GESMUNDO, C.J.:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this case should be, as it is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.The LA held that Emma, widow of the deceased Florencio, may pursue the complaint since it had already been filed by the late complainant. However, the LA found that Emma could not testify on the facts of the case as she is without personal knowledge thereof. The LA stated that the claims of constructive dismissal and illegal suspension, and the facts leading to the same, are personal to Florencio. It observed that Emma could not even state the exact dates when Florencio was supposedly suspended, when Florencio returned to work, and why he was fined in the amount of P6,000.00. Thus, the RTC declared that the claims of constructive dismissal and illegal suspension were not substantiated.[14]
SO ORDERED.[13]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Complainant-Appellant's appeal is hereby GRANTED. The 17 November 2014 Decision of Labor Arbiter Fe S. Cellan is hereby VACATED and SET ASIDE.The NLRC found that the LA erred in finding that Florencio was not illegally dismissed by respondent. It declared that Florencio was an employee of respondent. He was an on-call taxi driver paying boundary fees for the use of the taxi on a per day basis. He was also subject to the control of respondent, and as such he was suspended and fined by the latter for alleged violations. His functions were necessary and desirable in the usual business or trade of respondent as a taxi company. It thus declared that respondent had the burden of proof and failed to substantiate its claim that it did not dismiss Florencio.[16]
Respondents-appellees are hereby ordered to pay complainant-appellant's heirs substituted [sic] by his wife Emma G. Nedira, backwages and separation pay in the amounts of Php58,043.70 and Php17,589.00. Further, complainant-appellant's heirs [are] entitled to 10% attorney's fees.
All other claims are hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.[15]
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED. The May 29, 2015 and July 30, 2015 Resolutions of the National Labor Relations Commission, Third Division in NLRC LAC No. 01-000095-15 are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The November 17, 2014 Decision of the Labor Arbiter is REINSTATED.The CA found merit in respondent's imputation of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC in ruling that there was constructive dismissal despite Emma's failure to substantiate her claims.[19]
SO ORDERED.[18]
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN ANNULLING AND SETTING ASIDE THE NLRC'S RESOLUTIONS WHERE IT WAS HELD THAT THE DECEASED FLORENCIO NEDIRA WAS ILLEGALLY DISMISSED AND HIS HEIRS ARE ENTITLED TO BACKWAGES AND SEPARATION PAY.[26]
Florencio, through Emma, failed to prove the fact of his illegal dismissal. |
Ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat. The burden of proof is on the one who declares, not on one who denies. A party alleging a critical fact must suppo1i his allegation with substantial evidence, for any decision based on unsubstantiated allegation cannot stand without offending due process. And in illegal termination cases, jurisprudence had underscored that the fact of dismissal must be established by positive and overt acts of an employer indicating the intention to dismiss before the burden is shifted to the employer that the dismissal was legal.[27]It is regrettable that there is a dearth of proof about the fact of dismissal of Florencio. The records are absent of any evidence as to the nature of the supposed suspension, as well as the circumstances of the alleged constructive dismissal. No documentary proof was presented to substantiate the claim that respondent required Florencio to pay P6,000.00, and that, due to his alleged nonpayment, he was not permitted to work. Thus, as a result of the lack of evidence to substantiate this claim, the charge of constructive dismissal was not established.
A complaint for illegal dismissal may not be classified, like an ordinary civil action, as to cause or foundation for purposes of determining the effect of death of any of the parties to the case. |
Section 3. Suppletory Application of the Rules of Court. — In the absence of any applicable provision in these Rules, and in order to effectuate the objectives of the Labor Code, as amended, the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court of the Philippines, as amended, may, in the interest of expeditious dispensation of labor justice and whenever practicable and convenient, be applied by analogy or in a suppletory character and effect. (Emphasis supplied)The Rules of Court itself echoes the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure in providing for such suppletory effect. Sec. 4, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court reads:
Section 4. In what cases not applicable. — These Rules shall not apply to election cases, land registration, cadastral, naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and other cases not herein provided for, except by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient. (Emphases supplied)Sec. 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court governs situations where a party to a pending action dies during such pendency. It reads as follows:
Section 16. Death of party; duty of counsel. — Whenever a party to a pending action dies, and the claim is not thereby extinguished, it shall be the duty of his counsel to inform the court within thirty (30) days after such death of the fact thereof, and to give the name and address of his legal representative or representatives. Failure of counsel to comply with this duty shall be a ground for disciplinary action.Thus, in civil actions, the heirs of a deceased may substitute the deceased in a pending action if such action survives the death of the deceased. The survival of the action is the determinative factor.
The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.
The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to appear and be substituted within a period of thirty (30) days from notice.
If no legal representative is named by the counsel for the deceased party, or if the one so named shall fail to appear within the specified period, the court may order the opposing party, within a specified time, to procure the appointment of an executor or administrator for the estate of the deceased and the latter shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the deceased. The court charges in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as costs. (Emphases supplied)
Ordinary civil actions may be classified, as to their cause or foundation, into real and personal. Real action is that founded on privity of real estate. Personal action is that founded on privity of contract. In other words, in a real action, one seeks to recover a specific real property or its possession; while in a personal action, one seeks the enforcement of a contract or the recovery of personal property or damages.[33]Concomitantly, the Court explained in Bonilla v. Barcena[34] that causes of action involving injury to the person do not survive death, while those that involve property and property rights do:
The question as to whether an action survives or not depends on the nature of the action and the damage sued for. In the causes of action which survive the wrong complained affects primarily and principally property and property rights, the injuries to the person being merely incidental, while in the causes of action which do not survive the injury complained of is to the person, the property and rights of property affected being incidental.[35]The Court further elaborated in Jardeleza v. Spouses Jardeleza[36] that "[t]his rule is applicable regardless of whether it is the plaintiff or the defendant who dies, or whether the case is in the trial or in the appellate courts."[37]
The core of petitioners' argument is that action should not be dismissed since their complaint involves not just monetary claim but also real properties, as well.Jurisprudence[43] has consistently applied such rule, basing its determination on the nature of the action and not on the object thereof.
Petitioners' contention is untenable. While they maintain that what they are claiming include real properties, their Complaint is captioned as "For Collection of Money and for Specific Performance." Obviously, the petitioners themselves, who are lawyers, believed that the cause of action against the private respondent was in the nature of actio in personam.
"Actio in personam is a personal action seeking redress against a particular person. Personal actions are such whereby a man claims a debt, or personal duty, or damages in lieu thereof." In the present case, petitioners seek to recover attorney's fees from private respondent for the professional services they rendered to the latter. Attorney's fee is basically a compensation. In its ordinary sense, "the term (compensation) applies not only to salaries, but to compensation by fees for specific service."
Viewed in proper perspective, an action to recover attorney's fees is basically a monetary claim, which under Section 21, Rule 3 of B.P. 129 is an action that does not survive. Such is the fate of Civil Case No. 6465.
Petitioners theorize that the inclusion of real properties as part of the attorney's fees private respondent owes them, converted the action into one that survives or at the very least, split the action into one that did not survive, with respect to the monetary obligation, and which survived, with respect to the real properties of the deceased.
In Harden vs. Harden, x x x the Court ruled that an action for the satisfaction of attorney's fees is founded on a personal obligation which does not survive the death of the defendant before adjudication.
As enunciated in Bonilla, the litmus test in determining what action survives and what does not depends on the nature of the action and not on the object or kind of property sought to be recovered.[42] (Emphases supplied; citations omitted)
The instant case involves an illegal dismissal which is an action that does not survive the death of the accused [sic]. The Court ruled in Bonilla v. Barcena, to wit:Truly, if the traditional classification of an ordinary civil action as to cause or foundation is applied, a complaint for illegal dismissal, contrary to the CA's pronouncement, is one that involves injury to the person – the alleged illegal dismissal from employment of the employee by the employer. Any award of backwages and separation pay would only be incidental to the injury to the person complained of in such complaints.The question as to whether an action survives or not depends on the nature of the action and the damage sued for. In the causes of action which survive, the wrong complained [of] affects primarily and principally property and property rights, the injuries to the person being merely incidental, while in the causes of action which do not survive, the injury complained of is to the person, the property and rights of property affected being incidental.Since the property and property rights of the respondent is only incidental to his complaint for illegal dismissal, the same does not survive his death. Nonetheless, considering the foregoing disposition dismissing respondent's petition before the CA and ergo his complaint for illegal dismissal, the Court can proceed with the resolution of the petition even without the need for substitution of the heirs of respondent.[45] (Citation omitted)
Article 1700. The relations between capital and labor are not merely contractual. They are so impressed with public interest that labor contracts must yield to the common good. Therefore, such contracts are subject to the special laws on labor unions, collective bargaining, strikes and lockouts, closed shop, wages, working conditions, hours of labor and similar subjects. (Emphasis supplied)Accordingly, the interest involved in an employment contract is not merely private and individual, but also public.
Article 294. [279] Security of Tenure.[47] — In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by this Title. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement. (Emphasis supplied)Thus, an illegal dismissal – a dismissal without just or authorized cause – is not only a violation of the contractual relations between the employer and the employee but is, in fact, a violation of the Labor Code and its implementing rules and regulations. In short, when an employer illegally dismisses an employee, said employer is essentially violating a statute.
Verily, the dismissal without just cause of an employee from his employment constitutes a violation of the Labor Code and its implementing rules and regulations. Such violation, however, does not amount to an "offense" as understood under Article 291 of the Labor Code. In its broad sense, an offense is an illegal act which does not amount to a crime as defined in the penal law, but which by statute carries with it a penalty similar to those imposed by law for the punishment of a crime. It is in this sense that a general penalty clause is provided under Article 289 of the Labor Code which provides that "x x x any violation of the provisions of this code declared to be unlawful or penal in nature shall be punished with a fine of not less than One Thousand Pesos [P1,000.00] nor more than Ten Thousand Pesos [10,000.00], or imprisonment of not less than three [3] months nor more than three [3] years, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court." x x xThis analysis reveals the dual character of a complaint for illegal dismissal. It is an action predicated upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff, the purportedly illegally dismissed employee. As the Court previously noted, one's employment is a right and its violation is an injury. At the same time, the award arising from the finding of illegal dismissal – the payment of backwages – is not merely for redress of a private right, but a command for the employer to make public reparation for his or her violation of the Labor Code.
The confusion arises over the use of the term "illegal dismissal" which creates the impression that termination of an employment without just cause constitutes an offense. It must be noted, however[,] that unlike in cases of commission of any of the prohibited activities during strikes or lockouts under Article 265, unfair labor practices under Articles 248, 249 and 250 and illegal recruitment activities under Article 38, among others, which the Code itself declares to be unlawful, termination of an employment without just or valid cause is not categorized as an unlawful practice.
Besides, the reliefs principally sought by an employee who was illegally dismissed from his employment are reinstatement to his former position without loss of seniority rights and privileges, if any, backwages and damages, in case there is bad faith in his dismissal. As an affirmative relief, reinstatement may be ordered, with or without backwages. While ordinarily, reinstatement is a concomitant of backwages, the two are not necessarily complements, nor is the award of one a condition precedent to an award of the other. And, in proper cases, backwages may be awarded without ordering reinstatement. In either case, no penalty of fine nor imprisonment is imposed on the employer upon a finding of illegality in the dismissal. By the very nature of the reliefs sought, therefore, an action for illegal dismissal cannot be generally categorized as an "offense" as used under Article 291 of the Labor Code, which according to public respondent, must be brought within the period of three [3] years from the time the cause of action accrued, otherwise, the same is forever barred.
It is true that the "backwages" sought by an illegally dismissed employee may be considered, by reason of its practical effect, as a "money claim." However, it is not the principal cause of action in an illegal dismissal case but the unlawful deprivation of one's employment committed by the employer in violation of the right of an employee. Backwages is merely one of the reliefs which an illegally dismissed employee prays the labor arbiter and the NLRC to render in his favor as a consequence of the unlawful act committed by the employer. The award thereof is not private compensation or damages but is in furtherance and effectuation of the public objectives of the Labor Code. Even though the practical effect is the enrichment of the individual, the award of backwages is not in redress of a private right, but, rather, is in the nature of a command upon the employer to make public reparation for his violation of the Labor Code.
x x x x
Indeed there is, merit in the contention of petitioner that the four [4]-year prescriptive period under Article 1146 of the New Civil Code, applies by way of supplement, in the instant case, to wit:Art 1146. The following actions must be instituted within four years.As this Court stated in Bondoc vs. People's Bank and Trust Co., when a person has no property, his job may possibly be his only possession or means of livelihood, hence, he should be protected against any arbitrary and unjust deprivation of his job. Unemployment, said the Court in Almira vs. B.F. Goodrich Philippines, brings "untold hardships and sorrows on those dependent on the wage earners. The misery and pain attendant on the loss of jobs thus could be avoided if there be acceptance of the view that under all the circumstances of this case, petitioners should not be deprived of their means of livelihood."
[1] Upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff.
x x x x
It is a principle in American jurisprudence which, undoubtedly, is well-recognized in this jurisdiction that one's employment, profession, trade or calling is a "property right," and the wrongful interference therewith is an actionable wrong. The right is considered to be property within the protection of a constitutional guaranty of due process of law. Clearly then, when one is arbitrarily and unjustly deprived of his job or means of livelihood, the action instituted to contest the legality of one's dismissal from employment constitutes, in essence, an action predicated "upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff," as contemplated under Art. 1146 of the New Civil Code, which must be brought within four [4] years.[49] (Emphases supplied; citations omitted)
This revision reflects and solidifies the prevailing rule on the death of any of the parties in a complaint for illegal dismissal. It must be emphasized that, while the revision to the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure was introduced only in 2017, substitution has repeatedly been allowed in complaints for illegal dismissal filed even before such revision.[50]RULE V
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE LABOR ARBITERS
Section 20. Death of Parties. – In case any of the parties dies during the pendency of the proceedings, he/she may be substituted by his/her heirs. In the event a favorable judgment is obtained by the complainants, the same shall be enforced in accordance with Section 11, Rule XI of this Rules. (As amended by En Banc Resolution No. 14-17, Series of 2017)
As a general rule, laws have no retroactive effect. But there are certain recognized exceptions, such as when they are remedial or procedural in nature. This Court explained this exception in the following language:The instant complaint for illegal dismissal was filed on October 29, 2013, and was pending when the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure, particularly Sec. 20 of Rule V, was revised. Thus, Sec. 20, being a procedural rule, may be given retroactive effect to cases such as this, pending at the time of its enactment.It is true that under the Civil Code of the Philippines, "(l)aws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided." But there are settled exceptions to this general rule, such as when the statute is CURATIVE or REMEDIAL in nature or when it CREATES NEW RIGHTS.Thus, procedural laws may operate retroactively as to pending proceedings even without express provision to that effect. Accordingly, rules of procedure can apply to cases pending at the time of their enactment. In fact, statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be applied on actions undetermined at the time of their effectivity. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to that extent.[52]
[x x x x]
On the other hand, remedial or procedural laws, i.e., those statutes relating to remedies or modes of procedure, which do not create new or take away vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of such rights, ordinarily do not come within the legal meaning of a retrospective law, nor within the general rule against the retrospective operation of statutes.
(1) | Land, buildings, roads and constructions of all kinds adhered to the soil; |
(2) | Trees, plants, and growing fruits, while they are attached to the land or form an integral part of an immovable; |
(3) | Everything attached to an immovable in a fixed manner, in such a way that it cannot be separated therefrom without breaking the material or deterioration of the object; |
(4) | Statues, reliefs, paintings or other objects for use or ornamentation, placed in buildings or on lands by the owner of the immovable in such a manner that it reveals the intention to attach them permanently to the tenements; |
(5) | Machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry or works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land, and which tend directly to meet the needs of the said industry or works; |
(6) | Animal houses, pigeon-houses, beehives, fish ponds or breeding places of similar nature, in case their owner has placed them or preserves them with the intention to have them permanently attached to the land, and forming a permanent part of it; the animals in these places are included; |
(7) | Fertilizer actually used on a piece of land; |
(8) | Mines, quarries, and slag dumps, while the matter thereof forms part of the bed, and waters either running or stagnant; |
(9) | Docks and structures which, though floating, are intended by their nature and object to remain at a fixed place on a river, lake, or coast; [and] |
(10) | Contracts for public works, and servitudes and other real rights over immovable property. |
(1) | Those movables susceptible of appropriation which are not included in the preceding article; |
(2) | Real property which by any special provision of law is considered as personalty; |
(3) | Forces of nature which are brought under control by science; and |
(4) | In general, all things which can be transported from place to place without impairment of the real property to which they are fixed. |
(1) | Obligations and actions which have for their object movables or demandable sums; and |
(2) | Shares of stock of agricultural, commercial and industrial entities, although they may have real estate. |