475 PHIL 190
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
The undersigned accuses LUISITO D. BUSTINERA of the crime of Qualified Theft, committed as follows:Upon arraignment[4] on March 27, 2000, appellant, assisted by counsel de oficio, entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
That on or about the 25th day of December up to the 9th day of January, 1997, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused being then employed as one [of] the taxi Drivers of Elias S. Cipriano, an Operator of several taxi cabs with business address at corner 44 Commonwealth Avenue, iliman (sic), this City, and as such has free access to the taxi he being driven, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to gain, with grave abuse of confidence reposed upon him by his employer and without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, take, steal and carry away a Daewoo Racer GTE Taxi with Plate No. PWH-266 worth P303,000.00, Philippine Currency, belonging to Elias S. Cipriano, to the damage and prejudice of the said offended party in the amount of P303,000.00.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The following day, December 26, 1996, Cipriano went to appellant’s house to ascertain why the taxi was not returned.[7] Arriving at appellant’s house, he did not find the taxi there, appellant’s wife telling him that her husband had not yet arrived.[8] Leaving nothing to chance, Cipriano went to the Commonwealth Avenue police station and reported that his taxi was missing.[9]
Q: Now, Mr. Witness, on December 25, 1996, did you report for work? A: Yes, sir. Q: Now, since you reported for work, what are your duties and responsibilities as taxi driver of the taxi company? A: That we have to bring back the taxi at night with the boundary. Q: How much is your boundary? A: P780.00, sir. Q: On December 25, 1996, did you bring out any taxi? A: Yes, sir. Q: Now, when ever (sic) you bring out a taxi, what procedure [do] you follow with that company? A: That we have to bring back the taxi to the company and before we leave we also sign something, sir. Q: What is that something you mentioned? A: On the record book and on the daily trip ticket, sir. Q: You said that you have to return your taxi at the end of the day, what is then the procedure reflect (sic) by your company when you return a taxi?A: To remit the boundary and to sign the record book and daily trip ticket. Q: So, when you return the taxi, you sign the record book? A: Yes, sir. Q: You mentioned that on December 25, 1996, you brought out a taxi? A: Yes, sir. Q: What kind of taxi? A: Daewoo taxi, sir. Q: Now did you return the taxi on December 25, 1996? A: I was not able to bring back the taxi because I was short of my boundary, sir.[6]
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt as charged, and he is accordingly sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay the costs.Hence, the present appeal anchored on the following assigned errors:
In the service of his sentence, accused is ordered credited with four-fifths (4/5) of the preventive imprisonment undergone by him there being no showing that he agreed in writing to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners.
SO ORDERED.[24] (Emphasis and italics in the original)
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONCLUDING WITHOUT CONCRETE BASIS THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT HAS INTENT TO GAIN WHEN HE FAILED TO RETURN THE TAXI TO ITS GARAGE.It is settled that an appeal in a criminal proceeding throws the whole case open for review, and it becomes the duty of the appellate court to correct such errors as may be found in the judgment even if they have not been specifically assigned.[26]II.
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF QUALIFIED THEFT.[25]
. . . When statutes are in pari materia, the rule of statutory construction dictates that they should be construed together. This is because enactments of the same legislature on the same subject matter are supposed to form part of one uniform system; that later statutes are supplementary or complimentary to the earlier enactments and in the passage of its acts the legislature is supposed to have in mind the existing legislation on the same subject and to have enacted its new act with reference thereto. Having thus in mind the previous statutes relating to the same subject matter, whenever the legislature enacts a new law, it is deemed to have enacted the new provision in accordance with the legislative policy embodied in those prior statutes unless there is an express repeal of the old and they all should be construed together. In construing them the old statutes relating to the same subject matter should be compared with the new provisions and if possible by reasonable construction, both should be so construed that effect may be given to every provision of each. However, when the new provision and the old relating to the same subject cannot be reconciled the former shall prevail as it is the latter expression of the legislative will . . . [34] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)The elements of the crime of theft as provided for in Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code are: (1) that there be taking of personal property; (2) that said property belongs to another; (3) that the taking be done with intent to gain; (4) that the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and (5) that the taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things.[35]
There is no arguing that the anti-carnapping law is a special law, different from the crime of robbery and theft included in the Revised Penal Code. It particularly addresses the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the latter's consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things. But a careful comparison of this special law with the crimes of robbery and theft readily reveals their common features and characteristics, to wit: unlawful taking, intent to gain, and that personal property belonging to another is taken without the latter's consent. However, the anti-carnapping law particularly deals with the theft and robbery of motor vehicles. Hence a motor vehicle is said to have been carnapped when it has been taken, with intent to gain, without the owner's consent, whether the taking was done with or without the use of force upon things. Without the anti-carnapping law, such unlawful taking of a motor vehicle would fall within the purview of either theft or robbery which was certainly the case before the enactment of said statute.[42] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations omitted.)It is to be noted, however, that while the anti-carnapping law penalizes the unlawful taking of motor vehicles, it excepts from its coverage certain vehicles such as roadrollers, trolleys, street-sweepers, sprinklers, lawn mowers, amphibian trucks and cranes if not used on public highways, vehicles which run only on rails and tracks, and tractors, trailers and tractor engines of all kinds and used exclusively for agricultural purposes. By implication, the theft or robbery of the foregoing vehicles would be covered by Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended and the provisions on robbery, respectively.[43]
Appellant assails the trial court’s conclusion that there was intent to gain with the mere taking of the taxi without the owner’s consent. He maintains that his reason for failing to return the taxi was his inability to remit the boundary fee, his earnings that day not having permitted it; and that there was no intent to gain since the taking of the taxi was not permanent in character, he having returned it.
Q: Also you said that during your direct testimony that when you gave your wife the P2,500.00, you also told her to go to the company to ask the company for permission for you to use the taxi since you were then still short of the boundary. Alright, after telling that to your wife and after seeing your wife between December 27, 1996 and January 5, 1997, did you ask your wife what was the answer of the company to that request of yours?A: He did not allow me, sir, and he even [got] angry with me. Q: So, when did you learn that the company was not agreeable to your making use of the taxicab without first returning it to the company?A: Before the new year, sir. Q: When you said new year, you were referring to January 1, 1997? A: Either December 29 or December 30, 1996, sir. Q: So, are you telling us that even if you knew already that the company was not agreeable to your making use of the taxicab continually (sic) without returning the same to the company, you still went ahead and make (sic) use of it and returned it only on January 5, 1997.A: Yes, sir.[50] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Assuming, despite the totally inadequate evidence, that the taking was “temporary” and for a “joy ride”, the Court sustains as the better view[57] that which holds that when a person, either with the object of going to a certain place, or learning how to drive, or enjoying a free ride, takes possession of a vehicle belonging to another, without the consent of its owner, he is guilty of theft because by taking possession of the personal property belonging to another and using it, his intent to gain is evident since he derives therefrom utility, satisfaction, enjoyment and pleasure. Justice Ramon C. Aquino cites in his work Groizard who holds that the use of a thing constitutes gain and Cuello Calon who calls it “hurt de uso.”[58] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citation omitted)Besides, the trial court did not believe appellant’s claim that he in fact returned the taxi on January 5, 1997.
The Court can not (sic) believe accused’s assertion that he returned the subject vehicle on January 5, 1997 to the garage and that he had in fact paid the amount of P4,500.00 in partial payment of his unremitted “boundary” for ten (10) days. He could not even be certain of the exact amount he allegedly paid the taxicab owner. On direct-examination, he claimed that he paid Edwin Cipriano on December 27, 1996 the amount of P2,000.00 and it was his wife who handed said amount to Cipriano, yet on cross-examination, he claimed that he gave P2,500.00 to his wife on that date for payment to the taxicab owner.[59]The rule is well-entrenched that findings of fact of the trial court are accorded the highest degree of respect and will not be disturbed on appeal absent any clear showing that the trial court had overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and significance which, if considered, would alter the result of the case.[60] The reason for the rule being that trial courts have the distinct advantage of having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying or their conduct and behavior during the trial.[61]
While appellant maintains that he signed on January 5, 1997 the record book indicating that he returned the taxi on the said date and paid Cipriano the amount of P4,500.00 as partial payment for the boundary fee, appellant did not produce the documentary evidence alluded to, to substantiate his claim. That such alleged record book is in the possession of Cipriano did not prevent him from producing it as appellant has the right to have compulsory process issued to secure the production of evidence on his behalf.[63]
Q: You said that you returned the taxi on January 5, 1997, correct? A: Yes, sir. Q: Now, Mr. Witness, did you sign any record when you returned the taxi? A: Yes, sir. Q: Do you have any copy of that record? A: They were the one (sic) in-charge of the record book and I even voluntarily left my driver’s license with them, sir.Q: You said that you did not return the taxi because you were short of (sic) boundary, did you turn over any money to your employer when you returned the taxi?A: I gave them [an] additional P2,500.00, sir. Q: At the time when you returned the taxi, how much was your short indebtedness (sic) or short boundary (sic)? A: I was short for ten (10) days, and I was able to pay P4,500.00. Q: Do you have any receipt to show receipt of payment for this P4,500.00? A: They were the ones having the record of my payment, and our agreement was that I have to pay the balance in installment.[62] (Emphasis supplied)
The charge being simple carnapping, the imposable penalty is imprisonment for not less than 14 years and 8 months and not more than 17 years and 4 months. There can be no suppletory effect of the rules for the application of penalties under the Revised Penal Code or by other relevant statutory provisions based on, or applicable only to, the rules for felonies under the Code. While it is true that the penalty of 14 years and 8 months to 17 years and 4 months is virtually equivalent to the duration of the medium period of reclusion temporal, such technical term under the Revised Penal Code is not given to that penalty for carnapping. Besides, the other penalties for carnapping attended by the qualifying circumstances stated in the law do not correspond to those in the Code. The rules on penalties in the Code, therefore, cannot suppletorily apply to Republic Act No. 6539 and special laws of the same formulation. For this reason, we hold that the proper penalty to be imposed on each of accused-appellants is an indeterminate sentence of 14 years and 8 months, as minimum, to 17 years and 4 months, as maximum.[67] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)Appellant being then culpable for carnapping under the first clause of Section 14 of Republic Act No. 6539, as amended, the imposable penalty is imprisonment for not less than 14 years and 8 months, not more than 17 years and 4 months,[68] for, as discussed above, the provisions of the Revised Penal Code cannot be applied suppletorily and, therefore, the alleged aggravating circumstance of grave abuse of confidence cannot be appreciated.
“Motor vehicle” is any vehicle propelled by any power other than muscular power using the public highways, but excepting road rollers, trolley cars, street-sweepers, sprinklers, lawn mowers, bulldozers, graders, fork-lifts, amphibian trucks, and cranes if not used on public highways, vehicles, which run only on rails or tracts, and tractors, trailers and reaction engines of all kinds used exclusively for agricultural purposes. Trailers having any number of wheels, when propelled or intended to be propelled by attachment to a motor vehicle, shall be classified as separate motor vehicle with no power rating. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)[28] Statutes which are in pari materia may be independent or amendatory in form; they may be complete enactments dealing with a single, limited subject matter or sections of a code or revision; or they may be a combination of these. [2B N. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 140 (5th ed., 1992)]
From the definition cited by the Government which petitioners admit as authoritative, highways are always public, free for the use of every person. There is nothing in the law that requires a license to use a public highway to make the vehicle a "motor vehicle" within the definition given the anti-carnapping law. If a vehicle uses the streets with or without the required license, same comes within the protection of the law, for the severity of the offense is not to be measured by what kind of streets or highway the same is used; but by the very nature of the vehicle itself and the use to which it is devoted. Otherwise, cars using the streets but still unlicensed or unregistered as when they have just been bought from the company, or only on test runs, may be stolen without the penal sanction of the anti-carnapping statute, but only as simple robbery punishable under the provision of the Revised Penal Code. This obviously, could not have been the intention of the anti-carnapping law.[44] People v. Bali-balita, 340 SCRA 450, 469 (2000); People v. Banihit, 339 SCRA 86, 94 (2000); People v. Elamparo, 329 SCRA 404, 416 (2000); People v. Diaz, 320 SCRA 168, 175 (1999).
Going over the enumerations of excepted vehicle, it would readily be noted that any vehicle which is motorized using the streets which are public, not exclusively for private use, comes within the concept of motor vehicle. A tricycle which is not included in the exception, is thus deemed to be that kind of motor vehicle as defined in the law the stealing of which comes within its penal sanction. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Theft should not be confused with estafa. According to Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino in his book on the Revised Penal Code, “The principal distinction between the two crimes is that in theft the thing is taken while in estafa the accused receives the property and converts it to his own use or benefit. However, there may be theft even if the accused has possession of the property. If he was entrusted only with the material or physical (natural) or de facto possession of the thing, his misappropriation of the same constitutes theft, but if he has the juridical possession of the thing, his conversion of the same constitutes embezzlement or estafa. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citation omitted)Moreover, in People v. Isaac, 96 Phil. 931 (1955), this Court convicted a jeepney driver of theft and not estafa when he did not return the jeepney to its owner since the motor vehicle was in the juridical possession of its owner, although physically held by the driver. The Court reasoned that the accused was not a lessee or hirer of the jeepney because the Public Service Law and its regulations prohibit a motor vehicle operator from entering into any kind of contract with any person if by the terms thereof it allows the use and operation of all or any of his equipment under a fixed rental basis. The contract with the accused being under the “boundary system,” legally, the accused was not a lessee but only an employee of the owner. Thus, the accused’s possession of the vehicle was only an extension of the owner’s.
[58] Villacorta v. Insurance Commission, supra.
(1) In one robbery case, it was held that there must be permanency in the taking, or in the intent for the asportation, of the stolen property (People v. Kho Choc, CA, 50 O.G. 1667).
(2) In several theft cases, there were divided opinions, one line of cases holding that the intent of the taking was to permanently deprive the owner thereof (People v. Galang, CA, 43 O.G. 577; People v. Rico, CA, 50 O.G. 3103, cf. People v. Roxas, CA-G.R. No. 14953, Oct. 31, 1956). The contrary group of cases argued that there was no need for permanency in the taking or in its intent, as the mere disturbance of the proprietary rights of the owner was already apoderamiento (People v. Fernandez, CA, 38 O.G. 985; People v. Martisano, CA, 48 O.G. 4417).
(3) The second line of cases holding that there need be no intent to permanently deprive the owner of his property was later adopted by the Supreme Court, in construing the theft clause in an insurance policy, and ruling that there was criminal liability for theft even if the car was taken out only for a joyride but without the owner’s knowledge or consent. (Villacorta v. Insurance Comm., et al., G.R. No. 54171, Oct. 28, 1980; Ass’n of Baptists for World Evangelism v. Fieldmen’s Ins. Co, Inc., G.R. No. L-28772, Sept. 21, 1983). (Emphasis supplied)
Just like appellant Williams, she sought to buttress her aforesaid contention by lamenting the alleged failure of the State to present in the trial court her baggage declaration and the confiscation receipt involving these pieces of her baggage. In the first place, it was not the duty of the prosecution to present these alleged documents on which she relies for her defense. And, just as in the case of appellant Williams, it is a source of puzzlement why she never sought to compel either the prosecutors to produce the aforesaid documents which were allegedly in the possession of the latter or the customs office where such declarations are on file. Contrary to her argument hereon, since such pieces of evidence were equally available to both parties if sought by subpoena duces tecum, no presumption of suppression of evidence can be drawn, and these considerations likewise apply to the thesis of appellant Williams. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citation omitted)[64] People v. Simon, 234 SCRA 555, 574 (1994).