386 Phil. 121
PER CURIAM:
That on or about the 12th day of September 1994, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused by means of force and intimidation, to wit: by then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously brought the undersigned complainant NHANETTE DELOS SANTOS y RIVERA, a minor, 13 years of age, to a vacant apartment located at General Avenue, Project 8, of this City, then forced her to lie down, undressed her, removed her panty, mashed her private parts, afterwhich accused put himself on top of her, and thereafter have carnal knowledge with the undersigned complainant against her will and without her consent (Rollo, p. 5).Nowhere in the Information is it alleged that accused-appellant is the step-father of the victim NHANETTE delos Santos. As we first stated in People v. Garcia (281 SCRA 463 [1997]), as reiterated in the recent case of People v. Bragas (G.R. No. 128874, September 24, 1999), "[t]his Court has successively ruled that the circumstances under the amendatory provisions of Section 11 of Republic Act 7659 the attendance of any which mandates the single indivisible penalty of death, instead of the standard penalty of reclusion perpetua to death prescribed in Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, are in the nature of qualifying circumstances." Qualifying circumstances must be properly pleaded in the indictment. As adverted to earlier, the Information filed against accused-appellant charged only the felony of simple rape and no attendant qualifying circumstance, specifically that of he being the step-father of the victim, was alleged. Obviously, the technical flaw committed by the prosecution in this instance is a matter that cannot be ignored, and it constrains the Court to reduce the penalty of death to that of reclusion perpetua, the penalty prescribed for simple rape. It must likewise be pointed out that accused-appellant's relationship to the victim, even if proved during the trial, cannot be considered as an aggravating circumstance to increase his liability as the penalty for simple rape is the single indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua (Article 63, Revised Penal Code).
The Court has had the opportunity to declare in a long line of cases that the tribunal retains control over a case until a full satisfaction of the final judgment conformably with established legal processes. It has the authority to suspend the execution of a final judgment or to cause a modification thereof as and when it becomes imperative in the higher interest of justice or when supervening events warrant it.Moreover, our ruling in Garcia forms part of our penal statutes, pursuant to Article 8 of the Civil Code which provides that "judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law shall form part of the legal system of the land." And since Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same," the Garcia doctrine must perforce, be given retroactive effect in this case, said ruling being favorable to accused-appellant, who is not a habitual criminal.