598 Phil. 464
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
That on or about the 7th day of June, 1999, in the City of Makati, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent of gain, and by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away complainant's NELIA R. SILVESTRE gold necklace worth P3,500.00, belonging to said complainant, to the damage and prejudice of the owner thereof in the aforementioned amount of P3,500.00.From the evidence for the prosecution, the following version is gathered:
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2] (Emphasis in the original, underscoring supplied)
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds accused PEDRO C. CONSULTA guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as principal of the felony of Robbery with Intimidation of Persons defined and penalized under Article 294, paragraph No. 5, in relation to Article 293 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment from one (1) year, seven (7) months and eleven (11) days of arresto mayor, as minimum, to eight (8) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances which attended the commission of the said crime.The appellate court affirmed appellant's conviction with modification on the penalty.
The said accused is further ordered to pay unto the complainant Nelia Silvestre the amount of P3,500.00 representing the value of her necklace taken by him and to pay the costs of this suit.
SO ORDERED. (Italics in the original, underscoring supplied)
The first two issues, which appellant raised before the appellate court only when he filed his Motion for Reconsideration of said court's decision, were resolved in the negative in this wise:
(1) Whether or not appellant was validly arraigned; (2) Whether or not appellant was denied due process having been represented by a fake lawyer during arraignment, pre-trial and presentation of principal witnesses for the prosecution;(3) Whether or not appellant has committed the crime of which he was charged; and (4) Whether or not the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. (Underscoring supplied)
On the matter of accused-appellant's claim of having been denied due process, an examination of the records shows that while accused-appellant was represented by Atty. Jocelyn P. Reyes, who "seems not a lawyer," during the early stages of trial, the latter withdrew her appearance with the conformity of the former as early as July 28, 2000 and subsequently, approved by the RTC in its Order dated August 4, 2000. Thereafter, accused-appellant was represented by Atty. Rainald C. Paggao from the Public Defender's (Attorney's) Office of Makati City. Since the accused-appellant was already represented by a member of the Philippine Bar who principally handled his defense, albeit unsuccessfully, then he cannot now be heard to complain about having been denied of due process.[3] (Underscoring supplied)That appellant's first counsel may not have been a member of the bar does not dent the proven fact that appellant prevented Nelia and company from proceeding to their destination. Further, appellant was afforded competent representation by the Public Attorneys' Office during the presentation by the prosecution of the medico-legal officer and during the presentation of his evidence. People v. Elesterio[4] enlightens:
"As for the circumstance that the defense counsel turned out later to be a non-lawyer, it is observed that he was chosen by the accused himself and that his representation does not change the fact that Elesterio was undeniably carrying an unlicensed firearm when he was arrested. At any rate, he has since been represented by a member of the Philippine bar, who prepared the petition for habeas corpus and the appellant's brief." (Underscoring supplied)On the third and fourth issues. Article 293 of the Revised Penal Code under which appellant was charged provides:
Art. 293. Who are guilty of robbery. - Any person who, with intent to gain, shall take any personal property belonging to another, by means of violence against or intimidation of any person, or using force upon anything, shall be guilt of robbery. (Italics in the original, underscoring supplied)Article 294, paragraph 5, under which appellant was penalized provides:
Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons - Penalties. - Any person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of any person shall suffer:The elements of robbery are thus: 1) there is a taking of personal property; 2) the personal property belongs to another; 3) the taking is with animus lucrandi; and 4) the taking is with violence against or intimidation of persons or with force upon things.
x x x x
- The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period in other cases. x x x (Citations omitted; italics in the original; underscoring supplied)
SEC. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. - An offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved, when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those constituting the latter.[9] (Italics in the original, underscoring supplied)Grave coercion, like robbery, has violence for one of its elements. Thus Article 286 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
"Art. 286. Grave coercions. - The penalty of prision correccional and a fine not exceeding six thousand pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, without authority of law, shall, by means of violence, threats or intimidation, prevent another from doing something not prohibited by law or compel him to do something against his will, whether it be right or wrong.The difference in robbery and grave coercion lies in the intent in the commission of the act. The motives of the accused are the prime criterion:
If the coercion be committed in violation of the exercise of the right of suffrage or for the purpose of compelling another to perform any religious act or to prevent him from exercising such right or from doing such act, the penalty next higher in degree shall be imposed." (Italics in the original; underscoring supplied)
"The distinction between the two lines of decisions, the one holding to robbery and the other to coercion, is deemed to be the intention of the accused. Was the purpose with intent to gain to take the property of another by use of force or intimidation? Then, conviction for robbery. Was the purpose, without authority of law but still believing himself the owner or the creditor, to compel another to do something against his will and to seize property? Then, conviction for coercion under Article 497 of the Penal Code. The motives of the accused are the prime criterion. And there was no common robber in the present case, but a man who had fought bitterly for title to his ancestral estate, taking the law into his own hands and attempting to collect what he thought was due him. Animus furandi was lacking."[10] (Italics in the original; citations omitted; underscoring supplied)The Court finds that by appellant's employment of threats, intimidation and violence consisting of, inter alia, uttering of invectives, driving away of the tricycle driver, and kicking of the tricycle, Nelia was prevented from proceeding to her destination.