602 Phil. 84
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered denying Petitioner Jose S. Santos' Petition to be allowed to retire under the pension plan under RA 660, and modifying the Resolution of the Government Service Insurance System's Committee on Claims Settlement adopted in its Committee Meeting No. 158 held on September 23, 1996, insofar as it limits Petitioner's mode of retirement to that provided in RA 8291. The Operating Unit concerned is ordered to process Petitioner's retirement effective March 21, 2000 under the gratuity retirement of RA 1616 or the pension retirement under RA 8291 after he formally indicates which mode he would like to avail of.In the meantime, on March 20, 2000, petitioner was compulsorily retired for reaching the age of sixty-five.
SO ORDERED.
This Court is of the belief, however, that the focal issue raised herein, i.e., whether or not the petitioner can choose to retire under either Republic Act 8291 or Republic Act 660, is a pure question of law. As such, this Court is not vested with jurisdiction to take cognizance of this case since there is no dispute with respect to the fact that when an appeal raised only pure question of law, it is only the Supreme Court which has jurisdiction to entertain the same (Article VIII, Section 5 (2) (e), 1987 Constitution; Rule 45, Rules of Court; see also Santos, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, 152 SCRA [1987]).Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the CA denied the same in its Resolution dated April 22, 2003.xxx xxx xxx
As can be seen from both parties['] arguments, the instant case calls for the determination of what the law is on the particular situation of herein petitioner, i.e., whether RA 660 is applicable in his case or only that of RA 8291, or both. Such question does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties because there is no dispute as to the truth or falsity of the facts obtaining in the case.
Hence, the procedure adopted by the petitioner in this case is improper. The proper procedure that should have been followed was to file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court within 15 days from notice of judgment pointing out errors of law that will warrant a reversal or modification of the decision or judgment sought to be reviewed.xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction. (emphasis ours)
Petitioner avers that the CA erred in dismissing his petition which raised both questions of law and fact which are well within its jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. According to petitioner the petition raised factual issues which necessitated the review of the records of the re-employed retirees who were allowed by the GSIS to retire under the law of their choice. Petitioner further avers that even if CA-G.R. SP No. 65163 raises only questions of law, the same is still within the jurisdiction of the CA pursuant to Section 31 of Republic Act No. 8291, which provides that appeals from any decision or award by the Board of Trustees shall be governed by Rules 43 and 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
- The Honorable Court of Appeals committed an error of law in holding that CA-G.R. SP No. 65163 entitled Jose S. Santos vs. Committee on Claims Settlement, GSIS raises only questions of law, hence the proper remedy for petitioner is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45;
- The Honorable Court of Appeals committed an error in not giving due course to the petition as it raises questions of law only; a reading thereof shows that factual issues are raised therein. The said dismissal left unresolved the questions of law and facts raised in CA-G.R. SP No. 65163;
- The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not reversing the decision of the GSIS of February 15, 2000, it being contrary to law.
- The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in dismissing CA-G.R. SP No. 65163, allegedly for lack of jurisdiction.
Section 1. Scope. - This Rule shall apply to appeals from judgments or final orders of the Court of Tax Appeals and from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. Among these agencies are the Civil Service Commission, Central Board of Assessment Appeals, Securities and Exchange Commission, Office of the President, Land Registration Authority, Social Security Commission, Civil Aeronautics Board, Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer, National Electrification Administration, Energy Regulatory Board, National Telecommunications Commission, Department of Agrarian Reform under Republic Act 6657, Government Service Insurance System, Employees Compensation Commission, Agricultural Inventions Board, Insurance Commission, Philippine Atomic Energy Commission, Board of Investments, Construction Industry Arbitration Commission, and voluntary arbitrators authorized by law.In Posadas-Moya and Associates Construction Co., Inc. v. Greenfield Development Corporation, et al.,[9] the Court distinguished a question of law from one of fact, thus:x x x
Section 3. Where to appeal. - An appeal under this Rule may be taken to the Court of Appeals within the period and in the manner herein provided, whether the appeal involves questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law. (emphasis ours)
A question of law exists when there is doubt or controversy on what the law is on a certain state of facts. There is a question of fact when the doubt or difference arises from the truth or the falsity of the allegations of facts.Thus, the question on whether petitioner can retire under RA 660 or RA 8291 is undoubtedly a question of law because it centers on what law to apply in his case considering that he has previously retired from the government under a particular statute and that he was re-employed by the government. These facts are admitted and there is no need for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented.
Explained the Court:"A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct application of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted. A question of fact exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the query invites calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of the witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances as well as their relation to each other and to the whole, and the probability of the situation."
According to Section 3 of Rule 43, "[a]n appeal under this Rule may be taken to the Court of Appeals within the period and in the manner herein provided whether the appeal involves questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law." Hence, appeals from quasi-judicial agencies even only on questions of law may be brought to the CA. (emphasis ours)However, a remand of the case to the CA would serve no useful purpose, since the core issue in this case, i.e., under which law petitioner can retire, can already be resolved based on the records of the proceedings before the GSIS. A remand would unnecessarily impose on the parties the concomitant difficulties and expenses of another proceeding where they would have to present the same evidence and arguments again. This clearly runs counter to the Rules of Court, which mandates liberal construction of the Rules to attain just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of any action or proceeding.[13]
(c) Employees who were in the government service at the time of the effectivity of Presidential Decree No. 1146 shall, at the time of their retirement, have the option to retire under said Decree or under Commonwealth Act No. 186, as previously amended.On August 28, 1980, the GSIS Board of Trustees, in Board Resolution No. 583-80, adopted the following amendment to Section 11 (c), Rule IV of the Implementing Rules for PD 1146, upon the recommendation of the Committee on Gray Areas:
(c) Employees who were in the government service at the time of the effectivity of PD 1146 shall at the time of their retirement have the option to retire under said Decree or under CA 186 as previously amended Provided, that in the event the member is reinstated in the service after having exercised the option to retire under RA 1616 he shall subsequently be retireable under PD 1146 only.On July 19, 1985, P.D. No. 1981 was promulgated amending Section 13 of PD 1146 as follows:
Sec. 13. Retirement Option. - Employees who are in the government service upon the effectivity of this Act shall, at the time of their retirement, have the option to retire under this Act or under Commonwealth Act No. 186, as amended, and their benefits and entitlement thereto shall be determined in accordance with the provisions of the law so opted: Provided, however, That in the event of re-employment, the employee's subsequent retirement shall be governed by the provisions of this Act: Provided further, That the member may change the mode of his retirement within one year from the date of his retirement in accordance with such rules and regulations as may be prescribed by the System. x x x (emphasis ours)Clearly, the option to retire is preserved under PD 1146 for those who were in the government service upon its effectivity in view of the rule on non-impairment of benefits. There is an apparent gray area when an employee who was in the government service upon the effectivity PD 1146 but opted to retire under one of the previous retirement laws. Once reinstated, are they still entitled, upon reinstatement, to exercise the option to again retire under the old law?
One of the purposes for the passage of P.D. 1981 is to clarify the parties to whom the retirement option in Section 13 of P.D. 1146 is available, thus:Further, this Court notes that when petitioner formally applied for retirement in 1998 R.A. 8291 which amended P.D. 1146 was already in force and it was indubitably the law applicable to his second retirement. In contrast, the examples of subsequent retirements of re-employed government employees cited by petitioner were all prior to the effectivity of R.A. 8291.WHEREAS, there have been conflicting interpretations of certain provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1146, particularly as for whether or not elective public officials are covered by the GSIS for the duration of their term of office; whether or not a public officer or employee who is separated for cause or considered resigned automatically forfeits his retirement benefits; and whether or not public officers and employees in the government service at the time Presidential Decree No. 1146 took effect have the option of retiring under the said Decree or Commonwealth Act No. 186, as amended:With this legislative purpose in mind, the amendment of Section 13 of P.D. 1981, to include a proviso that in the event of re-employment of a member his subsequent retirement shall be governed by P.D. 1146, shows the clear legislative intent to withhold the availability of retirement option from those who have been re-employed and are retiring for the second time. If the intent was otherwise, then the said proviso should have also expressly stated so and/or said proviso should not have been included at all.
WHEREAS, conflicting claims for benefits have invariably been filed under the different laws administered by the GSIS, which have oftentimes resulted in unnecessary litigation, delay and inconvenience on the part of the rightful claimants.x x x
WHEREAS, it has thus become necessary to amend Presidential Decree No. 1146 to clarify some of its provisions to make it more responsive to the needs of the members of the GSIS and to assure the actuarial solvency of the Funds administered by the GSIS during these times of grave economic crisis affecting the country. (Underscoring ours)
Thus, the last proviso in Section 13 of P.D. 1146, as amended, granting the right to change the mode of retirement within one year, may not be considered as referring to the immediately preceding section, which is the proviso stating that subsequent retirements shall be governed by P.D. 1146. Such interpretation would only render both provisos inconsistent and conflicting with one another and effectively meaningless because even if the first proviso removes the option, the second proviso prescribes the period by which the option may be exercised. It has been held that statutes must be interpreted in such a way as to give a sensible meaning to the language of the statutes and thus avoid non-sensical or absurd results (People vs. Duque, 212 SCRA 607; Automatic Parts and Equipment vs. Lingad, 30 SCRA 247, as cited in Agpalo, op. Cit., pp. 114-115). Thus, a better and more sensible interpretation of Section 13 of P.D. 1146 as amended is that the last proviso refers to the first part of the section which states to whom the option is given. In other words, government employees who are in the service at the time of the effectivity of P.D. 1146 have the option to retire under CA 186 or P.D. 1146 and if said option is exercised, they may change the mode of retirement chosen or opted within one year from date of retirement. Once the retired employees are however re-employed, they shall subsequently retire only under P.D. 1146.
SEC. 3. Repealing Clause. - All laws and any other law or parts of law specifically inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed or modified accordingly: Provided, That the rights under the existing laws, rules and regulations vested upon or acquired by an employee who is already in the service as of the effectivity of this Act shall remain in force and effect: Provided, further, That subsequent to the effectivity of this Act, a new employee or an employee who has previously retired or separated and is reemployed in the service shall be covered by the provisions of this Act. (emphasis ours)In addition, Section 10 (b) of P.D. 1146, as amended by R.A. 8291, states:
(b) All service credited for retirement, resignation or separation for which corresponding benefits have been awarded under this Act or other laws shall be excluded in the computation of service in case of reinstatement in the service of an employer and subsequent retirement or separation which is compensable under this Act.As such, we find nothing objectionable in the following provisions of the GSIS' the Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. 8291 which provides:
Section 8.6. Effect of Re-employment. - When a retiree is re-employed, his/her previous services credited at the time of his/her retirement shall be excluded in the computation of future benefits. In effect, he/she shall be considered a new entrant. (emphasis ours)Additionally, Section 5.2 of the same implementing rules states that all service credited for retirement, resignation or separation for which corresponding benefits have been awarded shall be excluded in the computation of service in case of re-employment.