815 Phil. 123
MARTIRES, J.:
a) | G.R. Nos. 144760-61, filed by Evelyn L. Miranda (Miranda), is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition pursuant to Rule 65, Sections 1, 2 and 4 in relation to Sec. 1 Rule 58 of the Rules of Court on the 14 August 2000 Resolution[1] of the Sandiganbayan denying her motion to quash the Informations; |
b) | G.R. Nos. 167311-12 and G.R. Nos. 167625-26, filed by Miranda and Primo C. Obenza (Obenza), respectively, are Appeals by Certiorari pursuant to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court on the 10 January 2005 Decision[2] of the Sandiganbayan finding the accused in Criminal Case Nos. 23625-26, except Exuperia B. Austero (Austero), guilty of Violation of Sec. 3(g) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, and its 7 March 2005 Resolution[3] denying the separate Motion for Reconsideration of Obenza, Miranda, and Venancio R. Nava (Nava); and |
c) | G.R. Nos. 167316-17, filed by Nava, is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court on the above-mentioned 10 January 2005 Decision and 7 March 2005 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan. |
During the hearing of these cases, the prosecution presented Soriano who identified the report.Criminal Case No. 23625
That sometime on 16 November 1990, in Mati, Davao Oriental, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused VENANCIO R. NAVA, PRIMO C. OBENZA and EXUPERIA B. AUSTERO, all public officers being then the Regional Director Department of Education, Culture and Sports, Region XI Davao City and a high ranking official by express provision of RA 7975, Division Superintendent of DECS Division of Davao Oriental with salary grade below 27 and Administrative Officer of DECS Division of Davao Oriental with salary grade below 27, respectively, committing the offense in relation to their official duties and taking advantage of the same, conspiring, confederating, and mutually aiding one another and with accused ANTONIO S. TAN and EVELYN S. MIRANDA, there and then, willfully, unlawfully and criminally, enter into a contract of purchase grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government, namely: BY PURCHASING from accused Miranda and Tan, the following goods under Purchase Order dated 16 November 1990 and Check No. 072108, to wit:or a unit price of P27.30, P163.50, P551.00 and P701.00, respectively, when the actual price of the said items per canvass by the Commission on Audit after considering the 10% price variance were only P14.30, P38.50, P93.50 and P90.75, respectively, thus the above-said procurements were overpriced by as much as 91% or P4,550.00; 325% or P31,250.00; 489% or P59,475.00; and 672% or P45,768.75, respectively, thus shortchanging the government by as much as P141,043.75.[8]
350 Units of Test Tube Glass Pyrex for P 9,555.00;250 Units of Glass Spirit Burner for 40,875.00;130 Units of Spring Balance for 71,630.00; and75 Units of Bunsen Burner for 52,575.00Criminal Case No. 23626
That sometime on 27 December 1990, in Mati, Davao Oriental, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused VENANCIO R. NAVA, PRIMO C. OBENZA and EXUPERIA B. AUSTERO, all public officers being then the Regional Director Department of Education, Culture and Sports, Region XI Davao City, a high ranking official by express provision of RA 7975, Division Superintendent of DECS Division of Davao Oriental with salary grade below 27 and Administrative Officer of DECS Division of Davao Oriental with salary grade below 27; respectively, committing the offense in relation to their official duties and taking advantage of the same, conspiring and confederating, and mutually aiding one another and with accused ANTONIO S. TAN and EVELYN L. MIRANDA, there and then, wilfully, unlawfully and criminally, enter into a contract of purchase grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government, namely: BY PURCHASING from accused Miranda and Tan, the following goods under Purchase Order dated 27 December 1990 and Check No. 073908, to wit:or a unit price of P112.20, P713.00, P16.20, and P125.03, respectively, when the actual price of the said items per recanvassed by the Commission on Audit after considering the 10% price variance, were only P8.80, P159.50, P16.20, and P125.03, thus, the said purchases were overpriced, by as much as 1,175% or P8,892.40, 374% or P245,754.00, 64% or P1,228.50, and 434% or P2,043.90, respectively, thus shortchanging the government by as much as P257,918.80.[9]
89 Units of Flusk Brush (Nylon) for P 4,488,00;;444 Units of Graduated Cylinder for P 316,572.00;195 Units of Iron Wire Gauge for P 3,159.00; and54 Units of Beaker 250 ml. pyrex for P 6,751.00
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered -Obenza, Miranda,[11] and Nava[12] filed their separate motion for reconsideration which were denied by the Sandiganbayan in its 7 March 2005 Resolution.[13]
- in Criminal Case No. 23625 - finding accused VENANCIO R. NAVA, PRIMO C. OBENZA, ANTONIO S. TAN and EVELYN MIRANDA guilty beyond reasonable doubt as charged and sentencing each of them to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) month as minimum to ten (10) years as maximum, and to suffer perpetual disqualification from public office, and to indemnify, jointly and severally, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines in the amount of P141,043.75 representing the losses that it suffered and to proportionately pay the costs;
- in Criminal Case No. 23626 - finding accused VENANCIO R. NAVA, PRIMO C. OBENZA, ANTONIO S. TAN and EVELYN MIRANDA guilty beyond reasonable doubt as charged and sentencing each of them to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) month as minimum to ten (10) years as maximum, and to suffer perpetual disqualification from public office, and to indemnify, jointly and severally, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines in the amount of P257,918.80 representing the losses that it suffered, and to proportionately pay the costs; and
- in both cases ACQUITTING accused EXUPERIA B. AUSTERO, for insufficiency of evidence, with costs de officio.[10]
On the other hand, Miranda anchored her petition in G.R. No. 167311-12 on the ground that "the [Sandiganbayan] had decided questions of substance in a way not in accord with law and the applicable decisions of this Honorable Court and/or [had] so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceeding[s] or so far sanctioned such a departure by the court a quo as to call for an exercise of the power of supervision vested in this Honorable Court."[15]
- Respondent Court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying the motion to quash;
- The disputed resolution was in great contravention of the principle of "stare decisis" and settled jurisprudence;
- The Respondent court should be immediately prohibited or restrained from further proceedings, in order not to render the subject petition moot and academic.[14]
Obenza, on the one hand, raised the following issues in G.R. No. 167625-26 to justify his prayer for the reversal of the Sandiganbayan's assailed decision and resolution:
- THE SANDIGANBAYAN COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO A LACK OF OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN UPHOLDING THE FINDINGS OF THE SPECIAL AUDIT TEAM THAT IRREGULARLY CONDUCTED THE AUDIT BEYOND THE AUTHORIZED PERIOD AND WHICH TEAM FALSIFIED THE SPECIAL AUDIT REPORT.
- THE SANDIGANBAYAN COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO A LACK OF OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN UPHOLDING THE FINDINGS IN THE SPECIAL AUDIT REPORT WHERE, IN VIOLATION OF PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS, THE AUDIT TEAM EGREGIOUSLY FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE MINIMUM STANDARDS SET BY THE SUPREME COURT AND ADOPTED BY THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, AND CAME OUT WITH A REPORT THAT SUPPRESSED EVIDENCE FAVORABLE TO THE PETITIONER.
- THE SANDIGANBAYAN COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO A LACK OF OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN UPHOLDING THE FINDINGS IN THE SPECIAL AUDIT REPORT CONSIDERING THAT NONE OF THE ALLEGEDLY OVERPRICED ITEMS FROM THE DIVISION OF DAVAO ORIENTAL WERE CANVASSED OR PURCHASED BY THE SPECIAL AUDIT TEAM SUCH THAT THERE IS NO COMPETENT EVIDENCE FROM WHICH TO DETERMINE THAT THERE WAS AN OVERPRICE AND THAT THE TRANSACTION WAS MANIFESTLY AND GROSSLY DISADVANTAGEOUS TO THE GOVERNMENT.
- THE SANDIGANBAYAN COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO A LACK OF OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN RULING THAT PETITIONER WAS ESTOPPED FROM QUESTIONING THE VALIDITY OF THE SPECIAL AUDIT REPORT.
- THE SANDIGANBAYAN COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO A LACK OF OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN REFUSING TO REVIEW THE MANNER IN WHICH THE FINDINGS IN THE SPECIAL AUDIT REPORT CAME ABOUT AS A BASIS FOR THE SANDIGANBAYAN TO DETERMINE THE CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF THE PETITIONER.
- THE SANDIGANBAYAN COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO A LACK OF OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE SELF-SERVING AND PERJURIOUS TESTIMONY OF CO-ACCUSED PRIMO C. OBENZA THAT THE QUESTIONED TRANSACTIONS EMANATED FROM THE REGIONAL OFFICE IN SPITE OF THE DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE WHICH PROVE THAT THE TRANSACTIONS EMANATED FROM THE DIVISION OFFICE OF DAVAO ORIENTAL HEADED BY CO-ACCUSED OBENZA.
- THE SANDIGANBAYAN COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO A LACK OF OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN FINDING THAT PETITIONER PRE-SIGNED THE PROCUREMENT DOCUMENTS CONSIDERING THAT THERE IS NO DOCUMENTARY PROOF OF SUCH PRE-SIGNING AND WHERE THE TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE IS OBVIOUSLY CONTRIVED.
- VIII. THE SANDIGANBAYAN COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO A LACK OF OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN FAILING TO ABSOLVE THE PETITIONER WHERE CONSPIRACY WAS NOT PROVEN.
- IX. THE SANDIGANBAYAN COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO A LACK OF OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN CONVICTING THE PETITIONER IN THE ABSENCE OF PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.[16]
- The Public Respondent Honorable Sandiganbayan has palpably erred in ruling that Petitioner committed the crime found in Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019.
- The Public Respondent Honorable Sandiganbayan has palpably erred in ruling that there was conspiracy between Venancio R. Nava and the Petitioner.
- The Public Respondent Honorable Sandiganbayan has palpably erred in adamantly refusing to consider in favor of the Petitioner a case with similar facts arising from similar circumstances which have been finally decided by them, in consonance with the doctrine of stare decisis.
- The Public Respondent Honorable Sandiganbayan seriously erred in ruling that the Rule on judicial notice of a case decided by the same decision of the Honorable Sandiganbayan is not authorized in this case, which case is closely similar if not entirely the same in facts, offense charged and parties involved.
- The Public Respondent Sandiganbayan grievously erred in not acquitting herein Accused.[17]
The reason of the law in permitting appeal only from a final order or judgment, and not from interlocutory or incidental one, is to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single action, which must necessarily suspend the hearing and decision on the merits of the case during the pendency of the appeal. If such appeal were allowed, the trial on the merits of the case should necessarily be delayed for a considerable length of time, and compel the adverse party to incur unnecessary expenses; for one of the parties may interpose as many appeals as incidental questions may be raised by him and interlocutory orders rendered or issued by the lower court.[27]And third, Miranda failed to bring her petition within the jurisprudentially established exceptions where appeal would be inadequate and the special civil action of certiorari or prohibition may be allowed, viz: (1) when the court issued the order without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion; (2) when the interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief; (3) in the interest of a more enlightened and substantial justice; (4) to promote public welfare and public policy; and (5) when the cases have attracted nationwide attention, making it essential to proceed with dispatch in the consideration thereof.[28]
An act of a court or tribunal can only be considered as with grave abuse of discretion when such act is done in a "capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction." The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an "evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility." Furthermore, the use of a petition for certiorari is restricted only to "truly extraordinary cases wherein the act of the lower court or quasi-judicial body is wholly void." From the foregoing definition, it is clear that the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 can only strike an act down for having been done with grave abuse of discretion if the petitioner could manifestly show that such act was patent and gross. x x x[32]Nothing from Nava's petition will confirm the merits of his claim that the Sandiganbayan had acted in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise of its jurisdiction as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction when it rendered the assailed decision and resolution. Although Nava arrayed the issues in his petition with the alleged grave abuse of discretion by the Sandiganbayan, the truth is inescapably evident that these issues do not concern the resolution of errors of jurisdiction but of the alleged errors of judgment which the anti-graft court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction over Criminal Case Nos. 23625-26 and the person of Nava.
The office of the writ of certiorari has been reduced to the correction of defects of jurisdiction solely and cannot legally be used for any other purpose. It is truly an extraordinary remedy and, in this jurisdiction, its use is restricted to truly extraordinary cases — cases in which the action of the inferior court is wholly void; where any further steps in the case would result in a waste of time and money and would produce no result whatever; where the parties, or their privies, would be utterly deceived; where a final judgment or decree would be nought but a snare and a delusion, deciding nothing, protecting nobody, a judicial pretension, a recorded falsehood, a standing menace. It is only to avoid such results as these that a writ of certiorari is issuable; and even here an appeal will lie if the aggrieved party prefers to prosecute it.[40]On the second requisite, the remedy available to Nava was to appeal pursuant to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. As discussed earlier, the issues raised by Nava were undoubtedly errors of judgment for which both law and jurisprudence prescribe the remedy of appeal. Significantly, R.A. No. 8249,[41] which governs the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, pertinently states:
Section 7. Form, Finality and Enforcement of Decisions. - x x xThe afore-quoted is complimented by Part II, Rule X[42] of the Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan, viz:
x x x x
Decisions and final orders of the Sandiganbayan shall be appealable to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari raising pure questions of law in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. x x x.
Section 1. Method of Review. -As is clearly provided, the sole and proper remedy available to Nava in his quest to obtain a reversal of the decision and resolution of the Sandiganbayan was to appeal pursuant to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The existence and availability of the right of appeal prohibits the resort to certiorari because a requirement for the latter remedy is there should be no appeal.[43]
(a) In General - A party may appeal from a judgment or final order of the Sandiganbayan imposing or affirming a penalty less than death, life imprisonment or reclusion perpetua in criminal cases, and, in civil cases, by filing with the Supreme Court a petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 and a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 are mutually exclusive remedies. Certiorari cannot co-exist with an appeal or any other adequate remedy. The nature of the questions of law intended to be raised on appeal is of no consequence. It may well be that those questions of law will treat exclusively of whether or not the judgment or final order was rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. This is immaterial. The remedy is appeal, not certiorari as a special civil action.[45] (citations omitted)While this Court recognizes the importance of procedural rules in insuring the effective enforcement of substantive rights through the orderly and speedy administration of justice, we likewise take into consideration that at stake in these cases are the life and liberty of Nava who, in his earnestness to seek the reversal of the findings of the Sandiganbayan, filed his petition on the eleventh day after his receipt of the questioned resolution. Thus, it would only be proper to relax the rules considering that, in numerous cases, this Court had allowed the liberal construction of the rules when to do so would serve the demands of substantial justice and equity[46] as amply discussed in Aguam v. Court of Appeals:[47]
The court has discretion to dismiss or not to dismiss an appellant's appeal. It is a power conferred on the court, not a duty. The "discretion must be a sound one, to be exercised in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play, having in mind the circumstances obtaining in each case." Technicalities, however, must be avoided. The law abhors technicalities that impede the cause of justice. The court's primary duty is to render or dispense justice. "A litigation is not a game of technicalities." "Lawsuits unlike duels are not to be won by a rapier's thrust. Technicality, when it deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant consideration from courts." Litigations must be decided on their merits and not on technicality. Every party litigant must be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the unacceptable plea of technicalities. Thus, dismissal of appeals purely on technical grounds is frowned upon where the policy of the court is to encourage hearings of appeals on their merits and the rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense; rules of procedure are used only to help secure, not override substantial justice. It is a far better and more prudent course of action for the court to excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties a review of the case on appeal to attain the ends of justice rather than dispose of the case on technicality and cause a grave injustice to the parties, giving a false impression of speedy disposal of cases while actually resulting in more delay, if not a miscarriage of justice.[48]b) The Petitions of Nava, Obenza and Mendoza
A. DECENTRALIZATION OF NEGOTIATED CONTRACTSIn the same vein, not one of the aforementioned situations find their significance in these cases in order to excuse these transactions from public bidding and to allow resort to a negotiated procurement.
Sec. 1. Guidelines for Negotiated Contracts. Any provision of law, decree, executive order or other issuances to the contrary notwithstanding, no contract for public services or for furnishing supplies, materials and equipment to the government or any of its branches, agencies or instrumentalities shall be renewed or entered into without public bidding, except under any of the following situations:
- Whenever the supplies are urgently needed to meet an emergency which may involve the loss of, or danger to, life and/or property;
- Whenever the supplies are to be used in connection with a project or activity which cannot be delayed without causing detriment to the public service;
- Whenever the materials are sold by an exclusive distributor or manufacturer who does not have subdealers selling at lower prices and for which no suitable substitute can be obtained elsewhere at more advantageous terms to the government;
- Whenever the supplies under procurement have been unsuccessfully placed on bid for at least two consecutive times, either due to lack of bidders or the offers received in each instance were exorbitant or non-conforming to specifications;
- In cases where it is apparent that the requisition of the needed supplies through negotiated purchase is most advantageous to the government to be determined by the Department Head concerned;
- Whenever the purchase is made from an agency of the government.
The presence of the first and second elements is settled. As to the third, the Sandiganbayan primarily anchored on the report and the testimony of Soriano its declaration that the subject transactions were grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government. It ruled that based on the re-canvass conducted by the team on the eight (8) items involved in the transactions, the prices of the SLTDs procured from D'Implacable exceeded the prevailing market prices by as much as 64% to 1,175%; thus, were overpriced.[60]
a) the accused is a public officer; b) that he entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government; and c) that such contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government.[59]
3.3. EXCESSIVE EXPENDITURESThe report enumerated the procedure allegedly undertaken by the team in determining the prices of the SLTDs, viz:
Definition: The term "excessive expenditures" signifies unreasonable expense or expenses incurred at an immoderate quantity and exorbitant price. It also includes expenses which exceed what is usual or proper as well as expenses which are unreasonably high, and beyond just measure or amount. They also include expenses in excess of reasonable limits.
OVERPRICINGA review of the exhibits attached to the report readily evinced that, contrary to the team's claim, no samples of the SLTDs were actually obtained from DECS-Davao Oriental, the subject of its audit. Exhibits 1[62] and 2[63] referred to in 1.6.1 of the report were the Memorandum Receipt for Equipment, Semi-Expandable and Expandable Property, respectively, issued by the Schools Division Superintendent of Digos, Davao del Sur, and Davao City, for the SLTDs received by the team and which were intended to be used for the canvass; while Exhibit 3[64] was the Invoice-Receipt for Property issued by the Superintendent of Tagum, Davao Province.
1.6. To determine the reasonableness of the prices paid for by the Division Office on the purchase of SLTDs, the team performed the following audit procedure:1.6.1. Obtained samples of each laboratory tool and devices purchased by the Division of Davao Oriental. Memorandum Receipts covering all the samples were issued by the agency to the audit team and are marked as Exhibits 1, 2 and 3 of this report.
1.6.2. Brought and presented these samples to reputable business establishments in Davao City like the Mercury Drug Store, Berovan Marketing Incorporated and Allied Medical Equipment and Supply Corporation (AMESCO) where these items are also available, for price verification.
1.6.3. Available items which were exactly the same as the samples presented were purchased from AMESCO and Berovan Marketing Incorporated, the business establishments which quoted the lowest prices. Official Receipts were issued by the AMESCO and Berovan Marketing Incorporated which are hereto marked as Exhibits 4, 5, 6 and 7, respectively.[61]
x x x [I]n the absence of the actual canvass sheets and/or price quotations from identified suppliers, a valid basis for outright disallowance of agency disbursements/cost estimates for government projects.Obviously, the element that the transaction must be grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government was not sustained by the testimonial and documentary evidence of the People. "Manifest" means that it is evident to the senses, open, obvious, notorious, unmistakable, etc.[73] "Gross" means "flagrant, shameful, such conduct as is not to be excused."[74] On the one hand, "disadvantageous" is defined as unfavorable, prejudicial.[75] Assessed against these definitions, we cannot see how the assailed transactions in these cases could have been disadvantageous to the government when, at the very least, the evidence of the prosecution only confirmed that sample SLTDs were secured by the team from three different divisions of Region XI, but not from DECS-Davao Oriental which was the subject of its audit; and that SLTDs, at a unit each, were purchased from Berovan and AMESCO.
A more humane procedure, and totally conformable to the due process clause, is for the COA representative to allow the members of the Contracts Committee mandatory access to the COA source documents/canvass sheets. Besides, this gesture would have been in keeping with COA's own Audit Circular No. 85-55-A par. 2.6, that:
x x x As regards excessive expenditures, they shall be determined by place and origin of goods, volume or quantity of purchase, service warranties/quality, special features of units purchased and the like. x x x
By having access to source documents, petitioners could then satisfy themselves that COA guidelines/rules on excessive expenditures had been observed. The transparency would also erase any suspicion that the rules had been utilized to terrorize and/or work injustice, instead of ensuring a "working partnership" between COA and the government agency, for the conservation and protection of government funds, which is the main rationale for COA audit.
x x x x
We agree with petitioners that COA's disallowance was not sufficiently supported by evidence, as it was premised purely on undocumented claims, as in fact petitioners were denied access to the actual canvass sheets or price quotations from accredited suppliers. x x x
x x x x
It was incumbent upon the COA to prove that its standards were met in its audit disallowance. The records do not show that such was done in this case.
x x x [A]bsent due process and evidence to support COA's disallowance, COA's ruling on petitioner's liability has no basis.[72]