555 Phil. 235
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
The terms of the aforestated lease contract also implied that it was the petitioner and her relatives, and not the respondent, who were in actual possession of the subject land, with the knowledge, or even the implied consent, of the respondent:[7]
- That the LESSEE hereby undertakes to take care of the leased premises or coconuts with the deligence (sic) of a good father of the family, to fertilize the same if and when necessary, to apply proper insecticides or fungicides for proper pest and disease control and to replace old or worn out trees with new plantings of coconuts.
During the proceedings before the PARAD, petitioner formally offered evidence consisting of several receipts from 1965 to 1989 issued by respondent indicating that the payments were for "lot rentals." Only two receipts show that the payment was made for the lease of coconuts.[8] Petitioner also presented before the DARAB a Certification[9] by the Local Assessment Operations Officer, dated 17 January 1992, stating that the subject land was classified as "cocoland," and, therefore, agricultural in nature.
- That the LESSEE admits having allowed, without permission from the LESSOR, her relatives (namely, spouses Romeo and Betty Sobigon and Spouses Juan and Nora Recodo, Jr.) to construct their houses on Lot No. 614-A, Bacolod Cadestre, and binds and obliges herself on her coconut (sic) to cause their ejectment upon demand at any time by the LESSOR; and the LESSEE further binds and obliges herself not to allow any other person or persons to construct any structure or house in any portion of the lease premises and to report immediately to the LESSOR any attempt or attempts of construction. (Emphasis provided.)
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the respondent and against the petitioner, to wit:On appeal, the DARAB, in its Decision dated 11 July 1997, reversed the PARAD Decision. It pronounced that the subject land was agricultural in nature as evidenced by the Certification issued by the Local Assessment Operations Officer, stating that the same was officially classified as "cocoland." It further declared that the written contract of lease, dated 21 August 1984, is not reflective of the true intent of the parties. Even though the contract stipulated that only the coconut trees were covered, the DARAB resolved that petitioner was in actual possession of the land and cultivated the same.[16] In its Decision, dated 11 July 1997, the DARAB decreed that:No pronouncement as to cost.[15]
- Ordering the ejectment of petitioner from Lot No. 641-A, covered by TCT No.-27970, situated at Punta-Taytay, Bacolod City and deliver possession thereof to the respondent;
- Ordering petitioner to pay respondent the amount of
P5,000.00 as attorney's fees.
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new one is entered as follows:Respondent then filed a Petition for Certiorari under Section 43 of the 1997 Rules of Court before the Court of Appeals, which, in a Decision dated 12 April 2002, reversed the DARAB Decision. It determined that the lease of the 300 coconut trees was a contract of lease of things, not an agricultural lease which guaranteed the petitioner security of tenure.[18] The dispositive part of the appellate court's Decision reads:
- Declaring petitioner Dolores Granada the agricultural lessee of the subject landholding;
- Directing the party litigants to reduce their tenancy relation into a written agricultural leasehold contract before the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) of Bacolod City taking into consideration the pertinent provisions of Section 34 of R.A. 3844, as amended, in relation to Section 12 of R.A. No. 6657 and pertinent rules and regulations thereon.[17]
WHEREFORE, finding merit in the appeal, the Court renders judgment REVERSING the appealed Decision and UPHOLDING the Decision of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator with the modification that the contract between petitioner and respondent was one of contract of lease of things.[19]Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was subsequently denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated 4 July 2002.[20]
The petition is meritorious.I
THE ALLEGED CONTRACT OF LEASE DATED SEPTEMBER 29, 1965, RELIED UPON BY THE HONORALBE COURT OF APPEALS WAS NEVER PRESENTED AND OFFERED AS EVIDENCE IN THE ENTIRE PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE PROVINCIAL AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL (PARAD) AND BEFORE THE DEPARTMENT AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD (DARAB). SAID ALLEGED CONTRACT OF LEASE DATED SEPTEMBER 29, 1965, WAS BROUGHT FORTH BY THE RESPONDENT ONLY FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL;II
THE PETITIONER SUCCEEDED AS AGRICULTURAL LESSEE OF THE SUBJECT PARCEL OF LAND AFTER THE DEATH OF HER FATHER IN 1981. SUCH SUCCESSION AS AGRICULTURAL LESSEE COVERS BOTH THE LAND AND THE STANDING COCONUT TREES; ANDIII
THE FINDINGS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD (DARAB) THAT THE CONTRACT OF LEASE DID NOT REFLECT THE TRUE INTENTION OF THE PARTIES ARE SUPPORTED BY FACTS AND EVIDENCE.
Section 3. Agricultural Tenancy Defined.— Agricultural tenancy is the physical possession by a person of land devoted to agriculture belonging to, or legally possessed by, another for the purpose of production through the labor of the former and of the members of his immediate farm household, in consideration of which the former agrees to share the harvest with the latter, or to pay a price certain or ascertainable, either in produce or in money, or in both.In a line of cases, this Court specified the essential requisites of an agricultural tenancy relationship as follows: (1) The parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; (2) The subject matter of the relationship is agricultural land; (3) There is consent between the parties to the relationship; (4) The purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; (5) There is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and (6) The harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee.[23]
Sec. 166. Definition of Terms. —Based on the aforequoted definition for the petitioner to qualify as an agricultural lessee, it is required that she should cultivate the land with the consent of the landowner. In Coconut Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. (COCOMA) v. Court of Appeals,[24] citing Guerrero v. Court of Appeals,[25] this Court specified the activities which are considered as "cultivation" of coconut lands.
x x x x
(2) "Agricultural lessee" means a person who, by himself and with the aid available from within his immediate farm household, cultivates the land belonging to, or possessed by, another with the latter's consent for purposes of production, for a price certain in money or in produce or both. It is distinguished from civil law lessee as understood in the Civil Code of the Philippines.
The definition of cultivation is not limited merely to the tilling, plowing or harrowing of the land. It includes the promotion of growth and the care of the plants, or husbanding the ground to forward the products of the earth by general industry. The raising of coconuts is a unique agricultural enterprise. Unlike rice, the planting of coconut seedlings does not need harrowing or plowing. Holes are merely dug on the ground of sufficient depth and distance, the seedlings placed in the holes and the surface thereof covered by soil. Some coconut trees are planted only every thirty to a hundred years. The major work in raising coconuts begins when the coconut trees are already fruit bearing. Then it is cultivated by smudging or smoking the plantation, taking care of the coconut trees, applying fertilizer, weeding and watering, thereby increasing the produce. x x x.It is undisputable that the petitioner cultivated the land with the consent of the respondent. The Contract of Lease, dated 21 August 1984, executed by both parties, unequivocally stipulated that the petitioner perform the same acts of cultivation that were particularly described in the aforecited case. Under Section 3 of the aforementioned Contract of Lease, the petitioner was required to undertake the following activities:
Respondent admits that the Contract of Lease dated 21 August 1984, which covered the period from 1983 to 1984, was orally renewed until 1989, which means that for no less than six years, petitioner had cultivated the subject property.
- That the LESSEE hereby undertakes to take care of the leased premises or coconuts with the deligence (sic) of a good father of the family, to fertilize the same if and when necessary, to apply proper insecticides or fungicides for proper pest and disease control and to replace old or worn out trees with new plantings of coconuts.[26]
Section 4. Systems of Agricultural Tenancy. — x x x.Evidently, the law does not stipulate that the sharing of harvest be limited to a sharing of the crops, or that the amount be set based on the abundance of the harvest. A fixed amount of money, such as the
x x x x
Leasehold tenancy exists when a person who, either personally or with the aid of labor available from members of his immediate farm household, undertakes to cultivate a piece of agricultural land susceptible of cultivation by a single person together with members of his immediate farm household, belonging to or legally possessed by, another in consideration of a price certain or ascertainable to be paid by the person cultivating the land either in percentage of the production or in a fixed amount in money, or in both. (Emphasis provided.)
Respondent's claim is unjustified. An agricultural leasehold relation is not determined by the explicit provisions of written contract alone. Section 5 of Republic Act No. 3844 recognizes that an agricultural leasehold relation may exist by virtue of an implied agreement:
- That this lease shall cover only the growing coconut trees in the abovementioned parcel of land.
Section 5. Establishment of Agricultural Leasehold Relation. - The agricultural leasehold relation shall be established by operation of law in accordance with Section Four of this Code and, in other cases, either orally or in writing, expressly or impliedly.In stipulating that such relation may exist by implied agreement, the law seeks to prevent the invalidation by unscrupulous landowners of the right of security of tenure granted to agricultural lessees. If agrarian relations were determined only by the explicit provisions of written agreement, poor and unlettered farmers, who have toiled over the land, could easily be misled or pressured into signing away their rights, which have long been guaranteed by law.
Section 7. Tenure of Agricultural Leasehold Relation. - The agricultural leasehold relation once established shall confer upon the agricultural lessee the right to continue working on the landholding until such leasehold relation is extinguished. The agricultural lessee shall be entitled to security of tenure on his landholding and cannot be ejected therefrom unless authorized by the Court for causes herein provided.As in this case, the Contract of Lease dated 21 August 1984 required the petitioner to perform the grueling duties required of an agricultural lessee, but refused to grant her the consequent right to security of tenure. This Court shall not tolerate this unjust, unlawful, and most certainly undeserved double standard against agricultural tenants.
Article 1370. If the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations shall control.The charade that the lease contract of 21 August 1984 covered only the coconut trees and not the subject property wore thin after the petitioner presented before the PARAD receipts issued by the respondent from 1965 to 1989, which state that the payments were for "lot rental." In fact, only two receipts issued within this period indicated that the payments were made in connection with the rent for the coconut trees.
If the words appear to be contrary to the evident intention of the parties, the latter shall prevail over the former.
Article 1371. In order to judge the intention of the contracting parties, their contemporaneous and subsequent acts shall be principally considered.
While the aforequoted provision states that the petitioner's relatives occupied the subject land without the permission of the respondent, it also obliged the petitioner to cause their ejectment upon the respondent's demand. This means that before the respondent's demand to vacate, petitioner's relatives were permitted to stay. Had the petitioner been leasing the coconut trees only, there was no reason for the respondent, a stranger to the petitioner's relatives, to tolerate their occupancy of the subject property. Respondent could have easily initiated proceedings for the ejectment of petitioner's relatives. Conversely, respondent's implicit consent to let the petitioner's relatives stay on the subject property supports the petitioner's assertion that she and her relatives had cultivated the land with the permission of the respondent, which in turn, received its share of the agricultural produce through the rent paid by petitioner.
- That the LESSEE admits having allowed, without permission from the LESSOR, her relatives (namely, spouses Romeo and Betty Sobigon and spouses Juan and Nora Recodo, Jr.) to construct their houses on Lot No. 614-A, Bacolod Cadestre, and binds and obliges herself on her coconut (sic) to cause their ejectment upon demand at any time by the LESSOR; and the LESSEE further binds and obliges herself not to allow any other person or persons to construct any structure or house in any portion of the lease premises and to report immediately to the LESSOR any attempt or attempts of construction.
The said parcel of land was formerly owned by Augusto Villarosa, who leased the same to Alfredo Granada, father of the petitioner, under an oral contract as far back as 1950, on a yearly basis with the rentals, in terms of money. To make use of the property and to be able to pay the rentals, the lessee planted the landholding to coconuts and some fruit trees. The same was then purchased by respondent, BORMAHECO, present owner, but remained leased to the lessee until his death, sometime in 1982. Thereafter, the petitioner entered into a contract of lease with the respondent, covering only the growing coconut trees in the aforesaid parcel of land for the duration of one (1) year, beginning October 1, 1983 to October 1, 1984, x x x.The aforequoted portion of the PARAD Decision rendered in favor of the respondent clearly states that before the death of Alfredo Granada, the lease agreement was between respondent and Alfredo Granada, not the petitioner. Moreover, there was no mention of the lease contract of 29 September 1965 during the proceedings before the PARAD and the DARAB.