501 Phil. 704
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES, to wit:On 11 November 2002, another Notice of Strike was filed by the private respondent (NCMB-NCR-NS-11-412-02), which contained the following:
- PLDT's abolition of the Provisioning Support Division. Such action together with the consequent redundancy of PSD employees and the farming out of the jobs to casuals and contractuals, violates the duty to bargain collectively with MKP in good faith.
- PLDT's unreasonable refusal to honor its commitment before this Honorable Office that it will provide MKP its comprehensive plan/s with respect to personnel downsizing/reorganization and closure of exchanges. Such refusal violates its duty to bargain collectively with MKP in good faith.
- PLDT's continued hiring of "contractual", "temporary", "project" and "casual" employees for regular jobs performed by union members, resulting in the decimation of the union membership and in the denial of the right to self-organization to the concerned employees.
- PLDT's gross violation of the legal and CBA provisions on overtime work and compensation.
- PLDT's gross violation of the CBA provisions on promotions and job grade re-evaluation or reclassification.
UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES, to wit:A number of conciliation meetings, conducted by the NCMB, National Capital Region, were held between the parties. However, these efforts proved futile.
- PLDT's alleged restructuring of its GMM Operation Services effective December 31, 2002 and its closure [o]f traffic operations at the Batangas, Calamba, Davao, Iloilo, Lucena, Malolos and Tarlac Regional Operator Services effective December 31, 2002. These twin moves unjustly imperil the job security of 503 of MKP's members and will substantially decimate the parties' bargaining unit. And in the light of PLDT's previous commitment before this Honorable Office that it will provide MKP its comprehensive plan/s with respect to personnel downsizing/reorganization and closure of exchanges and of its more recent declaration that the Davao operator services will not be closed, these moves are treacherous and are thus violative of PLDT's duty to bargain collectively with MKP in good faith. That these moves were effected with PLDT paying only lip service to its duties under Art. Iii, Section 9 of the parties' CBA signifies PLDT's gross violation of said CBA.
PLDT is the largest telecommunications entity in the Philippines whose operations are closely linked with the country's other telecommunication companies. It operates the country's international gateway system through which overseas telecommunications are made. Its operations are also vital to the services of cellular phone companies. The Company employs more or less 13,000 employees, about 7,000 of whom are members of the union. A work stoppage at PLDT, without doubt, will adversely affect the smooth operations of PLDT as well as those other telecommunication companies dependent upon the continuous operations of PLDT to the detriment of the public.A Motion for Partial Reconsideration[6] dated 13 January 2003 was filed by the private respondent with the Office of the Secretary. It alleged that the Order dated 02 January 2003 was issued by the Secretary with grave abuse of discretion. It contended that the petitioner should have been ordered to admit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike. Those who were dismissed pursuant to the petitioner's redundancy program should not have been excluded. In doing so, the Secretary, in consequence, prejudged the case and effectively declared the dismissal as valid.
Undoubtedly, PLDT's operations is impressed with public and national interest as communication plays a vital role in furtherance of trade, commerce, and industry specially at this time of globalized economy where information is vital to economic survival. Work stoppage at PLDT will also adversely effect the ordinary day-to-day life of the public in areas of its franchise. Communication is also a component of state security.
. . .
These considerations have in the past guided this Office in consistently exercising its powers under Article 263(g) of the Labor Code, as amended, in handling labor disputes involving the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company and other telecommunications companies.
WHEREFORE, FOREGOING PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Office hereby CERTIFIES the labor dispute at the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for compulsory arbitration pursuant to Article 263(g) of the Labor Code as amended.
Accordingly, the strike staged by the Union is hereby enjoined. All striking workers are hereby directed to return to work within twenty four (24) hours from receipt of this Order, except those who were terminated due to redundancy.[5] The employer is hereby enjoined to accept the striking workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to the strike. The parties are likewise directed to cease and desist from committing any act that might worsen the situation.
In the interest of expeditious labor justice and pursuant to the Order of this Office dated January 2, 2003 certifying the instant labor dispute to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), and in order to avoid any splitting the cause of action and multiplicity of suits, which are obnoxious to the orderly administration of justice, the Motion for Partial Reconsideration filed by the Union, Manggagawa ng Komunikasyon sa Pilipinas (MKP) is merely NOTED without action.As the private respondent had no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, it filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus[9] under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure before the Court of Appeals. In the main, it argued that Article 263(g) of the Labor Code is very clear that once a strike is certified to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for compulsory arbitration, it is the direct mandate of the law that an employer should readmit all striking workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike. It prayed that the Orders of the Secretary dated 02 January 2003 and 24 February 2003 be set aside and, in their place, a new order be rendered directing PLDT to immediately readmit the alleged redundant employees under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to the strike.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, let the Motion for Partial Reconsideration, together with documents filed in connection thereto, be immediately referred to the NLRC for its appropriate action.
Henceforth, this Office shall no longer entertain any motions of similar nature. The parties are hereby directed to address all their pleadings and motions to the NLRC.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Order[s] of respondent Secretary in NCMB-NCR-NS-11-405-02 and NCMB-NCR-NS-11-412-02 [are] hereby SET ASIDE and NULLIFIED for being contrary to law. No costs.[11]A Motion for Reconsideration[12] was filed by the petitioner before the Court of Appeals, which was, however, denied in a Resolution[13] dated 19 March 2004.
THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT RULE IN ACCORD WITH APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT, WHICH RECOGNIZE THAT THE SECRETARY'S EXERCISE OF ART. 263(G), LABOR CODE POWERS IS BROAD, PLENARY AND ENTITLED TO RESPECT.II
THE COURT OF APPEALS DEPARTED FROM THE USUAL COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS WHEN IT ISSUED THE WRIT OF CERTIORARI DESPITE (A) THE ABSENCE OF "GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION" BY THE SECRETARY OF LABOR; AND (B) THE AVAILABILITY OF OTHER RELIEF TO MKP.III
THE MANIFEST AND GRAVE ERROR OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IS EVIDENT FROM THE DECISION'S INTERNAL INCONSISTENCIES.1V
CONTRARY TO MKP'S ALLEGATIONS THAT IT WAS RENDERED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, THE SECRETARY'S ASSUMPTION ORDER IS PRACTICAL, PRESERVES THE PARTIES' RIGHTS TO REDRESS, AND IS NOT UNPRECEDENTED.[15]
WHETHER OR NOT THE SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION FOR CERTIORARI INSTITUTED BY THE RESPONDENT BEFORE THE COURT OF APPEALS WAS PROCEDURALLY PRECISE, andII
WHETHER THE SUBJECT ORDERS OF THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT EXCLUDING FROM THE RETURN-TO-WORK ORDER THE WORKERS DISMISSED DUE TO THE REDUNDANCY PROGRAM OF PETITIONER, ARE VALID OR NOT.
Section 1. Petition for certiorari. — When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.It is the position of the private respondent that the Secretary committed an error of jurisdiction when she excluded from her return-to-work order the alleged redundant strikers, which should be corrected by a special civil action for certiorari. While she has the power to certify the strike to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration, she did not have the power to exclude a certain class of strikers from returning to work. Further, the private respondent contended that in issuing her assailed orders, the Secretary exceeded her authority.[18]
Art 263. Strikes, picketing, and lockouts. —In deciding the case, the Court of Appeals made the following observation:. . .
(g) When in his opinion, there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest, the Secretary of Labor and Employment may assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration. Such assumption or certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike or lockout as specified in the assumption or certification order. If one has already taken place at the time of assumption or certification, all striking or locked out employees shall immediately return to work and the employer shall immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. (Emphasis supplied.)
The phrase "all striking or locked out employees" and "readmit all workers" does not distinguish or qualify and emphatically is a catch all embracing enumeration of who should be returned to work. "Where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish (Recaña v. Court of Appeals, 349 SCRA 24 [2001])."[22]In the main, the petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals gave a narrow and too literal interpretation of Article 263(g) to justify its reversal of the Secretary's "qualified" return-to-work Order. The Court of Appeals erroneously favored a rule of statutory construction: ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. Where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish.[23]
. . . This is precisely why the law sets and defines the standard: even in the exercise of his power of compulsory arbitration under Article 263(g) of the Labor Code, the Secretary must follow the law. For "when an overzealous official by-passes the law on the pretext of retaining a laudable objective, the intendment or purpose of the law will lose its meaning as the law itself is disregarded."As Article 263(g) is clear and unequivocal in stating that ALL striking or locked out employees shall immediately return to work and the employer shall immediately resume operations and readmit ALL workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout, then the unmistakable mandate must be followed by the Secretary.
. . . Assumption of jurisdiction over a labor dispute, or as in this case the certification of the same to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration, always co-exists with an order for workers to return to work immediately and for employers to readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout.Time and again, this Court has held that when an official bypasses the law on the asserted ground of attaining a laudable objective, the same will not be maintained if the intendment or purpose of the law would be defeated.[30]