325 Phil. 1069
PANGANIBAN, J.:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered for the PLAINTIFF. The defendant and all persons claiming under him are hereby -On the appeal of petitioner, a decision[6] dated September 2, 1994 was issued by the Regional Trial Court of Manila,[7] Branch 40, affirming the lower court, except as to the amount of monthly rental, which was reduced, thusly:
(a) ORDERED to VACATE the premises commonly known as 2044 Velasquez Street, Tondo, Manila and surrender its possession to the plaintiff;
(b) ORDERED to PAY the plaintiff, the following amounts:
1. P640,000.00 as unpaid rent from October 1982 to August 1991 inclusive;
2. P27,000.00 per month from September 1991 and every month thereafter until the premises is completely vacated, as fair rental value for the use and occupancy thereof;
3. P10,000.00 for and as attorney’s fees; and,
4. The costs of suit."
"From the foregoing, the judgment of the lower court is hereby modified as follows:Thereafter, petitioners filed on April 18, 1995 (which is way beyond the 15-day reglementary period for petitions for review) in the respondent appellate court a "Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus" docketed as CA-G.R. No. 37033. Subsequent to the filing of the petition, counsel for petitioner filed a "Motion for Substitution of Heirs," petitioner Ongsitco having died on April 14, 1995. In its comment before the respondent Court, private respondent "submitted that while the petition itself is dated April 10, 1995, the Certification of the supposed affiant (petitioner in this case) and the subscription (sic) thereof appears to be dated April 18, 1995 or four days after the petitioner Marcelo Ongsitco died/passed away."[8]
"Defendant Marcelo L. Ongsitco and all persons claiming under him are hereby;
a. ordered to vacate the premises commonly known as 2044 Velasquez St., Tondo, Manila, and surrender his possession to the plaintiff;
b. ordered to pay the plaintiff the following amounts:
(1) P640,000.00 as rentals from October 1982
to August 1991;
(2) to pay monthly rental of P6,000.00 thereafter until the premises is completely vacated;
(3) P10,000.00 for and as attorney’s fees; and
(4) the costs of this suit."
"IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition at bench is DENIED DUE COURSE and is ordered dismissed."respondent Court held (1) that with the death of Ongsitco, "the lease in his favor is legally terminated and his heirs do not have any colorable right to occupy the apartment thereafter"; and (2) the RTC decision has become final since no appeal was taken by petitioner and "certiorari will not lie as a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal."
"Respondent Court of Appeals erred in not applying to the case at bar but instead misappreciated the doctrine enunciated in Fausta Dimaculangan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (170 SCRA 393) when it held that with the death of lessee Marcelo L. Ongsitco, the lease becomes legally terminated and his heirs do not have any colorable right to occupy the leased premises, considering that the doctrine held in said case is that a leasehold right is clearly inheritable.In its Comment, United traversed all the above alleged "errors."
"In holding that certiorari cannot be taken as a substitute for a lost appeal, respondent Court of Appeals erred in refusing to apply the exceptions to the said rule which are applicable to this case and considering the environmental circumstances of the case.
"Respondent Court of Appeals erred in holding that the gross negligence of petitioner Ongsitco’s former counsel in pursuing the wrong mode of appeal which prevented him from recovering the substantial, valuable improvements worth P5 Million does not fall under the exceptions to the general rule.
"Respondent Court of Appeals erred in holding that the deceased Marcelo L. Ongsitco was not entitled to recover the P5 Million expense incurred by the deceased petitioner Marcelo Ongsitco for the substantial and valuable improvements he introduced on the leased premises in good faith, the non-recovery of which would amount to unjust enrichment on the part of the private respondent corporation."
Did the respondent Court commit a reversible error in dismissing the petition on the ground that "certiorari will not lie as a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal"?The other alleged "errors" attributed by petitioner against the Court of Appeals, particularly the effect of the "gross negligence of petitioner Ongsitco’s former counsel," the claim for recovery of P5 Million worth of improvements and the transmissibility of leasehold rights will be taken up in connection with the disposition of said main issue.
"Moreover, this petition virtually seeks to review the modified decision rendered by the respondent court in Civil Case No. 94-69374 dated September 2, 1994 (Annex B, Petition) by reinstating the wrong mode of appeal taken by the petitioner in the said case. Apparently, said decision had already attained finality as a result of the mistake committed in taking the proper appeal. Under the pretext of a certiorari proceeding against the order remanding the case to the Metropolitan Trial Court for possible execution, petitioner hopes to attain what could no longer be achieved because of a lost appeal. Well entrenched is the rule that a client is bound by the negligence and mistake of his counsel (Ilasco, Jr. vs. CA, 228 SCRA 413 [1993]) who is duty bound by law to follow scrupulously the requisites for appeal prescribed by law, ever aware that any error or imprecision in compliance may as well be fatal to his client’s cause (Supreme Court Circular No. 2-90). In effect, a wrong or inappropriate mode of appeal is inefficacious and should be dismissed (Circular No. 2-90, supra).We agree with the above holding. Countless times in the past, this Court has held that "where appeal is the proper remedy, certiorari will not lie.10 The writs of certiorari and prohibition are remedies to correct lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion equivalent to lack of jurisdiction committed by a lower court."[11] "Where the proper remedy is appeal, the action for certiorari will not be entertained. x x x Certiorari is not a remedy for errors of judgment. Errors of judgment are correctible by appeal, errors of jurisdiction are reviewable by certiorari."[12]
"As a logical consequence, petitioner cannot seek refuge in this proceeding because of the time-honored jurisprudential doctrine that certiorari will not lie as a substitute for the lost remedy (of) appeal (Sy vs. Romero, 214 SCRA 187; Salas vs. Castro, 216 SCRA 198; Antonio vs. IAC, 216 SCRA 214 [1992])."
"The lower court’s decision stated that petitioner was unable to establish that he introduced the claimed improvement. But, granting for argument’s sake, that he really did, he will not be entitled for the reimbursements thereof simply because he is merely a lessee of the land and as such, is not a builder/possessor in good faith.Substantially, there is no error in the foregoing holding. A lessee cannot be considered as a builder in good faith because he knows or should know he is not the owner of the property where he builds.