585 Phil. 439
REYES, R.T., J.:
WHEREFORE, premised on the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:The trial court nullified the marriage, not on the ground of Article 36, but Article 45 of the Family Code. It ratiocinated:
- Declaring the marriage contracted by herein parties on 29 January 1989 and all its effects under the law null and void from the beginning;
- Dissolving the regime of community property between the same parties with forfeiture of defendant's share thereon in favor of the same parties' children whose
legal custody is awarded to plaintiff with visitorial right afforded to defendant;- Ordering the defendant to give monthly financial support to all the children; and
- Pursuant to the provisions of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC:
Upon compliance, a decree of nullity of marriage shall be issued.
- Directing the Branch Clerk of this Court to enter this Judgment upon its finality in the Book of Entry of Judgment and to issue an Entry of Judgment in accordance thereto; and
- Directing the Local Civil Registrars of Las Piñas City and Manila City to cause the registration of the said Entry of Judgment in their respective Books of Marriages.
SO ORDERED.[24] (Emphasis supplied)
x x x a careful evaluation and in-depth analysis of the surrounding circumstances of the allegations in the complaint and of the evidence presented in support thereof (sic) reveals that in this case (sic) there is more than meets the eyes (sic).Manuel filed a notice of appeal which was, however, denied due course. Undaunted, he filed a petition for annulment of judgment with the CA.[26]
Both legally and biologically, homosexuality x x x is, indeed, generally incompatible with hetero sexual marriage. This is reason enough that in this jurisdiction (sic) the law recognizes marriage as a special contract exclusively only between a man and a woman x x x and thus when homosexuality has trespassed into marriage, the same law provides ample remedies to correct the situation [Article 45(3) in relation to Article 46(4) or Article 55, par. 6, Family Code]. This is of course in recognition of the biological fact that no matter how a man cheats himself that he is not a homosexual and forces himself to live a normal heterosexual life, there will surely come a time when his true sexual preference as a homosexual shall prevail in haunting him and thus jeopardizing the solidity, honor, and welfare of his own family.[25]
WHEREFORE, the present Petition for Annulment of Judgment is hereby DENIED. The Court AFFIRMS in toto the Decision (dated November 25, 2005) of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 254), in Las Piñas City, in Civil Case No. LP-00-0132. No costs.[27]The CA stated that petitioner pursued the wrong remedy by filing the extraordinary remedy of petition for annulment of judgment. Said the appellate court:
It is obvious that the petitioner is questioning the propriety of the decision rendered by the lower Court. But the remedy assuming there was a mistake is not a Petition for Annulment of Judgment but an ordinary appeal. An error of judgment may be reversed or corrected only by appeal.
What petitioner is ascribing is an error of judgment, not of jurisdiction, which is properly the subject of an ordinary appeal.
In short, petitioner admits the jurisdiction of the lower court but he claims excess in the exercise thereof. "Excess" assuming there was is not covered by Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The Rule refers the lack of jurisdiction and not the exercise thereof.[28]
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT TREATING THE PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT AS A PETITION FOR REVIEW IN VIEW OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ISSUES INVOLVED AND IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE;II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT AS REGARDS THE ORDER DECLARING THE MARRIAGE AS NULL AND VOID ON THE GROUND OF PETITIONER'S PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY;III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT AS REGARDS THE ORDER TO FORFEIT THE SHARE OF PETITIONER IN HIS SHARE OF THE CONJUGAL ASSETS.[29]
Rules of procedures are intended to promote, not to defeat, substantial justice and, therefore, they should not be applied in a very rigid and technical sense. The exception is that while the Rules are liberally construed, the provisions with respect to the rules on the manner and periods for perfecting appeals are strictly applied. As an exception to the exception, these rules have sometimes been relaxed on equitable considerations. Also, in some cases the Supreme Court has given due course to an appeal perfected out of time where a stringent application of the rules would have denied it, but only when to do so would serve the demands of substantial justice and in the exercise of equity jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.[34] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)For reasons of justice and equity, this Court has allowed exceptions to the stringent rules governing appeals.[35] It has, in the past, refused to sacrifice justice for technicality.[36]
The CA dismissed Nerves' petition for certiorari for being the wrong remedy or the inappropriate mode of appeal.[39] The CA opined that "under the Supreme Court Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 x x x appeals from judgments or final orders or resolutions of CSC is by a petition for review."[40]
- This is a petition for certiorari filed pursuant to Article IX-A, Section 7 of the Constitution of the Philippines and under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
- But per Supreme Court Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 (Revised Circular No. 1-91) petitioner is filing the instant petition with this Honorable Court instead of the Supreme Court.[38] (Underscoring supplied)
More importantly, the appeal on its face appears to be impressed with merit. Hence, the Court of Appeals should have overlooked the insubstantial defects of the petition x x x in order to do justice to the parties concerned. There is, indeed, nothing sacrosanct about procedural rules, which should be liberally construed in order to promote their object and assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action or proceeding. As it has been said, where the rigid application of the rules would frustrate substantial justice, or bar the vindication of a legitimate grievance, the courts are justified in exempting a particular case from the operation of the rules.[41] (Underscoring supplied)Similarly, in the more recent case of Tan v. Dumarpa,[42] petitioner Joy G. Tan availed of a wrong remedy by filing a petition for review on certiorari instead of a motion for new trial or an ordinary appeal. In the interest of justice, this Court considered the petition, pro hac vice, as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
Indeed, where as here, there is a strong showing that grave miscarriage of justice would result from the strict application of the Rules, we will not hesitate to relax the same in the interest of substantial justice.[43] (Underscoring supplied)Measured by the foregoing yardstick, justice will be better served by giving due course to the present petition and treating petitioner's CA petition as one for certiorari under Rule 65, considering that what is at stake is the validity or non-validity of a marriage.
x x x The dismissal of appeals on purely technical grounds is frowned upon. While the right to appeal is a statutory, not a natural right, nonetheless it is an essential part of our judicial system and courts should proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of the right to appeal, but rather, ensure that every party-litigant has the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities.[45]Indeed, it is far better and more prudent for a court to excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties a review of the case on the merits to attain the ends of justice.[46]
It is settled that the negligence of counsel binds the client. This is based on the rule that any act performed by a counsel within the scope of his general or implied authority is regarded as an act of his client. However, where counsel is guilty of gross ignorance, negligence and dereliction of duty, which resulted in the client's being held liable for damages in a damage suit, the client is deprived of his day in court and the judgment may be set aside on such ground. In the instant case, higher interests of justice and equity demand that petitioners be allowed to present evidence on their defense. Petitioners may not be made to suffer for the lawyer's mistakes. This Court will always be disposed to grant relief to parties aggrieved by perfidy, fraud, reckless inattention and downright incompetence of lawyers, which has the consequence of depriving their clients, of their day in court.[49] (Emphasis supplied)Clearly, this Court has the power to except a particular case from the operation of the rule whenever the demands of justice require it. With more conviction should it wield such power in a case involving the sacrosanct institution of marriage. This Court is guided with the thrust of giving a party the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of one's action.[50]
But if under the circumstances of the case, the rule deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes a great hindrance and chief enemy, its rigors must be relaxed to admit exceptions thereto and to prevent a miscarriage of justice. In other words, the court has the power to except a particular case from the operation of the rule whenever the purposes of justice require it.[53]II. Concealment of homosexuality is the proper ground to annul a marriage, not homosexuality per se.
Indeed, mere allegations of conflicting personalities, irreconcilable differences, incessant quarrels and/or beatings, unpredictable mood swings, infidelities, vices, abandonment, and difficulty, neglect, or failure in the performance of some marital obligations do not suffice to establish psychological incapacity.[55]If so, the lower court should have dismissed outright the petition for not meeting the guidelines set in Molina. What Leonida attempted to demonstrate were Manuel's homosexual tendencies by citing overt acts generally predominant among homosexual individuals.[56] She wanted to prove that the perceived homosexuality rendered Manuel incapable of fulfilling the essential marital obligations.
As insinuated by the State (p. 75, TSN, 15 December 2003), when there is smoke surely there is fire. Although vehemently denied by defendant, there is preponderant evidence enough to establish with certainty that defendant is really a homosexual. This is the fact that can be deduced from the totality of the marriage life scenario of herein parties.Evidently, no sufficient proof was presented to substantiate the allegations that Manuel is a homosexual and that he concealed this to Leonida at the time of their marriage. The lower court considered the public perception of Manuel's sexual preference without the corroboration of witnesses. Also, it took cognizance of Manuel's peculiarities and interpreted it against his sexuality.
Before his marriage, defendant knew very well that people around him even including his own close friends doubted his true sexual preference (TSN, pp. 35-36, 13 December 2000; pp. 73-75, 15 December 2003). After receiving many forewarnings, plaintiff told defendant about the rumor she heard but defendant did not do anything to prove to the whole world once and for all the truth of all his denials. Defendant threatened to sue those people but nothing happened after that. There may have been more important matters to attend to than to waste time and effort filing cases against and be effected by these people and so, putting more premiums on defendant's denials, plaintiff just the same married him. Reasons upon reasons may be advanced to either exculpate or nail to the cross defendant for his act of initially concealing his homosexuality to plaintiff, but in the end, only one thing is certain - even during his marriage with plaintiff, the smoke of doubt about his real preference continued and even got thicker, reason why obviously defendant failed to establish a happy and solid family; and in so failing, plaintiff and their children became his innocent and unwilling victims.
Yes, there is nothing untoward of a man if, like herein defendant, he is meticulous over even small details in the house (sic) like wrongly folded bed sheets, etc. or if a man is more authoritative in knowing what clothes or jewelry shall fit his wife (pp. 77-81, TSN, 15 December 2003); but these admissions of defendant taken in the light of evidence presented apparently showing that he had extra fondness of his male friends (sic) to the extent that twice on separate occasions (pp. 4-7, TSN, 14 February 2001) he was allegedly seen by plaintiff kissing another man lips-to-lips plus the homosexual magazines and tapes likewise allegedly discovered underneath his bed (Exhibits "L" and "M"), the doubt as to his real sex identity becomes stronger. The accusation of plaintiff versus thereof of defendant may be the name of the game in this case; but the simple reason of professional rivalry advanced by the defendant is certainly not enough to justify and obscure the question why plaintiff should accuse him of such a very untoward infidelity at the expense and humiliation of their children and family as a whole.[57]
Justice Caguioa remarked that this ground should be eliminated in the provision on the grounds for legal separation. Dean Gupit, however, pointed out that in Article 46, they are talking only of "concealment," while in the article on legal separation, there is actuality. Judge Diy added that in legal separation, the ground existed after the marriage, while in Article 46, the ground existed at the time of the marriage. Justice Reyes suggested that, for clarity, they add the phrase "existing at the time of the marriage" at the end of subparagraph (4). The Committee approved the suggestion.[63]To reiterate, homosexuality per se is only a ground for legal separation. It is its concealment that serves as a valid ground to annul a marriage.[64] Concealment in this case is not simply a blanket denial, but one that is constitutive of fraud. It is this fundamental element that respondent failed to prove.
Unnatural practices of the kind charged here are an infamous indignity to the wife, and which would make the marriage relation so revolting to her that it would become impossible for her to discharge the duties of a wife, and would defeat the whole purpose of the relation. In the natural course of things, they would cause mental suffering to the extent of affecting her health.[67]However, although there may be similar sentiments here in the Philippines, the legal overtones are significantly different. Divorce is not recognized in the country. Homosexuality and its alleged incompatibility to a healthy heterosexual life are not sanctioned as grounds to sever the marriage bond in our jurisdiction. At most, it is only a ground to separate from bed and board.
Factual findings of the Court of Appeals, especially if they coincide with those of the trial court, as in the instant case, are generally binding on this Court. We affirm the findings of the Court of Appeals that petitioner freely and voluntarily married private respondent and that no threats or intimidation, duress or violence compelled him to do so, thus -Verily, the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion, not only by solely taking into account petitioner's homosexuality per se and not its concealment, but by declaring the marriage void from its existence.
Appellant anchored his prayer for the annulment of his marriage on the ground that he did not freely consent to be married to the appellee. He cited several incidents that created on his mind a reasonable and well-grounded fear of an imminent and grave danger to his life and safety. x x x
The Court is not convinced that appellant's apprehension of danger to his person is so overwhelming as to deprive him of the will to enter voluntarily to a contract of marriage. It is not disputed that at the time he was allegedly being harassed, appellant worked as a security guard in a bank. Given the rudiments of self-defense, or, at the very least, the proper way to keep himself out of harm's way. x x x
Appellant also invoked fraud to annul his marriage, as he was made to believe by appellee that the latter was pregnant with his child when they were married. Appellant's excuse that he could not have impregnated the appellee because he did not have an erection during their tryst is flimsy at best, and an outright lie at worst. The complaint is bereft of any reference to his inability to copulate with the appellee. x x xx x x x
x x x The failure to cohabit becomes relevant only if it arises as a result of the perpetration of any of the grounds for annulling the marriage, such as lack of parental consent, insanity, fraud, intimidation, or undue influence x x x. Since the appellant failed to justify his failure to cohabit with the appellee on any of these grounds, the validity of his marriage must be upheld.[69]
Art. 96. The administration and enjoyment of the community property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for a proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision.A similar provision, Article 124[72] prescribes joint administration and enjoyment in a regime of conjugal partnership. In a valid marriage, both spouses exercise administration and enjoyment of the property regime, jointly.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the common properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance without the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.
[62] Minutes of the 154th Meeting of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees held on September 6, 1986, 9:00 a.m. at the Conference Room, First Floor, Bacobo Hall, U.P. Law Complex, Diliman, Quezon City.
1) Non-disclosure of previous conviction by final judgment of the other party of a crime involving moral turpitude;2) Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than her husband;3) Concealment of sexually transmissible disease, regardless of its nature, existing at the time of the marriage; or4) Concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, or homosexuality or lesbianism existing at the time of the marriage.
Sec. 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. x x x[71] Tolentino v. Villanueva, G.R. No. L-23264, March 15, 1974, 56 SCRA 1.
Art. XV, Secs. 1-2 provides:
Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development.
Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.