482 Phil. 104
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed of the Honorable Court that, after due notice and hearing, judgment be rendered in favor of plaintiff and against defendants as follows:Appended to the complaint was a photocopy of TCT No. 133298.Plaintiff prays for such other reliefs and remedies just and equitable in the premises.[7]
- Ordering defendants to vacate the areas they respectively occupy in Lot No. 343 and to return the same to plaintiff;
- Ordering defendants to pay to plaintiff
P10,000.00 as litigation expenses;P50,000.00 as attorney’s fees, plusP1,000.00 for every court appearance andP20,000.00 as exemplary damages.
The petitioners prayed that the complaint be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action.
- - That the landholding, subject matter of the case more particularly described as Lot No. 343, has been placed within the ambit of the Operation Land Transfer program per P.D. 27 as amended;
- - That defendants herein are actual-occupants and tenant-tillers of the land wayback in [the] 1970’s, having been installed thereat by Lorenzo Zayco, the original landowner with the defendants sharing [with] the landowner the produce of the land up to 1981 as evidenced by receipts which will be presented in due time;
- - That being bonafide tenant-tillers thereat, they were identified by the Department of Agrarian Reform as qualified farmers-beneficiaries and consequently were issued Emancipation Patents;
- - That in 1982-83, the subject landholding was conveyed by way of sale by the former landowner to J. Salgado;
- - That despite the sale thereof to the plaintiff herein, defendants continued to cultivate the land and extend payment of lease rentals to the new landowner thereof;
- - That in 1988-1989, being beneficiaries of the program, caused to directly pay their amortization to the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP);
- - That defendants, having been issued EPs, are therefore considered owners of the land and now deemed full owners of the land they till as provided for under P.D. 27 and E.O. 328 respectively, thus, cannot be ejected/ousted therefrom without circumventing their right to [s]ecurity of tenure as amplified in the case of De Jesus vs. IAC, SCRA 559 (sic) and Dolorfino vs. CA, 191 SCRA 880, Dec. 3, 1990, where the Highest Tribunal ruled that:
“Once a leasehold relation has been established, the agricultural lessee is entitled to security of tenure. He has a right to continue working on the land and he may not be ejected therefrom except for cause as provided by law.
The agricultural relationship is not extinguished by the sale, alienation or transfer of the legal possession of the landholding. The purchaser or transferee is simply subjugated to the rights and substituted to the obligations of the agricultural lessor.” (Sec. 10, R.A. 3844) (Dolorfino vs. Court of Appeals, supra).- - That granting that the property in question has already been classified as residential, commercial and industrial zone per Res. No. 96-39, dated February 14, 1996, however, the landowner has failed to present a Conversion Order to be issued by the DAR Secretary, thus, in absence thereof, the subject landholding remains agricultural, in the light of A.O. 12, Series of 1994 the same provides and we quote:
“II. LEGAL MANDATE
- - The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) is mandated to “approved (sic) or disapproved (sic) applications for conversion, restructuring or readjustment of agricultural lands into non-agricultural uses,” pursuant to Section 4(j) of Executive Order No. 129-A, Series of 1987.
- - Section 5(1) of E.O. No. 129-A, Series of 1987, vests in the DAR, exclusive authority to approve or disapprove applications for conversion of agricultural lands for residential, commercial, industrial and other land uses.”[8]
WHEREFORE and upon the foregoing disquisitions, the Court hereby renders judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants, to wit:The court a quo ruled that the petitioners failed to prove that they were farmers-beneficiaries on the landholding and that based on Resolution No. 96-39 of the Municipal Council, the said property had already been reclassified as part residential and part industrial/commercial areas. The court a quo also ruled that thirteen (13) of the petitioners occupied portions of the landholding only by tolerance of the respondent and its predecessors, and failed to pay any amount as consideration for their occupancy of the petitioners’ property. It rejected the petitioners’ contention that the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) had exclusive original jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action, ruling that the action was one for unlawful detainer over which it had exclusive original jurisdiction.SO ORDERED.[10]
- - Ordering the named defendants to vacate the portions they had been occupying of Lot No. 343, situated in Sitio Lapui, Barangay Hilamanan, Kabankalan City, and to turn-over the possession thereof to the plaintiff; and
- - Ordering the DISMISSAL of plaintiff’s claims for litigation expenses, attorney’s fees and exemplary damages.
The petitioners also averred that, after she purchased the property in 1981, Julieta Salgado received rentals over the landholding from them, as evidenced by the receipts[14] signed by her. They averred that in 1988, Emancipation Patents[15] over their respective landholdings were issued in their favor. The petitioners also claimed that they had made partial payments to the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) for the price of the lots covered by their respective patents, as evidenced by the certification attached as Annex “BBB” of the petition. They also appended a Certification by the Register of Deeds that thirteen (13) of them were issued Transfer Certificates of Title based on the Emancipation Patents executed in their favor, viz:
- That subject landholding has the following farmers- beneficiaries, whose respective farmholdings were identified under [the] Operation Land Transfer (OLT) program of the government pursuant to PD 27 as follows:
1. Melchor Hilado 11. Federico Orlano 2. Cesar Aral 12. Felix Ortega 3. Adela Aral 13. Rogelio Semillano 4. Arturo Villarena 14. Antonio Ballentos 5. Salvador Mirano 15. Pacifico Talibutab 6. Tarcelo Mirano 16. Nestor Belliran 7. Roberto Pedulan 17. Salustiano Belliran 8. Antonio Solito 18. Salvador de Guzman 9. Vicente Onlayao 19. Edgardo Cabra 10. Manuel Caniendo 20. Yolanda Lestino - That when my father Celso “Nene” Zayco, during his lifetime, administered subject landholding, he received yearly rental consideration in the amount fixed by humber (sic) of cavans of palay, from the above-named farmer-beneficiaries. In fact, when my father was already sickly I was assigned to collect yearly rentals from said farmers-beneficiaries;
- That in 1981, unfortunately, the Pacific Banking Corporation foreclosed said farmholding of my late father and before the Zayco family knew it, it was already purchased by Julieta C. Salgado, the latter likewise, as far as my knowledge is concerned, also collected yearly rental consideration from the above-named parties.[13]
EP TITLE NO. | LOT NO. | NAME OF FARMERS | AREA/SQ.M. |
EP-1716 | 343-9 | Pacifico B. Talibutab | 8,735 |
EP-1717 | 343-15 | Felix S. Ortega | 8,106 |
EP-1718 | 343-22 | Roberto D. Peduhan | 7,779 |
EP-1719 | 343-25 | Arturo T. Villarena | 8,346 |
EP-1720 | 343-19 | Vicente C. Onlayao | 7,709 |
EP-1722 | 343-11 | Antonio E. Ballentos | 9,066 |
EP-1723 | 343-29 | Cesar C. Aral | 8,485 |
EP-1724 | 343-18 | Manuel P. Caniendo | 10,110 |
EP-1725 | 343-24 | Salvador G. Mirano | 8,215 |
EP-1740 | 343-8 | Salustiano P. Billeran | 23,391 |
EP-1751 | 343-16 | Federico L. Orlano | 10,453 |
EP-1754 | 343-14 | Rogelio U. Semillano | 7,668 |
EP-1813 | 343-23 | Tarcelo S. Mirano | 7,920[16] |
The issues for resolution are the following:
OWNER EMANCIPATION PATENT DATE OF APPROVAL TCT NUMBER DATE OF ISSUEFederico L. Orlano EP-1751 April 28, 1988 A-192817 September 20, 1988 Ma. Yolanda S. Lestino EP- 5656 July 1, 1988 A-192802 August 24, 1990 Felix S. Ortega EP-1717 April 28, 1988 A-192816 September 16, 1988 Melchor T. Hilado EP-5139 July 1, 1988 A-192831 March 21, 1990 Antonio D. Solito EP-5414 July 1, 1988 A-192821 July 12, 1990 Arturo T. Vellarena EP-1719 April 28, 1988 A-192826 September 16, 1988 Antonio E. Ballentos EP-1722 April 28, 1988 A-192812 September 16, 1988 Salvador J. De Guzman EP-5415 July 1, 1988 A-192808 July 12, 1990 Rogelio U. Semellano EP-1754 April 28, 1988 A-192815 September 20, 1988 Salustiano P. Billeran EP-1740 April 28, 1988 A-192809 September 20, 1988 Vicente Onlayao EP-1720 April 28, 1988 A-192820 September 16, 1988 Salvador G. Mirano EP-1725 April 28, 1988 A-192825 September 16, 1988 Nestor P. Billeran EP-5416 July 1, 1988 A-192804 July 12, 1990 Tarcelo S. Mirano EP-1813 April 28, 1988 A-192824 September 22, 1988 Pacifico P. Talibutab EP-1716 April 28, 1988 A-192810 September 16, 1988 Edgardo D. Cabra EP-5417 July 1, 1988 A-192807 July 12, 1990 Manuel P. Caniendo EP-1724 April 28, 1988 A-192819 September 16, 1988 Adela O. Aral EP-5657 July 1, 1988 A-192827 August 24, 1990 Roberto D. Peduhan EP-1718 April 28, 1988 A-192823 September 16, 1988 Cesar C. Aral EP-1723 April 28, 1988 A-192830 September 16, 1988
SECTION 1. Primary And Exclusive Original and Appellate Jurisdiction. The Board shall have primary and exclusive jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes involving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) under Republic Act No. 6657, Executive Order Nos. 228, and 129-A, Republic Act No. 3844 as amended by Republic Act No. 6389, Presidential Decree No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their implementing rules and regulations. Specifically, such jurisdiction shall include but not be limited to cases involving the following:The DAR is vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform programs. The rule is that the DARAB has jurisdiction to try and decide any agrarian dispute or any incident involving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.[24] In Tirona v. Alejo,[25] we held that the MTCC has no jurisdiction over an ejectment case where the issue of possession is inextricably interwoven with an agrarian dispute.
a) The rights and obligations of persons, whether natural or juridical, engaged in the management, cultivation and use of all agricultural lands covered by the CARP and other agrarian laws; …f) Those involving the issuance, correction and cancellation of Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) and Emancipation Patents (EPs) which are registered with the Land Registration Authority;g) Those cases previously falling under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the defunct Court of Agrarian Relations under Section 12 of Presidential Decree No. 946, except sub-paragraph (Q) thereof and Presidential Decree No. 1815.
It is understood that the aforementioned cases, complaints or petitions were filed with the DARAB after August 29, 1987.
Matters involving strictly the administrative implementation of Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (sic) (CARP) of 1988 and other agrarian laws as enunciated by pertinent rules shall be the exclusive prerogative of and cognizable by the Secretary of the DAR.
h) And such other agrarian cases, disputes, matters or concerns referred to it by the Secretary of the DAR.
ENTRY NO. EP LOT NO AREA/SQ.M NAME OF FARMER EP-1539 343-30 8,597 Melchor T. Hilado
The property described in this Title has been partially cancelled Emancipation Patent Issued By Department of Agrarian Reform, containing an Area as stated to above.
Date of Instrument July 1, 1988.
Date of Inscription March 21, 1990.(Sgd.) Illegible
Register of Deeds
ENTRY NO. EP LOT NO. AREA/SQ.M. NAME OF FARMERSEP-5414 343-20 7,232
Antonio D. Solito EP-5415 343-7
7,518
Salvador J. de Guzman EP-5416 343-3
6,531
Nestor P. Billeran EP-5417 343-6
14,529 Edgardo D. Cabra
The property described in this Transfer Certificate of Title has been PARTIALLY CANCELLED by Emancipation Patent issued by Department of Agrarian Reform containing an area of 35,810 SQ/M. as stated above.
Date of Instrument July 1, 1988. Date of Inscription July 12, 1990.(Sgd.) Illegible
Register of Deeds
The foregoing annotation confirmed the claim of the petitioners in their answer with motion to dismiss that the entirety of the landholding had been placed under the Operation Land Transfer program under P.D. No. 27 and that the petitioners to whom the said patents were granted by the government became the owners of the property covered by the said patents. In fact, TCT No. 133298 had been partially cancelled by the said patents. Consequently, the petitioners who were the beneficiaries under the Emancipation Patents are entitled to possess the property covered by said patents.[37]
ENTRY NO. EP LOT NO. AREA/SQ.M NAME OF FARMERSEP-5656 343-1
14,916 Maria Yolanda S. Lestino EP-5657 343-26 9,558 Adela O. Aral
The property described in this Transfer Certificate of Title has been PARTIALLY CANCELLED by Emancipation Patent issued by the Department of Agrarian Reform containing an area of TWENTY-FOUR THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED SEVENTY-FOUR (24,474) SQ. METERS as stated to above.
Date of Instrument July 1, 1988.
Date of Inscription August 24, 1990.(Sgd.) Illegible
Register of Deeds[36]
Firstly, they asseverate that they had been giving the original landowner Lorenzo Zayco (but the owner was Celso Zayco) his shares of the produce from 191970 (sic) to 1981 and that in 1982-83, they had been paying the lease rentals to the new landowner Julieta C. Salgado. Obviously, defendants predicate their tenurial rights on their perceived landowner Lorenzo Zayco (sic) and that therefore, the new landowner Julieta C. Salgado has assumed her liabilities to them as her alleged tenants. On this point, there is not a shred of evidence proving that either Lorenzo Zayco or Julieta C. Salgado had ever received their respective shares of the harvests.The MTCC even ignored the receipts appended by the petitioners to their position paper showing that the landowner and/or Julieta C. Salgado received their share of the produce of the landholding as “rental” of the petitioners.
Secondly, how was Celso Zayco (not Lorenzo Zayco, as erroneously claimed by defendants) able to mortgage Lot No. 343 with the Pacific Banking Corporation (PBC), despite this alleged tenancy relationship between him and the defendants? Equally baffling to the Court is this undisputed fact: although the Emancipation Patents (EPs) in the names of the seven (7) defendants were issued on July 1, 1988; yet, those were, respectively, registered on plaintiff’s title only on March 21, 1990, July 12, 1990 and August 24, 1990.
Thirdly, of the other thirteen (13) defendants, plaintiff’s Exhibit “A” clearly shows that they had not been cultivating personally the portions occupied by them or with the help of the immediate members of their families; but that they had been leasing such portions to several persons.[40]
It must be underscored that the said patents were already annotated at the dorsal portion of TCT No. 133298 long before the respondent filed its complaint with the MTCC against the petitioners.
EP TITLE NO. LOT NO . NAME OF FARMERS AREA/SQ.M. EP-1716 343-9 Pacifico P. Talibutab 8,735 EP-1717 343-15 Felix S. Ortega 8,106 EP-1718 343-22 Roberto D. Peduhan 7,779 EP-1719 343-25 Arturo T. Villarena 8,346 EP-1720 343-19 Vicente C. Onlayao 7,709 EP-1722 343-11 Antonio E. Ballentos 9,066 EP-1723 343-29 Cesar C. Aral 8,485 EP-1724 343-18 Manuel P. Caniendo 10,110 EP-1725 343-24 Salvador G. Mirano 8,215 EP-1740 343-8 Salustiano P. Billeran 23,391 EP-1751 343-16 Federico L. Orlano 10,453 EP-1754 343-14 Rogelio U. Semellano 7,668 EP-1813 343-23 Tarcelo S. Mirano 7,920[41]
At this point, it bears stressing that in its Comprehensive Land Use Plan (CLUP), per Resolution No. 96-39 dated February 14, 1996, the then Sangguniang Bayan of Kabankalan, Negros Occidental, now a component city under R.A. No. 8297, had reclassified Lot No. 343 into light industrial, commercial and residential areas. To the mind of the Court, this reclassification falls squarely within the ambit of Title VI, B.2.b of Administrative Order No. 07, Series of 1997 dated October 29, 1997 on the subject: “Omnibus Rules and Procedures Governing Conversion of Agricultural Lands to Non-Agricultural Uses.” This provision is as follows:The ruling of the MTCC is erroneous. Under Section 65 of Rep. Act No. 6657 which took effect on June 15, 1988, agricultural lands may be reclassified only by the DAR after the lapse of five (5) years from its award to the farmers-beneficiaries:
B. General Guidelines
1. x x x x x x x x x.
2. x x x x x x x x x.
a) x x x x x x x x.b) Conversion may be allowed if at the time of the application, the lands are reclassified as commercial, industrial, residential or other non-agricultural in the new or revised town plans promulgated by the Local Government Unit (LGU) and approved by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) or by the Sangguniang Panglalawigan (SP) after June 15, 1988 in accordance with Section 20 of R.A. No. 7160, as implemented by M.C. No. 54, and Executive Order No. 72, Series of 1993 of the Office of the President.[42]
Section 65. Conversion of Lands. – After the lapse of five (5) years from its award, when the land ceases to be economically feasible and sound for agricultural purposes, or the locality has become urbanized and the land will have greater economic value for residential, commercial or industrial purposes, the DAR, upon application of the beneficiary or the landowner, with due notice to the affected parties, and subject to existing laws, may authorize the reclassification of conversion of the land and its disposition: Provided, That the beneficiary shall have fully paid his obligation.In this case, there is no showing that the DAR ever approved the reclassification of the property. It appears that the reclassification of the landholding was unilaterally made by the Sangguniang Bayan despite the issuance to the petitioners of Emancipation Patents and transfer certificates of title in their names over the portions of the landholdings respectively occupied by them.
[F]urthermore, the want of jurisdiction by a court over the subject-matter renders its judgment void and a mere nullity, and considering that a void judgment is in legal effect no judgment, by which no rights are divested, from which no rights can be obtained, which neither binds nor bars any one, and under which all acts performed and all claims flowing out of are void, and considering further, that the decision, for want of jurisdiction of the court, is not a decision in contemplation of law, and, hence, can never become executory, it follows that such a void judgment cannot constitute a bar to another case by reason of res judicata.Our ruling in Abbain v. Chua [44] is also instructive:
In varying language, this Court has expressed its reprobation for judgments rendered by a court without jurisdiction. Such a judgment is held to be “a dead limb on the judicial tree, which should be lopped off or wholly disregarded as the circumstances require.” In the language of Mr. Justice Street: “Where a judgment or judicial order is void in this sense it maybe said to be a lawless thing, which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its head.” And in Gomez vs. Concepcion, this Court quoted with approval the following from Freeman on Judgments: “A void judgment is in legal effect no judgment. By it no rights are divested. From it no rights can be obtained. Being worthless in itself, all proceedings found upon it are equally worthless. It neither binds nor bars any one. All acts performed under it and all claims flowing out of it are void. The parties attempting to enforce it may be responsible as trespassers. The purchaser at a sale by virtue of its authority finds himself without title and without redress.”It is settled that jurisdiction over the judgment cannot be changed by agreement of the parties or by the act or omission of each of them that will contravene the legislative will. A party should not be allowed to divest a competent court of its jurisdiction, whether erroneously or even deliberately in derogation of the law.[45]
Since the judgment here on its face is void ab initio, the limited periods for relief from judgment in Rule 38 are inapplicable. That judgment is vulnerable to attack “in any way and at any time, even when no appeal has been taken.”
It is neither fair nor legal to bind a party by the result of a suit or proceeding which was taken cognizance of in a court which lacks jurisdiction over the same irrespective of the attendant circumstances. The equitable defense of estoppel requires knowledge or consciousness of the facts upon which it is based. The same thing is true with estoppel by conduct which may be asserted only when it is shown, among others, that the representation must have been made with knowledge of the facts and that the party to whom it was made is ignorant of the truth of the matter. (De Castro vs. Gineta, 27 SCRA 623.) The filing of an action or suit in a court that does not possess jurisdiction to entertain the same may not be presumed to be deliberate and intended to secure a ruling which could later be annulled if not favorable to the party who filed such suit or proceeding. Instituting such an action is not a one-sided affair. It can just as well be prejudicial to the one who filed the action or suit in the event that he obtains a favorable judgment therein which could also be attacked for having been rendered without jurisdiction. The determination of the correct jurisdiction of a court is not a simple matter. It can raise highly debatable issues of such importance that the highest tribunal of the land is given the exclusive appellate jurisdiction to entertain the same. The point simply is that when a party commits error in filing his suit or proceeding in a court that lacks jurisdiction to take cognizance of the same, such act may not at once be deemed sufficient basis of estoppel. It could have been the result of an honest mistake, or of divergent interpretations of doubtful legal provisions. If any fault is to be imputed to a party taking such course of action, part of the blame should be placed on the court which shall entertain the suit, thereby lulling the parties into believing that they pursued their remedies in the correct forum. Under the rules, it is the duty of the court to dismiss an action “whenever it appears that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter.” (Sec. 2, Rule 9, Rules of Court.) Should the court render a judgment without jurisdiction, such judgment may be impeached or annulled for lack of jurisdiction (Sec. 30, Rule 132, Ibid.), within ten (10) years from the finality of the same. (Art. 1144, par. 3, Civil Code.)It bears stressing that the petitioners are now the registered owners of the portions of the landholding and entitled to the possession thereof. For us to deny the petition and affirm the decision of the RTC would be to sanction the eviction of the petitioners who are the registered owners of the landholding and, as such, are entitled to the possession thereof and allow the respondent to take possession thereof in derogation of law. Not too long ago in Calimlim v. Ramirez[47] we held that:
The inequity of barring the petitioners from vindicating their right over their property in Civil Case No. SCC-180 is rendered more acute in the face of the undisputed fact that the property in question admittedly belonged to the petitioners, and that the title in the name of the private respondent was the result of an error committed by the Provincial Sheriff in issuing the deed of sale in the execution proceeding. The justness of the relief sought by herein petitioners may not be ignored or rendered futile by reason of a doctrine which is of highly doubtful applicability herein.IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The decisions of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities and the Regional Trial Court are SET ASIDE and declared NULL and VOID. The writ of execution issued by the MTCC is also set aside. No costs.