819 Phil. 500
REYES, JR., J:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondents DOHLE PHILMAN MANNING AGENCY INC., DOHLE (IOM) LIMITED, and CAPT. MANOLO T. GACUTAN are hereby ordered to pay. jointly and severally, complainant JULIUS REY QUINAL DOBLE the sum of US$90,882.00, by way of permanent total disability compensation benefit under the parties' CBA plus 10% thereof as attorney's fees, or its peso equivalent at the time of payment.Aggrieved, herein petitioners appealed to the NLRC, which eventually affirmed in toto the LA decision. The fallo of the NLRC decision states:
All other claims are dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[13]
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in toto (sic).The petitioners elevated the case to the CA via a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Once again, the case moved in favor of the respondent. The CA affirmed the NLRC decision, but modified the basis of the award of damages from the Collective Bargaining Agreement to the POEA-SEC, to wit:
SO ORDERED.[14]
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant Petition is hereby DENIED. Consequently, the assailed Resolutions dated March 18, 2015 and May 25, 2015 rendered by public respondent NLRC (Third Division) in NLRC NCR Case No. (M) 02-02128-14/NLRC LAC No. 02-000109-15 are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION by ordering petitioners to jointly and severally pay private respondent the following: a) permanent total disability benefits of US$60,000.00 at its peso equivalent at the time of actual payment; and b) attorney's fees of ten percent (10%) of the total monetary award at its peso equivalent at the time of actual payment.Both parties filed their respective motions for reconsideration, which were both denied by the CA via a Resolution dated March 9, 2016.[16]
SO ORDERED.[15]
8.1 WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT MODIFIED THE DECISION AND RESOLUTION OF [HEREIN PETITIONERS] DECLARING [HEREIN RESPONDENT] NOT ENTITLED [TO] THE BETTER DISABILITY BENEFIT UNDER THE APPLICABLE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT.[18]After a reading of the foregoing arguments, the issues presented before the Court could be summarized thus: (1) whether or not the respondent is fit to work, and thus, entitled to the disability benefits claimed; (2) whether or not the basis of the award of damages should be the CBA and not the POEA-SEC; and (3) whether or not the respondent is entitled to attorney's fees.
While the first issue identified above-the issue of the relation of respondent's illness to his work as an ordinary seaman-is essentially factual, the Court herein exercises its power of review considering that the CA issued the assailed decision with grave abuse of discretion: (1) by failing to consider the mandatory procedure of referring conflicting medical assessments to a third doctor; and (2) by relying on the 120-day rule, and not on the findings of the company-designated physician, in declaring the respondent's permanent and total disability.
1.) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; 2.) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; 3.) when there is grave abuse of discretion; 4.) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; 5.) when the findings of fact are conflicting; 6.) when in making its findings, the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; 7.) when the findings are contrary to that of the trial court; 8.) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; 9.) when the facts set forth in the petition, as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs, are not disputed by the respondent: 10.) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; or 11.) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.[22]
Section 20 [B]. Compensation and Benefits for Injury or IllnessThus, while it is the company-designated physician who is entrusted with the task of assessing the seaman's disability, whether total or partial, due to either injury or illness, during the term of the latter's employment,[24] the same is not automatically final, binding or conclusive.[25]
x x x x
2. x x x
However, if after repatriation, the seafarer still requires medical attention arising from said injury or illness, he shall be so provided at cost to the employer until such time as he is declared fit or the degree of his disability has been established by the company-designated physician.
3. Upon sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment, the seafarer is entitled to sickness allowance equivalent to his basic wage until he is declared fit to work or the degree of his permanent disability has been assessed by the company-designated physician, but in no case shall this period exceed one hundred twenty (120) days.
For this purpose, the seafarer shall submit himself to a post employment medical examination by a company-designated physician within three working days upon his return except when he is physically incapacitated to do so, in which case, a written notice to the agency within the same period is deemed as compliance. Failure of the seafarer to comply with the mandatory reporting requirement shall result in his forfeiture of the right to claim the above benefits.
If a doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment, a third doctor may be agreed jointly between the Employer and the seafarer. The third doctor's decision shall be final and binding on both parties.[23] (Emphasis Ours)
This referral to a third doctor has been held by this Court to be a mandatory procedure as a consequence of the provision that it is the company-designated doctor whose assessment should prevail. In other words, the company can insist on its disability rating even against a contrary opinion by another doctor, unless the seafarer expresses his disagreement by asking for the referral to a third doctor who shall make his or her determination and whose decision is final and binding on the parties. We have followed this rule in a string of cases x x x.[31] (Emphasis Ours)This is reiterated by the Court in the recent case of Silagan v. Southfield Agencies, Inc.,[32] to wit:
Second, petitioner failed to comply with the procedure laid down under Section 20 (B) (3) of the 2000 POEA-SEC with regard to the joint appointment by the parties of a third doctor whose decision shall be final and binding on them in case the seafarer's personal doctor disagrees with the company-designated physician's fit-to-work assessment. This referral to a third doctor has been held by this Court to be a mandatory procedure as a consequence of the provision that it is the company-designated doctor whose assessment should prevail. In other words, the company can insist on its disability rating even against the contrary opinion by another doctor, unless the seafarer expresses his disagreement by asking for a referral to a third doctor who shall make his or her determination and whose decision is final and binding on the parties. (Citations omitted and emphasis Ours)Thus, it is on the basis of the foregoing cases that the Court hereby reverses the ruling of the CA.
Patient was previously declared fit to work by the Hand Surgeon with regards to his bilateral Carpal Tunnel Syndrome.On the other hand, upon examination and evaluation of the respondent's own medical expert, Dr. Magtira opined that:
Patient was seen by the Orthopedic Surgeon who opines patient is now declared fit to work as of November 8, 2013.[33]
On physical examination, the patient is conscious, coherent and oriented to time, place and person. There is atrophy of the thenar and hypothenar muscles of both hands with post-operative scar noted. There is limitation of motion of the digits of the hands. There is pain and tenderness of both hands noted. Numbness of both hands was noted. Swelling of his right ankle joint was also noted. There are no neurologic deficits, and range of motion is full. Manual muscle testing showed 4-5/5 muscle strength. He is unable to squat and can stand on tiptoe for a very limited period only.However, contrary to the mandatory proceedings identified by the Court, the respondent herein did not demand for his re-examination by a third doctor, and instead opted to initiate the instant case.
Mr. Doble remains incapacitated. Despite his continuous physiotherapy, he continues to have limitation of flexion and difficulty in grasping object. He is still experiencing pain and numbness of his hands. He continues to have pain and discomfort on his right foot and ankle. He is unable to tolerate prolonged walking and standing. He is also unable to squat, especially is weight is borne on the right foot. He is therefore also not capable of working at his previous occupation from said impediment. As he lost his pre-injury capacity, he is now permanently disabled.
x x x x
Mr. Doble has lost his pre-injury (sic) capacity and is no longer capable of working on his previous occupation because of the injuries sustained and the permanent sequelae of said injury. It will be to his best interest to refrain from heavy labor as this is likely to cause him more harm than good. Mr. Doble is now permanently disabled and is therefore now permanently UNFIT in any capacity to resume his usual sea duties.[34]
We find the rulings of the labor authorities seriously flawed as they were rendered in total disregard of the law between the parties - the POEA-SEC and the CBA on the prescribed procedure for the determination of disability compensation claims, particularly with respect to the resolution of conflicting disability assessments of the company-designated physician and Dumadag's physicians, without saying why it was disregarded or ignored; it was as if the POEA-SEC and the CBA did not exist. This is grave abuse of discretion, considering that, as labor dispute adjudicators, the LA and the NLRC are expected to uphold the law. For affirming the labor tribunals, the CA committed the same jurisdictional error.[36]Finally, the CA also anchored its decision on the assertion that the respondent was "incapable of discharging his usual functions and he was not able to return to the job that he was trained to do for more than 120 days already,"[37] and as such, he was already considered totally and permanently disabled.
As these provisions operate, the seafarer, upon sign-off from his vessel must report to the company-designated physician within three (3) days from arrival for diagnosis and treatment. For the duration of the treatment but in no case to exceed 120 days, the seaman is on temporary total disability as he is totally unable to work. He receives his basic wage during this period until he is declared tit to work or his temporary disability is acknowledged by the company to be permanent, either partially or totally, as his condition is defined under the POEA-Standard Employment Contract [(SEC)] and by applicable Philippine laws. If the 120 days (sic) initial period is exceeded and no such declaration is made because the seafarer requires further medical attention, then the temporary total disability period may be extended up to a maximum of 240 days, subject to the right of the employer to declare within this period that a permanent partial or total disability already exists. The seaman may of course also be declared fit to work at any time such declaration is justified by his medical condition.In the present case, while the company-designated physician did indeed exceed 120 days in declaring the respondent fit to work, the former made the final diagnosis prior to the expiration of the 240-day limit. Thus, the CA found:
x x x x
As we outlined above, a temporary total disability only becomes permanent when so declared by the company physician within the periods he is allowed to do so, or upon the expiration of the maximum 240-day medical treatment period without a declaration of either fitness to work or the existence of a permanent disability. In the present case, while the initial 120-day treatment or temporary total disability period was exceeded, the company-designated doctor duly made a declaration well within the extended 240-day period that the petitioner was fit to work.[40] (Citations omitted and emphasis Ours)
In the case at bench, records show that private respondent was given a fit to work clearance by the company-designated physicians on November 8, 2013 based on the respective declarations of Dr. Lao and Dr. Chuasuan, Jr. The pronouncement that private respondent is already fit to work was made 210 days after he was first seen by company-designated physician on April 12, 2013. Meanwhile, private respondent consulted his physician of choice on November 14, 2013 and was declared permanently disabled as his present condition renders him incapable of discharging his previous occupation.[41] (Emphasis Ours)Two things must be said of this factual finding: first, the company-designated physician complied with the requirements of the law when the respondent's medical status was assessed with finality prior to the expiration of the 240-day rule; and second, the 240-day rule applies only to the assessment provided by the company-designated physician, and not to the assessment of the seafarer's personal physician, such that, even if the latter found the seafarer unfit to work after the 240-day period, the law would not automatically transform the temporary total disability of the seafarer to a permanent total disability.