350 Phil. 245
ROMERO, J.:
Petitioner seeks
the reversal, in this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court, of the February 16, 1995 resolution of the National Labor Relations
Commission, ordering it to pay private respondent Inocencio Praxides separation
pay equivalent to one month pay for every year of service.
The facts, as
culled from the records, are as follows:
Inocencio
Praxides was employed by the Iriga Telephone Company (hereafter ITELCO) as a
collector-technician in 1974. On March 21, 1989, Praxides complained to Sylvia
Abella, secretary to the ITELCO president, that the entries on his BIR Form
1701-B[1] were incorrect, the amount of
salaries and bonuses reflected therein being larger than what he had actually
received in 1988. The latter told him
to report the matter to Atty. Santiago Ortega, ITELCO’s president and general
manager. On April 1, 1989, ITELCO’s
telephone operator handed Praxides a note from Atty. Ortega, directing him to
confer with the latter at his office at 4 o’clock of the same day. At the conference, Atty. Ortega and Praxides
discussed the latter’s complaints, including that which pertained to the
disparity between his salary increase and the increase of his junior
co-employees. Sensing that Atty. Ortega
was losing his temper, Praxides prepared to leave. He was prevented from doing so, however, as Atty. Ortega, after calling
in a security guard, closed the door of the office. The former then kicked Praxides, all the while subjecting him to
verbal abuse. Ortega then told Praxides that he was being terminated due to his
propensity to complain, after which he was ordered to leave.
Praxides went to
the Iriga Police Station to report the incident between him and Atty. Ortega
before proceeding to the St. Jude Hospital for treatment. Later, he filed a criminal complaint against Atty. Ortega, who was, however,
acquitted of the charge due to insufficiency of evidence.
On April 3,
1989, Praxides sent a letter to Atty. Ortega, claiming that he “cannot yet
report for work until our differences is (sic) resolved for fear of repetition
of said incident or further maltreatment from you.”[2] In a letter dated April 11, 1989,
Atty. Ortega, declaring that Praxides was out of his mind, denied the
occurrence of the incident and stated that the latter was considered absent
without leave due to his failure to report for work from April 2 up to that
time.
On April 17,
1989, Praxides filed a complaint before the NLRC Sub-Regional Arbitration
Branch V–Naga City, docketed as Sub-RAB-V Case No. 04-00112-89, for unfair
labor practice, underpayment, premium pay for holiday and rest day, and damages
against ITELCO. The case was assigned
to Labor Arbiter Dominador B. Medroso, Jr. On April 28, 1989, the complaint was amended to include charges of
illegal dismissal and claims for separation pay and reinstatement.
The hearing of
the case was repeatedly reset, from May 17, 1989 to June 27, 1989, to July 20,
1989, then to September 19, 1989. On aforesaid date, ITELCO moved to postpone
the hearing, which was granted by the labor arbiter. Hearing was, thus, reset to October 10, 1989, then to October 24,
1989. Again, at the scheduled hearing
of January 21, 1990, ITELCO moved to postpone the same. The labor arbiter reset the same to March 1,
1990, but noting the repeated postponements of the case, warned that no further
motions for postponement would be entertained. Notwithstanding the same, ITELCO again sought to postpone the
hearing. The labor arbiter, thus,
denied the same and deemed the case submitted for decision.
On February 2,
1993, after the parties had submitted their respective position papers, memoranda,
and other pleadings, the labor arbiter rendered a decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the complaint for illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice for lack of merit. However, respondent is ordered to reinstate complainant to its (sic) former position without loss of seniority rights and without backwages immediately upon receipt of this Decision and submit proof of this Order within five (5) days from receipt hereof. If reinstatement is no longer feasible, respondent is ordered to pay complainant separation pay equivalent to ½ month pay for every year of service and to pay complainant his labor standard benefits (money claim from November 16, 1989 to April 1, 1989) or a total of P15,782.00.
x x x x x
x x x
x
All other claims are dismissed for lack of legal and factual basis.
SO ORDERED.[3]
Both parties
appealed to the NLRC, which, in a resolution dated August 16, 1994, affirmed
the decision of the labor arbiter with modification by increasing the award of
separation pay to one month pay for every year of service. Its motion for reconsideration of said
resolution having been denied by the NLRC in its resolution of February 16,
1995, ITELCO elevated its case to this Court, raising the following issues:
1. WHETHER
OR NOT RESPONDENT NLRC IN AFFIRMING THE LABOR ARBITER’S ACTION OF DECIDING THE
CASE WITHOUT HEARING DESPITE THE INSISTENCE TO THE CONTRARY BY IRIGA TELEPHONE
COMPANY, INC. AND DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF AN ORDER STATING THAT THE LABOR
ARBITER HAS FOUND NO NECESSITY OF FURTHER HEARING, INFORMING THE PARTIES
THEREOF AND STATING THE REASONS THEREFOR, ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION;
2. WHETHER
OR NOT RESPONDENT NLRC, IN ARBITRARILY AND WITHOUT ANY REASON INCREASING THE
AWARD OF SEPARATION PAY FROM ½ MONTH TO ONE MONTH SALARY FOR EVERY YEAR OF
SERVICE, DESPITE THE FINDING THAT PRAXIDES WENT ON AWOL, ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION.
The petition
lacks merit.
As regards the
first issue, ITELCO alleges that the last day for hearing, March 1, 1990, was
set by the labor arbiter himself, without the participation of Atty. Nagrampa,
ITELCO’s counsel. As the latter had
other pressing engagements on that date, he met with Praxides’ lawyer, Atty.
Raquel S. Payte, to have the same reset to March 16, 1990. Atty. Payte agreed, prompting Atty. Nagrampa
to file the requisite motion for postponement. ITELCO now claims that opposing
counsel reneged on their agreement by moving that the case be deemed submitted
for decision on March 1, 1990, while Atty. Nagrampa was absent. The labor arbiter ruled favorably on said
motion, prompting ITELCO to claim that it was precluded from adducing further
evidence in its favor.
ITELCO
conveniently forgets that the instant case has been repeatedly reset due to its
numerous postponements and failure to appear; that it filed an urgent motion to
postpone the January 21, 1990, hearing, citing counsel’s pressing engagements;
that the same was acted upon favorably by the labor arbiter, who reset the
hearing to March 1, 1990, with a note that no further motions for postponement
would be entertained. Despite the
warning of the labor arbiter, however, ITELCO again sought to postpone the
case. ITELCO only has its counsel to
blame if its motion was denied by the labor arbiter who deemed the case
submitted for decision on the basis of position papers, memoranda, and other
pleadings relevant to the case. A
lawyer should not assume that his motion for postponement will be granted even
if it bears the conformity of the other party, as the court is not bound
thereby.[4] The NLRC, thus, cannot be
considered to have acted with grave abuse of discretion when it affirmed the
labor arbiter’s act of deciding the case without hearing.
Moreover, the
holding of a trial is discretionary on the labor arbiter and cannot be demanded
as a matter of right by the parties.[5] Section 4, Rule V of the New Rules
of Procedure of the NLRC grants an arbiter wide latitude to determine, after
the submission by the parties of their position papers/memoranda, whether there
is need for a formal trial or hearing. ITELCO’s insistence on a formal hearing is not in consonance with the need
for speedy disposition of labor cases, for the parties may then willfully
withhold their evidence and disclose the same only during the formal hearing,
thus, creating surprises which would merely complicate the issues and prolong
the trial. There is a dire need to
lessen technicalities in the process of settling labor disputes.[6] This Court, thus, fails to see how
the failure of the arbiter to conduct a formal hearing could constitute grave
abuse of discretion.
With regard to
the award of separation pay, ITELCO capitalizes on the labor arbiter’s finding
that Praxides deliberately abandoned his work, the arbiter ruling that the
former’s fear of further maltreatment from Atty. Ortega if he reported for work
was merely speculative. But while the labor arbiter ruled that Praxides
voluntarily desisted from reporting for work, it awarded the former separation
pay on the ground that ITELCO was not entirely blameless for the incident as
the alleged assault of Atty. Ortega justified Praxides’ going AWOL. ITELCO contests the award, maintaining that
the arbiter’s justification for the award was non-existent, Atty. Ortega having
been acquitted of the criminal charge for physical injuries for lack of
evidence.
It is hornbook
doctrine that the quantum of evidence required in criminal cases is proof
beyond reasonable doubt. On the other
hand, in proceedings before the labor arbiter, what is required is merely
substantial evidence, or such amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.[7] Thus, the acquittal of ITELCO’s
president and manager of the charges of assault on Praxides is not incompatible
with the labor arbiter’s finding that “complainant [Praxides] could not be
totally blamed when he desisted from working with respondent. Complainant has some basis to justify to (a)
certain extent his being on AWOL. Likewise, respondent ITELCO [petitioner herein] cannot be said to be
blameless and totally relieved of its responsibility for the alleged act
committed by Atty. Ortega, its president and general manager.”[8] While the trial court may have
acquitted Atty. Ortega, the filing of criminal charges against him is, itself,
substantial evidence that, indeed, there was an assault on Praxides. This was
further bolstered by Praxides’ complaint to the police immediately after the
supposed incident, his seeking medical treatment thereafter, and his submission of an affidavit recounting the
alleged incident. The labor arbiter’s
factual finding of the existence of the assault, supported as it is by
substantial evidence, is binding upon the Supreme Court, in line with the
well-established rule that factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies like the
NLRC are generally accorded not only respect but even finality if such findings
are supported by substantial evidence.[9]
In sum, the
labor arbiter ruled that, while Praxides was at fault for desisting from
working for ITELCO, the former could not be totally blamed for doing so because
of the maltreatment he suffered at the hands of Atty. Ortega. He tried to restore the status quo by
decreeing Praxides’ reinstatement without loss of seniority rights but without
back wages. The filing by Praxides of a criminal complaint against ITELCO’s
president and general manager has, however, strained the relations between
them, moving the NLRC to award separation pay in lieu of reinstatement, in
conformity with applicable jurisprudence on the matter.[10] Certainly, this act does not
constitute abuse of discretion, much less grave abuse, on the part of the
NLRC. Finally, as to the amount of the
monetary award, this Court has ruled that where reinstatement is no longer an
option, a separation pay equivalent to one month’s salary for every year of
service is awarded as an alternative.[11]
WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of
discretion committed by public respondent NLRC, the present petition is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
[1]
Certificate of Income Payment Not Subject To Withholding Tax.
[2]
Rollo, p. 72.
[3]
Ibid., p. 52.
[4]
AGPALO, LEGAL ETHICS (5d), p. 176, citing Deluao vs. Casteel, 26 SCRA
475 (1968).
[5]
NFL vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 113466, December 15, 1997, citing Salonga v.
NLRC, 254 SCRA 111 (1996).
[6]
Ibid., citing Palomado vs. NLRC, 257 SCRA 680 (1996).
[7]
Madlos vs. NLRC, 254 SCRA 248 (1996).
[8]
Labor Arbiter’s Decision, p. 6.
[9]
PCI Automation Center, Inc. vs. NLRC, 252 SCRA 493 (1996).
[10]
Vallacar Transit vs. NLRC, 246 SCRA 460 (1995).
[11]
Reformist Union of R.B. Liner, Inc. vs. NLRC, 266 SCRA 713 (1997),
citing Sealand Service, Inc. vs. NLRC, 190 SCRA 347 (1990), Globe-Mackay
Cable vs. NLRC, 206 SCRA 701 (1992).