GAERLAN, J.:
Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution provides that unless otherwise provided by the Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within 30 days from receipt of a copy thereof. For this reason, the Rules of Court provide for a separate rule (Rule 64) specifically applicable only to decisions of the COMELEC and the Commission on Audit. This Rule expressly refers to the application of Rule 65 in the filing of a petition for certiorari, subject to the exception clause - "except as hereinafter provided".Here, the OSG summarizes the timeline of material dates as follows:
Even a superficial reading of the motion for reconsideration shows that the petitioner has not challenged our conclusion that his petition was filed outside the period required by Section 3, Rule 64; he merely insists that the fresh period rule applicable to a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 should likewise apply to petitions for certiorari of COMELEC rulings filed under Rule 64.
Rule 64, however, cannot simply be equated to Rule 65 even if it expressly refers to the latter rule. They exist as separate rules for substantive reasons as discussed below. Procedurally, the most patent difference between the two - i.e., the exception that Section 2, Rule 64 refers to - is Section 3 which provides for a special period for the filing of petitions for certiorari from decisions or rulings of the COMELEC en banc. The period is 30 days from notice of the decision or ruling (instead of the 60 days that Rule 65 provides), with the intervening period used for the filing of any motion for reconsideration deductible from the originally-granted 30 days (instead of the fresh period of 60 days that Rule 65 provides).[38]
The OSG correctly reasons that the petition was filed out of time because it was filed after the lapse of the thirty-day period from Villanueva's receipt of the first assailed resolution on February 1, 2016. Applying Rule 64, Section 3 to the timeline above, Villanueva filed her motion for reconsideration on the eighth day of the period, thus, she only had twenty-two days from notice of the COMELEC action on said motion to file her petition for certiorari. Since Villanueva was notified of the second assailed resolution upon her receipt thereof on March 21, 2022, she only had twenty-two (22) days from that date, or until April 12, 2022, to elevate the matter to this Court. Consequently, the present petition, which was filed on April 19, 2022, was filed out of time. Villanueva erroneously reckoned the thirty-day period from the date of notice of the second assailed resolution, instead of reckoning it from the date of notice of the first assailed resolution. The period cannot be reckoned from the date of notice of the second assailed resolution as this is merely a denial of the preliminary recourse (identified in Rule 64, Section 3 as the "motion for new trial or reconsideration") from the initial ruling, which is the "decision, order, or ruling" contemplated by the Constitution. This is precisely the reason why Rule 64, Section 3 suspends the running of the thirtyday period upon the filing of such preliminary recourse, and restarts the period once the aggrieved party is notified of the action thereon.
- December 11, 2015- [COMELEC] issued the [first] Assailed Resolution.
- February 1, 2016 - [Villanueva] received a copy of [the first assailed] Resolution dated December 11, 2015.
- February 9, 2016 - [Villanueva] filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the [first Assailed] Resolution dated December 11, 2015. (Eight days after receipt [thereof].)
- January 21, 2022 - [COMELEC] issued the [second assailed] Resolution denying [Villanueva]'s Motion for Reconsideration of the [first] assailed Resolution dated December 11, 2015.
- March 21, 2022 - [Villanueva] received a copy of [the second assailed] Resolution dated January 21, 2022.
- April 19, 2022 - [Villanueva] filed the instant Petition for Certiorari.[39]
In setting aside technical infirmities and thereby giving due course to tardy appeals, the Court has not been oblivious to, or unmindful of, the extraordinary situations that merit liberal application of the Rules. In those situations where technicalities were dispensed with, this Court's decisions were not meant to undermine the force and effectivity of the periods set by law. The Court hastens to add though that in those rare cases where procedural rules were not stringently applied, there always existed a clear need to prevent the commission of a grave injustice. Our judicial system and the courts have always tried to maintain a healthy balance between the strict enforcement of procedural laws and the guarantee that every litigant be given the full opportunity for the just and proper disposition of his cause. Here, the Court finds a compelling reason to relax the strict application of procedural rules -- the COMELEC's assailed actions were tainted with grave abuse of discretion which is correctible through the extraordinary writ of certiorari as will be further discussed below. To rule otherwise would unnecessarily expose petitioner to the expense and rigors of a public trial when records indubitably show that his plea for relief is based on meritorious grounds. The Court, thus, deems the relaxation of procedural rules warranted in this case as the ultimate purpose of substantial justice so requires.[40]Section 261 (f) not limited to election period
Section 261 (f) of the OEC reads as follows:Villanueva construes the provision to mean that the offense of coercion of election officials and employees can only be committed during an election period because the phrase ''functions and duties" is preceded by the modifying word "election". In support of this thesis, she points out that the other offenses defined in Section 261 refer to adjacent election-related terms such as "candidates," "campaign," "vote," and "voter." She further construes Sections 2 and 3 of the OEC to mean that Code should apply only during election periods, since, in her words, "Section 2 [of the OEC] pertains to applicability which states, ''This Code shall govern all elections of public officers and, to the extent appropriate, all referenda and plebiscites;'' And that Section 3 thereof pertains to election and campaign periods."[41]
SECTION 261. Prohibited Acts. - The following shall be guilty of an election offense:
(f) Coercion of election officials and employees. - Any person who, directly or indirectly, threatens, intimidates, terrorizes or coerces any election official or employee in the performance of his election functions or duties.
In this jurisdiction, an election means "the choice or selection of candidates to public office by popular vote" through the use of the ballot, and the elected officials of which are determined through the will of the electorate. "An election is the embodiment of the popular will, the expression of the sovereign power of the people." "Specifically, the term 'election,' in the context of the Constitution, may refer to the conduct of the polls, including the listing of voters, the holding of the electoral campaign, and the casting and counting of votes."[45]Thus, the phrase "election Junctions and duties" in Section 261(f) should be construed as referring to those functions which directly relate to the conduct of an election as contemplated in our laws. However, as the OSG correctly points out, the discharge of these functions and duties is not temporally limited to the election period. Functions such as voter registration, the validation of registration data, and the preparation of voter's lists are all directly related to the conduct of an election, and are all continuing tasks which are done months or even years prior to the actual casting and counting of votes in particular election.
During the 2013 barangay elections, Tolentino and respondent Henry Manalo both ran for the position of Barangay Captain in Barangay Calingcuan, Tarlac City. The election was held on October 28, 2013.The Court flagged Atty. Facun's threat as a possible violation of Section 261 (f), even if it was made almost two years after the election in question, and way beyond the election period prescribed by Section 3 of the OEC. Although this Court deferred to the COMELEC's inquisitorial authority, it nevertheless used Section 261 (f) as basis to exercise its disciplinary jurisdiction over Atty. Facun for an act of coercion committed outside an election period, against an election officer who was implementing court orders in an election protest. The applicable statutory and case law thus make it clear that Section 261 (f) does not contain a temporal limitation. Villanueva may therefore be charged with violating Section 261(f) in connection with her directive to close the Plaridel municipal election office, even if said directive was issued and implemented outside an election period.
x x x x
x x x [O]n April 10, 2015, Tolentino wrote the MTCC requesting the implementation of the writ of execution pending appeal. Tolentino also wrote to the City Election Officer of Tarlac requesting the implementation of the writ of execution pending appeal.
On April 27, 2015, the MTCC denied Tolentino's request/motion because it no longer had jurisdiction to entertain any further motions after it had transmitted the records of the case to the [COMELEC].
Despite the MTCC's denial, Tolentino, through Atty. Ramon D. Facun, wrote a ''Final Request" to the COMELEC City Election Office demanding the implementation of the writ of execution pending appeal with an accompanying threat that he would file contempt charges if immediate implementation would not take place[.]
x x x x
As a final word, this Court deems it necessary to admonish the petitioner and his counsel for their thinly veiled threat against the respondent City Election Officer Atty. Guiao-Garcia. Section 261 (f) of the Omnibus Election Code provides:
x x x x
Atty. Ramon D. Facun already knew that the MTCC refused to enforce the writ of execution pending appeal after having lost jurisdiction over the case. The matter, too, was already before the Commission, in Division. Yet in his zeal to advance the interests of his client, Atty. Facun threatened an election officer with the filing of a baseless contempt charge in violation of Canon 19.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility in relation with Section 261 (f) of the Omnibus Election Code.
While we cannot usurp the Commission's prerogative of prosecuting election offenses, this Court retains disciplinary authority over all members of the Bar. x x x
x x x x
Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility demands that a lawyer represent his client with zeal; but the same Canon provides that a lawyer's performance of his duties towards his client must be within the bounds of the law. Rule 19.01 of the same Canon requires, among others, that a lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client. Canon 15, Rule 15.07 also obliges lawyers to impress upon their clients compliance with the laws and the principle of fairness.[47]
Section 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.The landmark case of Cagang v. Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division, Quezon City, et al.[48] (Cagang) applies the right to speedy disposition to preliminary investigations by the State's specialized agencies:
[I]nordinate delay in the resolution and termination of a preliminary investigation violates the accused's right to due process and the speedy disposition of cases, and may result in the dismissal of the case against the accused. The burden of proving delay depends on whether delay is alleged within the periods provided by law or procedural rules. If the delay is alleged to have occurred during the given periods, the burden is on the respondent or the accused to prove that the delay was inordinate. If the delay is alleged to have occurred beyond the given periods, the burden shifts to the prosecution to prove that the delay was reasonable under the circumstances and that no prejudice was suffered by the accused as a result of the delay.Deprivation of the right to speedy disposition of cases as a ground for the dismissal of a criminal investigation was applied to COMELEC investigations for the first time in Peñas, which involved a prosecution for election campaign overspending:
The determination of whether the delay was inordinate is not through mere mathematical reckoning but through the examination of the facts and circumstances surrounding the case. Courts should appraise a reasonable period from the point of view of how much time a competent and independent public officer would need in relation to the complexity of a given case. If there has been delay, the prosecution must be able to satisfactorily explain the reasons for such delay and that no prejudice was suffered by the accused as a result. The timely invocation of the accused's constitutional rights must also be examined on a case-to-case basis.
x x x x
First, the right to speedy disposition of cases is different from the right to speedy trial. While the rationale for both rights is the same, the right to speedy trial may only be invoked in criminal prosecutions against courts of law. The right to speedy disposition of cases, however, may be invoked before any tribunal, whether judicial or quasi-judicial. What is important is that the accused may already be prejudiced by the proceeding for the right to speedy disposition of cases to be invoked.
Second, a case is deemed initiated upon the filing of a formal complaint prior to a conduct of a preliminary investigation. This Court acknowledges, however, that the Ombudsman should set reasonable periods for preliminary investigation, with due regard to the complexities and nuances of each case. Delays beyond this period will be taken against the prosecution. The period taken for fact-finding investigations prior to the filing of the formal complaint shall not be included in the determination of whether there has been inordinate delay.
Third, courts must first determine which party carries the burden of proof. If the right is invoked within the given time periods contained in current Supreme Court resolutions and circulars, 171 and the time periods that will be promulgated by the Office of the Ombudsman, the defense has the burden of proving that the right was justifiably invoked. If the delay occurs beyond the given time period and the right is invoked, the prosecution has the burden of justifying the delay.
x x x x
Fourth, determination of the length of delay is never mechanical. Courts must consider the entire context of the case, from the amount of evidence to be weighed to the simplicity or complexity of the issues raised.
x x x x
In all cases of dismissals due to inordinate delay, the causes of the delays must be properly laid out and discussed by the relevant court.
Fifth, the right to speedy disposition of cases or the right to speedy trial must be timely raised. The respondent or the accused must file the appropriate motion upon the lapse of the statutory or procedural periods. Otherwise, they are deemed to have waived their right to speedy disposition of cases.[49]
[Article III, Section 16 of the Constitution] expanded the speedy trial guarantee afforded to the accused in a criminal proceeding under the 1935 Constitution:Peñas was reiterated in Ecleo v. COMELEC[51] (Ecleo), another prosecution for election campaign overspending. ln both of those cases, we found the COMELEC guilty of inordinate delay in the determination of probable cause against the petitioning parties, considering the nature of their offense as well as the nature and amount of evidence necessary to determine probable cause:x x x Though both concepts are subsumed under the more basic tenet of procedural due process, the right to speedy disposition of cases, to contrast with the right to speedy trial, sweeps more broadly as it is not confined with criminal cases; it extends even to other adversarial proceedings before any judicial, quasi-judicial, and administrative tribunals. No branch of government is. therefore, exempt from duty observing the constitutional safeguard and the right confirms immunity from arbitrary delay. x x xHence, any party to a case may demand expeditious action from all officials who are tasked with the administration of justice, including herein respondent COMELEC.[50]
An adverse finding during preliminary investigation would give rise to a criminal charge for an election offense. If found guilty thereof, [Peñas] would have been disqualified from running for public office let alone sit as mayor of Digos City. Surely, the fact that [Peñas] was an incumbent elected official who was set to run for re-election if not higher office during the 2016 and 2019 NLEs should have prompted the COMELEC to conclude its investigation with utmost dispatch. Otherwise, those who intended to vote for [Peñas] could have ended up wasting their vote for a disqualified candidate.While the determination of probable cause in the case at bar cannot be made by mere mathematical computation as in Peñas and Ecleo, we still find the COMELEC guilty of inordinate delay in resolving Villanueva's case. To reiterate, the CLD initiated proceedings against Villanueva in February 2011. The CLD submitted its recommendation to the COMELEC en banc in April 2015, almost four (4) years after the filing of Villanueva's last pleading.[54] The COMELEC en banc then acted on the recommendation of its Law Department eight (8) months after the submission thereof. Thereafter, it took the COMELEC six (6) more years to rule on Villanueva's motion for reconsideration, which was mostly a rehash of the arguments raised in her answer. In the interim, Villanueva was able to serve three full terms as mayor of Plaridel; and by the time the COMELEC finally ordered the filing of charges against her, she had been elected to the Misamis Occidental provincial board. Like in Peñas and Ecleo, the facts of Villanueva's case are not complicated and do not involve voluminous records. It is a simple case of a local chief executive closing down the municipal election office in response to the COMELEC's inaction on her request for a new municipal election officer. The COMELEC cannot seek refuge in the novelty of the issue involving the construction of Section 26 l(f), for it is the constitutionally-designated implementor and frontline interpreter of the OEC and other election laws.[55] On this score, it bears emphasizing that the COMELEC also filed administrative and graft complaints against Villanueva before the Ombudsman for ordering the closure of the Plaridel municipal election office. The Ombudsman dismissed the administrative charge in a Resolution[56] dated July 27, 2012; while the graft complaint was dismissed in a Resolution[57] dated September 20, 2016.
For another. [Peñas'] case did not at all involve complex or intricate issues which require voluminous records or evidence. The lone issue needed to be resolved was whether [Peñas] went beyond the prescribed campaign expenditure limit. To determine if there had indeed been an excess, a simple mathematical equation is all that is required: multiply the number of registered voters in Digos City by three pesos (P3.00). The product must then be parried with the amount actually spent by [Peñas]. If the amount spent was greater than the product, then there is probable cause to charge [Peñas] with election overspending, subject to any valid defense which [Peñas] may raise in his counter-affidavit.[52]
To recall, the COMELEC, as represented by the CFU, initiated the filing of a complaint against Ecleo in 2014. However, it was only in 2021 that the COMELEC issued a Resolution directing the Law Department to file the appropriate Information against Ecleo for violation of the Omnibus Election Code, in flagrant violation of its own internal rules of procedure.
x x x x
In stark contrast to its self-prescribed timelines, the COMELEC took seven long years to determine probable cause on the part of Ecleo for violation of an election offense. Much had already transpired in the span of time between the filing of the complaint and the issuance of the assailed Resolution. Not only did Ecleo complete her term as Governor of Dinagat Islands, she had even been re-elected to the same post and had already completed her second term. Yet, preliminary investigation for an election-related charge filed during her first term was still ongoing.
The Supreme Court ruling in Peñas v. COMELEC (Peñas) squarely applies in this case. There, the Court held that there was inordinate delay on the part of the COMELEC for issuing a Resolution directing that an Information be filed against Mayor Peñas, more than six years after the filing of a complaint for violation of Section 100, in relation to Section 262, of the Omnibus Election Code. the very same violation for which Ecleo is presently charged.
Moreover, the ruling in Peñas provided that the issue of whether there was election overspending was not complex nor intricate, as it can be solved by a "simple mathematical equation." The Court elaborated:
Petitioner's case did not at all involve complex or intricate issues which require voluminous records or evidence. The lone issue needed to be resolved was whether petitioner went beyond the prescribed campaign expenditure limit. To determine if there had indeed been an excess, a simple mathematical equation is all that is required: multiply the number of registered voters in Digos City by three pesos (P3.00). The product must then be parried with the amount actually spent by petitioner. If the amount spent was greater than the product, then there is probable cause to charge petitioner with election overspending, subject to any valid defense which petitioner may raise in his counter-affidavit.[53]
Finally. Petitioner cannot be deemed to have waived his right to a speedy disposition of his case and against inordinate delay.In the absence of any explanation or justification for the eleven-year pendency of Villanueva's case, we must resort to the COMELEC's own procedural rules. Rule 34, Section 8 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure states in part:
xxxx
x x x [T]he Court cannot fault petitioner herein for only invoking his right to a speedy disposition of his case in the present petition. As held, a respondent in a criminal prosecution or investigation is not duty bound to follow up on his or her case; it is the governing agency that is tasked to promptly resolve it. As held in Cervantes v. Sandiganbayan,"[i]t is the duty of the prosecutor to speedily resolve the complaint, as mandated by the Constitution, regardless of whether the petitioner did not object to the delay or that the delay was with his acquiescence provided that it was not due to causes directly attributable to him."
Further, the Court observes that similar to the Rules of Procedure before the Ombudsman, [Section 1 (a), Rule 13] of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure likewise prohibits the filing of motions to dismiss.xx x
x x x x
In other words, there is also no legitimate avenue to invoke one's right to a speedy disposition of his case before the COMELEC. Petitioner's failure to do so should not therefore be taken against him.
At any rate, petitioner timely asserted his right to a speedy disposition of his case since he filed this petition immediately after the COMELEC directed the filing of an information against him. As held in Javier [v. Sandiganbayan ], it is sufficient that the right is asserted before entering a plea during arraignment.[60]
Section 8. Duty of Investigating Officer. - The preliminary investigation must be terminated within twenty (20) days after receipt of the counter affidavits and other evidence of the respondents, and resolution thereof shall be made within five (5) days thereafter.We reiterate that the COMELEC took eleven (11) years just to find probable cause against Villanueva, in flagrant contravention of its own procedural timelines, without providing even an iota of justification for the delay, and thereby violating Villanueva's right to the speedy disposition of her case. We therefore rule that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed resolutions in E.O. Case No. 11-092.