470 Phil. 386
PANGANIBAN, J.:
“WHEREFORE, the petition is GIVEN DUE COURSE. The appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 95) is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another rendered DISMISSING the ejectment case.”[4]On the other hand, the challenged Resolution denied petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration.
“Subject of an action for ejectment before the Metropolitan Trial Court [MeTC] of Quezon City (Branch 38) was a 540 square-meter land (or ‘subject property’), located at No. 174 Sct. Fuentebella, Quezon City and covered by TCT No. RT-109698 (26613) in the name of Jose C. Lopez (or ‘Lopez’).
“The action was instituted on October 2, 1996 by Salud D. Lopez, Remedios Lopez-Marzan, Rose Lopez-Co, Amado D. Lopez, Cynthia Lopez-Portugal, Jose D. Lopez, Jr. and May Lopez-Rueda [or ‘petitioners’] against Robert P. David and Cleopatra David Campo-Ruiz [or ‘respondents’]. It was predicated on the averments that [petitioners] are the owners of the subject property which was purchased from the People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation by Lopez, deceased husband of [petitioner] Salud D. Lopez (or ‘Salud’) and father of the rest of the [petitioners]; that in 1954, upon her request, Cirila Sadsad Vda. De David (or ‘Cirila’), Salud’s mother and [respondents’] grandmother, was allowed by Salud to build a residential house on the subject property and to stay thereon until she could find a suitable residence of her own; that upon Cirila’s death, [respondents] continued her occupancy of the subject property; that the possession of Cirila and [respondents] of the subject property, without paying rentals and a written contract, was upon tolerance of Salud; that [petitioners] withdrew their consent to [respondents] occupancy of the subject property per their lawyer’s letter dated August 10, 1995 demanding of them to vacate the same on or before September 15, 1995, which [respondents] did not heed.
“In their defense, [respondents] alleged that the subject property is owned in common by Cirila’s children, Salud, Robert S. David, Sr. (father of [respondent] Robert P. David) and Celestina S. David (mother of the other [respondent]); that the subject property was placed in the name of Lopez upon the agreement that it would be held in trust for Cirila’s children; and that Salud, Ligaya S. David (mother of [respondent] Robert P. David) and Celestina S. David built a three-door apartment on the subject property which equally belongs to them.
“On August 15, 1997, the [MeTC] rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:‘WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of [petitioners] and against [respondents]. Accordingly, the latter is hereby ordered as follows:“Petitioners appealed to the Regional Trial Court (or ‘RTC’) of Quezon City (Branch 95) which, on December 17, 1999, rendered a decision affirming en toto that of the [MeTC]. x x x."[5]a) To vacate the disputed property, specifically located at No. 174 Sct. Fuentebella St., Diliman, Quezon City and completely surrender possession thereof to [petitioners];The counter-claim of [respondents] is hereby dismissed for lack of merit.
b) To pay [petitioners] the amount of P10,000.00 as a reasonable amount of compensation or rental for the use and occupancy thereof per unit each month, to be reckoned from September 15, 1995 until they shall have vacated the same;
c) To pay [petitioners] the sum of P10,000.00 as and for attorney’s fees; and
d) To pay the costs of suit.
‘SO ORDERED.’
“It appears that pursuant to the demand letter dated August 10, 1995 of [petitioners’] lawyer, [respondents] were given until September 15, 1995 within which to vacate the subject property and surrender possession thereof to [petitioners]. Under the situation, [respondents’] possession became unlawful on September 16, 1995, or upon expiration of the grace period, when they continued occupying the subject property. However, the ejectment suit was only instituted on October 2, 1996, or more than one year from expiration of the period given [respondents] to vacate the subject property.In denying petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration,[8] the CA noted that “among the affirmative defenses pleaded in the Answer was that ‘this Honorable Court does not have any jurisdiction over the case’ because the real issue is ownership, while in the [pretrial] brief, [respondents] posed the issue of whether the court of origin ‘has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case considering that there is no lessor-lessee relationship between the parties.”[9]
“The one-year period provided for in Sec. 1, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure commences from accrual of the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the realty. In an action for unlawful detainer, as in the case at bench, it is counted from the last letter of demand to vacate.
“Since the ejectment suit was instituted after a year from the demand to vacate, it is an accion publiciana which is cognizable by the RTC. Accion publiciana is the plenary action to recover the right of possession when the dispossession has lasted for more than one year.
“Consequently, the MTC has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action. And in affirming the decision of the MTC, the RTC had committed a palpable error and/or had acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.”[7] (Citations omitted)
“Whether the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the case for ejectment [on] the ground of lack of jurisdiction despite the submission of respondents to the MTC and RTC and all the proceedings therein.”[11]
“3. That [petitioners] x x x are co-owners of a parcel of land located at Diliman, Quezon City x x x;To summarize, petitioners aver that (1) they are the owners of the property; (2) they allowed respondents to occupy it by tolerance; (3) they withdrew their consent; and (4) they demanded that respondents leave the property, but the latter refused to do so.
“4. That sometime in 1954, [petitioner] SALUD D. LOPEZ’s mother, CIRILA SADSAD Vda. DE DAVID, requested herein [petitioners] to allow the former to temporarily build a residential house at [petitioners’] property and stay in the premises until her mother shall [have] found a suitable residence of her own;
“5. That since then, [petitioners] allowed said Cirila David to occupy the premises without paying monthly rent and without the benefit of a written contract but thru sheer tolerance of the [petitioners];
“6. That upon the death of [petitioner] Salud D. Lopez’s mother, [respondents] continued to occupy the subject premises without paying any rentals and were allowed to continue to occupy two (2) separate units thru sheer generosity and mere tolerance of herein [petitioners];
“7. That subsequently, [petitioners] withdrew their consent and repeated demands were made upon [respondents] to vacate the subject premises but [respondents] refused and failed to heed the demand violative of [petitioners’] preferential right of possession over the subject 2 units;
“8. That on August 4, 1995, [petitioners] were constrained to refer the matter to their previous lawyer for appropriate legal action, to which a letter of demand was sent to [respondents] to vacate the premises but x x x the latter refused x x x to vacate the subject premises; x x x”[15]
“A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different reasons. Thus, we speak of estoppel in pais, of estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel by laches.We have applied this doctrine to succeeding cases by denying allegations of lack of jurisdiction if the question was not raised at an earlier stage, but brought up only after an adverse decision.[30] We have also stressed, however, that this doctrine is merely an exception to the general rule and time-honored principle that jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or by estoppel.[31]
“Laches, in a general sense, is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.
“The doctrine of laches or of ‘stale demands’ is based upon grounds of public policy which requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the statute of limitations, is not a mere question of time but is principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted.”[29]
“10. It is also an undisputed fact that [respondents] have been in continuous and uninterrupted possession of the premises from 1951 up to present time or [for] a period of forty seven years (47).It is apparent that respondents have been questioning the jurisdiction of the MeTC and alleging that the controversy was originally cognizable by the RTC, contrary to the contention of petitioners. Thus, we cannot countenance petitioners’ position that respondents are already estopped from raising the issue of jurisdiction or of whether the ejectment case was filed within the one-year period after the withholding of possession.x x x x x x x x x
‘Even if one is the owner of the property, the possession thereof cannot be wrested from another who had been in the physical or material possession of the same for more than one year by resorting to a summary action for ejectment. x x x’[37]x x x x x x x x x
‘Accion publiciana is the plenary action to recover the right of possession when dispossession has lasted for more than one year or when dispossession was effected by means other than those mentioned in Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.’”[38]
“Section 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. - Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth[;] or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession, together with damages and costs.”[19] Sarona v. Villegas, 131 Phil. 365, 372, March 27, 1968; Villaluz v. CA, 344 Phil. 77, 89, September 5, 1997; Arcal v. CA, supra, p. 825.