560 Phil. 42
CORONA, J.:
(1) there was no evidence that the loan was granted at the behest, command or urging of previous government officials;Hence this petition for certiorari.The issue for our resolution is whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse ofdiscretion in (1) holding that the offenses charged in the complaint had alreadyprescribed and (2) dismissing the complaint for lack of probable cause to indict privaterespondents for violation of Section 3 (e) and (g) of RA 3019.Had the Offenses Prescribed . The Ombudsman held that the ten-year prescriptive period commenced on the date ofthe violation of law under Section 11 of RA 3019. The transaction occurred in 1974.Hence, the complaint was allegedly barred by prescription when it was filed on February17, 1998.This issue had previously been resolved in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committeeon Behest Loans v. Desierto.[11] TheCourt held:
(2) PTPI complied with the DBP requirement that it would increase its paid-up capital from P25,000 to P1 million;
(3) the loan was not under collateralized and
(4) the complaint was barred by prescription. It denied reconsideration in an order dated January 5, 1999.
Since the law alleged to have been violated, i.e., paragraphs (e) and (g) of Section 3,R.A. No. 3019, as amended, is a special law, the applicable rule in the computation ofthe prescriptive period is Section 2 of Act No. 3326, as amended, which provides:This doctrine was reiterated in subsequent cases also involving petitioners and publicrespondent and is now well-settled.[13]Therefore, the counting of the prescriptive period commenced from the date ofdiscovery of the offenses in 1992 after the investigation of the Fact-FindingCommittee.[14] When the complaintwas filed in 1998 or after six years, prescription had not set in.[15]Was There Probable Cause?The Ombudsman did not act with grave abuse of discretion when he found that therewas no evidence to establish probable cause to sustain the charges against privaterespondents. Section 3 (e) and (g) of RA 3019 provide:Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of theviolation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discoverythereof and institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment. The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guiltyperson and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons notconstituting double jeopardy.This simply means that if the commission of the crime is known, theprescriptive period shall commence to run on the day it was committed.In the present case, it was well-nigh impossible for the State, the aggrievedparty, to have known the violations of R.A. No. 3019 at the time thequestioned transactions were made because, as alleged, the public officialsconcerned connived or conspired with the "beneficiaries of the loans." Thus,we agree with the COMMITTEE that the prescriptive period for the offenseswith which the respondents in OMB-0-96-0968 were charged should becomputed from the discovery of the commission thereof and not from theday of such commission.[12](Emphasis supplied)
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts oromissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the followingshall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declaredto be unlawful:Grave abuse is defined as:xxx xxx xxx e. Causing undue injury to any party, including the Government or giving anyprivate party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of hisofficial, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident badfaith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers andemployees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses orpermits or other concessions.xxx xxx xxx g. Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transactionmanifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public officerprofited or will profit thereby.[16]
... such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment on the part of the public officerconcerned which is equivalent to an excess or lack of jurisdiction. The abuse ofdiscretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive dutyor a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all incontemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despoticmanner by reason of passion or hostility.[17]The Ombudsman explained his reasons for dismissing the complaint:
There is no evidence on record to prove that the loan was granted to PTPIat the behest, command or urging by previous government officials. Asappearing from its Corporate Profile, PTPI is a company organized onAugust 9, 1974 to take over the properties acquired by DBP from Fil-EasternWood Industries, Inc. (FEWI). The foreign currency loan of US $13.5million will be used to purchase brand new sawmill and veneering plant andadditional logging equipment since the old equipment were found to beobsolete.Although at the inception or at the time the loan was applied, its paid-upcapital amounted to P25,000.00 only, DBP required, under BoardResolution No. 2415, that prior to the issuance of letter of guarantee andexecution of deed of sale, in order to cover the pre-operating expenses, PTPIshall first increase its paid-up capital from P25,000.00 to P1.0 million. Thetraditional equity requirement equivalent to 25% of investment was waived inview of the joint and several signature of Macmillan Jardine and the guaranteeof Macmillan Bloedel and Jardine Matheson. In addition, PTPI shouldalso comply with DBP’s requirement that the 80% collateral ratio ismaintained.Moreover, the loan granted to PTPI was not undercollateralized. Based onthe evidence on record, the financial accommodation was secured by theassets to be acquired; the forest concession and the joint and several signatureof Macmillan Jardine. In fact, DBP Board of Governors Chairman LeonidesS. Virata stated in his Memorandum to then President Ferdinand E. Marcos,that “the guarantee being requested will be more than the value of the assetssince the working capital requirement of about US $1.5 million and pre-operating expenses of another US $350 million will be funded out of the US$14 million.”[18]Under Sections 12 and 13, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution and RA 6770 (TheOmbudsman Act of 1989), the Ombudsman has the power to investigate and prosecuteany act or omission of a public officer or employee when such act or omissionappears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient.[19] It has been the consistent ruling of the Court not to interfere withthe Ombudsman's exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory powers as long as hisrulings are supported by substantial evidence.[20] Envisioned as the champion of the people and preserver of the integrity ofpublic service, he has wide latitude in exercising his powers and is free fromintervention from the three branches of government. This is to ensure that his Office isinsulated from any outside pressure and improper influence.[21]
The Ombudsman has discretion to determine whether a criminal case, given its factsand circumstances, should be filed or not. It is basically his call. He may dismiss thecomplaint forthwith should he find it to be insufficient in form or substance orshould he find it otherwise, to continue with the inquiry; or he may proceed with theinvestigation if, in his view, the complaint is in due and proper form andsubstance.[24]In fact, the Ombudsman has the power to dismiss a complaint without going through apreliminary investigation.[25]
“Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019, as amended by B.P. Blg. 195, provides thatthe offenses committed under the said statute shall prescribe in fifteen (15)years. It appears however, that prior to the amendment of Section 11 ofR.A. No. 3019 by B.P. Blg. 195 which was approved on March 16, 1982, theprescriptive period for offenses punishable under the said statute was onlyten (10) years. The longer prescriptive period of fifteen (15) years, as providedin Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019 as amended by B.P. Blg. 195, does not applyin this case for the reason that the amendment, not being favorable to theaccused (herein private respondent), cannot be given retroactive effect.Hence the crime prescribed on January 6, 1986 or ten (10) years from January6, 1976.”[16] In Singian, Jr. v.Sandiganbayan (G.R. Nos. 160577-94, 16 December 2005, 478 SCRA 348), we enumeratedthe elements of these offenses:The elements of the offense defined under Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019 are thefollowing:
1) that the accused are public officers or private persons charged in conspiracy withthem;[17] Soria v. Desierto, G.R.Nos. 153524-25, 31 January 2005, 450 SCRA 339, 345, citing Duero v. Court ofAppeals, G.R. No. 131282, 4 January 2002, 373 SCRA 11, 17; Perez v. Office of theOmbudsman, G.R. No. 131445, 27 May 2004, 429 SCRA 357.
2) that the prohibited act/s were done in the discharge of the public officer'sofficial, administrative or judicial, functions;
3) that they cause undue injury to any party, whether Government or a privateperson;
4) that such injury is caused by giving any unwarranted benefits, advantage orpreference to such party; and
5) that the public officers acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or grossinexcusable negligence.
To be indicted of the offense under Section 3(g) of Rep. Act No. 3019, the followingelements must be present:
1) that the accused is a public officer;
2) that he entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government; and
3) that such contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to thegovernment.(Id., pp. 358-359, citations omitted.)
Sec. 12. The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall actpromptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials oremployees of the government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,including government-owned or controlled corporations, and shall, in appropriatecases, notify the complainants of the action taken and results thereof.Sec. 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions,and duties:(1) Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission ofany public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears tobe illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient. xxxxSection 15 of RA 6770 states:Sec. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. — The Office of the Ombudsmanshall have the following powers, functions and duties:(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act oromission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act oromission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primaryjurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of thisprimary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency ofgovernment, the investigation of such cases; xxxx[20] Pres. Ad Hoc FactFinding Com. On Behest Loans v. Ombudsman Desierto, 415 Phil. 135, 142 (2001),citations omitted.
3.0. In consideration of the full cooperation of Mr. Jose Y. Campos to thisCommission, his voluntary surrender of the properties and assets disclosed anddeclared by him to belong to deposed President Ferdinand E. Marcos to theGovernment of the Republic of the Philippines, his full, complete and truthfuldisclosures, and his commitment to pay a sum of money as determined by thePhilippine Government, this Commission has decided and agreed:3.1. To grant to Mr. Jose Y. Campos, his family, Mariano K. Tan and Francisco deGuzman immunity from criminal prosecutions, as provided in Section 5 of ExecutiveOrder No. 14. xxxUndoubtedly, this resolution embodies a compromise agreement between the PCGG onone hand and Jose Y. Campos on the other. Hence, in exchange for the voluntarysurrender of the ill-gotten properties acquired by the then President Ferdinand E.Marcos and his family which were in Jose Campos' control, the latter and his familywere given full immunity in both civil and criminal prosecutions. (Id., p. 83.)(Emphasis supplied)
Sec. 2. Evaluation. - Upon evaluating the complaint, the investigating officer shall recommend whether it may be:In his Manifestation and Motion dated December 23, 2002, the Ombudsman statedthat the case could be referred back to his office for the conduct of preliminaryinvestigation in accordance with the decision in the aforementioned Presidential AdHoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto (Rollo, pp. 296-297).However, we decline to do this since we have already declared in PCGG v. Desierto(supra note 13; PCGG v. Desierto, supra note 13) that when it is evident that the meritsof the complaint had already been thoroughly examined by the Ombudsman, it wouldnot be right to subject the private respondents to an unnecessary and prolonged anguish.
a) dismissed outright for want of palpable merit;
b) referred to respondent for comment;
c) indorsed to the proper government agency which has jurisdiction over thecase;
d) forwarded to the appropriate officer or official for fact-findinginvestigation;
e) referred for administrative adjudication;
f) subjected to preliminary investigation.”