582 Phil. 183
REYES, R.T., J.:
Wherefore, premises considered, and in the light aforecited decision of the Supreme Court judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and the defendant is hereby ordered:Landex moved for reconsideration.[10] Records reveal that Landex failed to include a notice of hearing in its motion for reconsideration as required under Section 5, Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Realizing the defect, Landex later filed a motion[11] setting a hearing for its motion for reconsideration. Aneco countered with a motion for execution[12] claiming that the RTC decision is already final and executory.SO ORDERED.[9]
- To stop the completion of the concrete wall and excavation of the road lot in question and if the same is already completed, to remove the same and to return the lot to its original situation;
- To pay actual and compensatory damage to the plaintiff in the total amount of P50,000.00;
- To pay attorney's fees in the amount of P20,000.00;
- To pay the cost.
In previously ruling for the plaintiff, this Court anchored its decision on the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of "White Plains Association vs. Legaspi, 193 SCRA 765," wherein the issue involved was the ownership of a road lot, in an existing, fully developed and authorized subdivision, which after a second look, is apparently inapplicable to the instant case at bar, simply because the property in question never did exist as a subdivision. Since, the property in question never did exist as a subdivision, the limitations imposed by Section 1 of Republic Act No. 440, that no portion of a subdivision road lot shall be closed without the approval of the Court is clearly in appropriate to the case at bar.Aneco appealed to the CA.[16]
The records show that the plaintiff's property has access to a public road as it has its own ingress and egress along Miller St.; That plaintiff's property is not isolated as it is bounded by Miller St. and Resthaven St. in San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City; that plaintiff could easily make an access to a public road within the bounds and limits of its own property; and that the defendant has not yet been indemnified whatsoever for the use of his property, as mandated by the Bill of rights. The foregoing circumstances, negates the alleged plaintiffs right of way.[15]
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing, the instant appeal is perforce dismissed. Accordingly, the order dated 31 March 1996 is hereby affirmed.In affirming the RTC dismissal of the complaint for injunction, the CA held that Aneco knew at the time of the sale that the lots sold by FHDI were not subdivision units based on the express stipulation in the deed of sale that FHDI, the seller, was no longer interested in pursuing its subdivision project, thus:
SO ORDERED.[18]
The subject property ceased to be a road lot when its former owner (Fernandez Hermanos, Inc.) sold it to appellant Aneco not as subdivision lots and without the intention of pursuing the subdivision project. The law in point is Article 624 of the New Civil Code, which provides:Anent the issue of compulsory easement of right of way, the CA held that Aneco failed to prove the essential requisites to avail of such right, thus:Art. 624. The existence of an apparent sign of easement between two estates, established or maintained by the owner of both, shall be considered, should either of them be alienated, as a title in order that the easement may continue actively and passively, unless, at the time the ownership of the two estates is divided, the contrary should be provided in the title of conveyance of either of them, or the sign aforesaid should be removed before the execution of the deed. This provision shall also apply in case of the division of a thing owned in common by two or more persons.Viewed from the aforesaid law, there is no question that the law allows the continued use of an apparent easement should the owner alienate the property to different persons. It is noteworthy to emphasize that the lot in question was provided by the previous owner (Fernandez Hermanos, Inc.) as a road lot because of its intention to convert it into a subdivision project. The previous owner even applied for a development permit over the subject property. However, when the twenty-two (22) lots were sold to appellant Aneco, it was very clear from the seller's deed of sale that the lots sold ceased to be subdivision lots. The seller even warranted that it shall undertake to extend all the necessary assistance for the consolidation of the subdivided lots, including the execution of the requisite manifestation before the appropriate government agencies that the seller is no longer interested in pursuing the subdivision project. In fine, appellant Aneco knew from the very start that at the time of the sale, the 22 lots sold to it were not intended as subdivision units, although the titles to the different lots have yet to be consolidated. Consequently, the easement that used to exist on the subject lot ceased when appellant Aneco and the former owner agreed that the lots would be consolidated and would no longer be intended as a subdivision project.
Appellant Aneco insists that it has the intention of continuing the subdivision project earlier commenced by the former owner. It also holds on to the previous development permit granted to Fernandez Hermanos, Inc. The insistence is futile. Appellant Aneco did not acquire any right from the said previous owner since the latter itself expressly stated in their agreement that it has no more intention of continuing the subdivision project. If appellant desires to convert its property into a subdivision project, it has to apply in its own name, and must have its own provisions for a road lot.[19]
An easement involves an abnormal restriction on the property of the servient owner and is regarded as a charge or encumbrance on the servient owner and is regarded as a charge or encumbrance on the servient estate (Cristobal v. CA, 291 SCRA 122). The essential requisites to be entitled to a compulsory easement of way are: 1) that the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway; 2) that proper indemnity has been paid; 3) that the isolation was not due to acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate; 4) that the right of way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate and in so far as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest (Cristobal v. Court of Appeals, 291 SCRA 122).Aneco moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied.[21] Hence, the present petition or appeal by certiorari under Rule 45.
An in depth examination of the evidence adduced and offered by appellant Aneco, showed that it had failed to prove the existence of the aforementioned requisites, as the burden thereof lies upon the appellant Aneco.[20]
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DISMISSING PETITIONER'S APPEAL AND SUSTAINING THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER DATED 31 MARCH 1997 GRANTING RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WHICH IS FATALLY DEFECTIVE FOR LACK OF NOTICE OF HEARING.B.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER WHICH GAVE FULL WEIGHT AND CREDIT TO THE MISLEADING AND ERRONEOUS CERTIFICATION ISSUED BY GILDA E. ESTILO WHICH SHE LATER EXPRESSLY AND CATEGORICALLY RECANTED BY WAY OF HER AFFIDAVIT.C.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN APPLYING THE LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE RULES IN ORDER TO SUSTAIN THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER DATED 31 MARCH 1997.D.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER THAT MADE NO PRONOUNCEMENTS AS TO COSTS, AND IN DISREGARDING THE MERIT OF THE PETITIONER'S CAUSE OF ACTION.[22]
Let it be emphasized that the rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed. Even the Rules of Court reflect this principle. The power to suspend or even disregard rules can be so pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which this Court itself has already declared to be final x x x.Here, We find that the RTC and the CA soundly exercised their discretion in opting for a liberal rather than a strict application of the rules on notice of hearing. It must be stressed that there are no vested right to technicalities. It is within the court's sound discretion to relax procedural rules in order to fully adjudicate the merits of a case. This Court will not interfere with the exercise of that discretion absent grave abuse or palpable error. Section 6, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure even mandates a liberal construction of the rules to promote their objectives of securing a just, speedy, and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.
The emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford every party litigant the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities. Time and again, this Court has consistently held that rules must not be applied rigidly so as not to override substantial justice.[27]
Procedural due process is not based solely on a mechanistic and literal application of a rule such that any deviation is inexorably fatal. Rules of procedure, and this includes the three (3) days notice requirement, are liberally construed in order to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding (Section 2, Rule 1, Rules of Court). In Case and Nantz v. Jugo (77 Phil. 517), this Court made it clear that lapses in the literal observance of a rule of procedure may be overlooked when they have not prejudiced the adverse party and have not deprived the court of its authority.We also find that the procedural lapse committed by Landex was sufficiently cured when it filed another motion setting a hearing for its defective motion for reconsideration. Records reveal that the RTC set a hearing for the motion for reconsideration but Aneco's counsel failed to appear. The RTC then gave Aneco additional time to file comment on the motion for reconsideration.[30]
A party cannot ignore a more than sufficient opportunity to exercise its right to be heard and once the court performs its duty and the outcome happens to be against that negligent party, suddenly interpose a procedural violation already cured, insisting that everybody should again go back to square one. Dilatory tactics cannot be the guiding principle.
The rule in De Borja v. Tan (93 Phil. 167), that "what the law prohibits is not the absence of previous notice, but the absolute absence thereof and lack of opportunity to be heard," is the applicable doctrine. (See also Aguilar v. Tan, 31 SCRA 205; Omico v. Vallejos, 63 SCRA 285; Sumadchat v. Court of Appeals, 111 SCRA 488.) x x x[29]