386 Phil. 912
QUISUMBING, J.:
"That on or about the month of March 1989, in the municipality of Daet, province of Camarines Norte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, well knowing that he did not have funds in the bank, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously issue and make out a postdated SOLIDBANK Daet Branch Check No. PA0145244 dated September 30, 1989 in the amount of P50,000.00 and delivered the same to CARMENCITA S. RAFER in payment of a loan by the accused obtained from the latter, and when the said check was presented to the drawee bank for payment, the same was dishonored and rejected for the reason that said check was drawn against [a] closed account, and despite repeated demands made upon the accused to make good the value of the check or pay its equivalent amount, failed and refused to do so, to the damage and prejudice of said Carmencita S. Rafer in the aforestated amount.The informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 6940 to 6943, inclusive, were similarly worded as in Criminal Case No. 6929, except as to the dates, check numbers, and amounts involved. The cases were then consolidated and jointly tried.
"CONTRARY TO LAW."[3]
"[W]hat they agreed to was a money-lending partnership where Rafer provided the sums and Villanueva the operations. Their target clientele were the PC/INP personnel and civilian staff who were charged interests at 20% per month, of which Rafer was to get 15% and Villanueva 5%. When Rafer gave the amounts to be loaned, Villanueva issued the checks and the amounts thereon represent the sums given plus the interests to be earned in six (6) months but less his stipends. These were given as guarantees because Rafer had a change of mind and wanted that instead of the collections being deposited in the bank she wanted it paid to her outright. Villanueva had accordingly paid Rafer, but out of misplaced trust he failed to get back the checks."[4]On October 20, 1994, the trial court rendered a joint judgment, which found the petitioner guilty on all five counts. The fallo of said judgment reads:
"WHEREFORE, in the light of all the foregoing, finding the accused Paulino Villanueva, guilty beyond reasonable doubt (of violations) of the Bouncing Check Law (Batas Pambansa 22), is hereby sentenced in these consolidated cases, to suffer imprisonment as follows:Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. In affirming the trial court’s judgment in toto, the appellate court held:1. In Criminal Case No. 6929, he is hereby sentenced (to) imprisonment of One (1) year and to indemnify the complainant P50,000.00.The accused shall serve these sentences simultaneously in accordance with Art. 70, Revised Penal Code and with costs.
2. In Criminal Case No. 6940, he is sentenced to One (1) year imprisonment and to indemnify the complainant P20,000.00.
3. In Criminal Case No. 6941, he is hereby sentenced (to) One (1) year and to indemnify the complainant P75,000.00.
4. In Criminal Case No. 6942, he is hereby sentenced to One (1) year imprisonment and to indemnify the complainant P52,000.00.
5. In Criminal Case No. 6943, he is hereby sentenced (to) One (1) year imprisonment and to indemnify the complainant P100,000.00.
"SO ORDERED."[5]
"It is undeniably true that Villanueva made and issued the checks in consideration for sums of money he received from Rafer and these same checks were subsequently dishonored by the bank upon their presentment, and he failed to make good on them after notice and demand. As such, the full weight of the law must certainly be applied to him. B.P. Blg. 22 was enacted to prohibit under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes, but the act of making and issuing a check upon presentment for payment. (Italics in the original, citation omitted).Petitioner then belatedly moved for reconsideration, but the appellate court denied the same on August 15, 1998. The Court of Appeals resolution denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration noted:
"WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the Decision dated October 20, 1994 is AFFIRMED in toto.
"SO ORDERED."[6]
"It appears that the flurry of entries of appearances and motions and the withdrawals thereof, are but futile attempts to confound and confuse. Likewise, the accused-appellant wrongly alleges that the Motion for Reconsideration and/or New Trial attached to his Manifestation and Motion dated June 1, 1999 was personally filed and received on June 1, 1998. It was in fact personally filed on June 11, 1998 (p. 130, rollo).Hence, the instant petition relying on the following grounds:
"Regardless of their worth, the eminent point is that the subject Motion for Reconsideration was filed out of time, and the same is DENIED while the Resolution of June 29, 1998 is MAINTAINED.
"SO ORDERED."[7]
1. The petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration filed before the Honorable Court of Appeals should, in the interest of justice, be given due course and not ordered expunged from the Rollo.The principal issues before us are:
2. The requisites for the grant of a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence having been substantially shown, the Court of Appeals should have remanded the case to the court of origin for new trial.
3. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not holding that the subject checks were not drawn to apply on account or for value.
4. The Honorable Court of Appeals seriously erred in not acquitting the accused-petitioner of the offense charged, the same not having been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
We will now resolve these issues seriatim. Petitioner contends firstly that he received the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the joint judgment of the trial court on May 18, 1998. At that time, his counsel had already withdrawn from the case. After some difficulty in getting a new lawyer, petitioner then hired Atty. Silverio L. Ibay, Jr., as his new counsel de parte. The latter filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Motion for Reconsideration on June 2, 1998, which was the deadline for filing petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. The Motion for Reconsideration was belatedly filed on June 11, 1998. It was denied by the Court of Appeals for having been filed out of time. Petitioner contends that this procedural blunder by his lawyer, in effect, violated his constitutional right to counsel.[8] Petitioner now asks us to apply our ruling in De Guzman v. Sandiganbayan, 256 SCRA 171 (1996), where we held that an accused may not be penalized for the costly importunings of his lawyer.
(1) Did the Court of Appeals commit grave error when it expunged from the CA rollo petitioner’s motion for reconsideration for being filed out of time? (2) Did the Court of Appeals err when it did not remand the case for new trial considering that petitioner had newly discovered evidence in the form of private complainant’s Affidavit of Desistance? (3) Has the guilt of the accused been proven beyond reasonable doubt?
"[T]he argument of Villanueva that his checks were issued without consideration whatsoever is contrary to his statements in his Counter-Affidavit dated December 31, 1990 and his testimony. He said that the checks were issued when he received sums of money from Rafer."[15]With respect to the second element of the offense, the Court of Appeals said:
"Appellant’s claim of lack of knowledge of insufficiency of funds cannot withstand his categorical admission to the contrary in his testimony (tsn dated August 17, 1992, p. 16-17) and in his appeal brief (p.56, rollo)…"[16]Factual findings of the Court of Appeals are not, as a general rule, reviewable by the Supreme Court in petitions for certiorari under Rule 45, the exception being only when the findings of the appellate court are at variance with those of the trial court.[17] In the instant case, it is to be noted that the appellate court confirmed the factual findings of the trial court. The facts thus established are now conclusive upon this Court.