580 Phil. 413
CARPIO, J.:
WHEREFORE, the petition for reconveyance, declaration of nullity of sale of parcels of land and damages filed by plaintiffs against the defendants is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.The trial court ruled that although the title to the properties was secured by Gabriel Drilon without disclosing that allegedly third parties were in possession of the properties applied for, petitioners were unable to establish their claim over Lot Nos. 3658 and 3660.
SO ORDERED.[4]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated February 26, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City, Seventh Judicial Region, Branch 40, in Civil Case No. 11821, is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the appellants.The appellate court ruled that it is only the State, as the owner of the property allegedly taken by Gabriel Drilon through misrepresentation, which can assail the sale made by spouses Drilon to spouses Ybiosa. Petitioners, although occupants of the properties, have no legal personality to assail the patents issued to Gabriel Drilon as well as the sale of the properties to spouses Ybiosa.
SO ORDERED.[5]
Hence, this petition.The petition is without merit.
Petitioners raise the following issues:
- Whether the sale of Lot Nos. 3658 and 3660 by spouses Drilon to spouses Ybiosa is valid; and
- Whether petitioners may question the validity of the sale and ask for reconveyance of the properties.[6]
[O]nly the State can file a suit for reconveyance of a public land. Therefore, not being the owners of the land but mere applicants for sales patents thereon, respondents have no personality to file the suit. Neither will they be directly affected by the judgment in such suit.[9]In point is De la Peña v. Court of Appeals,[10] which likewise involved an action for reconveyance and annulment of title on the ground that the free patent and title over a parcel of land were allegedly obtained through fraud. Like the present case, the petitioner in De la Peña claimed that private respondent fraudulently stated in his application for free patent that "the land applied for is not claimed or occupied by any other person." The Court ruled that petitioner had no standing to file the case since reconveyance is a remedy granted only to the owner of the property alleged to be erroneously titled in another's name. In such instances, it is the State which is the proper party to file suit, thus:
Persons who have not obtained title to public lands could not question the titles legally issued by the State. In such cases, the real party-in-interest is the Republic of the Philippines to whom the property would revert if it is ever established, after appropriate proceedings, that the free patent issued to the grantee is indeed vulnerable to annulment on the ground that the grantee failed to comply with the conditions imposed by the law. Not being an applicant, much less a grantee, petitioner cannot ask for reconveyance.[11]Further, Section 101 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 provides that actions for reversion of public lands fraudulently awarded must be instituted by the Solicitor General in the name of the Republic of the Philippines:
Section 101. All actions for the reversion to the government of lands of the public domain or improvements thereon shall be instituted by the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead, in the proper courts, in the name of the Commonwealth of the Philippines.Thus, in Garingan v. Garingan,[12] the Court held that only the State may file a case for cancellation of title due to the grantee's violation of the conditions imposed by law:
A certificate of title issued pursuant to a homestead patent partakes of the nature of a certificate issued in a judicial proceeding, as long as the land disposed of is really a part of the disposable land of the public domain and becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible after one year from issuance. x x x. The only instance when a certificate of title covering a tract of land, formerly a part of the patrimonial property of the State, could be cancelled, is for failure on the part of the grantee to comply with the conditions imposed by law, and in such case the proper party to bring the action would be the Government to which the property would revert.[13]Petitioners, however, argue that although it is only the government that may institute reversion proceedings, they as persons whose rights are affected by the assailed sale may pray for the declaration of nullity of the sale.
The above provisions of law are clear and explicit. A contract which purports to alienate, transfer, convey or encumber any homestead within the prohibitory period of five years from the date of the issuance of the patent is void from its execution. In a number of cases, this Court has held that such provision is mandatory (De los Santos v. Roman Catholic Church of Midsayap, 94 Phil. 405).Petitioners reliance on Arsenal is misplaced. Arsenal involved the double sale of a homestead property. The homestead grantee sold the property during the prohibited period. Afterwards, the grantee again sold the same property, and title to the homestead property was issued to the second buyer. The first buyer sought to annul the title of the second buyer. The second buyer merely raised the nullity of the first sale but did not seek to annul the title of the homestead grantee for selling the property within the prohibited period.
Under the provisions of the Civil Code, a void contract is inexistent from the beginning. It cannot be ratified neither can the right to set up the defense of its illegality be waived. (Art. 1409, Civil Code).To further distinguish this contract from the other kinds of contract, a commentator has stated that:Any person may invoke the inexistence of the contract whenever juridical effects founded thereon are asserted against him. (Id. p. 595).
The right to set up the nullity of a void or non-existent contract is not limited to the parties as in the case of annullable or voidable contracts; it is extended to third persons who are directly affected by the contract. (Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. IV, p. 604, [1973]).
Concededly, the contract of sale executed between the respondents Palaos and Suralta in 1957 is void. It was entered into three (3) years and eight (8) months after the grant of the homestead patent to the respondent Palaos in 1954.
Being void, the foregoing principles and rulings are applicable. Thus, it was erroneous for the trial court to declare that the benefit of the prohibition in the Public Land Act does not inure to any third party. Such a sweeping declaration does not find support in the law or in precedents. A third person who is directly affected by a void contract may set up its nullity. In this case, it is precisely the petitioners' interest in the disputed land which is in question.[16]