence of four (4) years two (2) months and one (1) day prision correccional, as minimum to six (6) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day prision mayor, as maximum.SO ORDERED.
Further, VIANNA BANTANG y BRIONES is ORDERED to pay AAA241500 the sum of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS (PHP 150.00) as actual damages, TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (PHP 20,000.00) as moral damages, and TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (PHP 20,000.00) as exemplary damages. All the monetary awards shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum reckoned from the finality of this Decision until full payment.