465 Phil. 703
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
The complainant also alleged that she filed the complaint against the respondents because of the latter’s connivance in causing the withdrawal of the money in the bank. She pointed out that while the manifestation of compromise settlement does not bear the signature of Atty. Kollin, paragraph (b) of the prayer clearly shows that the amount of P30,000 was appropriated to a joint account belonging to the respondents by way of attorney’s fees.
- The said lawyers were aware that the money in the bank which was the subject of Civil Case No. 4580-R was the consideration for a supposed sale between me and Eliza Fanged which did not materialize because it could not be registered aside from the fact that it is void pursuant to the decision in Civil Case No. 4528-R. They knew that the money is not owned by Eliza Fanged. Yet, despite this knowledge, they misled the court by making it appear that all the parties agreed to the settlement by filing the manifestation of compromise settlement with motion (Annex “G”) knowing that I was abroad and could not have given my consent thereto.
- Worse, they made it appear that I was copy furnished of the pleading when in truth and in fact I never received the same as I was in the United States of America. My investigation of the matter reveals that the sister of Eliza Fanged, Veronica Buking, received the pleading for me.
- When confronted, Eliza Fanged admitted to me that the money was actually entrusted to respondent Atty. Matthew Kollin.[8]
…[T]he records reveal that the person who received the copy of the document purporting to cover the settlement intended for me is the very sister of his client, Eliza Fanged, in the person of Veronica Buking. Veronica Buking is not and was never a resident of Dagsian, Baguio City, the location of my permanent residence. Eliza Fanged could not have thought of this scheme. …
- But lawyer as he is, Atty. Kollin must have anticipated possible legal repercussion[s] that would ensue as a result of this scheme. In the Manifestation of Compromise Settlement with Motion, he asked his co-respondent, Atty. Pekas, to sign as counsel for Eliza Fanged. Atty. Pekas seem[ed] to be too willing to extend assistance to Eliza Fanged if only to get the money from the bank. However, in the actual release, and the partition of the money, the respondents reportedly actively participated to insure their share of P30,000.00 as attorney’s fees. Atty. Pekas did not stop there. As counsel for Eliza Fanged, he signed the Notice of Dismissal dated December 16, 1999 with a misleading statement that “the parties have extrajudicially settled this case amicably among themselves”, when in truth and in fact, I was never consulted. …[9]
To me, this is the gist of the problem. Complainant Mary Malecdan strongly believes that she was swindled because of the said decision. However, the only problem between Dato and Fanged is the determination of the actual balance and the payment thereof. Settle the balance with Mrs. Dato and everything would be settled likewise. As of this time, it is very safe to say that the issue is still “SUB JUDICE” and complainant could not even be sure of the outcome of said case, although there is a pending proposal for the eventual settlement of the case by the payment of the unpaid balance.Respondent Atty. Pekas, for his part, admitted that the amount of P30,000 was transferred by Atty. Bustamante to their account, but averred that it was done voluntarily. He denied the allegation that they misled the court by making it appear that the parties agreed to the compromise settlement with motion, since, as can be gleaned from the compromise agreement itself, the complainant was not a party thereto.[13] The respondent further alleged that:
Moreover, the title of the subject land is in the possession of the Complainant and could transfer said title in her name anytime. Perhaps, what the complainant is saying is that the title could be transferred in her name, however, a “notice of lis pendens” was annotated therein due to the filing of the case between O. Dato and the spouses Fanged.
For all intents and purposes, complainant could transfer the title in her name and take possession of the property although the “notice of lis pendens” will be transferred or be likewise annotated in her title. Complainant knows very well that the problem between O. Dato and Eliza Fanged is the actual balance to be paid as per the first deed of sale; …[12]
Respondent Atty. Pekas prayed that the case be dismissed for lack of merit, averring that as a new and young lawyer, there was no reason for him to risk his future for a measly sum, through dishonest conduct.[15]
- As best as the respondent can recall, on the late afternoon of December 12, 1999, Atty. Matthew Kollin called up respondent on the telephone. He was requesting for respondent to attend a hearing of his case the following day, December 13, 1999, for the issuance of a temporary restraining order. This was on the pretext that he has another out of town case on the same date and cannot attend the hearing. As it is a common practice among lawyers, respondent acceded to the request;
- As agreed by the respondent and Atty. Matthew Kollin, respondent shall enter a special appearance for that hearing only. Respondent shall not argue on the matter but shall only manifest submission of the matter for resolution;
…
- That after Eliza Fanged and Wilfreda Colorado related the foregoing story, respondent asked about the settlement being proposed by the Honorable Court. Eliza Fanged then expressed her willingness to accept the counter-offer of Atty. Artemio Bustamante to settle the case in the amount of Two Million;
- With the new development, respondent contacted the office of Atty. Matthew Kollin to refer the matter but was informed that the latter is still out of town. Respondent then advised that if Eliza Fanged is willing, he can assist her in the settlement, to which advice Eliza Fanged acceded;
- Respondent contacted Atty. Artemio Bustamante who likewise was willing to settle and the details of the settlement were agreed upon. Afterwhich the proper manifestation and motion was submitted to the Honorable Court for consideration and ultimately dismissal of the case;
- That during the whole time that respondent participated in the resolution of the case, he never committed any act involving deceit and machination. He acted in a way which he thinks is proper …[14]
When this case was called for hearing, Atty. Percival Pekas appeared. Atty. Matthew P. Kollin failed to appear despite the notice duly served on him.In his Rejoinder, respondent Atty. Pekas reiterated that he acted in good faith, and did not commit any act of deceit or machination. He also averred that Atty. Artemio Bustamante would have been a great help in determining the truth, but unfortunately, the complainant chose not to implead him.[17]
Complainant Mary D. Malecdan appeared without counsel. She manifested that she is submitting her case for resolution based on the pleadings on record.
The complainant was ordered to present certified true copies of Annex “A” attached to her complaint, the Agreement of Purchase and Sale and the Deed of Absolute Sale, Annex “B” of her complaint in favor of Mary Malecdan and the Decision Annex “D.” Complainant is given ten (10) days from today to present true copies of her documentary evidence.
Atty. Percival Pekas is given ten (10) days from today to file his rejoinder. Atty. Pekas likewise manifested that after he shall have filed his rejoinder he submits this case for resolution.[16]
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex “A;” and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering Atty. Matthew P. Kollin’s dishonesty to the court with resulting damage and prejudice to the complainant, Respondent Atty. Kollin’s (sic) is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) years. The complaint against Atty. Pekas is DISMISSED for there is no evidence on record to prove that he was aware of the defect in Eliza Fange[d]’s right to claim the sales proceeds with a WARNING that Atty. Pekas should be more circumspect with respect to taking over other lawyers’ cases and handling sensitive matters such as the compromise settlement in Civil Case No. 4580-R.According to IBP Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan’s Report dated May 30, 2002, the main issue to be resolved in the case was factual in nature: whether or not the respondents knowingly caused the withdrawal from the bank of the purchase price of the lot in question, despite their knowledge of a defect in their client’s right to claim the said amount. The Commission found that respondent Atty. Kollin knew that his client’s title was defective, having represented her in Civil Case No. 4528-R. He should have been mindful that his client had no right over the purchase price as paid by the complainant. Respondent Atty. Pekas was, however, exonerated of the charges against him, thus:
Insofar as respondent Atty. Pekas is concerned, it should be noted that there is no evidence on record to prove that respondent Atty. Pekas was aware of the defect in Eliza Fanged’s right to claim [t]he sales proceeds. It is likely that respondent Atty. Pekas unwittingly played into the hands of respondent Atty. Kolin when he signed said Manifestation of Compromise Settlement. …[18]In his October 12, 2002 Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing IBP Resolution, respondent Atty. Kollin alleged that contrary to the finding of the Commission, he was unaware of the defect in his client’s (Eliza Fanged’s) right to claim the sales proceeds. He filed the case for nullification of contract with prayer for the rescission of the sale between the complainant and his client on the ground that the latter would be disadvantaged if Atty. Bustamante succeeded in taking a huge chunk of the money deposited in his name. According to the respondent, if he was, indeed, interested in the money, he could have filed a case to compel Atty. Bustamante to release the money to his client, and not a complaint for rescission of contract. The respondent also reiterated that the reason why he requested respondent Atty. Pekas to attend the hearing of the case as collaborating counsel was that he attended a hearing in Bontoc, Mt. Province on December 14, 2002.[19]
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court:Respondent Atty. Kollin cannot now assert that the reason why the prayer in the complaint included the release of the money in favor of the complainant was that “his client realized that P600,000 would be too much to be given to Atty. Bustamante as attorney’s fees.” The respondent is bound by this assertion in his pleading,[24] which, as can reasonably be inferred, was made because he himself believed that his client was not entitled to the money in question. The respondent cannot, likewise, find refuge in the fact that his signature did not appear in the compromise agreement executed between the parties. As found by the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline:
- BEFORE HEARING:
- That it orders (sic) the issuance of a temporary restraining order directing the manager of the PCIBank Session Rd., Baguio City branch, through its branch manager, Oscar Aquino, to cease and desist from allowing withdrawal by Atty. Bustamante of the amount of P2,450,000.00 deposit in his account;
- DURING HEARING:
- That it orders the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction restraining the defendant PCIBank or its agents from disbursing or allowing withdrawal by Atty. Bustamante of the amount of P2,450,000.00 deposited in his account;
- AFTER HEARING:
- To order defendants Atty. Artemio Bustamante and the PCIBank, Session Rd., Baguio City branch, to release the amount of P2,450,000.00 in favor of Mary Malicdan (sic);
- To order defendant Atty. Artemio Bustamante to pay the amount of P30,000.00 as attorney’s fees;
- To order that the deed of sale executed between the Spouses Washington Fanged and Eliza Fanged in favor of Mary Malicdan (sic) be declared null and void;
- To order Atty. Artemio Bustamante to release the original owner’s copy of title no. T-71030 of the registry of deeds of Baguio City to the complainant;[23]
… [A]lthough it was respondent Atty. Pekas who signed the Manifestation of Compromise Settlement with Motion as counsel for Eliza Fanged, it is unbelievable that respondent Atty. Pekas would dare to sign said Manifestation without the approval or consent of respondent Atty. Kollin, the counsel of record of Eliza Fanged. As respondent Atty. Pekas himself stated his authority with respect to Civil Case No. 4580-R was limited as follows: “As agreed by the respondent and Atty. Matthew Kollin, respondent shall enter a special appearance for that hearing only. Respondent shall not argue on the matter but shall only manifest submission of the matter for resolution.” If as respondent Atty. Pekas claims he was only authorized by respondent Atty. Kollin to attend one hearing of Civil Case No. 4580-R, why did he exceed such authority by executing the Manifestation of Compromise Settlement on behalf of Eliza Fanged, respondent Atty. Kollin’s client?Contrary to the findings of the IBP, respondent Atty. Pekas cannot validly claim that he acted in good faith as his superior, respondent Atty. Kollin, merely authorized him to attend the December 2, 1999 hearing of Civil Case No. 4580-R. Atty. Pekas, in entering into a compromise agreement, overstepped the authority he was purportedly given. He was only authorized “to manifest submission of the matter for resolution.” Furthermore, respondent Atty. Pekas himself claimed that the complainant could not question the compromise agreement as she was not a party thereto. Atty. Pekas, thus, knew that there was no valid compromise agreement, as one of the parties in the case was absent at the time it was entered into. He knew that no valid notice was given to the complainant, since the signatory to the notice of the manifestation of compromise agreement was a certain Veronica Buking.[26]
The most plausible explanation in this matter is that respondent Atty. Kollin in fact authorized respondent Atty. Pekas to execute the Manifestation of Compromise Settlement on behalf of his (respondent Atty. Kollin) client Eliza Fanged in order to pave the way for the release of the sales proceeds. This maneuver was resorted to by the respondent Atty. Kollin in order to avoid any responsibility for securing the release of the sales proceeds to his client despite his knowledge that his client Eliza Fanged had no right thereto. By having respondent Atty. Pekas sign the Manifestation of Compromise Settlement, it was the intention of respondent Atty. Kollin to distance himself from such pleading and claim no responsibility or participation therein so that the same would not be tainted by his apparent knowledge of the defect in Eliza Fanged’s right to claim the sales proceeds. In this respect, respondent Atty. Kollin and his client Eliza [F]anged have succeeded as they have secured the release of the sales proceeds to the detriment and prejudice of herein complainant.[25]
The primary objective of administrative cases against lawyers is not only to punish and discipline the erring individual lawyers but also to safeguard the administration of justice by protecting the courts and the public from the misconduct of lawyers, and to remove from the legal profession persons whose utter disregard of their lawyer’s oath has proven them unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed in them as members of the bar. A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.[32]An attorney’s only safe guide is high moral principle, as the torch to light his way; his best shield is a clear conscience and an unblemished personal record; and his just reward is to find his highest honor in a deserved reputation for fidelity to private trust and to public duty, as an honest man and as a patriotic and loyal citizen.[33] The fiduciary duty of a lawyer and advocate is what places the law profession in a unique position of trust and confidence, and distinguishes it from any other calling. Once this trust and confidence is betrayed, the faith of the people not only on the individual lawyer but also in the legal profession as a whole is eroded. To this end, all members of the bar are strictly required to, at all times, maintain the highest degree of public confidence in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of their profession.[34]