543 Phil. 436
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
On February 15, 1980, [petitioner] instituted these cases, to wit: (1) Civil Case No. 36089, entitled: "Augusto Gomez, as Special Administrator of the Intestate Estate of Consuelo Gomez, Plaintiff, versus Maria Rita Gomez-Samson, Marcial Samson, Jesus B. Gomez, and the Registers of Deeds of Pasig and Marikina, Rizal, Defendants"; and (2) Civil Case No. 36090, entitled: "Augusto Gomez, as Special Administrator of the Intestate Estate of Consuelo Gomez, Plaintiff, versus Ariston Gomez, Sr., and Ariston B. Gomez, Jr., Defendants", both in the Regional Trial Court, Pasig City.The dispositive portion of the RTC Joint Decision reads:
CONSUELO, ARISTON, SR. and Angel, all surnamed Gomez, were sister and brothers, respectively. MARIA-RITA Gomez-Samson, JESUS Gomez and ARISTON Gomez, JR. are the children of ARISTON, SR. while AUGUSTO Gomez is the child of Angel.
In Civil Case No. 36089, plaintiff AUGUSTO alleged in his complaint that CONSUELO, who died on November 6, 1979, was the owner of the following real properties:"(a) A parcel of land, with all the improvements thereon, situated in Marikina, Metro Manila, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 340233 in her name, x x x;that after the death of Consuelo, defendants Rita and Jesus fraudulently prepared and/or caused to be prepared a Deed of Donation Intervivos; that in the said document, Consuelo donated the above described properties to defendants Rita and Jesus; that the said defendants forged or caused to be forged the signature of the donor, Consuelo; that the notarial acknowledgement on the said document was antedated to April 21, 1979; that on the basis of the said document defendants sought the cancellation of the certificates of title in the name of Consuelo and the issuance of new ones in the names of defendants Rita and Jesus.
"(b) A parcel of land, with all the improvements thereon, situated in Marikina, Metro Manila, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 353818 in her name, x x x,"
"(c) A parcel of land, with all the improvements thereon, situated in Pasig, Metro Manila, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 268396 in her name, x x x;"
On the basis of the foregoing, plaintiff prayed that the Deed of Donation Intervivos be declared false, null and void ab initio, and/or be nullified; that TCT Nos. 340233, 353818, and 268396 be reinstated or be replaced by titles in the name of the Intestate Estate of Consuelo Gomez; and, that defendants be ordered to pay damages, by way of attorney's fees and expenses of litigation plus costs.
On April 24, 1980, private defendants, and nominal defendants Registers of Deeds of Pasig and Marikina, Rizal, filed their common answer, denying the material allegations in the complaint and asserting that a copy of the deed of donation was submitted to the Notarial Section of the CFI of Quezon City as early as July 2, 1979; that the said document is valid and not a forgery or otherwise subject to similar infirmity; that the said document being valid, the properties covered therein passed in ownership to private defendants, as early as April 20, 1979; that defendants have the perfect and absolute right to cause the cancellation of TCT Nos. 340233, 353818, and 26839 and request for the issuance of new certificates of titles in their respective names; that they have the right to use, enjoy, possess, dispose and own these properties; that no law was violated by the nominal defendants when the old certificates of title were cancelled and new certificates were issued in the name of the private defendants, hence, plaintiff has no cause of action against the nominal defendants neither has the court jurisdiction over the foregoing issue.
Defendants thereafter prayed for moral damages of P2,000,000.00; compensatory damages of P1,000,000.00; exemplary damages of P500,000.00; attorney's fees of P200,000.00; and that individual plaintiff be made jointly and severally liable with the estate of Consuelo Gomez.
In Civil Case No. 36090, the same plaintiff alleged in his complaint that Consuelo was also the sole and absolute owner of the following personal properties:
(a) Seventy-five (75) common shares of stock of V-Tri Realty, Inc. with a total par value of P75,000.00 and covered by Stock Certificate No. 003;
(b) Eleven thousand eight hundred fifty three (11,853) common shares of stock of First Philippine Holdings Corporation with a total par value of P118,530.00 covered by Stock Certificates Nos. A-02614 (7,443 shares) and A-02613 (2,040 shares) and A-09018 (2,370 shares);
(c) Jewelries and collector's items, contained in Consuelo Gomez's Safe Deposit Box No. 44 at the PCI Bank, Marikina Branch, which were inventoried on January 9, 1980 per Order of the Court in Special Proceedings No. 9164;
(d) A four-door sedan 1978 Mercedes Benz 200 with Motor No. 11593810-050706, Serial/Chassis No. 12302050-069893, Plate No. A6-252 and LTC Registration Certificate No. 0140373 valued at P200,000.00, more or less at the time Consuelo Gomez died;
(e) A four-door sedan 1979 Toyota Corona with Motor No. 12RM-031643, Serial/Chassis No. RT-130-901150, Plate No. B-09-373 and LTC Registration Certificate No. 0358757, valued at P50,000.00, more or less at the time Consuelo Gomez died;
(f) Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) including accrued interests on money market placement with the BA Finance Corporation per its promissory note No. BAT-0116 dated March 9, 1978.
that after the death of Consuelo, defendants fraudulently prepared and/or caused to be prepared a Deed of Donation Intervivos; that in the said document Consuelo donated the above described properties to defendants Ariston, Sr. and Ariston, Jr.; that the said defendants forged or caused to be forged the signature of the donor, Consuelo; that the notarial acknowledgment on the said document was antedated to April 21, 1979; that on the basis of the said document defendant Ariston, Sr., [in] December 1978, effected or tried to effect a change of the LTC registration of the two (2) vehicles; that defendant Ariston, Jr., for his part, pre-terminated the money market placements with BA Finance and received checks in the sums of P187,027.74 and P4,405.56; that with the exception of the jewelries, which are with the bank, defendant Ariston, Sr., has benefited and will continue to benefit from the use of the two (2) vehicles and from the dividends earned by the shares of stocks.
On the basis of the foregoing, the plaintiff prayed that the Deed of Donation Intervivos be declared false, null and void ab initio, and/or be nullified; that defendant Ariston, Sr., be ordered to deliver the stock certificates, jewelries, collector's items, and vehicles in his possession plus all the cash dividends earned by the shares of stock and reasonable compensation for the use of the two (2) motor vehicles; that defendant Ariston, Jr. be ordered to pay the amount of P191,533.00 received by him from BA Finance, with interest from the time he received the amount until he fully pays the plaintiff; and, damages, by way of attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, plus costs.
On March 19, 1980, defendants Ariston, Sr. and Ariston Jr., filed their answer, denying the material allegations in the complaint and asserting that a copy of the Deed of Donation was submitted to the Notarial Section of the CFI of Quezon City as early as July 2, 1979; that the said document is valid and not a forgery or otherwise subject to similar infirmity; that the said document being valid, the properties covered therein passed in ownership to defendants, as early as April 20, 1979; and that defendants have the perfect and absolute right to use, enjoy, possess and own these properties.
Defendants thereafter prayed for moral damages of P2,000,000.00; compensatory damages of P1,000,000.00; exemplary damages of P500,000.00; attorney's fees of P200,000.00; and that individual plaintiff be made jointly and severally liable with the estate of Consuelo Gomez.
On May 27, 1980, the plaintiff filed a Motion to Consolidate, in both cases, which the trial court in Civil Case No. 36090 granted in its Order dated June 6, 1980. Whereupon, the records of Civil Case No. 36090 were transmitted to the RTC, Branch 23.
After appropriate proceedings, the trial court directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda thirty (30) days from their receipt of the transcript of stenographic notes.
In its joint decision dated April 8, 1992, the trial court dismissed the complaints.[3]
WHEREFORE, it is Ordered:Petitioner filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals. The latter affirmed the RTC's Joint Decision in the 4 September 2002 assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:And costs of suit; with legal interest on all the amounts, except on costs and attorney's fees, commencing from February 15, 1980, until fully paid.[4]
- That the instant complaints be dismissed;
- That the replevin bonds nos. 2223, 2224, 2225, and 2226 of the Stronghold Insurance Company, Incorporated be cancelled;
- That Augusto Gomez and the estate of the late Consuelo Gomez, jointly and solidarily, should pay to Ariston Gomez, Jr. the following amounts:
Moral damages of P1,000,000.00;
Exemplary damages of P250,000.00
Attorney's fees of P200,000.00
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED in toto.[5]Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the same was denied by the Court of Appeals in the assailed Resolution dated 27 November 2002.
1) Whether or not the instant petition presents several exceptions to the general rule that an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 may only raise questions of law and that factual findings of the Court of Appeals are binding on this Honorable Court;As acknowledged by petitioner, findings of fact of the trial court, especially when upheld by the Court of Appeals, are binding on the Supreme Court.[7] Petitioner, however, seeks refuge in the following established exceptions[8] to this rule:
2) Whether or not the Court of Appeals' Decision is based on a misapprehension of facts and on inferences that are manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
3) Whether or not the Court of Appeals seriously erred in its finding of fact that Consuelo Gomez herself paid the donor's tax of the properties subject of the donation on 09 October 1979 when the evidence on record point to the contrary;
4) Whether or not the Court of Appeals seriously erred in giving credence to the testimony of former judge Jose Sebastian, the Notary Public who notarized the assailed Deeds of Donation;
5) Whether or not the Court of Appeals seriously erred in dismissing the irregularities apparent on the face of the assailed Deeds of Donation as mere lapses of a non-lawyer who prepared them;
6) Whether or not the Court of Appeals seriously erred in totally disregarding the very unusual circumstances relative to the alleged totally execution and notarization of the assailed Deeds of Donation;
7) Whether or not the Court of Appeals seriously erred and is manifestly mistaken in inferring that respondents were able to sufficiently and substantially explain the reason for the belated transfer of the pertinent properties covered by the assailed Deeds of Donation;
8) Whether or not the Court of Appeals seriously erred and is manifestly mistaken in not giving due weight to the expert opinion of the NBI representative, which the lower court itself sought; and
9) Whether or not the Court of Appeals seriously erred in not finding that the totality of circumstantial evidence presented by petitioner produced a single network of circumstances establishing the simulation and falsification of the assailed Deeds of Donation.[6]
To start with, it is very significant that Torres herself admits that the signatures of Consuelo in the Donations 401 and 402 are genuine.On the other hand, the trial court gave weight to the testimony of Francisco Cruz:
(This is contrary to the allegations of Augusto in his complaint; wherein he alleged that the signatures of Consuelo were forged. In fact, as per the allegations, in Augusto's complaint, the signatures were forged, after the death of Consuelo).
(In effect, Augusto is now trying to shift the thrust of his attack, to a scenario wherein Consuelo allegedly signed two papers in blank, and thereafter, said Donations 401 and 402 were typed on top.)
Furthermore, Torres fell apart during, cross-examination. Torres admitted that she had not taken any specialized studies on the matter of "Questioned Documents," except on one or two seminars on "Questioned Documents." She admitted that she had not passed the Board Exams, as a Chemist; she further admitted that she has not written any thesis or similar work on the subject matter at issue.
Regarding non-typing in one continuous sitting, she admitted that she had never seen the typewriter used to type the Donations 401 and 402, nor even tried to get hold of it, before she made the report; that there were no variances insofar as the vertical alignments of the typewritten documents were concerned; that there were only variances insofar as the horizontal alignments are concerned; she admitted that if anybody had wanted to incorporate a document into a blank sheet of paper, on top of a signature, the normal step to be taken would be to be careful on horizontal alignment, which can be seen via the naked eye; and not the vertical alignment. Yet, the vertical alignment, as admitted by her, was perfect.
In fact, she had to admit that it is possible that if the paper roller is loose, the horizontal alignment will have a variance; whereas, the vertical alignment would have no variance, and there would be nothing sinister about this. She had to admit this, because she was confronted with an authority on the matter, more particularly the book of Wilson Harrison (vide Exhibit "17"). She admitted that she had not used bromide when she took the photographs of the two (2) Donations 401 and 402, which photographs she later on enlarged. She admitted that when she had taken the photographs of the two (2) Donations, she had not put the typewritten pitch measure on top. She admitted that when the photographs were enlarged, the alignment of the typewritten words became distorted; more so when a typewriter pitch measure is not used, when photographing the documents.
In effect, insofar as the issue of typewriting in one sitting or not, is concerned, the testimony of Torres was completely discredited (Vide TSN of May 19, 1986).[16]
Cruz testified on this point that the Donations 401 and 402 were both typed in one continuous sitting. He elucidated clearly on how he arrived at this conclusion.As stated above, petitioner also alleges that the signature "Consuelo C. Gomez" was written before the typewritten name "Consuelo C. Gomez." In this second round of analysis of the respective testimonies of Zenaida Torres and Francisco Cruz, the trial court arrived at the same conclusion:
To start with, he was able to determine that the typewriter used was the elite typewriter, because as per Cruz, when his typewriting measuring the instruments were placed over the documents, there were twelve (12) letters that went inside one inch, which is a characteristic of an elite typewriter.
Secondly, he noticed that the color tone of the typewriter ink is the same, thru the entire documents.
As per Cruz, this is another indication that the Donations 401 and 402 were prepared in one continuous sitting, because, as per Cruz, if the typewriter is used one time and sometime after that, the typewriter is used again, the color tone will most probably be different.
He further concluded that both the horizontal and vertical alignments are in agreement. He explained how he arrived at this conclusion.
As per Cruz, by using an instrument which is a typewriting measuring instrument produced by the Criminal Research Co., Inc. in the USA and placing said instrument to test the vertical alignment from the top down to the bottom, there is a perfect vertical alignment.
In fact, as per Cruz, when he took photographs of the documents, he had already placed the typewriting measuring instrument over the document and he showed to the court the enlarged photographs, indicating clearly that all the vertical alignments are all in order.
He also found out that the horizontal and vertical alignments are in agreement.
He explained that the slight variances as to the spacing of the words "Know All Men By These Presents" and the words "That I Consuelo C. Gomez, single, of legal age, Filipino, and a resident of 24 Pine Street, New Marikina Subdivision, Marikina", there is a slight disagreement in the spacing, but not in the alignment.
He explained that the normal reason for such discrepancy in the spacing is because the typist sometimes tries to push the variable spacer; the [button] on the left side of the roller, and if you press that round [button], there will be a variance spacing namely one space, two spaces, and three spaces; and these are not attached so there is a variable in the spacing.
In short, this was due to the pushing of the variable paper by the typist.
Furthermore, he emphasized that the left margins are aligned and this signifies that there was typing in one continuous sitting, because if you type on a paper and re-insert it again, there are differences in the left hand margin. All of his findings appear in the blow up photographs which were marked as Exhibits "31" to "34".
He even pointed out the differences in the Jurat wherein admittedly, Judge Sebastian inserted the date "21st" and "1" (page number), "401" (document number), "I" (book number), and "82" (series); and also his signature "Jose R. Sebastian" and his "PTR Number" (vide pages 12 to 19, TSN of April 25, 1982).
All attempts by opposite counsel to discredit the testimony of Cruz on this issue, proved futile.[17]
[ZENAIDA TORRES'S] FINDINGS ARE BASED SOLELY ON A SINGLE HANDWRITTEN LETTER "O", WHICH TOUCHES (DOES NOT EVEN INTERSECT) THE TYPEWRITTEN LETTER "N". BASED ON THIS, WITHOUT MORE, TORRES CONCLUDED THAT THE TYPEWRITTEN NAME "CONSUELO C. GOMEZ" CAME AFTER THE HANDWRITTEN SIGNATURE "CONSUELO C. GOMEZ".We need but cite authorities on the matter (with which Authorities Torres was confronted and which authorities she had to admit), which read as follows:
The Intersection of Ink Lines with Typescript. It is often stated that is possible to determine whether an ink line which intersects typescript was written before or after the typing. The theory is simple; most typewriter inks are greasy and an ink line tends to shrink in width as it passes over a greasy place on the paper. If, indeed, an ink line is observed to suffer a distinct reduction in width every time it intersects the typescript it may safely be concluded that the ink line was written after the typescript.The trial court again sided with Francisco Cruz who testified, citing authorities,[19] that it is impossible to determine accurately which came first, because there were no intersections at all.[20] The trial court added: "[i]n fact, common sense, without more, dictates that if there are no intersections (between the typewritten and the handwritten words), it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to determine which came first."[21] The Court of Appeals found nothing erroneous in these findings of the trial court.[22]
In practice, however, ink lines written across typescript are rarely seen to suffer any appreciable shrinkage in width, since the amount of oily medium transferred from the ribbon to the paper is rarely sufficient to have any effect. Indeed, if the ink happens to be alkaline, surplus ink, instead of shrinking, may spread out into the typescript to increase the width of the inkline at the intersection. In the case the proof that the ink followed the typescript would be the presence of a swelling rather than a shrinkage.
Experience has shown that it is rarely possible for any definite opinion as to the order of appearance on the paper for intersecting ink lines and typescript to be justified on the [meager] amount of evidence which generally available.
A similar state of affairs will be found to hold for carbon paper and waxer; which have much in common with typewriter ribbons in the way the mark they make on paper react with intersecting ink lines". (Wilson, Suspect Documents; Exhibits "19"; "19-A"; "37"; "37-D"; underscoring ours).
In fact, the very authority of Torres on the matter, states as follows:
"Sequence of Writing
Intersecting writing strokes may have distinctive patterns, depending upon the order of writing the lapse of time between the two writings, the density of the two strokes and the kind of inks, writing instruments, and paper used. With a binocular microscope or a hand-magnifier aided by skillfully controlled light and photography, the true order of preparation may be revealed and demonstrated to a lay observer.
What appears to be the obvious solution may not always be the correct answer. For example, the line of deepest color usually appears on top even if it was written first. Careful study and testing is necessary before reaching a conclusion. Some of the more common criteria for determining sequence are considered in the following paragraphs.
If we considered the intersection of two writing strokes or the intersection of writing and typewriting the majority of problems are covered. Substantial, repeated intersections of two writings offer a higher probability of success than a single indifferent intersection, such as a weak stroke crossing another which only very infrequently can produce a clear indication of the order of writing". (Exhibits "V" and "V-1" (underscoring ours).[18]
Expert testimony no doubt constitutes evidence worthy of meriting consideration, although not exclusive on questions of a professional character. The courts of justice, however, are not bound to submit their findings necessarily to such testimony; they are free to weigh them, and they can give or refuse to give them any value as proof, or they can even counterbalance such evidence with the other elements of conviction which may have been adduced during the trial. (Emphasis supplied.)Similarly, in Espiritu v. Court of Appeals[32] and Salomon v. Intermediate Appellate Court,[33] this Court held:
Although courts are not ordinarily bound by expert testimonies, they may place whatever weight they choose upon such testimonies in accordance with the facts of the case. The relative weight and sufficiency of expert testimony is peculiarly within the province of the trial court to decide, considering the ability and character of the witness, his actions upon the witness stand, the weight and process of the reasoning by which he has supported his opinion, his possible bias in favor of the side for whom he testifies, the fact that he is a paid witness, the relative opportunities for study or observation of the matters about which he testifies, and any other matters which serve to illuminate his statements. The opinion of the expert may not be arbitrarily rejected; it is to be considered by the court in view of all the facts and circumstances in the case and when common knowledge utterly fails, the expert opinion may be given controlling effect (20 Am. Jur., 1056-1058). The problem of the credibility of the expert witness and the evaluation of his testimony is left to the discretion of the trial court whose ruling thereupon is not reviewable in the absence of an abuse of that discretion. (Underscoring supplied.)Thus, while the expert witness' possible bias in favor of the side for whom he or she testifies, and the fact that he or she is a paid witness, may be considered by the trial court, the latter should weigh the same with all the other evidence adduced during trial, as well as with the witness' deportment, actions, ability, and character upon the witness stand. The trial court is consequently given the discretion in weighing all these circumstances in its determination of the expert witness' credibility, as it is in a better position than the appellate courts to observe the demeanor of these witnesses. As there is no evidence of abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in such determination, the latter is not reviewable by this Court.
As to the alleged intercalation of the text of the deeds of donation above the supposedly priorly affixed signature of CONSUELO on a blank sheet of bond paper, as shown by the one-page document in a letter size paper, typed single space with barely any room left on the top, bottom and left and right margins, as well as the lack of copies thereof, it has been explained that the same was due to the fact that the said documents were prepared by defendant ARISTON, JR., a non-lawyer inexperienced with the way such documents should be executed and in how many copies. x x x.Petitioner counters that the alleged irregularities "do not relate to the proper construction or manner of writing the documents as would necessitate the expertise of a lawyer. Rather, they relate to matters as basic as observing the proper margins at the top, left, right and bottom portions of the document, using the appropriate paper size and number of pages that are necessary and observing appropriate spacing and proper placement of the words in the document."
x x x x
Accordingly, it is not surprising that someone as unfamiliar and inexperienced in preparing a deed of donation, or any deed of conveyance for that matter, as ARISTON, JR., prepared the documents that are the subject matter of the case at bar in the manner that he did.[44]
LUNGSOD NG QUEZONDecember 4, 1979
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that MS. CONSUELO C. GOMEZ of 8059 Honradez St., Makati, Metro Manila, paid donor's tax on even date in the amount of P121,409.45 inclusive of surcharge, interest and compromise penalties as follows:
RTR No. 2814499, PTC Conf. Receipt No. 2896956- P119,283.63 RTR No. 2814500/PTC Conf. Receipt No. 2896957- 2,125.82 --------------- T o t a l P121,409.45
This certification is issued upon request of Mr. Ariston Gomez, Sr.(SGD)NESTOR M. ESPENILLA
Chief, Financing, Real Estate and Transfer
Taxes Division
TAN E2153-B0723-A-7[59]
Petitioner points out that the Certification was made after the death of Consuelo, and claims that the same appears to be a scheme by Jose Sebastian to concoct an opportunity for him to make mention of the subject Deeds of Donation intervivos, "despite the plain fact that the latter had utterly no relation to the matter referred to by Jose Sebastian in the opening phrase of the letter."[72]November 22, 1979
HON. ERNANI CRUZ PAÑO
Executive Judge
CFI - Quezon City
Sir:
In connection with the discrepancies noted by the Acting Clerk of Court in my notarial report pertaining to another document submitted to the Notarial Section last July 2, 1979 I have the honor to certify that documents Nos. 401 and 402 referring to Donations Inter Vivos executed by Donor Consuelo C. Gomez in favor of Donees Ma. Rita Gomez-Samson et. al. were signed in my presence by all the parties and their instrumental witnesses on April 21, 1979 in my office. I hereby further certify that said two documents among other documents were reported by me in accordance with law on July 2, 1979, for all legal intents and purposes.
In view of the above, it is respectfully requested that the certified true copies of the said two documents officially requested by one of the Donees be issued.Very respectfully,
(Sgd.) JOSE R. SEBASTIAN
Notary Public[71]
SEC. 12. Party may not impeach his own witness. - Except with respect to witnesses referred to in paragraphs (d) and (e) of section 10, the party producing a witness is not allowed to impeach his credibility.This rule is based on the theory that a person who produces a witness vouches for him as being worthy of credit, and that a direct attack upon the veracity of the witness "would enable the party to destroy the witness, if he spoke against him, and to make him a good witness, if he spoke for him, with the means in his hands of destroying his credit, if he spoke against him."[73]
A witness may be considered as unwilling or hostile only if so declared by the court upon adequate showing of his adverse interest, unjustified reluctance to testify, or his having misled the party into calling him to the witness stand.
The unwilling or hostile witness so declared, or the witness who is an adverse party, may be impeached by the party presenting him in all respects as if he had been called by the adverse party, except by evidence of his bad character. He may also be impeached and cross-examined by the adverse party, but such cross-examination must only be on the subject matter of his examination-in-chief.
(E)ven convicted criminals are not excluded from testifying in court so long as, having organs of sense, they "can perceive and perceiving can make known their perceptions to others."The effect of this pronouncement is even more significant in this case, as Jose Sebastian has never been convicted of a crime before his testimony, but was instead administratively sanctioned eleven years after such testimony. Scrutinizing the testimony of Jose Sebastian, we find, as the trial court and the Court of Appeals did, no evidence of bias on the part of Jose Sebastian. On top of this, Jose Sebastian's testimony is supported by the records of the notarial registry, which shows that the documents in question were received by the Notarial Registrar on 2 July 1979, which was four months before the death of Consuelo on 6 November 1979.
The fact of prior criminal conviction alone does not suffice to discredit a witness; the testimony of such a witness must be assayed and scrutinized in exactly the same way the testimony of other witnesses must be examined for its relevance and credibility. x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)
This Court does not find anything suspicious in a person wanting to transfer her properties by donation to her loved ones before leaving for abroad via an airplane. While many believe these days that taking the plane is the "safest way to travel," this has not always been the case. The fear that planes sometimes crash, now believed to be irrational, has always been at the back of the minds of air travelers. Respondents maintain in their testimonies before the RTC that the Deeds were completed to the satisfaction of Consuelo only on 20 April 1979. She allegedly wanted to have the documents signed and notarized before she left for abroad.
- The signing and acknowledgement of the Deeds of Donation on 21 April 1979 is highly improbable and implausible, considering the fact that Consuelo left the same day for the United States on a pleasure trip;[78]
- The flight time of Consuelo on 21 April 1979 was 11:00 a.m.. And even assuming that the flight time was 1:00 p.m., as contended by respondents, the ordinary boarding procedures require Consuelo to be at the airport at least two hours before flight time, or 11:00 a.m.. Petitioner points out that respondents' alleged time frame (from 7:00 a.m. to 11:00 a.m.) is not enough to accomplish the following acts: respondents and Consuelo leaving Marikina at 7:00 a.m. and arriving at the notary public Jose Sebastian's house at Pag-asa, Q.C. at about 8:00 a.m. to 8:30 a.m.; some "small talk with Jose Sebastian; Jose Sebastian examining the documents; Jose Sebastian having a closed meeting with Consuelo to discuss the documents; Jose Sebastian reading the documents to respondents line by line and asking the latter whether they accepted the donation; Jose Sebastian typing the notarial entries; the parties signing the deeds; Jose Sebastian talking privately with Consuelo, who paid the former in cash for his services; Ariston Gomez, Jr. driving Consuelo and other respondents back to Marikina, and dropping the other respondents at their respective residences; picking up Consuelo's luggage; and Ariston Gomez, Jr. bringing Consuelo to the Manila International Airport;[79]
- It is contrary to human experience for Consuelo and respondents not to make a prior arrangement with the notary public Jose Sebastian and instead take a gamble on his being in his office;[80]
- It is illogical for Consuelo to rush the execution of the donations when she was in fact planning to come back from her pleasure trip shortly, as she did;[81]
- The choice of a notary public from Quezon City is highly suspect, when Consuelo and respondents reside in Marikina. It is also illogical that Consuelo would have chosen a notary public whom she met only on the same day she executed the Deeds, especially when Consuelo had a regular lawyer whose notarial services she availed of only two weeks before her death;[82]
- It is improbable that Consuelo paid Jose Sebastian in cash, for there is no reason for her to carry much cash in peso when she was about to leave for the United States in that same morning;[83]
- Maria Rita's residence certificate was obtained from Manila when she is a resident of Marikina. Also, Maria Rita obtained said residence certificate on 20 April 1979, and yet Maria Rita testified that she was surprised to know of the donation only on 21 April 1979.[84] Also suspicious are the circumstances wherein Ariston Gomez, Jr. obtained a residence certificate on 17 April 1979, when he testified that he knew of the schedule for signing only on 20 April 1979, and Consuelo had two residence certificates, as she used different ones in the Deeds of Donation and the document notarized two weeks before her death;[85]
- If Consuelo was really frugal, she could have also made a will;[86]
- All the instrumental witnesses of the Deeds of Donation are biased, being themselves either donees of the other Deed of Donation, or a relative of a donee;[87] and
- Respondents were not able to sufficiently and substantially explain the belated transfer of the properties covered by the assailed Deeds of Donation. Petitioner points to Maria Rita's testimony that the real properties were transferred after the death of Consuelo. While respondents assert that the personal properties were transferred to them prior to Consuelo's death, evidence shows otherwise.[88]
Moreover, ARISTON, JR. disclosed that they could not have gone to the notary public whom his aunt, CONSUELO, knew because she did not want to go to said notary public since our cousins whom she didn't like had access to him and she wanted to keep the execution of the deeds confidential. Thus:The Court of Appeals had fully explained that the belated transfer of the properties does not affect the validity or effects of the donations at all, nor dent the credibility of respondents' factual assertions:Q: And also you know for a fact that your auntie had a regular Notary Public for the preparation and notarization of legal documents in the name of Atty. Angeles, now Congressman Angeles of Marikina, is that correct?
A: It depends on the frame of time. Yes and No. He was a regular Notary Public, but way before that date. But after that, he fall out of graces of my auntie. He was not anymore that regular.
Q: How long before April 30 did he fall out of graces of your auntie, year before that?
A: I don't specifically remember but what I do know is such confidential document like this, we would not really go to Angeles.
Q: Even for notarization purposes?
x x x x
A: Even for notarization purposes, no sir. This confidential nature, no.
ATTY. FERRY:
Are you saying that your auntie trusted more Sebastian than Angeles?
A: No. He is trusting her own experience about Atty. Angeles.
Q: Are you saying that she had sad experience with Atty. Angeles in connection with the latter's performance of his duty as Notary Public, as a lawyer?
A: That is what she told me.
Q: When was that?
A: She will tell me that regularly.
x x x x
ATTY. FERRY:
Q: Mr. Gomez, you testified last April 6, 1989 that after the execution of the two documents in question dated April 20, 1979, Atty. Angeles fell out of the graces of your auntie and you added that as a consequence, your auntie did not avail of the notarial services of Atty. Angeles when it comes to confidential matters, is that correct?
A: Yes. After that particular execution of the Deed of Donation Inter Vivos, Atty. Angeles especially if the documents are confidential in nature.
Q: You used confidential matters, did your aunt spell out what these confidential matters are?
A: This particular document, Deed of Donation was under the category "confidential".
Q: But did you discuss this, the matter of notarizing this document by Atty. Angeles with your auntie such that she made known to you this falls under confidential matters?
A: Yes we did.
Q: So in other words, you intimated to your auntie that Atty. Angeles would possibly notarized these documents?
A: No.
Q: How did it come about that your auntie gave that idea or information that these documents should be notarized by other notary public other than Angeles, because it is confidential?
A: It came from her.
Q: Yes, did she tell you that?
ATTY. GUEVARRA:
That's what he said. "It came from her".
ATTY. FERRY:
My question is, how did it come about your auntie told you that these two documents are of confidential matters?
A: Well, no problem. I said that it has to be notarized, she said more or less, "ayaw ko kay Atty. Angeles".
Q: She said that?
A: That's correct.
Q: And you were curious to know why she told you that?
A: No. I knew why she told me that. She said that Atty. Angeles....well, my cousins whom she didn't like have access to Atty. Angeles.[92]
Per our perusal of the records, we find that the defendants were able to sufficiently and substantially explain the reason for the belated transfer of the pertinent properties, i.e., after the death of CONSUELO. Thus, the testimony of MA. RITA revealed, insofar as the real properties are concerned, the following:Petitioner seems to unduly foreclose the possibility - one which experience tells us is not a rare occurrence at all - that donations are often resorted to in place of testamentary dispositions, often for the purpose of tax avoidance. Such properties usually remain in the donor's possession during his or her lifetime, despite the fact that the donations have already taken effect. Nevertheless, the purpose of utilizing donation as a mode to transfer property is not in issue here."Q: Since you were already aware as you claim that as early as when you went to the States in the company of your auntie, Consuelo Gomez, these 2 parcels of land together with the improvements consisting of a house were transferred to you, you did not exert efforts after your arrival from the States to effect the transfer of these properties?Clearly, the issuance of the titles in the names of the defendants is not the mode by which they acquired ownership of the properties, but rather the fact that the same were donated to them. The circumstance that aforesaid properties were actually transferred in the names of the donees only after the death of the donor, although the deeds of donation were dated April 21, 1979, does not by itself indicate that the said documents were antedated.[93]
"A: No, I did not.
"Q: Why?
"A: Well, for delicadeza. My auntie was still alive. I am not that aggressive. Tita Elo told me "akin na iyon" but I did not transfer it in my name. "Siempre nakakahiya."
"Q: That was your reason for not effecting the transfer of the properties in your name?
"A: Yes, that was my reason.
"Q: Did you not know that the deed supposedly executed by Consuelo Gomez was a donation inter vivos, meaning, it takes effect during her lifetime?
"A: I do not know the legal term donation inter vivos. I have also my sentiment. Tita Elo was very close to us but I did not want to tell her: "Tita Elo, ibigay mo Na iyan SA akin. Itransfer mo na sa pangalan ko." It is not my character to be very aggressive.�
In addition, Article 712 of the Civil Code provides:
"ART. 712. Ownership is acquired by occupation and by intellectual creation.
"Ownership and other real rights over property are acquired and transmitted by law, by donation, by testate and intestate succession, and in consequence of certain contracts, by tradition.
"They may also be acquired by means of prescription."
SEC. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. - Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:While the above provision seems to refer only to criminal cases, it has been pointed out that in some jurisdictions, no distinction is made between civil and criminal actions as to the quality of the burden of establishing a proposition by circumstantial evidence. In such jurisdictions the rule is generally stated to be that the circumstances established must not only be consistent with the proposition asserted but also inconsistent with any other rational theory.[94]
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
When the scales shall stand upon an equipoise and there is nothing in the evidence which shall incline it to one side or the other, the court will find for the defendant.Petitioner's liability for damages
Under this principle, the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his evidence and not on the weaknesses of the defendant's claim. Even if the evidence of the plaintiff may be stronger than that of the defendant, there is no preponderance of evidence on his side if such evidence is insufficient in itself to establish his cause of action."[95] (Emphasis supplied.)
The records are clear, that plaintiff was so desperate for evidence to support his charges, that he repeatedly subpoenaed the defendants themselves; at the risk of presenting evidence contradictory to his legal position and which actually happened, when plaintiff subpoenaed Ariston Gomez Jr., Ariston Gomez Sr., and Maria Rita Gomez-Samson, as his witnesses.Our own examination of the records of the case, however, convinces us of the contrary. Respondents never assailed the authenticity of petitioner's evidence, and merely presented their own evidence to support their assertions. As previously stated, petitioner's evidence had successfully given us doubts as to the authenticity of the subject Deeds of Donation. While such doubts are not enough to discharge petitioner's burden of proof, they are enough to convince us that petitioner's institution of the present case was carried out with good faith. The subpoenas directed against respondents merely demonstrate the zealous efforts of petitioner's counsel to represent its client, which can neither be taken against the counsel, nor against its clients.
All told, the court finds plaintiff was motivated not by a sincere desire to insure the totality of the estate of Consuelo, but rather by his desire to cause injury to defendants, and to appropriate for himself and the rest of the Gomez brothers and nephews, other than the donees, properties which were clearly validly disposed of by Consuelo, via Donations Inter Vivos.[96]
3. That Augusto Gomez and the estate of the late Consuelo Gomez, jointly and solidarily should pay to Ariston Gomez, Jr. the following amounts:SO ORDERED.
Moral damages of P1,000,000.00;
Exemplary damages of P250,000.00
Attorney's fees of P200,000.00
And costs of suit; with legal interest on all the amounts, except on costs and attorney's fees, commencing from February 15, 1980, until fully paid.