865 Phil 400
LEONEN, J.:
If the application is approved, the firearm license card is delivered through Werfast Documentary Agency, a courier service, instead of having it picked up at Camp Crame or in the regional offices of the Philippine National Police.[4]CONSENT OF VOLUNTARY PRESENTATION FOR INSPECTION
I hereby undertake to renew the registration of my firearm/s on or before the expiration of the same; that, pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 10591, I voluntarily give my consent and authorize the PNP to inspect my firearm/s described above at my residence/address as indicated in my application and, to confiscate or forfeit the same in favor of the government for failure to renew my firearm/s registration within six (6) months before the date of its expiration.[3]
a) | Sections 4(g),[6] 10,[7] 26,[8] and 39 (a),[9] all of Republic Act No. 10591; |
b) | Sections 4.4(a),[10] 4.10(b),[11] 7.3,[12] 7.9,[13] 7.11.2(b),[14] 7.12(b),[15] 10.3,[16] 26.3,[17] 26.4,[18] and 39(1)(a)[19] of the 2013 Implementing Rules and Regulations; and |
c) | The requirement of signing the Consent of Voluntary Presentation for Inspection in the pro forma application form for firearm registration, for violating Article III, Section 2[20] of the Constitution on the right against unreasonable searches and seizures.[21] |
a) | the centralization of all firearms licensing, renewal, and testing at the Philippine National Police Headquarters at Camp Crame, Quezon City, to the detriment of those who would be coming from places far from Metro Manila; |
b) | the requirement for applicants for a firearm license to waive their right to privacy and allow the police to enter their dwellings, in violation of Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution on the right against unreasonable searches and seizure; and |
c) | the outsourcing of the delivery of firearm license to a courier service, depriving the licensee of the right to use the firearm within the period from approval of the application to the actual date of delivery of the license card.[24] |
a) | The Philippine National Police's refusal or failure to establish regional and provincial offices where individual applicants may obtain the requirements for firearm licenses allegedly deprive Guns and Ammo Dealers' members of the profits from their firearm businesses, as they have no licensed customers to sell their firearms to. Many of the employees of gun dealers were likewise laid off due to losses from zero sales. |
b) | The Philippine National Police's refusal to accept and act on any firearm license application since January 2014 constitutes grave abuse of discretion.[30] |
c) | The centralization of firearms licensing in Camp Crame, Quezon City harms individual applicants from the provinces and in violation of their right to due process of law.[31] |
a) | The declaration that the firearm licenses issued under the old law are deemed vacated, and the requirement for all existing firearm holders to reapply for a new firearm license under Republic Act No. 10591 renders the latter an ex post facto law. The new law penalizes those who were validly holding licenses under the old law. |
b) | Exceeding its rule-making power, the Philippine National Police overregulated the firearm-related activities of gun clubs, sports shooters, reloaders, gunsmithing, competitions, and indentors. It also imposed numerous fees which are not authorized under Republic Act No. 10591. |
c) | The Philippine National Police added penal provisions m the Implementing Rules and Regulations, exercising a power exclusively vested in Congress. |
d) | The Philippine National Police drafted the Implementing Rules and Regulations without the required public consultation, in violation of Section 44 of Republic Act No. 10591.[42] |
SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.There is an actual case or controversy if it involves "a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution[.]"[52] The issues presented should be "definite and concrete, touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests."[53] Such is necessary for this Court to avoid giving advisory opinions, using its limited resources to resolve hypothetical cases or conjectural issues instead of properly devoting time to the more pressing and important cases for its resolution.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
Pertinently, a justiciable controversy refers to an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for judicial determination, not one that is conjectural or merely anticipatory. Corollary thereto, by "ripening seeds" it is meant, not that sufficient accrued facts may be dispensed with, but that a dispute may be tried at its inception before it has accumulated the asperity, distemper, animosity, passion, and violence of a full blown battle that looms ahead. The concept describes a state of facts indicating imminent and inevitable litigation provided that the issue is not settled and stabilized by tranquilizing declaration.Recently, in The Provincial Bus Operators Association of the Philippines v. Department of Labor and Employment,[61] this Court dismissed the petition filed by associations of provincial bus operators assailing the constitutionality of Department Order No. 118-12, which mandated the part fixed-part-performance-based compensation system for bus drivers and conductors. The petitioners alleged, first, that the compensation scheme "may [result] in [the] diminution of the income of ... bus drivers and conductors."[62] It also claimed that the compensation scheme was "unfit to the nature of operation of public transport system or business."[63]
A perusal of private respondents' petition for declaratory relief would show that they have failed to demonstrate how they are left to sustain or are in immediate danger to sustain some direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the assailed provisions of RA 9372. Not far removed from the factual milieu in the Southern Hemisphere cases, private respondents only assert general interests as citizens, and taxpayers and infractions which the government could prospectively commit if the enforcement of the said law would remain [untrammeled]. As their petition would disclose, private respondents' fear of prosecution was solely based on remarks of certain government officials which were addressed to the general public. They, however, failed to show how these remarks tended towards any prosecutorial or goverrnmental action geared towards the implementation of RA 9372 against them. In other words, there was no particular, real or imminent threat to any of them.[60] (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Even the expanded jurisdiction of this Court under Article VIII, Section 1 does not provide license to provide advisory opinions. An advisory opinion is one where the factual setting is conjectural or hypothetical. In such cases, the conflict will not have sufficient concreteness or adversariness so as to constrain the discretion of this Court. After all, legal arguments from concretely lived facts are chosen narrowly by the parties. Those who bring theoretical cases will have no such limits. They can argue up to the level of absurdity. They will bind the future parties who may have more motives to choose specific legal arguments. In other words, for there to be a real conflict between the parties, there must exist actual facts from which courts can properly determine whether there has been a breach of constitutional text.[64] (Emphasis in the original, citation omitted)Like the petitions in Southern Hemisphere, Roque, and The Provincial Bus Operators Association of the Philippines, the Petition in G.R. No. 211559 alleges no actual facts from which this Court can intelligently adjudicate the issues raised in it. Petitioners Acosta and Dela Paz assail the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 10591 because it allegedly violated their right to bear arms, their right to property, and even the right to presumption of innocence by disqualifying from holding a firearm license those who have committed a crime involving a firearm.[65] However, they did not show that their firearm licenses were revoked because of any of the provisions of the law or its Implementing Rules and Regulations.
1.) For taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure is unconstitutional;
2.) For voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law in question;
3.) For concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of transcendental importance which must be settled early; and
4.) For legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes their prerogatives as legislators.[77] (Emphasis in the original)
The liberality of this Court to grant standing for associations or corporations whose members are those who suffer direct and substantial injury depends on a few factors.
In all these cases, there must be an actual controversy. Furthermore, there should also be a clear and convincing demonstration of special reasons why the truly injured parties may not be able to sue.
Alternatively, there must be a similarly clear and convincing demonstration that the representation of the association is more efficient for the petitioners to bring. They must further show that it is more efficient for this Court to hear only one voice from the association. In other words, the association should show special reasons for bringing the action themselves rather than as a class suit, allowed when the subject matter of the controversy is one of common or general interest to many persons. In a class suit, a number of the members of the class are permitted to sue and to defend for the benefit of all the members so long as they are sufficiently numerous and representative of the class to which they belong.
In some circumstances similar to those in White Light, the third parties represented by the petitioner would have special and legitimate reasons why they may not bring the action themselves. Understandably, the cost to patrons in the White Light case to bring the action themselves-i.e., the amount they would pay for the lease of the motels-will be too small compared with the cost of the suit. But viewed in another way, whoever among the patrons files the case even for its transcendental interest endows benefits on a substantial number of interested parties without recovering their costs. This is the free rider problem in economics. It is a negative externality which operates as a disincentive to sue and assert a transcendental right.
In addition to an actual controversy, special reasons to represent, and disincentives for the injured party to bring the suit themselves, there must
be a showing of the transcendent nature of the right involved.
Only constitutional rights shared by many and requiring a grounded level of urgency can be transcendent....
As discussed, petitioners Acosta and Dela Paz assail the omission of engineers from Section 7.3[85] of the Implementing Rules and Regulations;[86] yet, they never alleged that they are engineers, the persons supposedly injured by Section 7.3. Neither did they allege that they were members of the Philippine National Police, the Armed Forces of the Philippines, or any law enforcement agency allegedly injured by Section 7.9 of the Implementing Rules.
This Court is not a forum to appeal political and policy choices made by the Executive, Legislative, and other constitutional agencies and organs. This Court dilutes its role in a democracy if it is asked to substitute its political wisdom for the wisdom of accountable and representative bodies where there is no unmistakable democratic deficit. It cannot lose this place in the constitutional order. Petitioners' invocation of our jurisdiction and the justiciability of their claims must be presented with rigor. Transcendental interest is not a talisman to blur the lines of authority drawn by our most fundamental law.[84] (Citation omitted)
Trial courts do not only determine the facts from the evaluation of the evidence presented before them. They are likewise competent to determine issues of law which may include the validity of an ordinance, statute, or even an executive issuance in relation to the Constitution. To effectively perform these functions, they are territorially organized into regions and then into branches. Their writs generally reach within those territorial boundaries. Necessarily, they mostly perform the all-important task of inferring the facts from the evidence as these are physically presented before them. In many instances, the facts occur within their territorial jurisdiction, which properly present the 'actual case' that makes ripe a determination of the constitutionality of such action. The consequences, of course, would be national in scope. There are, however, some cases where resort to courts at their level would not be practical considering their decisions could still be appealed before the higher courts, such as the Court of Appeals.In Gios-Samar, Inc. v. Department of Transportation and Communications,[91] this Court extensively discussed the evolution of this Court's original and concurrent jurisdiction which eventually led to the development of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. This Court then determined that the doctrine is, ultimately, a "constitutional filtering mechanism designed to enable the Court to focus on the more fundamental and essential tasks assigned to it by the highest law of the land":
The Court of Appeals is primarily designated as an appellate court that reviews the determination of facts and law made by the trial courts. It is collegiate in nature. This nature ensures more standpoints in the review of the actions of the trial court. But the Court of Appeals also has original jurisdiction over most special civil actions. Unlike the trial courts, its writs can have a nationwide scope. It is competent to determine facts and, ideally, should act on constitutional issues that may not necessarily be novel unless there are factual questions to determine.
This court, on the other hand, leads the judiciary by breaking new ground or further reiterating - in the light of new circumstances or in the light of some confusions of bench or bar - existing precedents. Rather than a court of first instance or as a repetition of the actions of the Court of Appeals, this court promulgates these doctrinal devices in order that it truly performs that role.[90] (Citation omitted)
Strict adherence to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts is an effective mechanism to filter the cases which reach the Court. As of December 31, 2016, 6,526 new cases were filed to the Court. Together with the reinstated/revived/reopened cases, the Court has a total of 14,491 cases in its docket. Of the new cases, 300 are raffled to the Court En Banc and 6,226 to the three Divisions of the Court. The Court En Banc disposed of 105 cases by decision or signed resolution, while the Divisions of the Court disposed of a total of 923 by decision or signed resolution.Here, to assail the constitutionality of some of the provisions of Republic Act No. 10591 and their corresponding provisions in the 2013 Implementing Rules and Regulations, petitioners filed actions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus-actions that could have been brought before a regional trial court.[93]
These, clearly, are staggering numbers. The Constitution provides that the Court has original jurisdiction over five extraordinary writs and by our rule-making power, we created four more writs which can be filed directly before us. There is also the matter of appeals brought to us from the decisions of lower courts. Considering the immense backlog facing the court, this begs the question: What is really the Court's work? What sort of cases deserves the Court's attention and time?
We restate the words of Justice Jose P. Laurel in Angara that the Supreme Court is the final arbiter of the Constitution. Hence, direct recourse to us should be allowed only when the issue involved is one of law. However, and as former Associate Justice Vicente V. Mendoza reminds, the Court may still choose to avoid passing upon constitutional questions which are confessedly within its jurisdiction if there is some other ground on which its decision may be based. The so-called "seven pillars of limitations of judicial review" or the "rules of avoidance" enunciated by US Supreme Court Justice Brandeis in his concurring opinion in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority teaches that:1. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of legislation in a friendly, non-adversary proceeding, declining because to decide such questions "is legitimate only in the last resort, and as a necessity in the determination of real, earnest and vital controversy between individuals. It never was the thought that, by means of a friendly suit, a party beaten in the legislature could transfer to the courts an inquiry as to the constitutionality of the legislative act."Meanwhile, in Francisco, Jr. v. Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Filipino, Inc., the Court summarized the foregoing "pillars" into six categories and adopted "parallel guidelines" in the exercise of its power of judicial review, to wit:
2. The Court will not "anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it." "It is not the habit of the Court to decide questions of a constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the case."
3. The Court will not "formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied."
4. The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question, although properly presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of. This rule has found most varied application. Thus, if a case can be decided on either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a question of statutory construction or general law, the Court will decide only the latter. Appeals from the highest court of a state challenging its decision of a question under the Federal Constitution are frequently dismissed because the judgment can be sustained on an independent state ground.
5. The Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon complaint of one who fails to show that he is injured by its operation. Among the many applications of this rule, none is more striking than the denial of the right of challenge to one who lacks a personal or property right. Thus, the challenge by a public official interested only in the performance of his official duty will not be entertained. In Fairchild v. Hughes, the Court affirmed the dismissal of a suit brought by a citizen who sought to have the Nineteenth Amendment declared unconstitutional. In Massachusetts v. Mellon, the challenge of the federal Maternity Act was not entertained although made by the Commonwealth on behalf of all its citizens.
6. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute at the instance of one who has availed himself of its benefits.
7. "When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided." ...The foregoing "pillars" of limitation of judicial review, summarized in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority from different decisions of the United States Supreme Court, can be encapsulated into the following categories:Thus, the exercise of our power of judicial review is subject to these four requisites and the further requirement that we can only resolve pure questions of law. These limitations, when properly and strictly observed, should aid in the decongestion of the Court's workload.[92] (Citations omitted)As stated previously, parallel guidelines have been adopted by this Court in the exercise of judicial review:
- that there be absolute necessity of deciding a case
- that rules of constitutional law shall be formulated only as required by the facts of the case
- that judgment may not be sustained on some other ground
- that there be actual injury sustained by the party by reason of the operation of the statute
- that the parties are not in estoppel
- that the Court upholds the presumption of constitutionality.
- actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power;
- the person challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement;
- the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity;
- the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
On the alleged breach of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, suffice it to say that the doctrine is not an iron-clad dictum. In several instances where this Court was confronted with cases of national interest and of serious implications, it never hesitated to set aside the rule and proceed with the judicial determination of the cases. The case at bar is of similar import as it involves the citizens' right to bear arms.[98] (Citation omitted)
It is true that under our constitutional system, the powers of government are distributed among three coordinate and substantially independent departments: the legislative, the executive and the judiciary. Each has exclusive cognizance of the matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere.Under Republic Act No. 10591, the authority to issue firearms licenses and permits to carry them outside of residence remains with the Philippine National Police. Section 44 specifically authorized the Chief of the Philippine National Police to promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to effectively implement the law:
Pertinently, the power to make laws-the legislative power-is vested in Congress. Congress may not escape its duties and responsibilities by delegating that power to any other body or authority. Any attempt to abdicate the power is unconstitutional and void, on the principle that "delegata potestas non potest delegari" - "delegated power may not be delegated."
The rule which forbids the delegation of legislative power, however, is not absolute and inflexible. It admits of exceptions. An exception sanctioned by immemorial practice permits the legislative body to delegate its licensing power to certain persons, municipal corporations, towns, boards, councils, commissions, commissioners, auditors, bureaus and directors. Such licensing power includes the power to promulgate necessary rules and regulations.
The evolution of our laws on firearms shows that since the early days of our Republic, the legislature's tendency was always towards the delegation of power. Act No. 1780, delegated upon the Governor-General (now the President) the authority (1) to approve or disapprove applications of any person for a license to deal in firearms or to possess the same for personal protection, hunting and other lawful purposes; and (2) to revoke such license any time. Further, it authorized him to issue regulations which he may deem necessary for the proper enforcement of the Act. With the enactment of Act No. 2711, the "Revised Administrative Code of 1917," the laws on firearms were integrated. The Act retained the authority of the Governor General provided in Act No. 1780. Subsequently, the growing complexity in the Office of the Governor-General resulted in the delegation of his authority to the Chief of the Constabulary. On January 21, 1919, Acting Governor-General Charles E. Yeater issued Executive Order No. 8 authorizing and directing the Chief of Constabulary to act on his behalf in approving and disapproving applications for personal, special and hunting licenses. This was followed by Executive Order No. 61 designating the Philippine Constabulary (PC) as the government custodian of all firearms, ammunitions and explosives. Executive Order No. 215, issued by President Diosdado Macapagal on December 3, 1965, granted the Chief of the Constabulary, not only the authority to approve or disapprove applications for personal, special and hunting license, but also the authority to revoke the same. With the foregoing developments, it is accurate to say that the Chief of the Constabulary had exercised the authority for a long time. In fact, subsequent issuances such as Sections 2 and 3 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Presidential Decree No. 1866 perpetuate such authority of the Chief of the Constabulary. Section 2 specifically provides that any person or entity desiring to possess any firearm "shall first secure the necessary permit/license/authority from the Chief of the Constabulary." With regard to the issuance of PTCFOR, Section 3 imparts: "The Chief of Constabulary may, in meritorious cases as determined by him and under such conditions as he may impose, authorize lawful holders of firearms to carry them outside of residence." These provisions are issued pursuant to the general power granted by P.D. No. 1866 empowering him to promulgate rules and regulations for the effective implementation of the decree. At this juncture, it bears emphasis that P.D. No. 1866 is the chief law governing possession of firearms in the Philippines and that it was issued by President Ferdinand E. Marcos in the exercise of his legislative power.
....
By virtue of Republic Act No. 6975, the Philippine National Police (PNP) absorbed the Philippine Constabulary (PC). Consequently, the PNP Chief succeeded the Chief of the Constabulary and, therefore, assumed the latter's licensing authority. Section 24 thereof specifies, as one of PNP's powers, the issuance of licenses for the possession of firearms and explosives in accordance with law. This is in conjunction with the PNP Chiefs "power to issue detailed implementing policies and instructions" on such "matters as may be necessary to effectively carry out the functions, powers and duties" of the PNP.[100] (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)
SECTION 44. Implementing Rules and Regulations. - Within one hundred twenty (120) days from the effectivity of this Act, the Chief of the PNP, after public hearings and consultation with concerned sectors of society, shall formulate the necessary rules and regulations for the effective implementation of this Act to be published in at least two (2) national newspapers of general circulation.Still, to validly exercise their quasi-legislative powers, administrative agencies must comply with two (2) tests: (1) the completeness test; and (2) the sufficient standard test.
If the Implementing Rules and Regulations were indeed in the nature of an ex post facto law, then private individuals who possess Class-A light weapons under the old law must be expressly punished under the new law because the new law only allows them to own and possess small arms. Yet, as expressly provided in the law, existing license holders of Class-A light weapons may renew their licenses under the new law and Implementing Rules.
Republic Act No. 10591 Implementing Rules (2013) SECTION 10. Firearms That May Be Registered. - Only small arms may be registered by licensed citizens or licensed juridical entities for ownership, possession and concealed carry. A light weapon shall be lawfully acquired or possessed exclusively by the AFP, the PNP and other law enforecement agencies authorized by the President in the performance of their duties: Provide, That private individuals who already have license to possess Class-A light weapons upon the effectiviy of this Act shall not be deprived of the privilege to continue possessing the same and renewing the licenses therefor, for the sole reason that these firearms are Class "A" light weapons, and shall be required to comply with other applicable provisions of this Act. (Emphasis supplied) SECTION 10. Firearms That May Be Registered. -
10.1 Only small arms as defined in this IRR may be registered by licensed citizens or licensed juridical entities for ownership, possession and concealed carry.
10.2 A light weapon as defined in this IRR shall be lawfully acquired or possessed exclusively the AFP, the PNP and other law enforcement agencies authorized for such purpose by the President or by law that Congress may pass after the effectivity of this IRR.
10.3 Private individuals who are already licensed holders for Class-A light weapons as herein defined upon the effectivity of this IRR shall not be deprived of the lawful possession thereof, provided that they renew their licenses and firearm registration and they continue to possess the standard requirements mentioned in paragraphs 4.1 and 4. 4, in this IRR. (Emphasis supplied)
... The constant and multifarious problems arising from firearms related activities that the legislature may not have anticipated, demands that the[Philippine National Police] be allowed reasonable elbow-room in crafting the [Implementing Rules and Regulations], as well as ample latitude in determining the most effective and efficient measures to regulate such activities. Since statutes are usually couched in general terms, after expressing the policy, purposes, objectives, remedies, and sanctions intended by the legislature, the details and the manner of carrying out their policies are often best left to the administrative agency entrusted with its enforcement.[111] (Citation omitted)
When it comes to the penal provisions, the text of the Implementing Rules and Regulations is almost a carbon copy of the law from which it is based. If there is any discrepancy, it is in item (g), where the Implementing Rules omitted the acquisition or possession of ammunition for a Class-A light weapon as a punishable act. Still, contrary to PROGUN's claim, the Philippine National Police placed no additional penal provisions relating to firearms use in the Implementing Rules.
Republic Act No. 10591 Implementing Rules (2013) ARTICLE V
PENAL PROVISIONS RULE V
Penal Provisions
SECTION 28. Unlawful Acquisition, or Possession of Firearms and Ammunition. - The unlawful acquisition, possession of firearms and ammunition shall be penalized as follows:
(a) The penalty of prision mayor in its medium period shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully acquire or possess a small arm;
(b) The penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed if three (3) or more small arms or Class-A light weapons are unlawfully acquired or possessed by any person;
(c) The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully acquire or possess a Class-A light weapon;
(d) The penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully acquire or possess a Class-B light weapon;
(e) The penalty of one (1) degree higher than that provided in paragraphs (a) to (c) in this section shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully possess any firearm under any or combination of the following conditions:
(1) Loaded with ammunition or inserted with a loaded magazine;
(2) Fitted or mounted with laser or any gadget used to guide the shooter to hit the target such as thermal weapon sight (TWS) and the like;
(3) Fitted or mounted with sniper scopes, firearm muffler or firearm silencer;
(4) Accompanied with an extra barrel; and
(5) Converted to be capable of firing full automatic bursts.
(f) The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully acquire or possess a major part of a small arm;
(g) The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully acquire or possess ammunition for a small arm or Class-A light weapon. If the violation of this paragraph is committed by the same person charged with the unlawful acquisition or possession of a small arm, the former violation shall be absorbed by the latter;
(h) The penalty of prision mayor in its medium period shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully acquire or possess a major part of a Class-A light weapon;
(i) The penalty of prision mayor in its medium period shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully acquire or possess ammunition for a Class-A light weapon. If the violation of this paragraph is committed by the same person charged with the unlawful acquisition or possession of a Class-A light weapon, the former violation shall be absorbed by the latter;
(j) The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully acquire or possess a major part of a Class-B light weapon; and
(k) The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully acquire or possess ammunition for a Class-B light weapon. If the violation of this paragraph is committed by the same person charged with the unlawful acquisition or possession of a Class-B light weapon, the former violation shall be absorbed by the latter. (Emphasis supplied)
SECTION 28. Unlawful Acquisition or Possession of Firearms and Ammunition. -
The unlawful acquisition, possession of firearms and ammunition shall be penalized as follows:
a) The penalty of prision mayor in its medium period shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully acquire or possess a small arm;
b) The penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed if three (3) or more small arms or Class-A light weapons are unlawfully acquired or possessed by any person;
c) The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully acquire or possess a Class-A light weapon;
d) The penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully acquire or possess a Class-B light weapon;
e) The penalty of one (1) degree higher than that provided in paragraphs a) to (c) in this section shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully possess any firearm under any or combination of the following conditions:
1) Loaded with ammunition or inserted with a loaded magazine;
2) Fitted or mounted with laser or any gadget used to guide the shooter to hit the target such as thermal weapon sight (TWS) and the like;
3) Fitted or mounted with sniper scopes, firearm muffler or firearm silencer;
4) Accompanied with an extra barrel;
5) Converted to be capable of firing full automatic bursts.
f) The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully acquire or possess a major part of a small arm;
g) The penalty of prision mayor in its minimmn period shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully acquire or possess ammunition for a small arm. If the violation of this paragraph is
committed by the same person charged with the unlawful acquisition or possession of a small arm, the former violation shall be absorbed by the latter;
h) The penalty of prision mayor in its medium period shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully acquire or possess a major part of a Class-A light weapon;
i) The penalty of prision mayor in its medium period shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully acquire or possess ammunition for a Class-A light weapon. If the violation of this paragraph is committed by the same person charged with the unlawful acquisition or possession of a Class-A light weapon, the former violation shall be absorbed by the latter;
j) The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully acquire or possess a major part of a Class-B light weapon; and
k) The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully acquire or possess ammunition for a Class-B light weapon. If the violation of this paragraph is committed by the same person charged with the unlawful acquisition or possession of a Class-B light weapon, the former violation shall be absorbed by the latter. (Emphasis supplied)
SECTION 6. Ownership of Firearms by the National Government. - All firearms owned by the National Government shall be registered with the FEO of the PNP in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. Such registration shall be exempt from all duties and taxes that may otherwise be levied on other authorized owners of firearms. For reason of national security, firearms of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), Coast Guard and other law enforcement agencies shall only be reported to the FEO of the PNP.Section 7.9 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations does not violate Section 6 of Republic Act No. 10591. Consistent with Section 6 of the law, the requirements under Section 7.9 do not entail a disclosure by the applicant of the details of the government-issued firearm assigned to him or her:
SECTION 7. Carrying of Firearms Outside of Residence or Place of Business. -
....
7.9 Members of the PNP, AFP and other Law Enforcement Agencies must apply for a PTCFOR-LEA, in order to be authorized to carry the corresponding government-issued firearm outside of residence: a) The Police Regional Director or his equivalent in the AFP and other law enforcement agencies, shall endorse to the Chief, PNP all application for PTCFOR-LEA;
b) The application must be accompanied by the latest appointment order of the personnel applying for PTCFOR-LEA and a certificate of non-pending case duly issued for the purpose;
c) The PTCFOR-LEA shall be issued only by the Chief, PNP through PTCFOR-Secretariat and shall be valid only for one (1) year;
d)
The fees to be charged in the filing of application for PTCFOR-LEA shall only be in such minimal amount corresponding to the actual administrative cost necessary for the issuance of the permit, as may be determined by the PNP; and
e)
The PTCFOR-LEA should always be accompanied by the corresponding Memorandum Receipt/Acknowledgment Receipt of Equipment (MR/ARE)[.]
A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.This Court interpreted this omission to mean that in the Philippines, "no private person [was] bound to keep arms."[122] The bearing of arms was considered a mere option, and a citizen then desiring to obtain a firearm "must do so upon such terms as the Government sees fit to impose[.]"[123] In 1908, this Court in The Government of the Philippine Islands v. Amechazurra[124] stated:
[N]o private person is bound to keep arms. Whether he does or not is entirely optional with himself, but if, for his own convenience or pleasure, he desires to possess arms, he must do so upon such terms as the Government sees fit to impose, for the right to keep and bear arms is not secured to him by law. The Government can impose upon him such terms as it appear. If he is not satisfied with the terms imposed, he should decline to accept them, but, if for the purpose of securing possession of the arms he does agree to such conditions, he must fulfill them.[125]At present, the bearing of arms remains a "mere statutory privilege, not a constitutional right."[126] In the 2004 case of Chavez, decided during the effectivity of the present Constitution, this Court characterized the keeping and bearing of arms as a "mere statutory creation."[127] From our first firearms law, Act No. 1780 (1907),[128] to Act No. 2711 (1917),[129] then Presidential Decree No. 1866 (1983),[130] and finally, under the current Republic Act No. 10591, any person desiring to keep and bear arms must obtain a license from the State to avail of the privilege.
ARTICLE II
Ownership and Possession of Firearms
SECTION 4. Standards and Requisites for Issuance of and Obtaining a License to Own and Possess Firearms. - In order to qualify and acquire a license to own and possess a firearm or firearms and ammunition, the applicant must be a Filipino citizen, at least twenty-one (21) years old and has gainful work, occupation or business or has filed an Income Tax Return (ITR) for the preceding year as proof of income, profession, business or occupation.
In addition, the applicant shall submit the following certification issued by appropriate authorities attesting the following:
(a) The applicant has not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude; (b) The applicant has passed the psychiatric test administered by a PNP-accredited psychologist or psychiatrist; (c) The applicant has passed the drug test conducted by an accredited and authorized drug testing laboratory or clinic; (d) The applicant has passed a gun safety seminar which is administered by the PNP or a registered and authorized gun club; (e) The applicant has filed in writing the application to possess a registered firearm which shall state the personal circumstances of the applicant; (f) The applicant must present a police clearance from the city or municipality police office; and (g) The applicant has not been convicted or is currently an accused in a pending criminal case before any court of law for a crime that is punishable with a penalty of more than two (2) years.
For purposes of this Act, an acquittal or permanent dismissal of a criminal case before the courts of law shall qualify the accused thereof to qualify and acquire a license.
The applicant shall pay the reasonable licensing fees as may be provided in the implementing rules and regulations of this Act.
An applicant who intends to possess a firearm owned by a juridical entity shall submit his/her duty detail order to the FEO of the PNP.
SECTION 7. Carrying of Firearms Outside of Residence or Place of Business. - A permit to carry firearms outside of residence shall be issued by the Chief of the PNP or his/her duly authorized representative to any qualified person whose life is under actual threat or his/her life is in imminent danger due to the nature of his/her profession, occupation or business.
It shall be the burden of the applicant to prove that his/her life is under actual threat by submitting a threat assessment certificate from the PNP.
For purposes of this Act, the following professionals are considered to be in imminent danger due to the nature of their profession, occupation or business:
(a) Members of the Philippine Bar; (b) Certified Public Accountants; (c) Accredited Media Practitioners; (d) Cashiers, Bank Tellers; (e) Priests, Ministers, Rabbi, Imams; (f) Physicians and Nurses; (g) Engineers; and (h) Businessmen, who by the nature of their business or undertaking, are exposed to high risk of being targets of criminal elements.ARTICLE III
Registration and Licensing
....
SECTION 9. Licenses Issued to Individuals. - Subject to the requirements set forth in this Act and payment of required fees to be determined by the Chief of the PNP, a qualified individual may be issued the appropriate license under the following categories:
Type 1 license - allows a citizen to own and possess a maximum of two (2) registered firearms;
Type 2 license - allows a citizen to own and possess a maximum of five (5) registered firearms;
Type 3 license - allows a citizen to own and possess a maximum often (10) registered firearms;
Type 4 license - allows a citizen to own and possess a maximum of fifteen (15) registered firearms; and
Type 5 license - allows a citizen, who is a certified gun collector, to own and possess more than fifteen (15) registered firearms.
For Types 1 to 5 licenses, a vault or a container secured by lock and key or other security measures for the safekeeping of firearms shall be required.
For Types 3 to 5 licenses, the citizen must comply with the inspection and bond requirements.
It is settled that the license to possess a firearm is not property. In Chavez, then Chief of Police Hermogenes E. Ebdane, Jr., taking cue from a speech delivered by then President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, issued the Philippine National Police Guidelines suspending the issuance of permits to carry firearms outside of residence "to avert the rising crime incidents."[131] Francisco I. Chavez (Chavez), a licensed gun owner with a permit to carry a firearm outside of residence, petitioned this Court to void the Guidelines for allegedly violating his right to due process. He argued that "the ownership and carrying of firearms are constitutionally protected property rights which cannot be taken away without due process of law and without just cause."[132]ARTICLE III
Bill of Rights
SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
Section 2 recognizes that the right to self-defense is provided as a justifying circumstance under the Revised Penal Code.[143] However, this right to self-defense, if it is to be done through the use of firearms, is granted to "qualified citizens": those who have satisfied the qualifications for obtaining a license to own and possess firearms under Republic Act No. 10591. Therefore, even with the new law, the exercise of the right to use a firearm, even for self-defense, is still subject to State regulation.ARTICLE I
Title, Declaration of Policy and Definition of Terms
SECTION 2. Declaration of State Policy. - It is the policy of the State to maintain peace and order and protect the people against violence. The State also recognizes the right of its qualified citizens to self-defense through, when it is the reasonable means to repel the unlawful aggression under the circumstances, the use of firearms. Towards this end, the State shall provide for a comprehensive law regulating the ownership, possession, carrying, manufacture, dealing in and importation of firearms, ammunition, or parts thereof, in order to provide legal support to law enforcement agencies in their campaign against crime, stop the proliferation of illegal firearms or weapons and the illegal manufacture of firearms or weapons, ammunition and parts thereof. (Emphasis supplied)
Counsel's contention seems to be based on those provisions of the Philippine Bill of Rights which prohibit the enactment of a law depriving any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or denying to any person the equal protection of the laws. He insists that restrictions placed on the carrying of deadly weapons have the effect of depriving the owner of the free use and enjoyment of his property, and that the granting of licenses to some persons to carry firearms and the denial of that right to others is a denial to the latter of the equal protection of the laws.In Chavez, this Court reiterated that "laws regulating the acquisition or possession of guns have frequently been upheld as reasonable exercise of the police power."[152]
Both the statute in question and the provision of the Philippine Bill of Rights with which it is claimed it is in conflict were enacted under American sovereignty, and both are to be construed more especially in the light of American authority and precedent. The earliest English statute (St. 2 Edw. III, c. 3) regulating the bearing of arms, enacted in the year 1328 A. D., was but an affirmation of the common law offense of going around with unusual and dangerous weapons to the terror of the people. Many statutes have been enacted since that time in England and the United States, regulating the carrying and the use of weapons, and these have, as a rule, been held to be constitutional, especially when the prohibitions have been directed to the wearing or carrying of deadly weapons in a concealed manner. (See 48 Cent. Digest, tit. Weapons, and, many cases there cited.)
There can be no real question as to the police power of the state to regulate the use of deadly weapons for the purpose of suppressing or restraining crime and lawlessness. Undoubtedly there are many deadly weapons, such as knives, bolos, krises and the like which every citizen has a right to own and to use in the various activities of human life. But the right to own and to, use such weapons does not carry with it the right to use them to the injury of his neighbor or so as to endanger the peace and welfare of the community. "It is a settled principle, growing out of the nature of well-ordered civil society, that every holder of property, however absolute and unqualified may be his title, holds it under his implied liability that his use of it may be so regulated that it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having an equal right to the enjoyment of their property, nor injurious to the rights of the community." [(]Com. vs. Alger, 7 Cush. (Mass.), 53, 84.) Provided the means adopted are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the end in view, not unduly oppressive upon individuals, and in the interest of the public generally rather than of a particular class, the legislature may adopt such regulations as it deems proper restricting, limiting, and regulating the use of private property in the exercise of its police power. (U S. vs. Toribio, 15 Phil. Rep., 85.)
We think there can be no question as to the reasonableness of a statutory regulation prohibiting the carrying of concealed weapons as a police measure well calculated to restrict the too frequent resort to such weapons in moments of anger and excitement. We do not doubt that the strict enforcement of such a regulation would tend to increase the security of life and limb, and to suppress crime and lawlessness, in any community wherein the practice of carrying concealed weapons prevails, and this without being unduly oppressive upon the individual owners of these weapons. It follows that its enactment by the legislature is a proper and legitimate exercise of the police power of the state.[151] (Emphasis in the
original)
It is apparent from the assailed Guidelines that the basis for its issuance was the need for peace and order in the society. Owing to the proliferation of crimes, particularly those committed by the New People's Army (NPA), which tends to disturb the peace of the community, President Arroyo deemed it best to impose a nationwide gun ban. Undeniably, the motivating factor in the issuance of the assailed Guidelines is the interest of the public in general.Like the assailed Guidelines in Chavez, Republic Act No. 10591, which regulates the use of firearms, is a valid police power measure. The maintenance of peace and order and the protection of people from violence are not only for the good of the general public; they are fundamental duties of the State, the fulfillment of which strengthens its legitimacy. The means employed to fulfill these State duties-requiring a license for the ownership and possession of firearms and a permit to carry the weapon outside of residence-are reasonably necessary. As discussed, licenses to operate firearms have been required under the old firearms laws. For Congress, stricter gun laws are effective in reducing gun-related violence.
The only question that can then arise is whether the means employed are appropriate and reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and are not unduly oppressive. In the instant case, the assailed Guidelines do not entirely prohibit possession of firearms. What they proscribe is merely the carrying of firearms outside of residence. However, those who wish to carry their firearms outside of their residences may reapply for a new PTCFOR. This we believe is a reasonable regulation. If the carrying of firearms is regulated, necessarily, crime incidents will be curtailed. Criminals carry their weapon to hunt for their victims; they do not wait in the comfort of their homes. With the revocation of all PTCFOR, it would be difficult for criminals to roam around with their guns. On the other hand, it would be easier for the PNP to apprehend them.
Notably, laws regulating the acquisition or possession of guns have frequently been upheld as reasonable exercise of the police power. In State vs. Reams, it was held that the legislature may regulate the right to bear arms in a manner conducive to the public peace. With the promotion of public peace as its objective and the revocation of all PTCFOR as the means, we are convinced that the issuance of the assailed Guidelines constitutes a reasonable exercise of police power.[155] (Citations omitted)
Republic Act No. 10591 Implementing Rules (2013) SECTION 4. Standards and Requisites for Issuance of and Obtaining a License to Own and Possess Firearms. - In order to qualify and acquire a license to own and possess a firearm or firearms and ammunition, the applicant must be a Filipino citizen, at least twenty-one (21) years old and has gainful work, occupation or business or has filed an Income Tax Return (ITR) for the preceding year as proof of income, profession, business or occupation.
In addition, the applicant shall submit the following certification issued by appropriate authorities attesting the following:
....
(g) The applicant has not been convicted or is currently an accused in a pending criminal case before any court of law for a crime that is punishable with a penalty of more than two (2) years.
For purposes of this Act, an acquittal or permanent dismissal of a criminal case before the courts of law shall qualify the accused thereof to qualify and acquire a license.
SECTION 4. Standards Requisites for Issuance of and Obtaining a License to Own and Possess Firearms. - ....
....
4.4 The written application to own and possess firearm/s shall be filed at the FEO, in three (3) legible copies duly notarized, and must be accompanied by the original copy of the following requirements:
a) Clearances issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and Municipal/Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) that has jurisdiction over the place where the applicant resides and/or the Sandiganbayan as the case may be, showing that he/she has not been convicted by final judgment of a crime involving moral turpitude or that he/she has not been convicted or is currently an accused in any pending criminal case before any court of law for a crime that is punishable with a penalty of more than two (2) years[.]
SECTION 7. Carrying of Firearms Outside of Residence or Place of Business....Keeping the firearm secured in the compartment of a vehicle or motorcycle is consistent with the prohibition on displaying the firearm.[158] It also prevents firearms owners from impulsively using their firearms in cases of altercation.
....
7.11 The following guidelines regarding the manner of carrying firearms shall be observed:
....
7.11.2 For All Other Persons (including members of the PNP, AFP and other LEAs in civilian attire)
....
b) The firearm must be secured inside a vehicle or a motor cycle compartment.
7.12 The following other restriction shall likewise be observed:
....
b) The firearm shall not be brought inside places of worship, public drinking and amusement places and all other commercial or public establishment.
Republic Act No. 10591 Implementing Rules (2013) SECTION 10. Firearms That May Be Registered. - Only small arms may be registered by licensed citizens or licensed juridical entities for ownership, possession and concealed carry. A light weapon shall be lawfully acquired or possessed exclusively by the AFP, the PNP and other law enforcement agencies authorized by the President in the performance of their duties: Provided, That private individuals who already have licenses to possess Class-A light weapons upon the effectivity of this Act shall not be deprived of the privilege to continue possessing the same and renewing the licenses therefor, for the sole reason that these firearms are Class "A" light weapons, and shall be required to comply with other applicable provisions of this Act. SECTION 10. Firearms That May Be Registered. -
10.1 Only small arms as defined in this IRR may be registered by licensed citizens or licensed juridical entities for ownership, possession and concealed carry.
10.2 A light weapon as defined in this IRR shall be lawfully acquired or possessed exclusively by the AFP, the PNP and other law enforcement agencies authorized for such purpose by the President or by law that Congress may pass after the effectivity ofthis IRR.
10.3 Private individuals who are already licensed holders for Class-A light weapons as herein defined upon the effectivity of this IRR shall not be deprived of the lawful possession thereof, provided that they renew their licenses and firearm registration and they continue to possess the standard requirements mentioned in paragraphs 4.1 and 4.4, in this IRR.
... Section 10 of RA 10591 is a legitimate exercise of police power by the State. In the wrong hands, Class-A Light Weapons, with their capability to inflict multiple injuries to a large number of people at a rate several times faster than small arms, are highly destructive instruments and pose serious threats to public safety. Thus, the limitation imposed by Section 10 of RA 10591 on the ownership and possession of Class-A Light weapons is a valid restraint on property rights aimed at fostering the common good.[162]Likewise, the prohibition on the transfer of firearms ownership through succession is a valid exercise of police power. Section 26 of Republic Act No. 10591 and its equivalent provision in the Implementing Rules and Regulations state:
Republic Act No. 10591 Implementing Rules (2013) SECTION 26. Death or Disability of Licensee. - Upon the death or legal disability of the holder of a firearm license, it shall be the duty of his/her next of kin, nearest relative, legal representative, or other person who shall knowingly come into possession of such firearm or ammunition, to deliver the same to the FEO of the PNP or Police Regional Office, and such firearm or ammunition shall be retained by the police custodian pending the issuance of a license and its registration in accordance with this Act. The failure to deliver the firearm or ammunition within six (6) months after the death or legal disability of the licensee shall render the possessor liable for illegal possession of the firearm. SECTION 26. Death or Disability of the Licensee. -
....
26.3 When a licensed citizen with registered firearm dies or become legally disabled, his/her next of kin, nearest relative, legal representative, or any other person who shall knowingly come into possession of the registered firearm shall cause the delivery of the same to the FEO or Police Regional Office or through the nearest police station which has jurisdiction over the licensee and/or the registered firearm.
26.4 In case of death or legal disability of the licensee, the next of kin, nearest relative, legal representative or any other person who shall knowingly come into possession of the registered firearm shall register the firearm/s provided he/she meets the standard requirements and qualifications in accordance with RA 10591 and its IRR.
. . . Article 776 of the Civil Code specifically provides that inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person which are not extinguished by his death. Thus, what the heirs can only inherit are the rights which are not extinguished by the decedent's death. Since the license to own and possess a firearm is only a privilege and is strictly personal to the firearm license holder, it is therefore not transmissible to the heirs of the former. In addition, they cannot interpret said provision so as to include practically everything owned by the decedent. Common sense dictates that things, articles, and belongings which are highly regulated and are prohibited by law such as contraband and drugs or those that have been already removed from private ownership, like Class-A light weapons, cannot be transmitted to the heirs by operation of law. If their interpretation is to be accepted, then a ridiculous situation would arise wherein the heirs, without intending to violate the applicable law, would be indiscriminately subjected to criminal prosecution for illegal possession of a firearm.[163]As to the automatic revocation of license if the registered firearm is used for the commission of a crime, Section 39(a) of Republic Act No. 10591 and its corresponding provision in the Implementing Rules and Regulations state:
Republic Act No. 10591 Implementing Rules (2013) SECTION 39. Grounds for
Revocation, Cancellation or Suspension of License or Permit. -
The Chief of the PNP or his/her authorized representative
may revoke, cancel or suspend a license or permit on the following grounds:
(a) Commission of a crime or offense involving the firearm, ammunition, of major parts thereof[.] SECTION 39. Grounds for
Revocation, Cancellation or Suspension of License or Permit. -
39.1 The Chief, PNP or his/her
authorized representative may revoke, cancel or suspend a
license or permit on the following grounds:
a) Commission of a crime or offense involving the firearm, ammunition or major parts or pendency of a criminal case involving the firearm, ammunition or major parts thereof[.]
Republic Act No. 10591 Implementing Rules (2013) SECTION 9. Licenses Issued to Individuals. - Subject to the requirements set forth in this Act and payment of required fees to be determined by the Chief of the PNP, a qualified individual may be issued the appropriate license under the following categories:
Type 1 license-allows a citizen to own and possess a maximum of two (2) registered firearms;
Type 2 license -allows a citizen to own and possess a maximum of five (5) registered firearms;
Type 3 license-allows a citizen to own and possess a maximum of ten (10) registered firearms;
Type 4 license -allows a citizen to own and possess a maximum of fifteen (15) registered firearms; and
Type 5 license -allows a citizen, who is a certified gun collector, to own and possess more than fifteen (15) registered firearms.
For Types 1 to 5 licenses, a vault or a container secured by lock and key or other security measures for the safekeeping of firearms shall be required.
For Types 3 to 5 licenses, the citizen must comply with the inspection and bond requirements. (Emphasis supplied) SECTION 9. Licenses Issued to Individuals. -
....
9.6 For Types 3 to 5 licenses, the licensed citizen must comply with the inspection requirements of the PNP. Failure on their part to comply with any of the requirements herein mentioned is a ground for the cancellation of license and/or registration.
In petitioners' view, this inspection is an unreasonable search prohibited in Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution and a violation of their right to privacy. Further, signing the Consent of Voluntary Presentation for Inspection would allegedly be an invalid waiver, as it is not given "freely, voluntarily, and knowingly"[164] by the applicant who would just sign it, lest the application not be approved.CONSENT OF VOLUNTARY PRESENTATION FOR INSPECTION
I hereby undertake to renew the registration of my firearm/s on or before the expiration of the same; that, pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 10591, I voluntarily give my consent and authorize the PNP to inspect my firearm/s described above at my residence/address as indicated in my application and, to confiscate or forfeit the same in favor of the government for failure to renew my firearm/s registration/s within six (6) months before the date of its expiration. (Emphasis supplied)
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.When the Americans arrived, Section 5 of the Philippine Bill of 1902 became effective here, generically providing that "the right to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated." The Philippine Autonomy Act, or the Jones Law of 1916, similarly provided in its Section 3 that "the right to be secured against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated."
With the enactment of the 1973 Constitution, the right against unreasonable searches and seizures was expanded to cover all such search and seizure "of whatever nature and for any purpose[.]" Its Article IV, Section 3 stated:ARTICLE III
Bill of Rights
SECTION 1....
....
(3) The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
The present Constitution provides the prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures in Article III, Section 2:ARTICLE IV
Bill of Rights
....
SECTION 3. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall not be violated, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
ARTICLE III
Bill of Rights
....
SECTION 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Indeed, the constitutional guarantee is not a blanket prohibition. Rather, it operates against "unreasonable" searches and seizures only. Conversely, when a search is "reasonable," Section 2, Article III of the Constitution does not apply. As to what qualifies as a reasonable search, the pronouncements of the U.S. Supreme Court, which are doctrinal in this jurisdiction, may shed light on the matter.A reduced expectation of privacy is the reason why the inspection of persons and their effects under routine inspections, such as those done in airports, seaports, bus terminals, malls, and similar public places, does not require a search warrant.[171] These routine inspections are considered reasonable searches, clearly done to ensure public safety.
In the seminal case of Katz v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the electronic surveillance of a phone conversation without a warrant violated the Fourth Amendment. According to the U.S. Supreme Court, what the Fourth Amendment protects are people, not places such that what a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his or her own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection in much the same way that what he or she seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected, thus:Because of the misleading way the issues have been formulated, the parties have attached great significance to the characterization of the telephone booth from which the petitioner placed his calls. The petitioner has strenuously argued that the booth was a "constitutionally protected area." The Government has maintained with equal vigor that it was not. But this effort to decide whether or not a given "area," viewed in the abstract, is "constitutionally protected" deflects attention from the problem presented by this case. For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. See Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 210; United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected. See Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253; Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733....Further, Justice John Harlan laid down in his concurring opinion the two-part test that would trigger the application of the Fourth Amendment. First, a person exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy. Second, the expectation is one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable (objective).
The prohibition of unreasonable search and seizure ultimately stems from a person's right to privacy. Hence, only when the State intrudes into a person's expectation of privacy, which society regards as reasonable, is the Fourth Amendment triggered. Conversely, where a person does not have an expectation of privacy or one's expectation of privacy is not reasonable to society, the alleged State intrusion is not a "search" within the protection of the Fourth Amendment.[170] (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)
The poorest man may, in his cottage, bid defiance to all the forces of the Crown. It may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may blow through it; the storm may enter; the rain may enter, but the King of England may not enter; all his force dare not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement.[173]Article 10 of the Malolos Constitution of 1899 even provided that, save for some exceptions, "[N]o one shall enter the dwelling house of any Filipino or a foreigner residing in the Philippines without his consent":
ARTICLE 10. No one shall enter the dwelling house of any Filipino or a foreigner residing in the Philippines without his consent, except in urgent cases of fire, inundation, earthquake or other similar danger, or by reason of unlawful aggression from within, or in order to assist a person therein who cries for help.The 1904 case of United States v. Arceo[174] echoes the principle of "inviolability of the dwelling":
Outside of these cases, the entry into the dwelling house of any Filipino or foreigner resident in the Philippines or the search of his papers and effects can only be decreed by a competent court and executed only in the daytime.
The search of papers and effects shall be made always in the presence of the person searched or of a member of his family and, in their absence, of two witnesses resident of the same place.
However, when a criminal caught in fraganti should take refuge in his dwelling house, the authorities in pursuit may enter into it, only for the purpose of making an arrest.
If the criminal should take refuge in the dwelling house of a foreigner, the consent of the latter must first be obtained.
The inviolability of the house is one of the most fundamental of all the individual rights declared and recognized in the political codes of civilized nations. No one can enter into the home of another without the consent of its owners or occupants.Still, the right against unreasonable searches and seizures may be waived if it can be shown that the consent was "unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given, uncontaminated by any duress or coercion."[176] In Caballes v. Court of Appeals,[177] this Court discussed the parameters for giving a valid consent to search one's home:
The privacy of the home - the place of abode, the place where a man with his family may dwell in peace and enjoy the companionship of his wife and children unmolested by anyone, even the king, except in the rare cases - has always been regarded by civilized nations as one of the most sacred personal rights to which men are entitled. Both the common and the civil law guaranteed to man the right of absolute protection to the privacy of his home. The king was powerful; he was clothed with majesty; his will was the law, but, with few exceptions, the humblest citizen or subject might shut the door of his humble cottage in the face of the monarch and defend his intrusion into that privacy which was regarded as sacred as any of the kingly prerogatives. The poorest and most humble citizen or subject may, in his cottage, no matter how frail or humble it is, bid defiance to all the powers of the state; the wind, the storm and the sunshine alike may enter through its weather-beaten parts, but the king may not enter against its owner's will; none of the forces dare to cross the threshold even the humblest tenement without its owner's consent.
"A man's house is his castle," has become a maxim among the civilized peoples of the earth. His protection therein has become a matter of constitutional protection in England, America, and Spain, as well as in other countries.[175]
Doubtless, the constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right which may be waived. The consent must be voluntary in order to validate an otherwise illegal detention and search, i.e., the consent is unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given, uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. Hence, consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred, but must be shown by clear and convincing evidence. The question whether a consent to a search was in fact voluntary is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances. Relevant to this determination are the following characteristics of the person giving consent and the environment in which consent is given: (1) the age of the defendant; (2) whether he was in a public or secluded location; (3) whether he objected to the search or passively looked on; (4) the education and intelligence of the defendant; (5) the presence of coercive police procedures; (6) the defendant's belief that no incriminating evidence will be found; (7) the nature of the police questioning; (8) the environment in which the questioning took place; and (9) the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person consenting. It is the State which has the burden of proving, by clear and positive testimony, that the necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given.[178] (Citations omitted)In requiring a waiver in the pro forma Individual Application for New Firearm Registration, the Philippine National Police appears to recognize the inviolability of the home. Nevertheless, signing the Consent of Voluntary Presentation for Inspection does not result in a true and valid consented search.
The attempted inspection of appellant's home is merely to determine whether conditions exist which the Baltimore Health Code proscribes. If they do, appellant is notified to remedy the infringing conditions. No evidence for criminal prosecution is sought to be seized. Appellant is simply directed to do what he could have been ordered to do without any inspection, and what he cannot properly resist, namely, act in a manner consistent with the maintenance of minimum community standards of health and well being, including his own. Appellant's resistance can only be based not on admissible self-protection, but on a rarely voiced denial of any official justification for seeking to enter his home. The constitutional "liberty" that is asserted is the absolute right to refuse consent for an inspection designed and pursued solely for the protection of the community's health, even when the inspection is conducted with due regard for every convenience of time and place.Frank was overturned in Camara v. Municipal Court.[185] In the latter case, a municipal health inspector entered an apartment building to determine compliance with the San Francisco Housing Code. During the inspection, the building manager informed the inspector that Ronald Camara (Camara), the person leasing the building's ground floor, used part of the property as his residence. The inspector, claiming that the ground floor could not be used as a residence based on the building's occupancy permit, demanded entry to the property. Camara refused the inspector entry as no search warrant was presented.
The power of inspection granted by the Baltimore City Code is strictly limited, more exacting than the analogous provisions of many other municipal codes. Valid grounds for suspicion of the existence of a nuisance must exist. Certainly the presence of a pile of filth in the back yard combined with the rundown condition of the house gave adequate grounds for such suspicion. The inspection must be made in the daytime. Here was no midnight knock on the door, but an orderly visit in the middle of the afternoon with no suggestion that the hour was inconvenient. Moreover, the inspector has no power to force entry and did not attempt it. A fine is imposed for resistance, but officials are not authorized to break past the unwilling occupant.
Thus, not only does the inspection touch, at most, upon the periphery of the important interests safeguarded by the Fourteenth Amendment's protection against official intrusion, but it is hedged about with safeguards designed to make the least possible demand on the individual occupant, and to cause only the slightest restriction on his claims of privacy. Such a demand must be assessed in the light of the needs which have produced it.[184]
To the Frank majority, municipal fire, health, and housing inspection programs "touch at most upon the periphery of the important interests safeguarded by the Fourteenth Amendment's protection against official intrusion," because the inspections are merely to determine whether physical conditions exist which do not comply with minimum standards prescribed in local regulatory ordinances. Since the inspector does not ask that the property owner open his doors to a search for "evidence of criminal action" which may be used to secure the owner's criminal conviction, historic interests of "self-protection" jointly protected by the Fourth and Fifth Amendments are said not to be involved, but only the less intense "right to be secure from intrusion into personal privacy."The United States Supreme Court further clarified in Camara that there is no question as to the reasonableness of administrative inspections or whether they are done for the common good. The question, rather, should be whether such inspection should be made with a warrant:
We may agree that a routine inspection of the physical condition of private property is a less hostile intrusion than the typical policeman's search for the fruits and instrumentalities of crime. For this reason alone, Frank differed from the great bulk of Fourth Amendment cases which have been considered by this Court. But we cannot agree that the Fourth Amendment interests at stake in these inspection cases are merely "peripheral." It is surely anomalous to say that the individual and his private property are fully protected by the Fourth Amendment only when the individual is suspected of criminal behavior. For instance, even the most law-abiding citizen has a very tangible interest in limiting the circumstances under which the sanctity of his home may be broken by official authority, for the possibility of criminal entry under the guise of official sanction is a serious threat to personal and family security. And even accepting Frank's rather remarkable premise, inspections of the kind we are here considering do, in fact, jeopardize "self-protection" interests of the property owner. Like most regulatory laws, fire, health, and housing codes are enforced by criminal processes. In some cities, discovery of a violation by the inspector leads to a criminal complaint. Even in cities where discovery of a violation produces only an administrative compliance order, refusal to comply is a criminal offense, and the fact of compliance is verified by a second inspection, again without a warrant. Finally, as this case demonstrates, refusal to permit an inspection is itself a crime, punishable by fine or even by jail sentence.
The Frank majority suggested, and appellee reasserts, two other justifications for permitting administrative health and safety inspections without a warrant. First, it is argued that these inspections are "designed to make the least possible demand on the individual occupant." The ordinances authorizing inspections are hedged with safeguards, and at any rate the inspector's particular decision to enter must comply with the constitutional standard of reasonableness even if he may enter without a warrant. In addition, the argument proceeds, the warrant process could not function effectively in this field. The decision to inspect an entire municipal area is based upon legislative or administrative assessment of broad factors such as the area's age and condition. Unless the magistrate is to review such policy matters, he must issue a "rubber stamp" warrant which provides no protection at all to the property owner.
In our opinion, these arguments unduly discount the purposes behind the warrant machinery contemplated by the Fourth Amendment. Under the present system, when the inspector demands entry, the occupant has no way of knowing whether enforcement of the municipal code involved requires inspection of his premises, no way of knowing the lawful limits of the inspector's power to search, and no way of knowing whether the inspector himself is acting under proper authorization. These are questions which may be reviewed by a neutral magistrate without any reassessment of the basic agency decision to canvass an area. Yet only by refusing entry and risking a criminal conviction can the occupant at present challenge the inspector's decision to search. And even if the occupant possesses sufficient fortitude to take this risk, as appellant did here, he may never learn any more about the reason for the inspection than that the law generally allows housing inspectors to gain entry. The practical effect of this system is to leave the occupant subject to the discretion of the official in the field. This is precisely the discretion to invade private property which we have consistently circumscribed by a requirement that a disinterested party warrant the need to search. We simply cannot say that the protections provided by the warrant procedure are not needed in this context; broad statutory safeguards are no substitute for individualized review, particularly when those safeguards may only be invoked at the risk of a criminal penalty.[194] (Citations omitted)
The final justification suggested for warrantless administrative searches is that the public interest demands such a rule: it is vigorously argued that the health and safety of entire urban populations is dependent upon enforcement of minimum fire, housing, and sanitation standards, and that the only effective means of enforcing such codes is by routine systematized inspection of all physical structures. Of course, in applying any reasonableness standard, including one of constitutional dimension, an argument that the public interest demands a particular rule must receive careful consideration. But we think this argument misses the mark. The question is not, at this stage, at least, whether these inspections may be made, but whether they may be made without a warrant. For example, to say that gambling raids may not be made at the discretion of the police without a Warrant is not necessarily to say that gambling raids may never be made. In assessing whether the public interest demands creation of a general exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement, the question is not whether the public interest justifies the type of search in question, but whether the authority to search should be evidenced by a warrant, which in turn depends in part upon whether the burden of obtaining a warrant is likely to frustrate the governmental purpose behind the search. It has nowhere been urged that fire, health, and housing code inspection programs could not achieve their goals within the confines of a reasonable search warrant requirement. Thus, we do not find the public need argument dispositive.[195] (Citation omitted)It was held in Camara that a warrantless inspection of a home is deemed reasonable if it involves an emergency situation concerning health and safety. For instance, the seizure of unwholesome food, compulsory smallpox vaccination, health quarantine, and summary destruction of tubercular cattle were found as proper subjects of prompt inspections. However, if "there is no compelling urgency to inspect at a particular time or on a particular day[,]"[196] a warrant should "be sought only after entry is refused unless there has been a citizen complaint or there is other satisfactory reason for securing immediate entry."[197] Ultimately, the judgment of conviction against Camara was vacated since there was no emergency situation and, therefore, no compelling urgency to enter the property he was renting.
INSPECTION OF BUILDING AND PREMISES. It shall be the duty of the Fire Chief to inspect and he may enter all buildings and premises, except the interiors of dwellings, as often as may be necessary for the purpose of ascertaining and causing to be corrected any conditions liable to cause fire, or any violations of the provisions of this Title, and of any other ordinance concerning fire hazards.[199]See challenged the constitutionality of the provision for allegedly violating the Fourth Amendment and in light of the Camara ruling. See argued,[200] and the United States Supreme Court agreed, that there is "no justification for so relaxing Fourth Amendment safeguards where the official inspection is intended to aid enforcement of laws prescribing minimum physical standards for commercial premises."[201] It stated:
As we explained in Camara, a search of private houses is presumptively unreasonable if conducted without a warrant. The businessman, like the occupant of a residence, has a constitutional right to go about his business free from unreasonable official entries upon his private commercial property. The businessman, too, has that right placed in jeopardy if the decision to enter and inspect for violation of regulatory laws can be made and enforced by the inspector in the field without official authority evidenced by a warrant.[202]The United States Supreme Court in See found administrative inspections of business premises akin to administrative agency subpoenas for inspection of corporate books or records. According to it, the subpoena should "be sufficiently limited in scope, relevant in purpose, and specific in directive so that compliance will not be unreasonably burdensome."[203] Further, it clarified that it did "not in any way imply that business premises may not reasonably be inspected in many more situations than private homes, nor[did it] question such accepted regulatory techniques as licensing programs which require inspections prior to operating a business or marketing a product."[204] Should the constitutionality of such programs be challenged, the United States High Court held that the issue should be resolved "on a case-by-case basis under the general Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness."[205]
[I]f inspection is to be effective and serve as a credible deterrent, unannounced, even frequent, inspections are essential. In this context, the prerequisite of a warrant could easily frustrate inspection, and, if the necessary flexibility as to time, scope, and frequency is to be preserved, the protections afforded by a warrant would be negligible.[216]As to possible violations of the right to privacy that warrantless inspections under the Gun Control Act entail, the United States High Court stated that "[W]hen a dealer chooses to engage in this pervasively regulated business and to accept a federal license, he [or she] does so with the knowledge that his [or her] business records, firearms, and ammunition will be subject to effective inspection."[217]
To this Court, the inspection contemplated in Section 9.3 of the 2018 Implementing Rules, though it now provides the scope and extent of the inspection, may only be done with a search warrant as required in Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution. Considering that the inspection is done before a license is issued, there is no compelling urgency to immediately conduct the inspection. A search warrant must first be obtained from a judge to determine probable cause for its issuance.
Implementing Rules (2013) Implementing Rules (2018) SECTION 9. Licenses Issued to
Individuals. -
....
9.6 For Types 3 to 5 licenses, the licensed citizen must comply with the inspection requirements of thePNP. Failure on their part to comply with
any of the requirements herein mentioned is a ground for the cancellation of license and/or registration.
SECTION 9. Licenses Issued to Individuals. -
....
9.3 For Types 3 to 5 licenses, licensed citizens must comply with the inspection requirements of the PNP before the issuance of license. Failure on their part to comply with any of the requirements herein mentioned is a ground for the denial of license. The inspection shall be limited to visual, announced seven days prior, and conducted during office
hours (8:00 AM to 5:00 PM) in the presence of the licensed citizen or his authorized representative and must be limited to the compliance on vault requirement. The Inspection Team shall be covered with a Letter Order issued by the Director, CSG.
SECTION 4. Standards and Requisites for Issuance and Obtaining a License to Own and Possess Firearms. -
.... 4.10 A qualified applicant shall submit the following requirements to apply as a sports shooter: a) A copy of the License to Own and Possess Firearms; b) Certification from the President of a recognized Gun Club or Sports Shooting Association; and c) Written Authority or Consent from Parents/Guardian (for minors).
SECTION 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.It has been held that Article III, Section 8 not only guarantees the freedom to associate; it also protects the freedom not to associate. The provision is not basis to compel others to form or join an association.[228]
US courts have permitted exceptions to the Fourth Amendment when "special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable cause requirement impracticable" such as work-related searches of government employees' desks and offices, warrantless searches conducted by school officials of a student's property, government investigators conducting searches pursuant to a regulatory scheme when the searches meet "reasonable legislative or administrative standards," and a State's operation of a probation system. The Fourth Amendment permits the warrantless search of "closely regulated" businesses; "special needs" cases such as schools, employment, and probation; and "checkpoint" searches such as airport screenings under the administrative search doctrine.[12]From this vantage ground, an inspection prior to the issuance of Types 3 to 5 licenses must be allowed as an adjunct of administrative search, owing to the weight of responsibility involved in gun ownership, which from its nature, necessitates a stricter regulatory scheme.
(Citation omitted)
Section 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.
a) Members of the Philippine Bar;[2] 475 Phil. 486 (2004).
b) Certified Public Accountants;
c) Accredited media practitioners from recognized media institutions; Cashiers and bank tellers;
d) Priests, Ministers, Rabbi, Imams;
e) Physicians and Nurses; and
f) Businessmen, who by the nature of their business or undertaking duly recognized or regulated by law, are exposed to high risk of being targets of criminal elements.