HERNANDO, J.:
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court (RTC): |
WHEREFORE, pursuant to the provisions of Section 29 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 in relation to Republic Act No. 496, as amended, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the Land Registration Authority, Diliman, Quezon City, upon payment of the corresponding legal fees, to register Lot No. 713-A, 713-B, 713-C, 713-D, 713-E, and 713-F of Iba Cadastre in the name of applicant, Philippine National Police (PNP), subject to all legal easements and reservations provided for under existing laws.Ruling of the Court of Appeals:
SO ORDERED.[11]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision dated January 20, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 70, Iba, Zambales, is hereby AFFIRMED.Aggrieved, the OSG filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which raises the following lone assignment of error:
SO ORDERED.[17]
Thus, the primary issue is whether or not the PNP has proven that the subject lots are alienable and disposable lands of the public domain.Issue
The [CA] erred in affirming the [RTC's] Decision despite the unregistrable character of the subject lots being reserved for military purposes by virtue of Executive Order No. 87 dated November 6, 1915 since no evidence of a positive act from the government withdrawing the land from military purposes was ever presented.[18]
An applicant for land registration must prove that the land is an alienable and disposable land of the public domain. |
Section 14. Who May Apply. - The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:In Republic v. Bautista,[20] We explained the requisites as follows:
(l) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provision of existing laws.[19]
For registration under Section 14(1) to prosper, the applicant for original registration of title to land must establish the following:Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution provides that all lands of the public domain belong to the State. Thus, the State is presumed to own all lands except those clearly proven as privately owned. To overcome this presumption, the applicant must show that the land subject of registration has been declassified and now belongs to the alienable and disposable portion of the public domain.[22]
(1) that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain; (2) that the applicants by themselves and their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation thereof; and (3) that the possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
On the other hand, registration under Section 14(2) requires the applicant to establish the following requisites: (a) the land is an alienable and disposable, and patrimonial property of the public domain; (b) the applicant and its predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the land for at least 10 years, in good faith and with just title, or for at least 30 years, regardless of good faith or just title; and (c) the land had already been converted to or declared as patrimonial property of the State at the beginning of the said 10-year or 30-year period of possession.
From their respective requisites, it is clear that the bases for registration under these two provisions of law differ from one another. Registration under Section 14(1) is based on possession; whereas registration under Section 14(2) is based on prescription. Thus, under Section 14(1), it is not necessary for the land applied for to be alienable and disposable at the beginning of the possession on or before June 12, 1945 - Section 14(1) only requires that the property sought to be registered is alienable and disposable at the time of the filing of the application for registration. However, in Section 14(2), the alienable and disposable character of the land, as well as its declaration as patrimonial property of the State, must exist at the beginning of the relevant period of possession.[21] (Emphasis supplied)
The prevailing rule during the pendency of the PNP's application for registration of land title in the RTC was that a DENR certification stating that the land subject for registration is entirely within the alienable and disposable zone constitutes as substantial compliance, which the PNP failed to comply with. |
This survey falls within alienable and disposable land under Proj. No. 1 as per BFLC Map No. 204 dated December 29, 1923, as checked by Marciano L. Lapuz, Chief Engineering Section dated February 24, 2003. (Emphasis supplied)The foregoing annotation, however, is insufficient to prove the classification of the subject lots as alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. In a similar case of Republic v. Sese,[36] We held:
Here, the only evidence presented by respondents to prove the disposable and alienable character of the subject land was an annotation by a geodetic engineer in a survey plan. Although this was certified by the DENR, it clearly falls short of the requirements for original registration. (Emphasis supplied)We likewise pronounced in Republic v. Mendiola,[37] viz.:
In Rep. of the Phils. v. Lualhati, the Court ruled that the applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the subject property as alienable and disposable, to wit:Therefore, respondent's reliance on the subject lots' subdivision plan, without the corresponding DENR certification stating that they are entirely within the alienable and disposable zone, which was the prevailing rule during the pendency of its application with the RTC, proved fatal to its case. In short, respondent failed to substantially prove that the subject lots are alienable and disposable lands of the public domain.Accordingly, in a number of subsequent rulings, this Court consistently deemed it appropriate to reiterate the pronouncements in T.A.N. Properties in denying applications for registration on the ground of failure to prove the alienable and disposable nature of the land subject therein. In said cases, it has been repeatedly ruled that certifications issued by the CENRO, or specialists of the DENR, as well as Survey Plans prepared by the DENR containing annotations that the subject lots are alienable, do not constitute incontrovertible evidence to overcome the presumption that the property sought to be registered belongs to the inalienable public domain. Rather, this Court stressed the importance of proving alienability by presenting a copy of the original classification of the land approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as true copy by the legal custodian of the official records.[38] (Citations omitted and emphasis supplied)
The PNP failed to refute the CENRO Report by submitting the twin certifications as required in T.A.N. Properties. An applicant for land registration bears the burden of proving that the land applied for registration is alienable and disposable. |
In T.A.N. Properties, the Court ruled that it is not enough for the CENRO or the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) to certify that the land is alienable and disposable. The applicant for original registration must present a copy of the original land classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records to establish that the land is alienable and disposable. In ruling in this wise, the Court explained that the CENRO or the PENRO are not the official repository or legal custodian of the issuances of the DENR Secretary declaring public lands as alienable and disposable. As such, the certifications they issue relating to the character of the land cannot be considered prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.However, despite this pronouncement in T.A.N. Properties during the pendency of the case in the appellate court, the PNP did not make any attempt to submit the required twin certifications in order to prove that the subject lots have been classified as alienable and disposable lands of the public domain.
Thus, as things stand, the present rule is that an application for original registration must be accompanied by (1) a CENRO or PENRO Certification; and (2) a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. (Emphasis supplied)
In this case, it is undisputed that respondent failed to present a copy of the original land classification covering the subject land; and that she relied solely on the CENRO Certification dated May 7, 2002 to prove that the subject land is alienable and disposable. Clearly, the evidence presented by respondent would not suffice to entitle her to a registration of the subject land. This is true even if the Republic failed to refute the contents of the said certification during the trial of the case. After all, it is the applicant who bears the burden of proving that the land applied for registration is alienable and disposable. (Emphasis supplied)In any event, in accepting the CENRO Report as evidence, the PNP was not denied due process because as a public document, the CENRO Report can easily be verified and examined if they have doubts as to its authenticity.
The rule on substantial compliance as enunciated in Vega is inapplicable since the factual milieu is different; here, the PNP had ample time to comply with the twin certifications as enunciated under T.A.N. Properties in order to substantially refute the CENRO Report. |
In Espiritu, Jr. v. Republic, the Court stressed that the pronouncements in Serrano and Vega with respect to substantial compliance were mere pro hac vice which neither abandoned nor modified the strict compliance rule in T.A.N. Properties. This point was even expressly stated in Vega wherein the Court clarified that strict compliance with T.A.N. Properties remains to be the general rule. Thus:In fine, We find that the respondent's evidence does not suffice to entitle it to register the subject lots. The PNP failed to present any evidence showing that the DENR Secretary had indeed released the subject lots as alienable and disposable lands of the public domain.It must be emphasized that the present ruling on substantial compliance applies pro hac vice. It does not in any way detract from our rulings in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., and similar cases which impose a strict requirement to prove that the public land is alienable and disposable, especially in this case when the Decisions of the lower court and the Court of Appeals were rendered prior to these rulings.[x x x x]The Court further elaborated on the reason behind the rule on substantial compliance in Republic v. San Mateo. In the said case, the Court explained that the rule on substantial compliance was allowed in Vega due to the lack of opportunity for the applicant to comply with the requirements provided in T.A.N. Properties. The Court explained:In Vega, the Court was mindful of the fact that the trial court rendered its decision on November 13, 2003, way before the rule on strict compliance was laid down in T.A.N. Properties on June 26, 2008. Thus, the trial court was merely applying the rule prevailing at the time, which was substantial compliance. Thus, even if the case reached the Supreme Court after the promulgation of T.A.N. Properties, the Court allowed the application of substantial compliance, because there was no opportunity for the registrant to comply with the Court's ruling in T.A.N. Properties, the trial court and the CA already having decided the case prior to the promulgation of T.A.N. Properties.Conversely, if there is an opportunity for the applicant to comply with the ruling in T.A.N. Properties (i.e., the case was still pending before the trial court after the promulgation of T.A.N. Properties), the rule on strict compliance shall be applied. From the foregoing, it is clear that substantial compliance may be applied, at the discretion of the courts, only if the trial court rendered its decision on the application prior to June 26, 2008, the date of the promulgation of T.A.N. Properties. (Citations omitted and emphasis supplied)