PERALTA, C.J.:
That on or about the 19th day of July, 2003, at 12:45 A.M., more or less, in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused conniving, confederating, and mutually helping with one another, armed with and (sic) unlicensed handgun, with deliberate intent, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there suddenly and unexpectedly attack, assault and use personal violence upon the person of Mark James Enriquez, by striking him with bottles of beer and shot him with the use of the said unlicensed handgun, hitting him on his head, thereby inflicting upon him injuries, as a consequence of which Mark James S. Enriquez died on July 21, 2003.Apura and his co-accused entered their respective pleas of "not guilty" during their arraignment. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing this court finds accused SHERWIN QUE GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as a principal in the crime of Murder qualified by treachery and hereby sentences him to suffer reclusion perpetua. The court likewise finds accused ANTHONY JOHN APURA GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as an accomplice, not as a principal, in the crime of Murder qualified by treachery and, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, hereby sentences him to an indeterminate prison term of 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum, to 14 years 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum.Petitioner elevated the case to the CA and the latter court, on May 29, 2014, dismissed the appeal with modifications, thus:
Both accused are also hereby ordered to pay jointly and severally the heirs of Mark James S. Enriquez the sum of [P]50,000.00 as indemnity ex delicto and [P]50,000.00 as moral damages, and the costs.
Considering that the three other accused have remained at-large, let warrants of arrest issue against them, to be separately tried once, apprehended.
SO ORDERED.[4]
WHEREFORE, the April 10, 2007 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Cebu City in Criminal Case No. CBU-66703, convicting [accused] Sherwin Que @ Bungot of Murder and sentencing him of reclusion perpetua is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. [Apura] is ineligible for parole. Moreover, the accessory penalties are deemed INCLUDED in the principal penalty. [Apura] is ORDERED to pay the heirs of Mark James Enriquez, the amounts of [P]75,000.00 as civil indemnity, [P]50,000.00 as moral damages, P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, [P]4,431,013.62 as actual damages, 6% interest on all the damages herein awarded from the date of the incident to the finality of the judgment and 12% interest from the finality hereof until fully paid, and to pay costs.The CA rejected accused Que's plea of self-defense because he failed to prove the presence of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, which is an essential element of such plea. The prosecution, according to the CA, was able to prove that all the elements of the crime of murder are present in this case. As to petitioner, the CA ruled that he was an accomplice to the crime of murder as there was unity of purpose with the principal.
The Director of the Bureau of Prisons is ordered to submit a REPORT to this Court within five (5) days, acknowledging receipt of this Decision.
The April 10, 2007 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Cebu City in Criminal Case No. CBU-66703, convicting [petitioner] Anthony John Apura as accomplice in the crime of murder is also AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as to the maximum term of his penalty. [Petitioner] Anthony John Apura is penalized to suffer imprisonment for a period of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum together with the accessory penalties under the law. [Petitioner] Anthony John Apura must pay jointly and solidarily with [accused] Sherwin Que@ Bungot, the heirs of the victim, Mark James Enriquez, the amounts aforestated as his civil liability.
The Regional Trial Court is DIRECTED to cancel the bail posted by [petitioner] Anthony John Apura and to issue alias warrants of arrest for the other accused who are still at-large.
SO ORDERED.[5]
A. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMUTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN, IN VIOLATION OF RECENT LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE, IT GAVE CREDIT TO THE TESTIMONY OF LAPATIS DURING DIRECT EXAMINATION, DESPITE THE LATTER'S INCONSISTENCIES AND SELF-CONTRADICTIONS;According to Apura, prosecution witness Lapatis is an incredible witness and his testimonies do not deserve any consideration because it is full of inconsistencies and contradictions. He also claims that the prosecution failed to show that there was a community of criminal intent between him and accused Que and the latter's group, that he agreed to the criminal purpose of accused Que and his group and that he cooperated in the accomplishment of the crime. As such, Apura argues that he cannot be held liable as an accomplice because the requisites of which are wanting. He further argues that the cases relied upon by the CA are inapplicable in his case and that he should be held separately and individually liable only for physical injuries. Lastly, he questions the award of damages by stating expenses incurred were not proven with reasonable certainty.
B. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT RULED, ON THE BASIS OF LAPATIS' TESTIMONY DURING DIRECT EXAMINATION, THAT THERE IS COMMUNITY OF CRIMINAL DESIGN BETWEEN APURA AND THE GROUP OF QUE AND THAT APURA BY HIS ACTIONS AGREED WITH THE CRIMINAL PURPOSE OF QUE.
C. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ITS APPLICATION OF THE LAW RELEVANT TO ACCOMPLICES, AND WHEN IT HELD APURA LIABLE AS AN ACCOMPLICE, NOT SEPARATELY AND INDIVIDUALLY LIABLE FOR PHYSICAL INJURIES;
D. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT AWARDED ACTUAL DAMAGES INCONSISTENTLY WITH RELEVANT LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE.[6]
The evidence shows that Apura struck Enriquez with a beer bottle in the head from behind. In fact, he was the first to assault the victim. Thus, even if he was not a co-conspirator, the incontrovertible fact remains that he did an act which started the chain of events that culminated in the shooting of the victim by Que. By his act of striking Enriquez with a beer bottle in the head, he is deemed by this court to have cooperated in the execution of the offense by a previous act, albeit not indispensable as it was not necessary for him to do it in order that Que could carry out his criminal design to kill Enriquez. This fixes Apura's criminal liability in this case as that of an accomplice in the commission of the offense under Article 18 of the Revised Penal Code and comformably to the ruling of the Supreme Court in People vs. Templonuevo, G.R. No. L-12280, January 30, 1960. Under Article 18, Revised Penal Code, "(a)ccomplices are those persons who, not being included in Article 17, cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts". In People vs. Templonuevo, where it was shown that appellant struck the deceased on the forehead with a piece of wood, rendering the latter unconscious, thereby facilitating the subsequent slaying of the deceased by appellant's co-accused, the Supreme Court held that said appellant must be deemed responsible as an accomplice in the killing. He cooperated in it by previous or simultaneous acts, albeit non-indispensable ones, as his co-accused could have killed the victim with his bolo even if appellant had not intervened.[8]Thus, all the elements for one to be an accomplice are present in this case. The cooperation that the law punishes is the assistance knowingly or intentionally rendered that cannot exist without previous cognizance of the criminal act intended to be executed,[9] and the prosecution was able to prove such cooperation. The unity of purpose with that of the accused Que was also proven by the prosecution. The CA, thus, appropriately ruled:
[Petitioner] Apura's insistence that the ruling in People v. Rustico Tilos and Mateo Mahinay (at-large) is applicable, fails to convince Us. In that case, the Supreme Court noted that of the three prosecution witnesses, only one stated that the attacks of accused-appellant and accused-at-large on the victim immediately followed one another. The Supreme Court observed that the daughter and wife of the victim declared that the accused at-large attacked the victim through fistic blows on the face and nape only after the victim's wife arrived and pulled him (victim) away from accused-appellant. It was the accused-appellant who first inflicted fistic blows on the abdomen of the victim. In the Tilos case, the Supreme Court held that such inconsistency in the sequence of events posed a significant doubt on the unity of purpose between the two accused so that the accused-appellant cannot be considered as an accomplice.As to the inconsistencies in the testimony of the witness for the prosecution, the Court finds no need to deviate from the findings of both the RTC and the CA, as the said inconsistencies are minor and insignificant and does not affect the credibility of the said witness. As correctly ruled by the CA:
We do not find the facts in the Tilos case similar to the instant appeal. Immediately before the victim in this case was shot at the back of his head by appellant Que, he was first struck by [petitioner] Apura in the head using a bottle. The acts occurred in close proximity with each other and after the shooting, [petitioner] Apura was seen leaving the locus criminis with [accused] Que and the others. These circumstances constitute convincing evidence of unity of purpose with the principal (appellant Que) that makes [petitioner] Apura an accomplice.[10]
Caution must be exercised to avoid the sweeping conclusion that [petitioner] Apura was no longer around during the shooting. The Supreme Court in People v. Retuta acceded that it cannot expect absolute uniformity in every detail because witnesses react differently to what they see and hear depending upon their situation and state of mind. In this case, Labay's answer to the question on cross-examination if he saw [petitioner] when the shooting occurred, was "no more." It is a remark which could mean that Labay did not see [petitioner] but not necessarily that [petitioner] was no longer around during the shooting. In the preceding question, Labay's answer was that he did not know where the accused was when the victim was struck again in the head which is about consistent with what he said in the direct examination that he did not know anymore what happened to Mr. Apura after the latter struck Mark James Enriquez.Minor inconsistencies and discrepancies pertaining to trivial matters do not affect the credibility of witnesses. Moreover, time and again, the Court has deferred to the trial court's factual findings and evaluation of the credibility of witnesses, especially when affirmed by the CA, in the absence of any clear showing that the trial court overlooked or misconstrued cogent facts and circumstances that would justify altering or revising such findings and evaluation.[12] This is because the trial court's determination proceeds from its first-hand opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses, their conduct and attitude under grilling examination, thereby placing the trial court in the unique position to assess the witnesses' credibility and to appreciate their truthfulness, honesty and candor.[13]
At any rate, Lapatis' account was more specific that [petitioner] Apura stood at the side, after he struck victim with a bottle, and consequently, when the others threw bottles at the [Enriquez] and [accused] Que shot him (victim). [Petitioner] Apura exited the resto bar with them too. On these circumstances, it is reasonable to deduce that [petitioner] Apura knew of the criminal purpose of [accused] Que although his participation as a co-principal is not at all clear. In People v. Samudio, et al., the Supreme Court stressed that the failure of the prosecution to prove the existence of conspiracy does not eliminate criminal liability on the part of the appellant. xxx Where the quantum of proof required to establish conspiracy is lacking, the doubt created as to whether the appellant acted as principal or as an accomplice will always be resolved in favor of the milder form of criminal liability - that of a mere accomplice. Juxtaposing jurisprudence with the evidence at hand, We fail to see any error committed by the trial court when it held that [petitioner] Apura's criminal liability was that of an accomplice only.[11]
(1) | Sherwin Que, as principal, to pay the heirs of the victim P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P33,333.00 as moral damages, P20,000.00 as exemplary damages and P33,333.00 as temperate damages. |
(2) | Petitioner Anthony John Apura, as an accomplice, to pay the heirs of the victim P25,000.00 as civil indemnity, P25,000.00 as moral damages, P25,000.00 as exemplary damages and P16,667.00 as temperate damages. |
(a) | An appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter; |