753 Phil. 456
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
1. They are of legal age, Filipinos and represented herein by their attorney-in-fact, [co-petitioner] HERMINIO M. DE GUZMAN x x x.
x x x x
3. [Petitioners] are the children and only heirs of the spouses Serafin and Amelia de Guzman who died both intestate on April 23, 2001 and January 01, 1997.
4. The spouses were the owners of a parcel of land situated at Sta. Cruz de Malabon, Trece Martires City, Cavite Province, with area of 74,415 square meters covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-3531 (T-95734), a copy is attached as Annex “A.”
5. [Petitioners] inherited the property by intestate succession upon the death of their parents. They are now therefore its owners and are the ones in possession of the property.
6. Annotated on [petitioners’] TCT No. 3531 (T-95734) in the name of their deceased parents are the following entries of encumbrances, to wit:7. The foregoing entries/encumbrances are apparently valid and subsisting but in fact and in law, they are void and ineffective or otherwise had been terminated and extinguished or barred by prescription, estoppel and laches.
- Entry No. 8616-23 (sic) – Execution - Covering the parcel of land described in the title, as per Execution: entitled FILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM [CORP.], Plaintiff vs. SERAFIN & JOSEFINO DE GUZMAN, ET AL., Defendants, issued by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, National Capital Judicial Region, on file in this Registry. Date of Inscription (sic) - May 3, 1983; Date of Inscription - July 01, 1983.
- Entry No. 8619-23 - Notice of Levy - Covering the parcel of land described in this title, as per Notice of Levy: entitled FILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORP. vs. SERAFIN & JOSEFINO DE GUZMAN, ET AL., Defendants, under Civil Case No. 120680 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Br. XX, copy on file in this Registry. Date of instrument - June 30, 1983. Date of Inscription - July 01, 1983.
- Entry No. 1487 - Certificate of Sale - In favor of TABANGAO REALTY INCORPORATED - Covering the parcel of land described in this title, by virtue of the sheriff’s certificate of sale exec. by Jose R. Bawalan, Clerk of Court & Ex-Officio Sheriff of Cavite and approved by PROCESO P. SILANGCRUZ, acting etc. Judge of Branch 23, TMC. Date of instrument - Feb. 4, 1988. Date of Inscription - April 13, 1988.
- Entry No. 1488 - BIR certification - In favor of TABANGAO REALTY INCORPORATED - That SERAFIN DE GUZMAN as per certification issued by the BIR. Date of instrument - April 13, 1988. Date of Inscription - April 13, 1988.
8. Specifically, the Certificate of Sale, annotated on TCT No. 3531 (T-95734) as Entry No. 1487, which supposedly emanated from the Execution (Entry No. 8616-23 [sic]) and Notice of Levy (Entry No. 8619-23) is void for the following reasons:
a. The Sheriff’s Certificate of Sale dated February 4, 1988 (copy is attached as Annex “B”) recites that “on June 30, 1983 LEVY was made upon the right, titles, interests and participation of defendants SERAFIN and JOSEFINO DE GUZMAN and sold at public auction sale in front of the Capitol Building of Cavite situated at Trece Martires City, after due publication of the Sheriff’s Sale in the Record Newsweekly, and after the Notice of Sheriff’s Sale was posted in three (3) conspicuous places and later sold in favor of Tabangao Realty Incorporated, x x x as the highest bidder for the amount of SEVENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P70,000) Philippine Currency, x x x
x x x x
The truth is there was no such Sheriff’s Sale conducted on June 30, 1983 and it was legally impossible to do the levy and execution sale on the same date.
b. Assuming an execution sale was indeed conducted on any other date the same was void for lack of the required notice and publication.
c. Assuming an execution sale was indeed conducted with due notice and publication, still [respondent’s] acquisition was void because [respondent] was not and up to now is not capacitated to own and acquire agricultural land and its aggregate area of landholding exceeds the retention limit fixed by law. Being legally incapacitated to own this agricultural land the execution of the Certificate of Sale in its favor was void and did not create any legal effect.
9. Assuming there was a valid execution sale conducted, the Sheriff’s Certificate of Sale has lost its effectivity as it had been terminated and extinguished by prescription, laches and estoppel, more than 13 years having elapsed from its registration on 13 April 1988 without the buyer, [respondent] herein, taking any step to consolidate its ownership and/or take possession of the property. In the meantime [petitioners] and their predecessors have introduced on the land improvements of considerable value and are the ones paying the real property taxes and performing all the tasks and paying all the expenses of preserving the land and protecting it from intruders.
10. Assuming there was a valid execution sale executed, [respondent] is guilty of fraud and bad faith in suspending indefinitely the consolidation of title in its name. Its motive is to conceal its acquisition of the land from the public and the government, particularly the Department of Agrarian Reform, and project in the public records the [petitioners’] title, who are otherwise qualified under the law to retain it, and thereby evade its obligation to strip itself of this landholding within the period required by law and thus indefinitely keep the land away from the coverage of agrarian reform laws. Being guilty of fraud and bad faith [respondent] cannot under the principle of “in pari delicto” recover the land from the [petitioners], especially after the lapse of an unreasonably long period of time. Or at the very least, because of its guilt, [respondent] should not be allowed to deny the [petitioners] the right to redeem the land by paying the amount of P70,000.00 and the legal interest from its purchase.
11. No valid execution sale having been conducted within the ten[-]year period from the finality of the judgment against Serafin and Josefino de Guzman in the case mentioned being executed, the writ of execution (Entry No. 8618-23) and Notice of Levy (Entry No. 8619-23) are now ineffective, having been terminated and extinguished by [the] lapse of more than eighteen (18) years from the date they were taken or annotated on July 1, 1983. The judgment itself sought to be executed had prescribed.
12. The existence of the Sheriff’s Certificate of Sale and the continued annotation of the above-cited encumbrances on TCT No. T-3531 (T-95734) cast a cloud on and are prejudicial to [petitioners’] title and are one of those which the law allows to be removed in order to quiet [petitioners’] title.[4]
a. Declaring the Sheriff’s Certificate of Sale (Annex “B”), its entry as well as the entries of execution and notice of levy and BIR Certification on TCT No. T-3531 (T-95734) and all the claims of the [respondent] against the land by virtue of these documents void or as already ineffective or terminated and extinguished by prescription, laches and estoppel;
b. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Trece Martires City to cancel the annotations of Entries Nos. 8618-28, 8619-23, 1487, and 1488 on TCT No. T-3531 (T-95734).
c. Or otherwise allowing the [petitioners] to exercise their right of redemption within a certain period and compelling the [respondent] to accept from the [petitioners] the amount of P70,000.00 and its legal interest since April 1988 as redemption price.
d. Granting the [petitioners] other just and equitable reliefs.[5]
It appearing from the Sheriff’s Certificate of Sale (Annex “B” of the Complaint) dated February 4, 1988 that proper steps had been undertaken thereto prior to issuance of such document (Annex “B” of the Complaint), i.e., on June 30, 1983 a levy (Entry No. 8619-23-Notice of Levy, dorsal portion, Annex “A” of the Complaint) was conducted as a preliminary step prior to satisfaction of judgment rendered in favor of Filipinas Shell Petroleum Corp. in a civil case the latter filed against [petitioners’] predecessors-in-interest; that due publication of the Sheriff’s Sale was executed in the Record Newsweekly together with the posting of the Notice of Sheriff’s Sale in 3 conspicuous places. After substantial compliance with the notice and publication requirements as provided for by law, particularly Rule 39, Sec. 15, of the Revised Rules of Court, an execution sale was conducted on the subject property in favor of [respondent] herein Tabangao Realty Incorporated, thenceforth the questioned Sheriff’s Certificate of Sale (Entry No. 1487, Certificate of Sale, Annex “A,” of the Complaint) dated February 4, 1988 is valid, and its subsequent registration with the Registry of Deeds on April 13, 1988 and the failure of the [petitioners’] predecessors-in-interest to redeem the property within the one year period from the date of registration of the Sheriff’s Certificate of Sale, pursuant to Rule 39, Section 33 of the Revised Rules of Court, purchaser-[respondent] herein, Tabangao Realty shall be substituted to and acquires all the rights, title, interest and claim over the subject property, regardless of the fact that [respondent] had not taken any steps to consolidate its ownership and/or take possession of the property hereof, subject of this litigation, against [petitioners] in this case.
Considering all matters in their respective pleadings, both the Motion to Dismiss as well as the Opposition thus filed, the Court is of the opinion and so holds that the Certificate of Sale remains valid and that Tabangao Realty’s right has not yet prescribed as provided for in Art. 1141 of the New Civil Code, thus, the Opposition (To Motion to Dismiss) is hereby denied.
Accordingly, finding merit in the Motion to Dismiss filed by [respondent] Tabangao Realty, Inc., herein, this case is hereby dismissed. No costs.[6]
4.3. Foremost among the questions of law that this petition raises is what rule governs the prescriptive period for a buyer in execution sale to demand or compel the Sheriff to execute and deliver to him the final deed of conveyance in order that it may consolidate its title. Should it be Article 1141 which provides for thirty (30) years within which to bring real actions (as the court a quo has concluded), or should it be either Article 1149 (five years in cases where the Code or the law is silent); or Article 1144 (ten years in obligations created by law), as suggested by the petitioners.
4.4. Another question to be raise[d] is whether Sec. 33 (par. 2), Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure can be given retroactive effect in this case. As can be seen, the rights of the respondent over the property as buyer in execution sale should not be governed by Sec. 33 (2nd paragraph), Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure but by the old Sec. 35, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which was the law in force at the time of the execution sale and expiration of the period of redemption. This issue is very pivotal in determining the conflicting claims of the parties. Because whereas in the 1997 Rules the buyer in execution sale acquires all the rights of judgment debtor in the property automatically upon the lapse of the period of redemption under old Rules of Court, the buyer in execution sale acquires the right of the owner only upon the execution and delivery of the final deed of conveyance. Hence, if this is the rule applicable – as petitioners will show – then respondent has up to now not acquired right on the property and could not now assert any right based on the Certificate of Sale by reason of prescription.
4.5. In effect this petition will also raise the constitutionality of the amendment introduced [b]y the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure to 2nd paragraph of Sec. 35 of Rule 39 of the Old Rules of Court. To petitioners’ mind the subject of the amendment deals with substantive rights.
4.6. Finally, this petition shall raise the very basic question of whether or not the allegations of the petitioners’ complaint in the court below are sufficient to constitute a cause of action.[7]
Regarding the nature of the action filed before the trial court, quieting of title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud upon or doubt or uncertainty with respect to title to real property. Originating in equity jurisprudence, its purpose is to secure “x x x an adjudication that a claim of title to or an interest in property, adverse to that of the complainant, is invalid, so that the complainant and those claiming under him may be forever afterward free from any danger of hostile claim.” In an action for quieting of title, the competent court is tasked to determine the respective rights of the complainant and other claimants, “x x x not only to place things in their proper place, to make the one who has no rights to said immovable respect and not disturb the other, but also for the benefit of both, so that he who has the right would see every cloud of doubt over the property dissipated, and he could afterwards without fear introduce the improvements he may desire, to use, and even to abuse the property as he deems best x x x.” (Citation omitted.)”
Art. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title.
An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to real property or any interest therein.
Art. 478. There may also be an action to quiet title or remove a cloud therefrom when the contract, instrument or other obligation has been extinguished or has terminated, or has been barred by extinctive prescription.
SEC. 33. Deed and possession to be given at expiration of redemption period; by whom executed or given. – If no redemption be made within one (1) year from the date of the registration of the certificate of sale, the purchaser is entitled to a conveyance and possession of the property; or, if so redeemed whenever sixty (60) days have elapsed and no other redemption has expired, the last redemptioner is entitled to the conveyance and possession; but in all cases the judgment obligor shall have the entire period of one (1) year from the date of the registration of the sale to redeem the property. The deed shall be executed by the officer making the sale or by his successor in office, and in the latter case shall have the same validity as though the officer making the sale had continued in office and executed it.
Upon the expiration of the right of redemption, the purchaser or redemptioner shall be substituted to and acquire all the rights, title, interest and claim of the judgment obligor to the property as of the time of the levy. The possession of the property shall be given to the purchaser or last redemptioner by the same officer unless a third party is actually holding the property adversely to the judgment obligor. (Emphasis supplied.)
Sec. 35. Deed and possession to be given at expiration of redemption period. By whom executed or given.— If no redemption be made within twelve (12) months after the sale, the purchaser, or his assignee, is entitled to a conveyance and possession of the property; or, if so redeemed whenever sixty (60) days have elapsed and no other redemption has been made and notice thereof given, and the time for redemption has expired, the last redemptioner, or his assignee, is entitled to the conveyance and possession; but in all cases the judgment debtor shall have the entire period of twelve (12) months from the date of the sale to redeem the property. The deed shall be executed by the officer making the sale or by his successor in office, and in the latter case shall have the same validity as though the officer making the sale had continued in office and executed it.
Upon the execution and delivery of said deed the purchaser, or redemptioner, or his assignee, shall be substituted to and acquire all the right, title, interest and claim of the judgment debtor to the property as of the time of the levy, except as against the judgment debtor in possession, in which case the substitution shall be effective as of the date of the deed. The possession of the property shall be given to the purchaser or last redemptioner by the same officer unless a third party is actually holding the property adversely to the judgment debtor. (Emphasis supplied.)
To start with, petitioners base their claim of legal title not on the strength of any independent writing in their favor but simply and solely on respondent Republic’s failure to secure the Certificate of Final Sale, execute an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership and obtain a writ of possession over the property in dispute within ten (10) years from the registration of the Certificate of Sale.
Petitioners’ reliance on the foregoing shortcomings or inactions of respondent Republic cannot stand.
For one, it bears stressing that petitioners’ predecessors-in-interest lost whatever right they had over land in question from the very moment they failed to redeem it during the 1-year period of redemption. Certainly, the Republic’s failure to execute the acts referred to by the petitioners within ten (10) years from the registration of the Certificate of Sale cannot, in any way, operate to restore whatever rights petitioners’ predecessors-in-interest had over the same. For sure, petitioners have yet to cite any provision of law or rule of jurisprudence, and we are not aware of any, to the effect that the failure of a buyer in a foreclosure sale to secure a Certificate of Final Sale, execute an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership and obtain a writ of possession over the property thus acquired, within ten (10) years from the registration of the Certificate of Sale will operate to bring ownership back to him whose property has been previously foreclosed and sold. x x x.
Quite the contrary, Section 33, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure explicitly provides that “[u]pon the expiration of the right of redemption, the purchaser or redemptioner shall be substituted to and acquire all the rights, title, interest and claim of the judgment obligor to the property as of the time of the levy.”
Concededly, the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure was yet inexistent when the facts of this case transpired. Even then, the application thereof to this case is justified by our pronouncement in Lascano vs. Universal Steel Smelting Co., Inc., et al., to wit:Procedural laws are construed to be applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage, and are deemed retroactive in that sense and to that extent. As a general rule, the retroactive application of procedural laws cannot be considered violative of any personal rights because no vested right may attach to nor arise therefrom.Moreover, with the rule that the expiration of the 1-year redemption period forecloses the obligor’s right to redeem and that the sale thereby becomes absolute, the issuance thereafter of a final deed of sale is at best a mere formality and mere confirmation of the title that is already vested in the purchaser. As this Court has said in Manuel vs. Philippine National Bank, et al.:Note must be taken of the fact that under the Rules of Court the expiration of that one-year period forecloses the owner’s right to redeem, thus making the sheriff’s sale absolute. The issuance thereafter of a final deed of sale becomes a mere formality, an act merely confirmatory of the title that is already in the purchaser and constituting official evidence of that fact.With the reality that petitioners are not holders of any legal title over the property subject of this case and are bereft of any equitable claim thereon, the very first requisite of an action to quiet title, i.e., that the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject matter of the action, is miserably wanting in this case. (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted.)
Before discussing whether or not those allegations in the complaint referred to sufficiently state a cause or causes of action, it may be well to state beforehand the rule, uniformly held by this Court, that in order to sustain a dismissal on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action, the insufficiency of the cause of action must appear on the face of the complaint, and the test of the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint to constitute a cause of action is whether or not, admitting the facts alleged, the court could render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer of the complaint. For the purpose, the motion to dismiss must hypothetically admit the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint. The admission, however, is limited only to all material and relevant facts which are well pleaded in the complaint. Thus, it has been ruled that a demurrer admits only such matters of fact as are sufficiently pleaded; that the demurrer does not admit the truth of mere epithets charging fraud; nor allegations of legal conclusions; nor an erroneous statement of law. The admission of the truth of material and relevant facts well pleaded does not extend to render a demurrer an admission of inferences or conclusions drawn therefrom, even if alleged in the pleading; nor mere inferences or conclusions from facts not stated; nor conclusions of law; nor matters of evidence; nor surplusage and irrelevant matter. Examples of allegations considered by this Court as conclusions of law are: that defendant had incurred damages as a consequence of the “malicious and unjustified” institution of the action; that “with intent of circumventing the constitutional prohibition that ‘no officer or employee in the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law,’ respondents “maliciously and illegally for the purpose of political persecution and political vengeance, reverted the fund of the salary item x x x and furthermore eliminated or abolished the said position effective July 1, 1960”; that the “defendant usurped the office of Senator of the Philippines.” From American jurisprudence come the following examples:“Bare allegations in employee’s action for breach of employment contract that master had breached or violated the contract or discharged him in a wrongful, illegal, unlawful, unjust, arbitrary or fraudulent manner or without authority are compulsory and insufficient in absence of additional allegations and raise no triable issue.” Wise vs. Southern Pacific Co., 35 Cal. Rptr. 652.As quoted above, paragraph 5 of the complaint avers that the “defendants actuated by ulterior motives, contrary to law and morals, with abuse of their advantageous position as employers, in gross and evident bad faith and without giving plaintiff Alfredo Vergel de Dios his due, willfully, maliciously, unlawfully, and in a summary and arbitrary manner, dismissed said plaintiff Alfredo Vergel de Dios by means of a libelous letter.” It further avers that the “charges and statements mentioned in said letter are not true” and that the “defendants knowingly made the same in order to justify their dismissal of Alfredo Vergel de Dios.” In the light of the examples cited above, the allegations that the defendants-appellees were “actuated by ulterior motives, contrary to law and morals, with abuse of their advantageous position as employers, in gross and evident bad faith and without giving plaintiff Alfredo Vergel de Dios his due, willfully, maliciously, unlawfully, and in a summary and arbitrary manner,” are conclusions of law, inferences from facts not alleged and expressions of opinion unsupported by factual premises. For nowhere in the complaint can be found any particular factual allegations as to the ulterior motives of the defendants-appellees; as to how they abused their position as employer; as to how or why there was bad faith; and as to how plaintiff Alfredo Vergel de Dios was deprived of his due. Likewise, the allegation characterizing the letter of dismissal as a “libelous letter” is a conclusion of law without factual basis. And the allegations that the “charges and statements mentioned in said letter are not true,” and that defendants “knowingly made the same,” are legal conclusions or mere expressions of opinion, there being no factual premises showing why the charges and statements in the letter are not true; nor is there stated any particular fact or circumstance upon which the defendants-appellees’ knowledge of the falsity thereof can be predicated.
“Allegations that defendants acted maliciously and unreasonably were conclusionary.” Norkin vs. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 47 Cal. Rptr. 15.
“Allegations that acts of defendants are arbitrary, capricious, fraudulent, wrongful, and unlawful are mere conclusions of law not admitted by demurrer.” Burt vs. Irvine Co., 47 Cal. Rptr. 362.
“A bare characterization in a petition of unlawfulness, is merely a legal conclusion and a wish of the pleader, and such a legal conclusion unsubstantiated by facts which could give it life, has no standing in any court where issues must be presented and determined by facts in ordinary and concise language.” Petty vs. Dayton Musicians’ Ass’n., 153 NE2d 218, affirmed 153 NE2d 223.
“Where acts of defendants were described as willful, wanton and malicious and an abuse of process, such descriptions were mere conclusions of the pleader and were not admitted by motion to dismiss.” Burr vs. State Bank of St. Charles, 100 NE2d 773, 344 Ill. App. 332.
x x x x
Pursuant, therefore, to the rule stated above that conclusions of law, inferences or conclusions from facts not stated, and mere expressions of opinion, are not deemed admitted by the motion to dismiss, what should be deemed admitted in paragraph 5 of the complaint would be the bare allegation that Alfredo Vergel de Dios was dismissed from employment on September 15, 1965, per letter of dismissal of even date, a copy of which was attached to the complaint and made part thereof as Annex “A”. At this juncture, it should be pointed out that the succeeding allegations of the complaint are anchored on the allegations in paragraph 5, except the later part of paragraph 9 alleging refusal of the defendants-appellees to make an accounting of funds which allegation is an inference from facts not alleged, there being no allegation in the pleading to the effect that any amount is due the plaintiffs-appellants and that the amount is being withheld by the defendants-appellees. Since the only fact alleged and deemed admitted by the motion to dismiss is that Alfredo Vergel de Dios was dismissed from employment on September 15, 1965, the other allegations premised on the allegations in paragraph 5 must be considered in that light alone.
Applying now the test of the sufficiency of the facts alleged to constitute a cause of action, can the court render a valid judgment upon the facts alleged and deemed admitted, in accordance with the prayer of the complaint? Certainly not, there being no alleged and admitted fact showing that the defendants-appellees have committed acts constituting a “delict or wrong” by which the defendants-appellees violated the right of the plaintiffs-appellants causing them loss or injury. Or more specifically, there is no alleged and admitted fact that defendants-appellees fabricated a false ground to dismiss Alfredo Vergel de Dios from employment, the admitted fact being that his dismissal was for a just cause, as shown by the letter of dismissal, Annex “A” of the complaint. In this regard, while the letter of dismissal is being attached to the complaint to show its existence and character, in the absence of material facts well pleaded in the complaint and admitted, showing the nature of the dismissal, the complaint should be read and interpreted with the aid of the exhibit, Annex “A”, which, on its face, shows that the dismissal was for a just cause. (Citations omitted.)
[O]n June 30, 1983, LEVY was made upon the right, titles, interests and participation of defendants SERAFIN & JOSEFINO DE GUZMAN and sold at public auction sale in front of the Capitol Building of Cavite situated at Trece Martires City, after due publication of the Sheriff’s Sale in the Record Newsweekly, and after the Notice of Sheriff’s Sale was posted in three (3) conspicuous places and later sold in favor of Tabangao Realty Incorporated, with address at 4th Floor, Insular Life Bldg., Ayala Ave., Makati, Metro Manila as the highest bidder for the amount of SEVENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P70,000.00) Philippine Currency, the properties of said defendants x x x.[14]
The arguments and contentions of the Spouses Ching cannot be upheld.
First, the Spouses Ching's reliance on prescription is unavailing in the case at bar. The Spouses Ching are implying that the RTC violated Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, viz.:Sec. 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. – A final and executory judgment or order may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action. The revived judgment may also be enforced by motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry and thereafter by action before it is barred by the statute of limitations.However, it must be noted that contrary to their allegation, the summary judgment of the RTC in Civil Case No. 142309 had in fact already been enforced. During the pendency of the case, the subject property was already levied upon. Subsequently, after summary judgment and while the case was on appeal, the RTC granted the Bank’s motion for execution pending appeal. Consequently, on October 10, 1983, an auction sale of the subject property was conducted, with the Bank emerging as the highest bidder. Later, a Certificate of Sale in its favor was executed by the Sheriff and, thereafter, inscribed as a memorandum of encumbrance on TCT No. S-3151.
It is settled that execution is enforced by the fact of levy and sale. The result of such execution was that title over the subject property was vested immediately in the purchaser subject only to the Spouses Ching’s right to redeem the property within the period provided for by law. The right acquired by the purchaser at an execution sale is inchoate and does not become absolute until after the expiration of the redemption period without the right of redemption having been exercised. But inchoate though it be, it is, like any other right, entitled to protection and must be respected until extinguished by redemption. Since, the Spouses Ching failed to redeem the subject property within the period allowed by law, they have been divested of their rights over the property.
Verily, the Bank’s “Motion to Retrieve Records, for Issuance of Final Deed of Conveyance, to Order the Register of Deeds of Makati City to Transfer Title and for Writ of Possession” was merely a consequence of the execution of the summary judgment as the judgment in Civil Case No. 142309 had already been enforced when the lot was levied upon and sold at public auction, with the Bank as the highest bidder.[16]